Bryce B.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 2, 2018
0120162556 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 2, 2018)

0120162556

02-02-2018

Bryce B.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Bryce B.,1

Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Western Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120162556

Agency No. 1E-853-0007-16

DECISION

On August 3, 2016, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's June 30, 2016, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Manager, Maintenance at the Agency's Processing and Distribution Center facility in Phoenix, Arizona.

On January 22, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (male), and disability (not specified) when: (1) on or about November 30, 2015, he was placed on administrative leave for the day, and (2) was placed on an involuntary detail assignment from December 1-28, 2015, rather than being allowed to return to his regular position.

The investigation into his claim indicated that from October 8, 2015 to November 29, 2015, Complainant was on medical leave under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On November 30, 2015, when he reported back to work, he was placed on administrative leave and told to go home for the day. Complainant indicated that he had been out on leave under FMLA for a protected absence and believed that the Agency was breaking the law by not allowing him to work. He was allowed to return to work the next day, but asserted he was placed on an involuntary detail assignment from December 1 - 28, 2015. Complainant was required to perform some of his job functions but some duties that were outside of his normal assignment. His work hours remained the same during the detailed assignment, and the Agency asserted that he did not lose any pay.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with Complainant's request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision dismissed the claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a claim and also concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

The instant appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

As an initial matter, we note that Complainant indicated that the investigation was not adequately developed. In particular, he claims that the Investigator failed to contact those he listed as potential witnesses. Based on our review of the record, we find that the investigation was complete and impartial and disagree with Complainant's contentions. The Commission notes that Complainant did not request a hearing, where he could have called witnesses and cross-examined management witnesses, which would have addressed the deficiencies he perceived. Complainant provided the Commission with statements for consideration on appeal.

Claim of Disparate Treatment

A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep't. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep't. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

For the purposes of analysis, we assume Complainant is an individual with a disability. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g)(1). Upon review of the record, we find that the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Namely, the Senior Plant Manager averred that Complainant was not permitted to return to work without the proper clearance from the Medical Unit. On November 30, 2015, the Medical Unit cleared Complainant. However, it was later during the day and Complainant's position had been covered by other staff. As such, the Senior Plant Manager placed Complainant on administrative leave and asked him to report to work the next day. Upon his return to work, the Senior Plant Manager assigned Complainant the task of focusing on developing a plan to improve Line H. The Senior Plant Manager noted that this type of assignment was within Complainant's regular duties as a manager. As such, the Senior Plant Manager stated that Complainant was working in his regular position and not an "involuntary job detail" as characterized by Complainant. The Manager of Human Resources stated that the project entailed the review of custodial scheduling practices in field offices and based on the findings, Complainant was to develop an action plan and disseminate guidance on proper scheduling of custodians to meet Line H contractual requirements. The Manager of Human Resources noted that Complainant's position oversaw the district's custodial services function and that the task fell within the duties and responsibilities of his position.

Based on our review, we find that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Furthermore, we hold that Complainant has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's reasons constituted pretext for discrimination

Claim of Improper Request for Medical Documentation/Medical Inquiry

Complainant also argued that he was improperly sent to the Medical Unit to be cleared to return to the workplace. An employer may not make disability-related inquiries or require a medical examination of any employee unless the examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.14(c); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans With Disabilities Act (July 27, 2000) at "General Principles" � B & n.3 (noting application of ADA standard to Rehabilitation Act claims). Moreover, a complainant need not establish that he or she is an individual with a disability in order to raise such a claim under the Rehabilitation Act; the provisions regarding when an employer may require a medical examination apply to all employees, not solely to individuals with disabilities as defined under the Rehabilitation Act. Id.

Under this standard, disability-related inquiries or medical examinations are permitted only where the employer "has a reasonable belief that an employee's present ability to perform essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition or that s/he will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition." Id. at question 17.

Here, the record indicates that there existed a sufficient basis for Complainant to have report to the Medical Unit following his nearly 2-month absence from work due to a medical condition. The Senior Plant Manager did not have access to Complainant's medical records or his request for leave under FMLA. As such he was not aware of Complainant's medical condition or if he had any ongoing medical restrictions. The Medical Unit conducted its inquiry and Complainant was permitted to return to work. These circumstances were sufficient to support a reasonable belief, based on the objective evidence, that Complainant's ability to perform essential job functions may have continued to be impaired, and that he may have posed a direct threat to safety, thus justifying the request for medical documentation prior to permitting Complainant to return to work.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 2, 2018

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

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