Bruce AbramsonDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 31, 20202020003993 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/225,085 09/02/2011 Bruce D. Abramson 404613 1781 23460 7590 12/31/2020 LEYDIG VOIT & MAYER, LTD TWO PRUDENTIAL PLAZA, SUITE 4900 180 NORTH STETSON AVENUE CHICAGO, IL 60601-6731 EXAMINER POLLOCK, GREGORY A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3695 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/31/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Chgpatent@leydig.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte BRUCE D. ABRAMSON ________________ Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN A. EVANS, and JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection of claims 26–30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, and 42.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.3 INVENTION The invention relates to facilitating the completion of contracts for conditional or unconditional forward sales (“CCUFSs”) of retail goods via a CCUFS exchange, in combination with a distribution network for taking 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Bruce D. Abramson is the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1. 2 Claims 1–25, 31, 35, 37, 41, 43 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 17, 19, 21, 23. 3 Our panel rendered a decision previously on December 25, 2018. Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 2 delivery on completed contracts. Abstract. Claim 26 is illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below. The emphasized text denotes an abstract idea as discussed infra in § D. 26. A system for processing contractual transactions relating to gasoline and providing distribution of the gasoline pursuant to contractual terms, the system comprising: a networked computing system including one or more networked computing devices accessible via a network to a plurality of user computing devices, the networked computing system being configured to: receive, from a first seller, a first offer to sell a first quantity of gasoline at a price, the first offer to sell having a plurality of parameters including a gasoline type, a location for distribution, and a time for distribution, wherein the first offer to sell is received from the first seller via a first contract-writing interface which allows sellers to input quantity, type, price, location and time terms; group the first offer to sell with one or more other offers to sell having the same gasoline type, the same location for distribution, and the same time for distribution to form a pool, wherein the pool corresponds to a second quantity of gasoline greater than the first quantity of gasoline and the pool includes the gasoline type, the location for distribution, and the time for distribution; receive, from a first buyer, a first offer to buy a quantity of gasoline at a price, the first offer to buy having a plurality of parameters including the gasoline type, the location for distribution, and the time for distribution, wherein the first offer to buy is received from the first buyer via a second contract- writing interface which allows buyers to input quantity, type, price, location and time terms; determine that the gasoline type, the location for distribution, and the time for distribution of the first offer to buy matches the gasoline type, the location for distribution, and the time for distribution of the pool, and that the price of the offer to Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 3 buy is greater than or equal to the price of one or more offers to sell of the pool; generate, in response to the determination, a record of a futures contract for the first buyer permitting distribution of gasoline of the gasoline type at the location for distribution and the time for distribution; and store the record of the futures contract in a database accessible on the networked computing system; and a plurality of gas station computing devices located at a plurality of gas stations, each gas station including one or more gas station computing devices, wherein each of the gas station computing devices is configured to: receive a request for distribution of a quantity of gasoline of the gasoline type at the location for distribution and at the time for distribution pursuant to the record of the futures contract; determine whether to distribute the requested quantity of gasoline in whole or in part pursuant to the record of the futures contract by accessing the networked computing system; distribute some or all of the requested quantity of gasoline, as determined; and update the record of the futures contract for the first buyer to deduct the distributed quantity of gasoline by accessing the networked computing system. Appeal Br. 17–18 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added). REJECTION The Examiner rejects claims 26–30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, and 42 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–12. Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 4 ANALYSIS Claims 26–30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, and 42 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 A. Principles of Law Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75– 77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 5 such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 6 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“Update”); see also October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the Update). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).4 Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites the following: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and 4 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 7 (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.5 MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activity” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(d). C. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain methods of organizing human activity. Final Act. 9, 13. The Examiner concludes the present claims are not integrated into a practical application and there are no limitations recited in the present claims that add significantly more to the abstract idea. Ans. 4–6; Final Act. 10, 13. The Examiner determines the present claims do not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea itself because the abstract idea is implemented using additional elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Ans. 10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 2– 5 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 8 21, 31–32); Final Act. 15 (citing Spec. ¶ 37). Appellant argues the present claims recite specific limitations that do not preempt any abstract idea. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant argues the Examiner overemphasizes the consideration of whether a generic processor performs the recited operations. Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Examples 21, 36, 37). Appellant argues the present claims are novel and non-obvious and are, therefore, an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues the present claims recite interactions between multiple computing devices and distributions of gasoline pursuant to those interactions, thereby providing efficient parameter-based pooling and matching along with actual distribution with network-based verification, which results in an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 13–14 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant argues the Examiner does not provide the evidence required by Berkheimer to support a determination that the additional elements are well-understood, routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 15–16 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Reply Br. 4–6. We disagree with Appellant. D. Step 2A, Prong 1 Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question that we resolve pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance. The emphasized portions of claim 1, reproduced above (see supra at 2)6, recite commercial interactions 6 We determine that the “store” (claim 26), “storing” (claims 32 and 38), and “transmitting” (claims 32 and 38) limitations amount to insignificant extra- solution activities (e.g., gathering or sending data). Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 9 (including agreements in the form of contracts or legal obligations) because they pertain to processing contractual transactions relating to gasoline and providing distribution of the gasoline pursuant to contractual terms, which Appellant acknowledges. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d); Appeal Br. 2. Commercial interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts or legal obligations) fall into the category of certain methods of organizing human activity. MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). Certain methods of organizing human activity are a type of abstract idea. Id. We must still determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). We therefore (1) identify whether there are any additional recited elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements both individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. See id. Accordingly, we proceed to Prong 2. E. Step 2A, Prong 2 Here, the elements in the present claims used to implement the abstract idea are the “networked computing system,” “networked computing devices,” “network,”7 “user computing devices,”8 “first contract-writing 7 Claims 32 and 39 do not recite “network,” whereas claim 26 recites “network.” 8 Claims 32 and 39 do not recite “user computer devices,” whereas claim 26 recites “user computer devices.” Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 10 interface,” “second contract-writing interface,” “database,” “gas station computing devices,”9 and “gas stations.”10 See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons. The Update addresses how we consider evidence of improvement that is presented to us. MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). It states: [T]he evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole “integrates [the] judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Update 11 (emphases added). The Update further states: During examination, the examiner should analyze the “improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R. 9 Claims 32 and 39 recite “gas station computing device,” whereas claim 26 recites “gas station computing devices.” 10 Claims 32 and 39 recite “gas station,” whereas claim 26 recites “gas stations.” Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 11 § 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under § 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). We, therefore, focus on any evidence Appellant cites in its briefs, as discussed in the Update. Appellant does not refer us to any paragraphs of the Specification. See generally Appeal Br. (Appellant does not refer to any paragraphs). At best, the present claims recite an improvement to certain methods of organizing human activity (i.e., an abstract idea as discussed supra in § D). Id.; see, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the additional elements in the present claims, namely “networked computing system,” “networked computing devices,” “network,” “user computing devices,” “first contract-writing interface,” “second contract-writing interface,” “database,” “gas station computing devices,” and “gas stations” do not, either individually or in combination, integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. In particular, Appellant’s Specification discloses that these elements encompass generic Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 12 computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 16, 31–33, 38, 39, 43, 56. Merely adding generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d) (Citing 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application)). Appellant’s arguments that the present claims do not preempt any abstract idea (Appeal Br. 11) do not persuade us that the claims are patent eligible. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner overemphasizes the consideration of whether a generic processor performs the recited operations. Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Examples 21, 36, 37). The present claims pertain to processing contractual transactions relating to gasoline and providing distribution of the gasoline pursuant to contractual terms, which Appellant acknowledges (see Appeal Br. 2); whereas the claims in Example 36 (i.e., Example 36 pertains to tracking inventory) and Example 37 (i.e., Example 37 pertains to a relocation of icons on a graphical user interface) are unlike the present claims. Appellant’s citation to Example 21 is unavailing. Example 21 pertains to a fundamental economic practice, whereas the present claims recite certain methods of organizing Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 13 human activity as stated supra in § D. We, therefore, conclude that the additional elements, whether considered individually or as an ordered combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements are generic computer components that do not impose meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to Step 2A, Prong 2. Because we determine that the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B. F. Step 2B We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner does not provide the evidence required by Berkheimer to support a determination that the additional elements are well-understood, routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 15–16 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Reply Br. 4–6. The Examiner determines the present claims do not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea itself because the abstract idea is implemented using additional elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Ans. 10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 2–21, 31–32); Final Act. 15 (citing Spec. ¶ 37). Notably, Appellant does not rebut paragraph 37 cited in the Final Office Action. Additionally, the Specification indicates that the additional elements (i.e., “networked computing system,” “networked computing devices,” “network,” “user computing devices,” “first contract-writing interface,” “second contract-writing interface,” “database,” “gas station computing devices,” and “gas stations”) are nothing more than generic Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 14 computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 16, 31–33, 38, 39, 43, 56. Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional components because it describes them at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates that they are sufficiently well-known. Id. We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims are novel and non-obvious and are, therefore, an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant improperly conflates the requirements for patent-eligible subject matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty (§ 102) and non-obviousness (§ 103). “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89; see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that, “under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility”). We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements, either individually or in combination, do not amount to an inventive concept. Ans. 5, 8. An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic, 818 F.3d at 1376; see also 2019 Revised Guidance; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining that, after determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?”’ (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 15 furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim, as a whole, amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” (emphasis added)). Appellant’s citation to BASCOM is unavailing. Appeal Br. 13–14. As an initial matter, Appellant’s argument appears misplaced because all of the features recited, with the exception of the additional elements identified above, are directed to the abstract idea, as discussed supra. Moreover, in BASCOM, the claims were directed to “a filter implementation versatile enough that it could be adapted to many different users’ preferences while also installed remotely in a single location.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348–51. The inventive concept was “the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user” that “gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the [Internet Service Provider] server.” Id. at 1350. Thus, when considered as an ordered combination, the Federal Circuit concluded the claims provided “an inventive concept can be found in the non- conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” Id. Here, the present claims recite an abstract idea using additional elements that are generic computer components as discussed supra, or at best, Appeal 2020-003993 Application 13/225,085 16 improving an abstract idea—not an inventive concept. Accordingly, Appellant’s assertion fails to identify error in the Examiner’s analysis. For at least the above reasons, we conclude that each of the present claims, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of: (1) independent claims 26, 32, and 38; and (2) dependent claims 27–30, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40, and 42 under § 101. We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). CONCLUSION No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 26–30, 32– 34, 36, 38– 40, 42 101 Eligibility 26–30, 32– 34, 36, 38– 40, 42 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation