Burns Security Services

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 31, 1990

300 N.L.R.B. 1143 (N.L.R.B. 1990)

1143
300 NLRB No. 160
BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings.
The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s
credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evi-
dence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully ex-
amined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
BPS Guard Service, Inc. d/b/a Burns International
Security Services and International Union,
United Plant Guard Workers of America
(UPGWA). Cases 33–CA–8548, 33–CA–8568,
33–CA–8648 (formerly 12–CA–13242)
December 31, 1990
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY
On January 30, 1990, Administrative Law Judge
David L. Evans issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
Union filed an answering brief, and the General Coun-
sel filed a brief in support of the judge’s decision. The
General Counsel also filed cross-exceptions and a sup-
porting brief to which the Charging Party filed a brief
in support and the Respondent filed a response brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions only to the extent consistent with this Deci-
sion and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by a bad-faith refusal
to meet for collective bargaining at a location reason-
ably close to a unit in Cordova, Illinois. He also dis-
missed parallel 8(a)(5) allegations concerning units in
Clinton, Illinois, and Crystal River, Florida. We adopt
the finding of a violation and reverse the dismissals for
the reasons set forth below.
A. Facts
The Respondent’s utilities division provides guard
services to operators of nuclear powerplants at various
locations throughout the country. At each of the three
facilities at issue in this consolidated case the employ-
ees are represented by the Union and a constituent
local. In August 1988 the Respondent and Local 206
began negotiations for a successor collective-bar-
gaining agreement covering the Cordova, Illinois unit.
In December 1988 the Respondent granted initial rec-
ognition to the Union for the units in Clinton, Illinois,
and Crystal River, Florida, and began discussions with
the spokesmen of Locals 235 and 604, respectively,
about the scheduling of negotiating sessions. At all
times and at all three locations the Respondent was
represented by the utilities division’s labor relations
manager, Guy Thomas.
The Respondent neither owns nor operates the pow-
erplants in question and none of them has on-site
meeting facilities available to the parties for collective
bargaining. The Cordova plant is approximately 15
miles from the nearest towns with appropriate meeting
facilities (the Quad Cities) and approximately 160
miles from Thomas’ office in Lisle, Illinois. The Clin-
ton plant is approximately 30 miles from the nearest
appropriate meeting place (Bloomington) and approxi-
mately 150 miles from Lisle. The Crystal River plant
is, at most, approximately 10 miles from an appro-
priate meeting place (Homosassa Springs) and approxi-
mately 90 miles from the Orlando airport.
As the judge found, Thomas informed Ronald War-
field, the Union’s chief negotiator at both Cordova and
Clinton, that the Respondent would meet for collective
bargaining only at a location which required each party
to travel an equal distance. Accordingly, for the Cor-
dova unit Thomas proposed locations (Lasalle, Rock-
ford, and Peoria) whose distances from the Cordova
plant range from 90 to 125 miles. For the Clinton unit
he proposed meeting in Pontiac which is 75 miles from
the plant. With respect to scheduling negotiations for
the Florida unit at Crystal River, Thomas informed
Gerry Hartlege, the Union’s chief negotiator, that the
Respondent’s standard of ‘‘equal travel distance,’’ al-
ready invoked in the Illinois setting, required in this
instance meeting halfway between the plant and the
Orlando airport. That location (Leesburg) is approxi-
mately 45 miles from the plant.
The judge found that the Respondent first asserted
its purported right to insist on equal travel burdens in
September 1988 with respect to the Cordova negotia-
tions. No further meeting date was scheduled or held
until the Respondent relented from this position. Fol-
lowing the Union’s filing of a refusal to bargain charge
on December 14, 1988, the Respondent agreed, on
February 23, 1989, to meet with the Union in the Quad
Cities. The parties met there on March 9, 1989.
The judge also found that the Respondent and the
Union began discussions on December 30, 1988, con-
cerning the Clinton negotiations. They agreed then to
meet on January 27, 1989. The Respondent imme-
diately took the position that any meeting site had to
conform to the equal travel requirement it was seeking
to impose at Cordova. It was not until after the Union
filed an 8(a)(5) charge that the Respondent agreed to
hold the scheduled January 27 meeting at Bloom-
ington, as proposed by the Union. A similar sequence
of events obtained with respect to the Crystal River ne-
gotiations. The judge found that the parties agreed on
January 5, 1989, to meet on February 8–9. But, only
after the Union had filed an unfair labor practice
charge did the Respondent agree to conduct the sched-
1144 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 117 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1941); revd. on other grounds 314 U.S. 512
(1942).
3 273 NLRB 671, 672 (1984), enfd. mem. 772 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1985).
4 We find it unnecessary to adopt the judge’s characterization of the lan-
guage in Thomas’ November 15, 1988 letter to Warfield.
5 Thomas’ letter of November 15, 1988, to Warfield stated in part:
With respect to the meeting location, it is and remains the Company’s
position that we are required by requisite labor laws to meet in a reason-
able and mutually acceptable location for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining agreements. . . . It is Burns’ position that equal travel distance
between the parties is an inherent criterion in establishing a reasonable
and mutually acceptable location.
uled February meeting at Homosassa Springs rather
than halfway between the plant and the airport to
which Thomas would travel from division head-
quarters.
B. Analysis
The judge found that the Respondent acted in bad
faith by insisting that the Union travel further from
each of the respective plants than the closest reason-
able location proposed by the Union as a site for col-
lective bargaining. In determining whether the Re-
spondent had met its 8(d) obligation to ‘‘meet at rea-
sonable times and confer in good faith,’’ the judge re-
lied on the Board’s historic policy of placing central
emphasis on the locale of the represented employees.
The judge acknowledged the principle, stated by the
court in NLRB v. Lorillard Co.,2 that an employer’s
bargaining obligations under the Act require that he
‘‘make his representatives available for conferences at
the plant where the controversy is in progress’’ and
confer ‘‘at reasonable times and places.’’ Also central
to the judge’s analysis was the Board’s most recent
discussion of this issue in Tower Books.3 In that case
the Board emphasized that it does not advocate a per
se approach in deciding where bargaining should take
place. Rather, it considers all the relevant cir-
cumstances. The Board found an 8(a)(5) refusal to
make a reasonable and sincere effort to meet for col-
lective bargaining where the company failed to provide
an ‘‘overriding reason compelling negotiations’’ at its
proposed bargaining site located far from the affected
union and employees. It was this failure combined
with the company’s ‘‘intransigent insistence’’ on that
distant location that led the Board to characterize its
actions as a ‘‘stratagem to delay or avoid bargaining’’
and thus a violation of Section 8(a)(5).
The judge acknowledged that the additional travel
distances which the Respondent sought to impose here
are much shorter than the 700-mile trip that the re-
spondent in Tower Books attempted to require of the
union as a condition for bargaining. However, the
judge also stressed that the Respondent, after con-
ceding that some travel by Thomas would be nec-
essary, failed to substantiate the Tower Books defense
of showing reasons which would ‘‘compel’’ negotia-
tions at the locations it insisted on. The Respondent
does not cite any authority for its ‘‘half-way rule’’
and, as noted by the judge and reluctantly conceded by
the Respondent in its exceptions, none exists. We
agree with the judge that the Respondent’s proposals
were punitive, because their sole purpose was to force
on the Union and its bargaining committee members,
at all three units, travel time and expenses equivalent
to that which Thomas would incur when meeting away
from his office in Lisle, Illinois. We further agree with
the judge’s finding that the bargaining tactic with re-
spect to selection of meeting sites was designed and
implemented not to achieve agreement through accom-
modating legitimate needs of one or both parties, as
sanctioned by Tower Books, but rather to delay or
avoid bargaining altogether.4
However, after his finding of bad-faith efforts to
delay or avoid bargaining at all three locations, the
judge continued his analysis by distinguishing between
the Respondent’s actions at Cordova on one hand and
at Clinton and Crystal River on the other. He focused
on the presence or absence of actual delay. He found
an 8(a)(5) violation at Cordova because he found that
about 3 months of the 5-month delay in resuming bar-
gaining for the Cordova unit is directly attributable to
Thomas’ insistence5 that negotiating sessions be held
at sites remote from the plant’s immediate vicinity.
The judge dismissed the allegations with respect to
Clinton and Crystal River because, despite the Re-
spondent’s continued use of the equal distance tactic,
bargaining for each of these two units did begin on the
day originally agreed on by the parties. Thus, no actual
delays took place.
We agree with the judge that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) in delaying the Cordova negotia-
tions by means of its ‘‘bad faith contentions that the
Union should incur unwarranted expense by traveling
to remote locations.’’ We find, however, contrary to
the judge, that the Respondent’s lack of success in ac-
tually delaying substantive negotiations for the Clinton
and Crystal River units beyond the originally agreed-
upon starting dates should not preclude the Board from
finding 8(a)(5) violations with respect to these bar-
gaining obligations as well.
The key to finding an unfair labor practice in the
Respondent’s actions with respect to the units at Clin-
ton and Crystal River is its overall effort, undertaken
in bad faith, to thwart the collective-bargaining process
by intransigently refusing to meet with the Union in a
reasonable place. First, as the judge emphasized in the
remedy section of his decision, Thomas’ written com-
munications with the Union and later with the Re-
gional Directors after charges were filed made it clear
that it was the Respondent’s national policy to insist
on the equal travel condition in selecting negotiating
1145BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
6 The judge found that Thomas never qualified these statements by confining
his assertions to the three units involved in this case or even to the Respond-
ent’s division which he represented in labor relations.
sites.6 Second, the delay caused by the Respondent’s
having invoked that policy at Cordova was both ongo-
ing and well known to the union representatives for the
Clinton and Crystal River units when the Respondent
later sought to impose the equal travel condition in
those negotiations. Third, the Respondent did not yield
and finally agree to meet reasonably near the Clinton
and Crystal River units until after it had been served
with unfair labor practice charges filed by the Union.
In these circumstances we conclude that the Respond-
ent’s brinksmanship with respect to the intended im-
pact on negotiations of its equal travel stratagem also
supports findings of 8(a)(5) violations at Clinton and
Crystal River.
AMENDED REMEDY
The Respondent excepts to the judge’s extending the
breadth of the cease-and-desist provision of his rec-
ommended Order beyond the three specific sites at
issue here, so that it covers all of the Respondent’s fa-
cilities nationwide. We find merit in the Respondent’s
exception. This extraordinary remedy is not warranted
because it has not been shown that the Respondent has
previously demonstrated a general disregard for em-
ployees’ fundamental statutory rights with respect to
the particular unfair labor practice found here. In the
absence, therefore, of a showing that the Respondent
at this point has a proclivity to violate the Act, we
shall modify the recommended Order (which includes
an affirmative order to bargain), so as to limit its cov-
erage to the sites at Cordova, Clinton, and Crystal
River.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Substitute the following for paragraphs 3 through 6
of the judge’s conclusions of law.
‘‘3. Each of the following units is appropriate for
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time guards em-
ployed by the Respondent at its client, Quad Cit-
ies Nuclear Generating Station, in Cordova, Illi-
nois; but excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees and sergeants and lieuten-
ants and other supervisors as defined in the Act,
and all other employees.
All full-time and regular part-time armed and/or
unarmed security officers within the meaning of
Section 9(b)(3) of the Act, employed by the Re-
spondent at Clinton Nuclear Power Station in
Clinton, Illinois; but excluding all other employ-
ees, professional employees, office clerical em-
ployees, training coordinator and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
All full-time and regular part-time nuclear secu-
rity officers, watchpersons and firewatch persons
employed by the Respondent, who are assigned to
work at the Crystal River unit 3 Power Plant; ex-
cluding all clerical employees, captains, lieuten-
ants, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
‘‘4. At all relevant times, the Union, along with a
constituent local union, has been the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees in each
of the three units as follows: Cordova (Local 206);
Clinton (Local 235); and Crystal River (Local 604).
‘‘5. The Respondent has failed to bargain in good
faith with the Union and has thereby violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to meet with the
Union for purposes of collective bargaining at a place
reasonably close to the location of each of the three
bargaining units found appropriate.’’
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, BPS Guard Service, Inc. d/b/a Burns
International Security Services, Lisle, Illinois, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, at its facilities in
Cordova and Clinton, Illinois, and Crystal River, Flor-
ida, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Inter-
national Union, United Plant Guard Workers of Amer-
ica (UPGWA) and its appropriate constituent local
union by refusing to meet for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining at a place reasonably close to the loca-
tion of the bargaining unit. The bargaining units are:
All full-time and regular part-time guards em-
ployed by the Respondent at its client, Quad Cit-
ies Nuclear Generating Station, in Cordova, Illi-
nois; but excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees and sergeants and lieuten-
ants and other supervisors as defined in the Act,
and all other employees.
All full-time and regular part-time armed and/or
unarmed security officers within the meaning of
Section 9(b)(3) of the Act, employed by the Re-
spondent at Clinton Nuclear Power Station in
Clinton, Illinois; but excluding all other employ-
ees, professional employees, office clerical em-
ployees, training coordinator and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
All full-time and regular part-time nuclear secu-
rity officers, watchpersons and firewatch persons
employed by the Respondent, who are assigned to
work at the Crystal River Unit 3 Power Plant; ex-
cluding all clerical employees, captains, lieuten-
ants, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
1146 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals,
the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
8 If the owners of any of the properties where the respective bargaining unit
employees work will not allow posting in conformity with this Order, the no-
tice shall be mailed to each affected employee.
1 The charge numbers and respective dates of filing are Case 33–CA–8548,
on December 14, 1988; Case 33–CA–8648 (which was formerly Case 12–CA–
13242), on January 11, 1989; Case 33–CA–8568, on January 12, 1989. A
fourth charge, Case 33–CA–8590, was filed by the Union on February 2,
1989, and that charge was originally part of this case; however, the charge
was withdrawn at trial, and the allegations based thereon were dismissed.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain in good faith with the Union
at a reasonable location near each of the three facilities
with respect to collective-bargaining agreements cov-
ering employees in the respective appropriate units set
forth above and, if understandings are reached, embody
such understandings in signed agreements.
(b) Post at its facilities in Cordova and Clinton, Illi-
nois, and Crystal River, Florida, copies of the attached
notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’7 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
33, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent im-
mediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
tive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.8
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of
America (UPGWA) and its appropriate constituent
local union by refusing to meet for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining at a place reasonably close to the lo-
cation of each of the following three bargaining units:
All full-time and regular part-time guards em-
ployed by us at our client, Quad Cities Nuclear
Generating Station, in Cordova, Illinois; but ex-
cluding all office clerical employees, professional
employees and sergeants and lieutenants and other
supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other
employees.
All full-time and regular part-time armed and/or
unarmed security officers within the meaning of
Section 9(b)(3) of the Act, employed by us at
Clinton Nuclear Power Station in Clinton, Illinois;
but excluding all other employees, professional
employees, office clerical employees, training co-
ordinator and supervisors as defined in the Act.
All full-time and regular part-time nuclear secu-
rity officers, watchpersons and firewatch persons
employed by us, who are assigned to work at the
Crystal River Unit 3 Power Plant; excluding all
clerical employees, captains, lieutenants, and all
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain in good faith with the
Union at a reasonable location near each of the three
facilities with respect to collective-bargaining agree-
ments covering employees in the respective appropriate
units set forth above and, if understandings are
reached, embody such understandings in signed agree-
ments.
BPS GUARD SERVICE, INC. D/B/A
BURNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
SERVICES
Judith T. Poltz, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Stewart J. Katz, Esq. (Keller, Thoma, Schwarze, Schwarze,
DuBay, & Katz, P.C.), of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for
the Respondent.
Scott A. Brooks, Esq. (Gregory, Moore, Jeakle & Heinen), of
Detroit, Michigan, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID L. EVANS, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried before me on November 1–2, 1989, in Peoria, Illi-
nois. The charges against BPS Guard Service, Inc. d/b/a
Burns International Security Services (the Respondent) were
filed by International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of
America (UPGWA) (the Union). A consolidated complaint
and notice of hearing (the complaint) issued on April 11,
1989, alleging that, by specified conduct,1 Respondent had
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Respondent duly
filed an answer admitting jurisdiction but denying commis-
sion of any unfair labor practices.
On the entire record, and my observation of the demeanor
of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the
parties, I make the following
1147BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
2 These refusals are alleged to have occurred in the second half of 1988 and
early 1989; accordingly, dates subsequently referred to are between September
1, 1988, and March 1, 1989.
3 In this narrative there are extensive quotations of correspondence and the
transcript. Where spelling and punctuation errors are obvious, I have corrected
them without editorial indication.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is, and has been at all times material, a cor-
poration that maintains an office at Lisle, Illinois, and other
places of business located, inter alia, at the Clinton, Illinois
nuclear powerplant of Illinois Power Company, and the Cor-
dova, Illinois nuclear powerplant of Commonwealth Edison
Company, and the Crystal River, Florida nuclear powerplant
of Florida Power Corporation. At each of these three loca-
tions, Respondent is engaged in the business of providing se-
curity guard services. During the 12 months preceding the
issuance of the complaint, Respondent derived more than
$50,000 from Commonwealth Edison Company and Illinois
Power Company for providing guard services within Illinois,
and during the same period of time Respondent derived more
than $50,000 from Florida Power Corporation for providing
guard services within Florida. Commonwealth Edison Com-
pany, Illinois Power Company, and Florida Power Corpora-
tion are employers who meet the Board’s direct inflow and
outflow jurisdictional standards. Respondent admits, and I
find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent provides guard services to all types of busi-
ness entities nationwide. Concerned is Respondent’s division,
which provides guard services to nuclear power facilities
throughout the nation. At 10 of these facilities the Union,
along with constituent locals, represents the guard employ-
ees.
The specific operations out of which this case arose are
three: two in Illinois and one in Florida. Respondent’s Cor-
dova, Illinois operation is at the Quad Cities Nuclear Gener-
ating Station. (The Quad Cities are Rock Island and Moline,
Illinois, and Davenport and Bettendorf, Iowa.) Respondent’s
Clinton, Illinois operation is at the Clinton Nuclear Power
Station. Respondent’s Crystal River, Florida operation is at
the Crystal River unit 3 powerplant.
Guards at each of these operations are represented by con-
stituent locals of the Union: Local 206 at Cordova; Local
235 at Clinton; and Local 604 at Crystal River.
Respondent does not have any physical facilities at any of
the three involved locations; Respondent’s operations are
performed entirely on the properties of the public utilities
that own the powerplants. In the immediate geographic areas
of the powerplants, neither the Union nor the Respondent has
any offices or other places of business where bargaining
could be conducted.
Guy Thomas is Respondent’s labor relations manager; his
office is in Lisle, Illinois, a western suburb of Chicago. The
complaint alleges that Respondent, by Thomas, refused to
meet with the Union at reasonable places for the purposes of
bargaining for each of the three involved bargaining units.2
1. The Cordova, Illinois unit
The Cordova facility is 15 miles from the Quad Cities; and
the employees are often referred to by the parties as the
‘‘Quad Cities’’ unit. The location of the bargaining unit is
about 160 miles from Thomas’ office at Lisle.
In 1982 and 1983 bargaining for the Cordova unit was
held in the Quad Cities area. In 1985, the parties met in
Morris, Illinois, which is about 36 miles from Lisle, and 125
miles (or about three-fourths of the way across the State)
from Cordova. The 1985 bargaining session produced a con-
tract in 4 days. At the end of the bargaining, Union Rep-
resentative John Baumler told Thomas that the Union’s bar-
gaining committee members were upset at having to come so
far to bargain and would not do so again; Thomas shrugged
and said nothing.
During the life of the 1985–1988 contract, the parties met
several times for grievances and arbitrations in the LaSalle-
Peru, Illinois area, which is about 60 miles from Lisle and
90 miles from Cordova; and once they met at Ottawa, Illi-
nois (which resulted in about 16 more miles of travel to the
Union and 16 less to Thomas).
At the expiration of the 1985–1988 contract in August, the
parties met first for renewal negotiations at LaSalle on Au-
gust 23–25. The bargaining was unsuccessful, and the parties
parted without an agreement being reached or further nego-
tiations scheduled.
Through no fault of Respondent, there were no negotiation
sessions between August 26 and September 26.
On September 26, Ronald Warfield, director of the
Union’s region 4 and chief spokesman for the Union in the
Cordova negotiations, wrote Thomas stating a desire to re-
sume negotiations at Cordova (and another facility not in-
volved) and adding:3
Furthermore, it is the Union’s request that said meet-
ings be held at each of the facilities or as near such fa-
cilities as possible, due to changed financial conditions
of the Locals that makes it unreasonable and they can
no longer afford lengthy travel assignments, overnight
lodging, etc.
Also on September 26, Thomas sent a letter to Warfield.
Thomas recites that, in a telephone call of September 21,
Thomas had proposed meeting on October 13–14, but that
Warfield had declined because of previous commitments.
Thomas further recited that he had offered to meet for the
Cordova negotiations on October 20, again in the LaSalle-
Peru area. Finally, Thomas states that he had received no
reply to this proposal, and he requested one.
On September 27, Thomas wrote to Warfield, first pro-
posing to meet on October 10–11, then concluding:
With respect to a meeting facility, it is and remains the
Company’s position that we will meet in a reasonable,
mutually agreeable location. With respect to the loca-
tion, Burns would propose that we continue the practice
of meeting in the LaSalle area. While I deeply regret
the ‘‘changed financial conditions of the [Locals]’’
which you reference in your letter, I would remind you
1148 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the location should be one that represents an equal
travel distance for both committees. Accordingly, in
order to insure that adequate arrangements are made,
the Company will take measures to secure a meeting
room at the LaSalle Holiday Inn on October 10–11,
1988. Please advise if the foregoing is acceptable.
On October 7, Thomas again wrote Warfield indicating
that he had been informed by a mediator that the Union
could not meet on October 10–11. Thomas then proposed
November 14–15 and added:
Further, the sites proposed by the Union [apparently]
through the mediator, Rock falls and Sterling, are unac-
ceptable to the Company. In an effort to agree upon a
reasonable site which is mutually acceptable to both
Parties, the Company would propose meeting in the Pe-
oria area.
Sterling/Rock Falls is 35 miles from Cordova. Peoria is 125
miles from Cordova and 225 miles from Lisle.
On October 26, Warfield wrote Thomas again. Warfield
did not respond to the November 14–15 proposed meeting
date, but did, again, ask that any future sessions be held
nearby such facilities as possible, and again stated that the
Union was making its request because of financial hardship.
On November 1, Thomas replied:
It is Burns’ understanding of the law that we [must]
meet in a mutually acceptable, reasonable location. The
law, as understood by the undersigned, does not make
any differentiation relative to the cash flow of a Union
for its financial status or problems [related] thereto, real
or perceived. Simply stated, any financial difficulties
which this Local may be having does not serve as a
practical or legal consideration as to a meeting location.
It is Burns’ position that the meeting place for the Quad
Cities site should represent a relatively equal travel dis-
tance for the Parties. Accordingly, I would propose to
recognize the Parties’ practice at these negotiations of
meeting in the LaSalle area.
Thomas then suggests that Warfield propose a meeting date
in any future communication, and then he concludes:
So there is no misunderstanding, Burns’ position was,
is, and will continue to remain that we will agree to
meet, in accordance with the law, in a reasonable, mu-
tually acceptable location.
On November 7, Warfield responded to Thomas:
[T]he meeting dates of November 14 & 15, 1988 for
Cordova, Il., were rejected by the Union whereas [sic]
the company was wanting to meet in Peoria, Il. which
[requires] further travel distance and needed time off
from work to accomplish the same.
Warfield concludes his letter by asking Thomas for citation
of any authority for Thomas’ position that ‘‘equal travel dis-
tance’’ is a consideration in determining a reasonable loca-
tion for bargaining.
On November 15, Thomas replied, first pointing out that
Warfield had proposed no alternate location for a meeting on
November 14–15, then:
With respect to the meeting location, it is and re-
mains the Company’s position that we are required by
requisite labor laws to meet in a reasonable and mutu-
ally acceptable location for the purpose of collective
bargaining agreements. This requirement is clearly set
forth in the appropriate labor law and, I am sure, given
your position of significant responsibility within the
International Union, you have at least a modicum of
understanding of the applicable labor laws. It is Burns’
position that equal travel distance between the parties is
an inherent criterion in establishing a reasonable and
mutually acceptable location.
With respect to your request that I provide you with
a reference to laws which I am relying upon, as I am
aware that you have a law firm on retainer, I believe
it would be presumptuous of me to provide you with
advice in this area.
Thomas concluded his letter with:
In order to attempt to resolve this matter of the Quad
Cities negotiations, the Company offers December 28–
29, 1988, as dates to resume the Quad Cities negotia-
tions. The Company would also propose the meeting be
held at the LaSalle Holiday Inn.
By letter dated November 23, Warfield responded that
‘‘equal travel distance’’ was not a relevant consideration in
determining the places of bargaining, and he again asked for
citations to any authorities that held to the contrary. Warfield
further asserted that negotiations should be ‘‘in an immediate
area’’ such as Quad Cities or Sterling/Rock Falls, Illinois (as
he had previously proposed through the mediator) or Clinton,
Illinois (which is about 16 miles away from the Cordova
worksite). Warfield also indicated that he was unavailable for
negotiations, apparently anywhere, on December 28–29.
On December 2, Thomas replied, refusing again to cite
any authority for Respondent’s position, and proposing Janu-
ary 10–11 as dates for the next sessions, but also proposing
that they be held in Rockford, Illinois. Rockford is 100 miles
from Cordova and 110 miles from Lisle.
On December 5, Warfield replied to Thomas that the
Union was available for bargaining on January 10 and 11,
but that the Union would not agree to meet in Rockford and
that the Union would take further action to resolve the issue.
On December 12, Thomas replied, first noting that the De-
cember 5 letter had not proposed an alternate location, then:
Burns advised you at the outset of this correspond-
ence that, in view of the inequities involved in travel
distances, the Quad Cities and the immediate sur-
rounding areas are inappropriate meeting locations.
. . . .
In an attempt to try and resolve this matter, I would
ask you to contact me as soon as possible in order that
we can attempt to agree upon a site that represents an
equal travel distance for the respective bargaining com-
mittees.
1149BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
On December 14, the Union filed the charge regarding the
Cordova matter.
On February 13, Warfield again asked for bargaining ‘‘at
the facility or as nearby the facility as possible,’’ but he did
not suggest a date.
On February 23, Thomas responded that, while Respond-
ent would be ‘‘within its rights to await a decision by the
National Labor Relations Board’’:
[t]he Company will agree to meet in the Quad Cities
area under protest. However, in doing so, it is expressly
agreed and understood, that this action by the Company
does not in any way constitute a waiver of its position
in the matter of NLRB 33–CA–8548, and, as such, the
Company reserves all rights and defenses thereto.
Thomas proposed meeting on March 9, which the parties did.
The record does not disclose if a contract was reached.
2. The Clinton, Illinois unit
Respondent succeeded Pinkertons as the provider of guard
services at the Clinton facility in December, and on Decem-
ber 21, by letter of that date from Thomas to Warfield, Re-
spondent recognized the Union as the representative of the
unit employees.
On December 30, there was a telephone conversation be-
tween Warfield and Thomas. Warfield was asked on direct
examination and testified:
Q. Please go on and tell us what was said.
A. I proposed Bloomington, Illinois. Mr. Thomas
said—proposed Pontiac, Illinois, and I informed Mr.
Thomas that Pontiac, Illinois, didn’t have proper facili-
ties to my knowledge to conduct proper negotiations.
And I asked why he wanted to go to Pontiac, and
he said, ‘‘To cover my butt because of our attitude in
Cordova.’’
Q. And when you say ‘‘our attitude,’’ who does the
‘‘our’’ infer?
A. The Union’s attitude in Cordova had established
a nearby facility [sic].
Q. Do you recall whether anything else was said dur-
ing this conversation?
A. He then proposed Lisle, Illinois, and I told Mr.
Thomas that was more ridiculous to the committee and
Union and to confirm what his position was in a letter.
Bloomington is 30 miles from the Clinton facility and 125
miles from Lisle. Lisle is about 150 miles from the Clinton
facility; Pontiac is 75 miles away from the Clinton facility,
and about 100 miles from Lisle.
Thomas testified that he proposed Pontiac because he had
heard that the Union had, at least once, met with Pinkertons
in Pontiac. Pontiac, at the time of the December 30 conversa-
tion, had no meeting facilities, although there is no evidence
that Thomas then knew that fact, independent of Warfield’s
statement that he (Warfield) knew of no meeting places
there.
Thomas denied that he told Warfield in the December 30
conversation that he was proposing Pontiac ‘‘[to cover my
butt] because of [the Union’s] attitude in Cordova.’’ How-
ever, Thomas did not deny that Warfield had asked Thomas
why he (Thomas) was proposing Pontiac, and he did not tes-
tify that he gave any response to the question, if it was not
the response as described by Warfield. Because of this, and
because Warfield impressed me more favorably, I credit
Warfield’s account of the conversation.
Thomas did send a confirming letter, dated January 3, stat-
ing:
Specifically, at the outset of [the December 30] discus-
sion, you proposed Bloomington, Illinois. As there ex-
ists no previously established practice between the par-
ties relative to a meeting location, it is the Company’s
desire that the travel distance of the parties reflect an
approximately equal and like distance. Accordingly, the
Company proposed Pontiac, Illinois. You advised that
Pontiac, Illinois, was not acceptable to the Union. How-
ever, the Company will hold January 27, 1989, open in
anticipation of resolving the issue of an acceptable
meeting location.
By letter of January 11, Warfield responded, pointing out
that Thomas had proposed Lisle, as well as Pontiac, and fur-
ther objected to Thomas’ premise of ‘‘equal and like dis-
tances for the parties to conduct negotiations.’’ Warfield
again proposed Bloomington as the site of negotiations.
Also, on January 11, Warfield and Thomas had another
telephone conversation in which Thomas agreed to meet in
Bloomington, but only if the Union would assume all admin-
istrative costs of typing and printing of any contract finally
agreed on. Warfield said that he would get back to Thomas
on that proposal.
On January 12, Warfield filed the charge over the Clinton
bargaining.
On January 17, Thomas again wrote Warfield restating his
conditional offer to meet in Bloomington and adding:
This offer was made, and, if accepted, will be done on
a non-precedent setting basis. Simply stated, it will be
agreed that the parties will not use or attempt to use the
settlement of a location in this negotiation as precedent
for other meeting locations between the parties.
On or about January 26, Thomas had a telephone con-
versation with the Regional Director. On that date, Thomas
sent a confirming letter to the Regional Director stating:
[U]pon review of the geographic area involved in
this case, a meeting location as initially proposed by the
Company would not be conducive to the most effective
manner of negotiations. Accordingly, the Company will
agree to the Union’s proposed meeting location of
Bloomington, Illinois. However, the Company is taking
this action in order that the parties might commence the
negotiation process for its bargaining unit members at
the Clinton site.
. . . .
This action by the Company is done with the under-
standing that same is done without prejudice to the
Company’s position in any other similar matter before
the National Labor Relations Board and the Company
does not, by this action, admit, agree, or indicate that
its position in the instant case was violative of the Act.
To the contrary, it is the Company’s position that it has,
1150 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
throughout the events that precipitated this charge,
acted in strict accordance and compliance with the Act.
Negotiations did commence on January 27, the date estab-
lished in the December 30 telephone conversation between
Thomas and Warfield according to the undisputed testimony
of Thomas.
3. The Crystal River, Florida unit
Respondent also acquired the contract to provide guard
services at the Crystal River, Florida powerplant in Decem-
ber 1988. By letter of December 30, which was addressed to
Gerry Hartlage, director of the Union’s region covering Flor-
ida, Thomas extended recognition and requested that
Hartlage contact him for the scheduling of negotiations.
On January 5, Hartlage and Thomas had a telephone con-
versation. They agreed to meet on February 8 and 9, but
there was no agreement as to place. Hartlage proposed the
Holiday Inn in Crystal River. Then, according to the undis-
puted testimony of Hartlage:
He mentioned Orlando, and I told him that it was too
far to go from Crystal River. That historically we had
always negotiated at Crystal River or Homosassa
Springs for Local 604 for the nuclear power plant there
at Crystal River.
. . . .
[He] said that he would agree to negotiate at Crystal
River or Homosassa Springs on an non-precedent set-
ting basis. And I rejected that offer. . . . I said to Mr.
Thomas that the reason I could not sign a non-prece-
dent setting letter was due to the fact that I knew that
there [were] problems being had in [Illinois].
Mr. Thomas said that he needed a non-precedent set-
ting letter. I said to Mr. Thomas, ‘‘well, I can’t do that.
I will be back in contact with you.’’ We agreed to keep
. . . the 8th and 9th [of February] open, until I could
get back with him.
Hartlage testified that Leesburg, Florida, was also mentioned:
That came up through discussion of Orlando and the
distance and Crystal River and Homosassa Springs and
the distance from that area to Orlando. And I believe
Mr. Thomas said that Leesburg looked to him to be
about halfway.
The Crystal River powerplant is in the immediate area of
the town of Crystal River, Florida. Homosassa Springs is
about 10 miles from the plant. Orlando is 90 miles from
Crystal River, and Leesburg is about half the distance be-
tween.
Finally, Hartlage testified that when he refused to send the
‘‘non-precedent setting’’ letter, Thomas replied that his (con-
ditional) offer to meet in Crystal River or Homosassa
Springs was off the table.
On cross-examination, Thomas was asked about his initial
contact with Hartlage; he testified:
I had asked Mr. Hartlage to work out some type of
meeting arrangement between the site and Orlando.
Originally, I had proposed meeting in Orlando. I had
subsequently, to try to get a resolution, asked him to
work out something between Orlando and the site.
Basically, it was about a seven and a half hour trip
from Chicago, Lisle, to Crystal River. And I was trying
to ask that that seven and a half hours be offset by the
Union meeting me part of the way from the Orlando
airport.
Scott Brooks is the Union’s attorney. Brooks testified that
he received a telephone call from Hartlage on January 5, and
immediately thereafter he called Thomas. According to
Brooks:
I told Mr. Thomas that I understood he had offered
to Mr. Hartlage that Burns Security would negotiate the
Crystal River contract in either Crystal River or
Homosassa Springs on a non-precedent setting basis.
And that the Union was prepared to accept that offer.
Mr. Thomas told me that Mr. Hartlage had rejected
the offer, and the offer was ‘‘off the table.’’ I then
asked Mr. Thomas where he was prepared to negotiate
a contract for the Crystal River facility. He told me Or-
lando, Winter [Garden,] or Leesburg . . . I then again
suggested that the negotiations take place in Homosassa
Springs or Crystal River which are immediately adja-
cent to the facility. Mr. Thomas told me that it was un-
reasonable for us to expect him to have to make the
round trip from Orlando to there.
I asked him if Leesburg was as close to the facility
as Burns was willing to go. Mr. Thomas responded
something to the effect of, ‘‘Yes, let’s see. Leesburg it
is. We can beat a charge there.’’
Mr. Thomas then suggested to me that if I was un-
happy with his decision that I file an unfair labor prac-
tice charge with the National Labor Relations Board.
Winter Garden is halfway between Leesburg and Orlando,
and approximately 60 miles from Crystal River.
Thomas denied Brooks’ testimony that he had stated that
he could ‘‘beat’’ a charge if he agreed to Leesburg or that
he suggested that Brooks could file a charge. However,
Thomas appeared truthful as he gave that testimony, and I
credit his testimony.
Thomas and Brooks had two telephone conversations on
January 6. In the first, according to the undisputed testimony
of Brooks:
Mr. Thomas suggested to me alternating sites for the
negotiations for the Crystal River facility between Or-
lando and the Crystal River/Homosassa Springs, Flor-
ida, area. And I rejected that offer.
In the second conversation, Brooks proposed Leesburg, but
on a nonprecedent-setting basis. Although the testimony is
not clear, Thomas apparently agreed to Brooks’ proposal at
that time. However, Thomas later found out that there was
no meeting space in Leesburg.
On January 11, the Union filed the charge over the matter.
On January 12, Thomas, in a telephone call to Brooks,
proposed that the parties meet in Homosassa Springs for bar-
gaining, but only if the Union assumed all administrative
costs of preparing any contract reached. Brooks said he
1151BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
4 Thomas testified that he proposed Peoria for the Cordova negotiations be-
cause there were free meeting rooms there, and this would, to some extent,
lessen the financial burden on the Union. Thomas did not testify that he told
Warfield, at any point, that this was the reason he was proposing Peoria, and
he did not venture that any savings on the room would make up for travel,
meals, and lodging expenses of the employee committee members.
5 No reason is suggested about why Thomas announced an intention to fly
to Orlando rather than Tampa, which is much closer to the Crystal River site.
6 In Tower Books, supra, the dissent argued that proposals to meet halfway
between the location of the negotiator and the locus of the bargaining unit
weighed in favor of a finding of good faith; this was, sub silento, rejected by
the majority.
would get back to Thomas on that proposal, but, at least ac-
cording to this record, he did not.
On January 19, Thomas wrote Hartlage that his office had
been unsuccessful in securing facilities in Leesburg and that
his assistant had reserved a meeting room at the Sheraton Inn
in New Port Richey. New Port Richey is about 45 miles
from the Tampa airport, to which Thomas would have flown,
and about an equal distance from Crystal River. There had
been no prior contact with the Union about New Port
Richey.
On January 26, Thomas wrote the Board’s Regional Direc-
tor:
[T]he Company will agree to the Union’s proposed
meeting location of Homosassa Springs, Florida. The
Company is taking this action in order that the parties
might commence the negotiation process for its bar-
gaining unit members at the Crystal River site.
Then follows the same paragraph of the January 26 letter
to the Regional Director, as quoted above, which states that
Respondent’s position was taken only because of a lack of
facilities where Respondent had been proposing to meet and
disavowing any implication that Respondent had violated the
Act.
The parties did meet on February 9–10, as scheduled.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
Section 8(d) requires the parties ‘‘to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith.’’ Inherent in this duty to
meet at reasonable times is a duty to meet at reasonable
places. In determining what is a reasonable place, the Board
has frequently stated that the paramount consideration is the
locus of the bargaining unit. As was observed early in the
history of the administration of the Act, in NLRB v. P.
Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1941):
The collective bargaining features of the statute cannot
be made effective unless employer and employees co-
operate in the give and take of personal conferences.
. . . [The employer] must make his representatives
available for conferences at the plant where the con-
troversy is in progress, and at reasonable times and
places so that personal negotiations are practical. [Em-
phasis added.]
This language, strictly construed, would require meetings at
the nearest place physically possible. However, in Tower
Books, 273 NLRB 671 (1984), the Board quoted the above
language, but added, at footnote 8:
Contrary to the assertion made by the dissent, we do
not, by any means, advocate a per se approach to decid-
ing where bargaining should take place. . . . We have
considered all the relevant circumstances bearing on the
issue in this case and have concluded that all the fac-
tors, taken as a whole, lead to the conclusion that the
Respondent was not bargaining in good faith, but was
merely using this issue as a stratagem to delay or avoid
bargaining.
The circumstances noted by the Board were that the em-
ployer had insisted on meeting 700 miles away from the bar-
gaining unit site; it suggested no reason why bargaining
could not have been conducted near the bargaining unit; and
its proposal to meet halfway between its corporate office (or
attorney’s office) constituted an acknowledgement that some
travel would be necessary for bargaining.
Although the distances proposed in this case are not so
great, there are present two of the factors mentioned in
Tower Books as circumstances indicating a lack of good
faith: Respondent failed to suggest any reason why bar-
gaining could not be held near to the sites of the bargaining
units (Quad Cities in the case of Cordova, Bloomington in
the case of Clinton, and Crystal River-Homosassa Springs in
the case of Crystal River), and all of Respondent’s proposals
acknowledged that some travel by it would be necessary.
Moreover, while Respondent was not proposing dramatic
distances for the Union to travel, it must be questioned why
the Respondent was requiring the Union to travel at all. Re-
spondent was not proposing that the Union, and the em-
ployee-members of the bargaining committees, travel to se-
cure more serviceable, or even more pleasant, accommoda-
tions.4 Respondent was making its proposals on the premise
that the Union (and, necessarily, the employee-members of
the negotiating committees) should incur transportation and
lodging costs simply because it was incurring those costs;
that is, the proposals were punitive, or the product of a desire
for retribution.
It is further noted that Thomas advanced Respondent’s
proposals in an disingenuous manner: Thomas, in writing,
premised his proposals on an alleged duty on the part of the
Union to meet him halfway between his office and the bar-
gaining unit locations (in the Illinois cases) or halfway be-
tween the location of the Florida unit and the airport of
Thomas’ choice.5 Of course, there is no such duty on the
part of the Union or the employee-members of the Union’s
bargaining committees. Indeed, the Board has never held that
the location of an employer’s (or a union’s) chosen nego-
tiator is a relevant consideration in deciding what is a reason-
able place for bargaining to occur.6 Nevertheless, when War-
field questioned Thomas on the proposition that the Union
was legally required to travel to places remote from the loca-
tion of the bargaining unit, Thomas did not back down; in
the most arrogant, disdainful, and belittling of terms, Thomas
referred Warfield to the Union’s attorney.
Using such a direct lie as a premise for a position, then
arrogantly refusing to back down when called on it, is hardly
a bargaining technique designed to achieve agreement
through accommodation. Indeed, it was not an attempt to
achieve agreement at all. Thomas knew that Warfield would
not meekly accept the outrageous lie that a union has a duty
to travel away from the bargaining unit locale just because
an employer’s chosen negotiator is required to engage in
1152 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7 Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 252 NLRB 544 (1980).
travel for negotiations. Thomas’ only possible purpose in ad-
vancing the proposition was a desire to delay bargaining
while Warfield did check with his lawyer and otherwise at-
tempted to get Respondent to meet at a reasonable location.
As stated in the above quotation of Tower Books, a bad-
faith refusal to meet at reasonable locations violates Section
8(a)(5), whether the action is designed to delay bargaining or
to avoid bargaining altogether.
In the case of the Cordova unit, Respondent argues that
it was privileged to insist on LaSalle/Peru because the parties
had previously conducted grievance and arbitration sessions
there. This argument is without merit. Just because the Union
had previously agreed (for whatever reasons) to meet at that
remote location, even several times, does not forever estop
the Union from insisting on its statutory right to require Re-
spondent to meet at a location closer to the bargaining unit.
In a converse situation (where the parties had bargained at
a remote location, but the employer later refused to meet
there for grievance and arbitrations) the Board has held that
meeting for bargaining and meeting for grievances cannot be
equated.7 This must be so as the two functions may raise de-
cidedly different considerations (none the least of which is
the convenience to, and expenses of, the arbitrator chosen).
Respondent further contends that, since proposing remote
locations for bargaining is not prohibited by the statute, it
was free to continue proposing remote locations as long as
an impasse was not reached over the matter.
In the case of Cordova, Respondent proposed remote loca-
tions for bargaining for 5 months, from Thomas’ letter to
Warfield on September 27 until Thomas’ letter to Warfield
on February 23. During this period no negotiations were con-
ducted. Arguably, the exchange of letters between Warfield
and Thomas indicates that Warfield would not have been
available for some dates during the initial portion of that 5-
month period. However, at least 3 months of the delay were
directly attributable to Thomas’ insistence that the parties
meet at a remote location; Warfield’s letter of November 7
bases his rejection of November 14 and 15 solely on the fact
that Thomas was demanding that negotiations be conducted
at remote locations. Warfield acknowledged (in his letter of
November 23) that he could not meet on December 28–29,
but the remainder of the November 14 to February 23 period
was blocked off from meeting by Respondent’s insistence
that the Union incur enhanced, and totally unwarranted, ex-
penses of traveling to a remote location before negotiations
could occur.
Therefore, assuming that Respondent had taken its position
in good faith, it is clear that, by the elapsed time alone, the
matter had been taken to impasse for the Cordova unit.
But Respondent’s proposals that the Union meet at a re-
mote location were not made in good faith. I have already
concluded that Respondent’s demands were punitive in na-
ture, were premised on some nonexistent legal precedent, and
were advanced only for the purpose of delay. Therefore, Re-
spondent’s consumption of any amount of time that would
otherwise have been used for negotiations was bad-faith bar-
gaining, or a refusal to bargain under Section 8(a)(5), as I
find and conclude.
In the cases of the Clinton and Crystal River units, how-
ever, no time at all was consumed while the parties, and the
Regional Directors in Peoria and Tampa, dispensed with
Thomas’ frivolous, and bad-faith, contentions that the Union
should incur unwarranted expenses by traveling to remote lo-
cations for the purpose of negotiations. Thomas’ original pro-
posal for a date to meet for the Clinton negotiations was Jan-
uary 27; the Union did not object or demand an earlier date
(at any place); and the parties did, in fact, meet on January
27. Thomas’ original proposal for a date to meet for the
Crystal negotiations was February 8; the Union did not ob-
ject or demand an earlier date (at any place); and the parties
did, in fact, meet on February 8. It would be sheer specula-
tion to argue that the Union would have asked for earlier
dates for bargaining for either unit had Respondent not, in
bad faith, demanded that the Union meet at remote locations.
In both cases, for reasons totally unrelated to Thomas’ de-
mands that bargaining occur at remote locations, the Union
may well have been unable to meet Respondent on any dates
that were earlier than those proposed by Thomas. (Indeed,
neither Warfield nor Hartlage testified that they told Thomas
that they wanted earlier negotiations, or that they were, in
fact, available for earlier negotiations.)
The absence of any delay of either the Clinton or Crystal
River negotiations precludes the finding of a violation in ei-
ther case. Section 8(d) speaks of meeting at ‘‘reasonable
times’’ but not ‘‘reasonable places.’’ This was no legislative
oversight; delay was the evil addressed by the framers of the
statute, and in all cases where a refusal to meet at reasonable
places has been found to be violative, at least some delay
was incurred. That is, the Board has never held that pro-
posing, or even insisting on, meeting at remote locations con-
stitutes a per se violation; proof of delay, or impact on unit
employees, has always been shown.
Therefore, as Thomas’ conduct caused no delay in either
the Clinton or Crystal River negotiations, there was no con-
ceivable impact on the employees, and there was no violation
of Section 8(a)(5), as I further find and conclude.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent BPS Guard Service, Inc. d/b/a Burns Inter-
national Security Services is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of
America (UPGWA) is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time guards employed by
the Respondent at its client, Quad Cities Nuclear Gen-
erating Station, in Cordova, Illinois; but excluding all
office clerical employees, professional employees, and
sergeants and lieutenants and other supervisors as de-
fined in the Act, and all other employees.
4. Since on or before January 1, 1975, the Union, along
with its constituent Local 206, has been the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of all of the employees in the
above-described appropriate unit within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(a) of the Act.
5. Since on or about November 14, 1988, Respondent has
failed to bargain in good faith with the Union, and has there-
1153BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
8 The Board condemned the tactic of refusing to meet at a reasonable place
for bargaining until Board processes were invoked (and thereby causing delays
in bargaining) in Westinghouse Pacific Coast Brake Co., 89 NLRB 145
(1950).
9 As it appears that Respondent does not own the property at which the Cor-
dova, Illinois bargaining unit employees work, the notice shall be mailed to
the employees if the owner of the property will not allow posting in conform-
ance with this Order.
fore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, by refusing
to meet with the Union for purposes of collective bargaining
at a place reasonably near to the location of the Cordova bar-
gaining unit found appropriate.
6. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act as al-
leged.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
General Counsel requests an order against Respondent that
would encompass all of its operations, nationwide. General
Counsel further requests an order that any notice to employ-
ees be posted at every facility where Respondent employs
members of the Charging Party.
In his letters to both Warfield and the Regional Directors,
Thomas stated unequivocally that it was the position of Re-
spondent that the Union was obligated to bargain at remote
locations. Thomas did not qualify his statements in any re-
spect; specifically he did not confine his assertions to the
three units involved, and he did not confine his statements
to the division of Respondent that handles guard contracts at
nuclear facilities.
That is, Thomas made unrepentant written statements that
it was companywide policy to insist that Respondent’s em-
ployees’ bargaining agents meet at locations remote to the lo-
cations of bargaining units. In so doing, Respondent has an-
nounced that it is going to do the same thing again anywhere
it thinks it can get away with it, and an order limited to the
situs of the specific violation proven herein, Cordova, would
be no more than an empty, impotent plea that Respondent
behave itself elsewhere. Therefore, it is necessary for the pre-
vention of future unfair labor practices to order Respondent
not to invoke its announced policy anywhere else. Otherwise,
Respondent will feel free to try this stratagem again, and di-
rect interventions by Board Regional Directors may not be
as successful in the future as they were in this case.8
Therefore, the recommended Order will not be confined to
the locus of the unfair labor practice found.
However, there is no necessity for postings of the notice
at Respondent’s facilities other than Cordova as no employ-
ees, other than those at Cordova, have been adversely af-
fected by Respondent’s conduct.9
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]