Caavo Inc

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 4, 2020

2019006281 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/945,201 11/18/2015 Pankaj Kumar Kashyap H16.00080001 9550
68242 7590 09/04/2020
FIALA & WEAVER P.L.L.C.
C/O CPA GLOBAL
900 SECOND AVENUE SOUTH
SUITE 600
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402
EXAMINER
GILMAN, ALEXANDER
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2831
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
DOCKETING@CPAGLOBAL.COM
docketing@fwiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte PANKAJ KUMAR KASHYAP,
SHARATH HARIHARPUR SATHEESH, VINOD GOPINATH,
and ASHISH AGGARWAL
____________

Appeal 2019-006281
Application 14/945,201
Technology Center 2800
____________

Before N. WHITNEY WILSON, DEBRA L. DENNETT,
and MERRELL C. CASHION JR., Administrative Patent Judges.

CASHION, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 13–19, which constitute all the claims pending in this
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Caavo Inc.
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2019-006281
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The invention generally relates to a method of controlling an
electronic device. Spec. ¶ 4. Claim 13 is illustrative of the subject matter
claimed and is reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the Appeal
Brief:

13. A method performed by a control device for
controlling a first electronic device, comprising:

receiving, by the control device, an indication of an
amount of current being provided from a power socket to the
first electronic device via a socket device that is coupled
between the power socket and the first electronic device, the
indication being received from the socket device, the control
device being a separate device from the socket device, wherein
the first electronic device comprises at least one of a digital
versatile disc (DVD) player, a display device, a speaker, an
audio/video receiver, a compact disc (CD) player, a Blu-ray
player, a cable television set-top box, a satellite television set-
top box, a video game console, or a media streaming device;

determining, by the control device, that the first
electronic device is to be in a first power state based on a
triggering event detected by the control device;

determining, by the control device, whether the first
electronic device is in one of the first power state or a second
power state based on the indication received from the socket
device; and

in response to determining that the first electronic device
is in the second power state, transmitting, by the control device,
a control signal to the first electronic device that causes the first
electronic device to transition to the first power state.

Appellant requests review of the Examiner’s rejections of claims 13–
19 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by
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Application 14/945,201

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Borean (US 2015/0372485 A1, published December 24, 2015). Appeal Br.
14; Final Act. 4.2
Appellant presents arguments only for independent claim 13.
Accordingly, we select claim 13 as representative of the subject matter on
appeal and decide the appeal on the arguments Appellant makes in support
of the patentability of this claim.
OPINION
After review of the respective positions Appellant provides in the
Appeal and Reply Briefs and the Examiner provides in the Final Office
Action and the Answer, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections of claims
13–19 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) for essentially the reasons
the Examiner presents in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add
the following for emphasis.

Claim 13
Claim 13 recites a method for controlling an electronic device
comprising the use of a control device to transmit a control signal to the an
electronic device in response to change in the electronic device from a first
power state to a second power state, where the control signal causes the
electronic device to transition to the first power state.
We refer to the Examiner’s Final Office Action for a complete
statement of the rejections of claim 13. Final Act. 4–6.

2 The Examiner withdrew the rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 112(a) and
112(b). Ans. 3. Accordingly, these rejections are not before us for review
on appeal.
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Appellant argues that Borean does not teach the claim limitation “in
response to determining that the first electronic device is in the second
power state, transmitting, by the control device, a control signal to the first
electronic device that causes the first electronic device to transition to the
first power state,” as recited by claim 13. Appeal Br. 14. According to
Appellant, the claimed method includes a step of transmitting a control
signal directly from the control device to a first electronic device, where the
control signal causes the first electronic device to transition from a second
power state to a first power state. Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 3. Appellant
argues that Borean’s local control unit 130 sends a control signal to a relay
unit of smart plug 135 upon detecting a certain event and the smart plug 135
then controls the appliance supply of the electronic device. Appeal Br. 15;
Borean ¶ 52. That is, Appellant contends that Borean’s control unit 130
does not transmit a control signal directly to an electronic device.
The rejections turn on whether the claim requires the control device to
transmit a control signal directly to an electronic device. Therefore, as a
preliminary matter, our review of the Examiner’s analysis requires that the
claims must first be construed to define the scope and meaning of the subject
matter before us on appeal. See Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
“[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Translogic
Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211
F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). See also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that the scope of the
claims in patent applications is not determined solely on the basis of the
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claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim
construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to
the meaning of a disputed term’” (citation omitted)). In general,
the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage
as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art,
taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the [Appellant’s] [S]pecification.

In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Thus, the terms in the appealed claims must be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation including the ordinary meaning unless another
meaning is intended by Appellant as established in the written description of
their Specification. See, e.g., In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321–22 (Fed. Cir.
1989). Indeed, “[i]t is the applicants’ burden to precisely define the
invention, not the PTO’s. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 [statute omitted].”
Morris, 127 F.3d at 1055–56.
Appellant does not direct us to any portion of the Specification that
supports the assertion that the claim requires direct transmission of the
control signal between the control device and the electronic device. We
have reviewed the Specification and Application Figures and note that both
Figures 5 and 6 depict a control signal arrow 532D (for example) and an
unnumbered arrow, respectively, between the control device and an
electronic device that seems to be a direct transmission. However, the
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Specification describes these Figures as “block diagrams” (see Spec. ¶¶ 13–
14), which are typically meant to illustrate concepts and relationships
between components and not actual components of the device. In addition,
the Specification describes Figure 5’s arrows as depicting the control signal
transmitted by the control device to the electronic device to cause the
electronic device to transition to a desired power state. Id. ¶ 69. The
Specification provides a similar description for Figure 6’s control signal. Id.
¶¶ 81–87. Lacking in those descriptions is any discussion that the control
device sends the control signal directly to an electronic device. Moreover,
describing the control signal as causing an electronic device to transition to a
desired power state does not inform one skilled in the art that the control
signal must be directly transmitted by the control device to the electronic
device. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that “[t]he claim does not
require[] that the signal [sent by the control device be] received, directly or
indirectly, by the first electronic device.” Ans. 4. That is, we agree with the
Examiner that the claim language, under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, encompasses direct transmission as well as indirect
transmission of the control signal between the control device and the
electronic device.
With respect to the merits of the Examiner’s rejections under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2), in order to anticipate, a reference must
identify something falling within the claimed subject matter with sufficient
specificity to constitute a description thereof within the purview of § 102. In
re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312, 317 (CCPA 1978).
After considering Appellants arguments in the Appeal and Reply
Briefs, in light of the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims, we
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agree with the Examiner’s finding that Borean’s method for controlling an
electronic device anticipates the subject matter of claim 1 because the claim
does not require that a control device sends a control signal directly to an
electronic device. Ans. 3–4. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments do not
identify reversible error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s prior art rejections of
claims 13–19 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) for the reasons the
Examiner presents and we give above.

CONCLUSION
In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
13–19 102(a)(1) Borean 13–19
13–19 102(a)(2) Borean 13–19
Overall
Outcome
13–19

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED