Bunabu Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 21, 2015

No. 86148376 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2015)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: October 21, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Bunabu Inc.
_____

Serial No. 86148376
_____

Matthew H. Swyers of The Trademark Company,
for Bunabu Inc.
Diane Collopy,1 Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 107,
J. Leslie Bishop, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Quinn, Zervas and Taylor,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Taylor, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Banubu Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark INTLMOVERS.COM (in standard characters) for
Moving company services; Transport services, namely,
local, interstate and international moving services in
International Class 39.2

1 Leslie LaMothe was the Examining Attorney responsible for the application until briefing.
2 Application Serial No. 86148376 was filed on December 19, 2013, based upon Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
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The Examining Attorney has refused registration on the ground that
INTLMOVERS.COM is merely descriptive of the identified services under Section
2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
The Trademark Examining Attorney also has refused registration of Applicant’s
mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground
that Applicant’s mark INTLMOVERS.COM (in standard characters) is likely to be
confused with the marks in the following registrations, both owned by the same
entity:
Principal Register Registration No. 33806193 for the mark shown below, and
which includes a disclaimer of the terminology “INTL MOVE INTERNATIONAL
MOVERS,”

Supplemental Register Registration No. 34163544 for the mark INTLMOVE,
both for “Moving and relocation services, namely, international transportation of
commodities, household goods and personal effects over water” in International
Class 39.
After the Trademark Examining Attorney made the refusals final, Applicant
appealed to this Board. Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney have filed
briefs.5 We affirm the refusals to register.

3 Registration No. 3380619 issued February 12, 2008; Section 8 affidavit accepted.
4 Registration No. 3416354 issued on the Supplemental Register on April 22, 2008; Section
8 affidavit accepted.
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I. Descriptiveness
We turn first to the mere descriptiveness refusal. Applicant, in urging reversal of
the refusal, maintains that its applied-for mark INTLMOVERS.COM is suggestive,
and therefore, there is no basis to maintain the refusal.
The Examining Attorney conversely maintains that Applicant’s mark
immediately describes characteristics and features of Applicant’s listed services.
The Examining Attorney supported the refusal with the following.
1. Various definitions of the terms “intl,” “international,” “move,” and “.com.” The
following are representative.
Intl
international6
International
Adj. ABBR. int. or intl.
1. Of, relating to, or involving two or more nations: an
international commission; international affairs. 2.
Extending across or transcending national boundaries.7
1. between or among nations; involving two or more
nations.8

5 In her brief, the Examining Attorney requested, and we take, judicial notice of the
definitions for the abbreviation “INTL” and the word “move.” The Board may take judicial
notice of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries that exist in printed format. In
re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014); Threshold.TV Inc. v.
Metronome Enters. Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1031, 1038 n.14 (TTAB 2010).
6 Collins Dictionaries [American English Dictionary], retrieved at
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/american/intl.
7 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (4th ed. 2000, updated
2009), retrieved at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/international.
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Move
v. moved, moving, moves
f. to go from one residence or location to another;
relocate: We moved to a new apartment.9
.com
abbr.
commercial organization (in internet address)10

2. Internet evidence showing the phrase “international movers” widely used by
third parties, e.g., Allied (http://www.allied.com); Alliance Relocation Systems
(http://www.alliancerelocationsystems.com); Atlas (http://www.atlasvanlines.com);
123 Movers (http://www.123movers.com); and Schumacher Cargo Logistics
(http://www.schumachercargo.com.), to describe their overseas moving and
relocation services.
The test for determining whether a mark is merely descriptive is whether it
immediately conveys information concerning a significant quality, characteristic,
function, ingredient, attribute or feature of the product or service in connection with
which it is used, or intended to be used. See, e.g., In re Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal citations
omitted). See also In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 71 USPQ2d 1370,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004), quoting, Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 252

8 Random House Kernerman Webster’s College Dictionary (2010), retrieved at
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/international.
9 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (5th ed. 2015), retrieved at
https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=move&submitx=0&submit.y=0.
10 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, (4th ed. 2000, updated
2009), retrieved at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/international.
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U.S. 538, 543 (1920) (“A mark is merely descriptive if it ‘consist[s] merely of words
descriptive of the qualities, ingredients or characteristics of the goods or services
related to the mark.”).11 It is not necessary, in order to find a mark merely
descriptive, that the mark describes each feature of the goods or services, it need
only describe a single, significant ingredient, quality, characteristic, function,
feature, purpose or use of the goods or services. Id.; In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216,
1217, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Where a mark consists of multiple components, the mere combination of
descriptive components does not necessarily create a nondescriptive word or phrase.
In re Phoseon Tech., Inc., 103 UPQ2d 1822, 1823 (TTAB 2012); In re Associated
Theatre Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (TTAB 1988). A mark comprising a
combination of merely descriptive components is registrable only if the combination
of terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, nondescriptive meaning, or if the

11 Applicant additionally points to, and has extensively argued with respect to, a three-part
test for determining whether a mark is suggestive rather than descriptive. The test
includes: (1) the degree of imagination necessary to understand the product; (2) a
competitor’s need to use the same term; and (3) the competitor’s current use of the same or
similar terms. Br. p. 12, 4 TTABVue 20. We note, however, that this “test” was set out in an
inter partes case in a discussion of whether the use of a term by third parties on their
packaging detracted from the plaintiff’s trademark rights. See No Nonsense Fashions, Inc.
v. Consolidated Food Corp., 226 USPQ 502 (TTAB 1985). Since this decision issued in 1985,
there have been numerous decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, our
primary reviewing court, and from the Board making clear that the test for descriptiveness
is whether a term “immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or
characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used.” Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S, 102 USPQ2d at 1219; In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.2d 960, 82 USPQ2d 1828,
1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007), citing In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir.
1987); In re Engineering Systems Corp., 2 USPQ2d 1075 (TTAB 1986); In re Bright-Crest,
Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979). We base our decision herein on the test for
descriptiveness set forth in the post 1985 decisions and have considered Applicant’s
arguments within those parameters.
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composite has a bizarre or incongruous meaning as applied to the goods or services.
See In re Colonial Stores Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 157 USPQ 382 (CCPA 1968); In re
Shutts, 217 USPQ 363 (TTAB 1983). However, if each component retains its merely
descriptive significance in relation to the goods or services, the combination results
in a composite that is itself merely descriptive. Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 71
USPQ2d at 1371.
Based upon the evidence of record, it is clear that the wording
“INTLMOVERS.COM,” as a whole, immediately describes the international scope of
Applicant’s moving services. The term INTERNATIONAL as well as its
abbreviation, INTL, describes the scope of Applicant’s services and the term
MOVERS describes Applicant’s business. Further, the combined term “international
movers” is used by third parties to describe their international moving services.
Notably, Applicant uses the combination “international moving services” in its
recitation of services. The fact that Applicant’s mark uses the abbreviation INTL as
opposed to the word “international” is of no moment, inasmuch as abbreviations
generally are considered to be merely descriptive when, as in this case, they are
understood to be substantially synonymous with the descriptive word(s) they
represent. See, e.g., In re Thomas Nelson, Inc., 97 USPQ2d 1712, 1715 (TTAB 2011)
(citing Modern Optics, Inc. v. Univis Lens Co., 234 F.2d 504, 506, 110 USPQ 293,
295 (CCPA 1956)) (holding NKJV substantially synonymous with merely
descriptive term “New King James Version” and thus merely descriptive of bibles);
In re BetaBatt Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (TTAB 2008) (holding DEC substantially
Serial No. 86148376
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synonymous with merely descriptive term “direct energy conversion” and thus
merely descriptive of a type of batteries and battery-related services).
Moreover, as regards the top-level domain (TLD) “.com,” it merely indicates an
Internet address for use by commercial, for-profit organizations, and its addition to
an otherwise unregistrable mark will typically not add any source-identifying
significance. See Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 71 USPQ2d at 1371-1372; In re
CyberFinancial.Net, Inc., 66 USPQ2d 1789, 1792 (TTAB 2001). As the Board noted
in In re Eddie Z’s Blinds and Drapery Inc. 74 USPQ2d 1037, 1042 (TTAB 2005):
Oppedahl cautions that while the “addition of a TLDsuch
as ‘.com’ or ‘.org’ to an otherwise unregistrable mark will
typically not add any source-identifying significance,” this
“is not a bright-line, per se rule” and that “exceptional
circumstances” might yield a different result. Id. at 71
USPQ2d 1374. … Clearly, the Oppedahl decision's
reference to exceptional circumstances, and its discussion
of a hypothetical mark employing a TLD that could be
considered not merely descriptive, reveal that the Federal
Circuit has anticipated situations whereby the coupling of
an otherwise unregistrable term and a TLD create a
whole greater than the sum of its parts.
We do not believe Applicant's combination of components creates such
circumstances, and the “.COM” portion of Applicant’s applied-for mark adds nothing
distinctive to the whole.
Quite simply, there is nothing in the combination of terms which is incongruous,
nor is there anything which would require the gathering of further information, in
order for the merely descriptive significance thereof to be readily apparent to
prospective purchasers of the services. See, for example, In re Abcor Development
Corp., Inc., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215 (CCPA) (Rich, J., concurring) (GASBADGE
Serial No. 86148376
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described as a shortening of the name “gas monitoring badge”); Cummins Engine
Co., Inc. v. Continental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892, 149 USPQ 559 (CCPA 1966)
[TURBODIESEL held generically descriptive of engines having exhaust driven
turbine super-chargers].
Applicant’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. In large part, Applicant
bases its suggestiveness argument on the assertion that Applicant provides
information to individuals seeking to hire a moving company, and not moving
services.12 However, this is not reflected in the recitation and, as Applicant noted,
the determination of whether or not a mark is merely descriptive must be made in
relation to the services for which registration is sought. See In re Abcor, 200 USPQ
at 218.
During prosecution, Applicant also argued that there are several definitions of
the term “mover,”13 such as “a powerful or influential person, as in politics or
business” or “a person who is ambitious; a go-getter,” that do not necessarily
describe the services associated with Applicant’s mark. That “mover” has other
meanings in other contexts is not controlling on the question of descriptiveness
presently before us. See In re Chopper Indus., 222 USPQ2d 258, 259 (TTAB 1984).
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that when used in connection with
Applicant’s identified services, the designation INTLMOVERS.COM immediately
describes, without any kind of mental reasoning, Applicant’s moving services and
its international scope.

12 Applicant’s br. p. 19, 4 TTABVUE 20.
13 Ex. 8 to Aug. 18 response to Office Action.
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II. Likelihood of Confusion
We next consider the likelihood of confusion refusal. Our determination of that
issue is based on an analysis of all the probative facts in evidence that are relevant
to the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also In re Majestic Distilling Company, Inc., 315 F.3d
1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976).
We first consider the relatedness of the services. As Applicant acknowledges, it
is well settled that the question of likelihood of confusion must be determined based
on an analysis of the services recited in Applicant’s application vis-à-vis the services
recited in the cited registrations, rather than on the basis of what the record reveals
the actual services to be. Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 811 F.2d
1490, 1 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992); The Chicago Corp. v. North American
Chicago Corp., 20 USPQ2d 1715 (TTAB 1991). Despite this acknowledgement,
Applicant contends that its services are distinct from those of Registrant because it
“provides the names and contact information of potentially interested consumers to
companies in the business of moving personal belongings, and information about
pricing and services about moving companies to those consumers.”14 Applicant then

14 Applicant’s br. p. 11, 4 TTABVUE 12. Applicant made this same argument during
prosecution of its application, to which Applicant was advised: “the question of likelihood of
confusion is determined based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the
application and registration, and not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.” [citations omitted]
Serial No. 86148376
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maintains that “evaluating extrinsic evidence of actual use is necessary in this case
for the purpose of clarifying the points of similarity and distinction between the
Registrant’s services and those of Applicant.”15 We find no such need as the nature
of the services provided by Applicant, as identified, is clear. Cf., In re Trackmobile
Inc., 15 USPQ2d 1152, 1153 (TTAB 1990) (The Board found that when the nature of
the goods is unclear, e.g., “mobile railcar movers” versus “light railray motor
tractors,” extrinsic evidence may be used to demonstrate what a specific term
means in an industry to understand whether or not one is encompassed by the
other). Because Applicant’s services require no clarification, we compare Applicant’s
“moving company services; transport services, namely, local, interstate, and
international moving services with Registrant’s “moving and relocation services,
namely, international transportation of commodities, household goods and personal
effects over water.”
We note, further, where the services in an application or cited registration are
broadly described, such that there are no restrictions as to trade channels and
purchasers, it is presumed that the recitation of services encompass not only all
services of the nature and type described therein, but that the identified services
are provided in all channels of trade which would be normal therefor, and that they

Final Office Action, unnumbered p. 3. Applicant obviously elected to go forward with this
appeal on the services as originally identified.
15 Applicant’s br. p. 10, 4 TTABVUE 11. Applicant made of record the affidavit “of its
“founder and co-owner,” explaining, among other things, the actual nature of Applicant’s
services as well as the trade channels and classes of consumers therefor. Notably, the
affidavit of Mr. Arthur Wijnschenk identifies him only as “a resident and citizen of the
Netherlands.” Moreover, besides being self-serving in nature, the affidavit primarily
recounts extrinsic facts which have no probative value to this proceeding.
Serial No. 86148376
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would be purchased by all potential customers thereof. See, e.g., In re Elbaum, 211
USPQ 639 (TTAB 1981).
As identified, Applicant’s broadly worded “moving company services” and “local,
interstate and international moving services” encompass Registrant’s more
narrowly identified “moving and relocation services, namely, international
transportation of commodities, household goods and personal effects over water.”
Thus, for purposes of our likelihood of confusion analysis, we find the respective
services legally identical. Moreover, given the identity of services, we must presume
that they would be offered in the same trade channels for such services and to the
same classes of purchasers, including ordinary consumers. In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ
at 640.
Applicant’s attempt to distinguish the channels of trade and classes of
purchasers by arguing certain limitations not present in its recitation of services is
unavailing.
The du Pont factors of similarity of the services, trade channels and classes of
purchasers thus heavily favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.
We turn then to a consideration of the marks. In determining the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks, we must consider the marks in their entireties in terms
of sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression. See Palm Bay Imports,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The test is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-
side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in their
Serial No. 86148376
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entireties that confusion as to the source of the services offered under the respective
marks is likely to result. The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser,
who normally retains a general, rather than a specific impression of trademarks.
See Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975). Finally, when
marks would appear in connection with legally identical services, as they do here,
the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion
declines. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23
USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
With these principles in mind, we compare Applicant’s mark
INTLMOVERS.COM (standard characters) to the cited marks INTLMOVE
(standard characters) and . We find all three marks to be highly similar
in that they all contain, as literal elements, the term INTLMOVE or the very
similar terms INTLMOVERS and INTERNATIONAL MOVERS. Indeed, Applicant
does not dispute that “[its] mark and the Registrant’s marks contain common literal
elements, namely, the abbreviation for the word ‘international’ and variation on the
word ‘move.’”16 The minimal differences between Applicant’s mark and the cited
standard character mark INTLMOVE are insufficient to distinguish them. We
particularly note that the additional letters in Registrant’s mark, “r” and “s,” fall at
the end of the mark and may not even be noticed. Cf., Palm Bay Imports v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1722, 73 USPQ2d at 1692 (the Court found
VEUVE, the first word of the compound mark VEUVE CLICQUOT, to make the

16 Applicant’s br. p. 9; 4 TTABVUE 10.
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stronger impact on consumers and the way they remember the mark). Further, the
letter “r” personifies the term “move,” while the letter “s” only creates a plural term.
See Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D&D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB
2014) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (CCPA 1957)
(Marks “consisting of the singular and plural forms of the same term are essentially
the same mark.”). The addition of “.COM” to Applicant’s mark also fails to
distinguish it from the cited marks because, as discussed previously, it is merely
indicia of a commercial internet address and has no source-indicating function.
As regards the cited composite mark , it includes as a literal element,
the connotative equivalent of INTLMOVERS, that is, INTERNATIONAL MOVERS.
Although marks must be considered in their entireties, it is settled that one feature
of a mark may be more significant than another, and it is not improper to give more
weight to this dominant feature in determining the commercial impression created
by the mark. In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (“There is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or
less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties. Indeed, this type
of analysis appears to be unavoidable.”). With a composite mark comprising a
design and words, it is the wording that would make a greater impression on
purchasers and is the portion that is more likely to be remembered as the source-
signifying portion of the applicant’s mark. In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59
USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 2001) (“words are normally accorded greater weight because
Serial No. 86148376
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they would be used by purchasers to request the goods”). See also, e.g., In re
Appetito Provisions Co., 3 USPQ2d 1553 (1987). As such, it is the literal elements
INTLMOVE (likely pronounced as “international movers”) and INTERNATIONAL
MOVERS in the cited composite mark that will be used to call for
Registrant’s services. The shaded rectangle has minimal visual impact and serves
as background, while the globe design element, while clearly noticeable, is merely
evocative of the international nature and scope of Registrant’s moving and
relocation services.
While we recognize that the common matter between Applicant’s mark and the
marks in the cited registrations is descriptive, as previously discussed with respect
to Applicant’s mark and, with respect to the cited marks, as evidenced by the
disclaimer in the ‘619 mark and presence on the Supplemental Register of the ‘354
mark, descriptive and disclaimed matter nevertheless must be considered with the
rest of the mark as a whole in assessing the similarity between the marks. As
stated by our primary reviewing court with regard to disclaimed matter,
it is well settled that the disclaimed material still forms a
part of the mark and cannot be ignored in determining
likelihood of confusion. Such disclaimers are not helpful
in preventing likelihood of confusion in the mind of the
consumer, because he is unaware of their existence.
Therefore, the disclaimed portions must be considered in
determining the likelihood of confusion. (citations
omitted)

Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218, USPQ2d 390, 395
(Fed.Cir. 1983); see also In re National Data Corp., 224 USPQ at 751-752; V-M
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Mayfair Sound Prd., Inc., 480 F.2d 898, 178 USPQ 477, 477-478 (CCPA 1973).
Notwithstanding the disclaimer in one of the cited marks, or presence on the
Supplemental Register of the other, the terms INTLMOVE, INTLMOVERS and
INTERNATIONAL MOVERS dominate the marks because they would be used to
refer to the respective moving services when discussed orally.
There is simply nothing of record to demonstrate that the cited marks are so
weak that the public would be able to distinguish the source of one international
moving service from the other. Cf., In re Broadway Chicken Inc., 38 USPQ2d 1559
(TTAB 1996) (“Broadway” is weak for restaurant services based on evidence that
hundreds of restaurants and eating establishments use Broadway as a trademark
or trade name) We acknowledge the term “INTERNATIONAL MOVERS” is
descriptive of Registrant’s moving services. Nonetheless, and particularly given the
absence of evidence showing third-party use or registration of that term in
connection with moving services, we must accept that even weak marks are entitled
to protection. See Matsushita Electric Company v. National Steel Co., 442 F.2d 1383,
170 USPQ 98, 99 (CCPA 1971)(“Even though a mark may be ‘weak’ in the sense of
being a common word in common use as a trademark, it is entitled to be protected
sufficiently to prevent confusion from source arising”).
At issue here are substantially similar marks for legally identical services.
Under these circumstances, the mere weakness of the term INTLMOVE or
INTERNATIONAL MOVERS does not obviate a likelihood of confusion because it is
the common portion of the marks. While we recognize the differences between
Serial No. 86148376
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Applicant’s mark and the cited registered marks, we find that, in their entireties,
they are substantially similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression due to the shared term INTLMOVERS (INTERNATIONAL MOVERS).
The du Pont factor of the similarity/dissimilarity of the marks thus favors a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
For the reasons discussed, we conclude that, despite any weakness in the cited
marks, prospective purchasers familiar with Registrant’s INTLMOVE and
marks for “moving and relocation services, namely, international
transportation of commodities, household goods and personal effects over water”
would be likely to believe, upon encountering Applicant’s mark
INTLMOVERS.COM for “moving company services; transport services, namely,
local, interstate and international moving services,” that Applicant’s and
Registrant’s legally identical services originate with or are somehow associated with
or sponsored by the same entity.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed as to both the Section 2(d) and
Section 2(e)(1) refusals.
Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
I concur with the Section 2(e)(1) affirmance and respectfully dissent with regard
to the Section 2(d) affirmance.
Serial No. 86148376
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As noted in the majority opinion, INTLMOVE is registered on the Supplemental
Register. A Supplemental Register registrant has no proprietary rights in a mark.
See Books On Tape, Inc. v. Booktape Corp., 836 F.2d 519, 520, 5 USPQ2d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:33 (4th ed.,
database updated Sept. 2015) (A “designation on the Supplemental Register is not a
‘trademark’ at all.”). INTLMOVE, meaning “international move,” for, inter alia,
international moving services is at best a highly descriptive term. As a non-mark,
and as a term which is at best highly descriptive, INTLMOVE must be accorded a
most narrow scope of protection. Applicant’s designation INTLMOVE has sufficient
differences from INTLMOVERS.COM to distinguish the terms. In view of these
differences, purchasers would not likely confuse the source of Applicant’s services
with those of registrant, even for identical services.
With regard to the cited mark, the majority opinion affirms the
Section 2(d) refusal based on the wording in the mark. The majority believes that
the wording makes a greater impression on purchasers than the design, and the
wording is more likely to be remembered as the source-signifying portion of the
applicant’s mark.17 The problem is that INTLMOVE is at best highly descriptive of
registrant’s international moving services and registrant uses INTERNATIONAL
MOVERS generically to refer to its business. Further, registrant has disclaimed
both terms. Any rights registrant has these terms for international moving services
are very limited in scope and do not extend to INTLMOVERS.COM. The differences

17 Opinion at p. 13.
Serial No. 86148376
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between this combination word and design mark and Applicant’s word mark are
sufficient to make purchaser confusion not likely.
I also disagree with the majority opinion insofar as it states, “[t]here is simply
nothing of record to demonstrate that the cited marks are so weak that the public
would be able to distinguish the source of one international moving service from the
other.”18 Dictionary definitions of “international,” “intl” and “mover” are in the
record. So are webpages showing generic use of “International Movers” by
registrant at Exhibit B (“Your International Movers”) and by a third-party at
Exhibit F (“Compare international movers”) to the affidavit of Arthur Wijnschenk
submitted with Applicant’s response to the First Office Action. See also, the
webpage from www.atlasvanlines.com, submitted with the Final Office Action,
identifying “Home > International Movers” and “Atlas International Movers”; and
webpage from www.platinum-moving.com listing “International Movers & Shippers
in Alexandria, VA.” This evidence demonstrates an inherent weakness in the terms.
In my view, the record is sufficiently robust to reverse the Section 2(d) refusal to
register.

18 Opinion at p.15.