Brookside Industries, Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 10, 1961133 N.L.R.B. 842 (N.L.R.B. 1961) Copy Citation '842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All our employees are free to become or remain or to refrain from becoming or remaining members of Retail Automobile Salesmen, Local Union No. 501, .affiliated with Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. TY-HAD FELTON, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS HEMPHILL FORD, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be -altered, defaced , or cavered , by any other material. Brookside Industries , Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 11-CA-1660, 11-CA-1669, and 11-CA-1685. October 10, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On January 12, 1961, Trial Examiner Louis Libbin issued his In- -termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and -take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Re- port attached hereto. He further found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com- plaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. There- -after the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem- bers Rodgers and Leedom]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at -the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the' Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Brook- side Industries, Inc., Reidsville, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : 133 NLRB No. 90. BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 843 (a) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of Amal- gamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging its employees, ,or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or-any term or condition of employment. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their own and other em- ployees' union membership, activities, sympathies, and their attend- ance at union meetings as well as the number in attendance at such meetings, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, and co- ercion within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. (c) Asking employees to report and inform concerning the union membership and activities of other employees, and soliciting em- ployees to withdraw from the above-named or any other labor organi- zation with unsolicited advice as to how to effect such withdrawals. (d) Engaging in surveillance of union meetings. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will ,effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to Mary Strader, Lillian M. Adkins, and Cliffie Bolden immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant at Reidsville, North Carolina, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 1 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for at least 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where IIn the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." 844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD notices to employees are customarily posted. Respondent shall take reasonable steps to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of the receipt of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis- missed insofar as it alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act by the discharges of Virginia Cochran, Jewelyn Crumpton, Ethel King, Dollie Mae Shorter, and Yvonne Smith, and that Respondent independently violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by the conduct of S. K. Tanger, Moe Tanger, Sidney Magid, Julius Gwyn, and Joe Ann Shelton. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that : WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Amalgamated Cloth- ing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization , by discriminatorily discharging any of our employees , or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their own and other employees ' union membership , activities , sympathies, and their attendance at union meetings as well as the number in at- tendance at such meetings , in .a manner constituting interference, restraint , and coercion within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT ask employees to report and inform concerning the union membership and activities of other employees. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to withdraw from the Amal- gamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , nor give them unsolicited advice as to how to effect such withdrawals. WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of union meetings. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self -organiza- tion , to form labor organizations , to join or assist the Amal- gamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 845 for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any and all such activities. WE WILL offer to Mary Strader , Lillian M. Adkins, and Cliffie Bolden immediate and full reinstatement to their former or sub- stantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their senior- ity and other rights and privileges , and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimina- tion against them. All our employees are free to become, remain , or refrain ' from be- coming or remaining , members of the Amalgamated Clothing Work- ers of America , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. BROOK SIDE INDUSTRIES, INC., Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges flied by Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board , by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region (Winston-Salem, North Carolina), issued his consolidated complaint , dated September 9, 1960, and amended consolidated complaint , dated October 5, 1960 , against Brookside Indus- tries, Inc., herein called the Respondent . With respect to the unfair labor practices, the amended consolidated complaint , as amended at the hearing, alleges , in sub- stance, that : ( 1) Respondent discharged eight named employees on specified dates because of their union and concerted activities ; ( 2) certain named supervisors and agents of Respondent engaged in specified acts of interference , restraint, and coer- cion ; and (3 ) by the foregoing conduct Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1 ) and Sec- tion 2 ( 6) and ( 7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, as amended , 73 Stat . 519, herein called the Act. In its duly filed answers, as amended at the hearing , Respondent admits certain specific allegations and denies all unfair labor practice allegations. Pursuant to due notice , a hearing was held before the duly designated Trial Ex- aminer at Reidsville , North Carolina , on October 11-14 , 1960 . All parties were represented at and participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross -examine witnesses , to present oral argument, and to file briefs. Respondent 's motion to dismiss the complaint , made before the close of the hearing and upon which I reserved ruling , is hereby granted in part and denied in part, in accordance with the findings and conclusions hereinafter made. On November 29, 1960 , the Respondent filed a brief which I have fully considered. Upon the entire record in the case , and from my observations of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Respondent , Brookside Industries , Inc., a North Carolina corporation , operates a plant at Reidsville , North Carolina , where it is engaged in the production and dis- tribution of men 's shirts. Respondent produces shirts under contract for Creighton Shirt Corporation, New York,' New York. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the consolidated complaints, which is a representative period , Respondent manufactured , sold, and shipped from its Reidsville , North Carolina, plant to points outside the State of North Carolina finished products valued in excess of $1,000,000. 846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the above -admitted facts, I find , as Respondent admits in its answers, that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The parties stipulated , and I find , that Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)• of the Act. 111. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction; the issues Since the latter part of 1957, Respondent has been operating a plant in Reidsville, North Carolina, where it is engaged in the production of men 's shirts. Over 100 production girls are employed by Respondent in this operation . Self-organization among Respondent 's employees first began about June 1960 . The Union held its first organizational meeting, attended by Respondent 's employees , on Thursday eve- ning, June 9, in the Tobacco Workers Union Hall located in Reidsville . Thereafter, weekly meetings , attended by Respondent 's employees , were held every Thursday evening at the same place. The complaint alleges, and the General Counsel contends , ( 1) that beginning with June 15, 1960, Respondent , through its supervisors and agents , engaged in con- duct proscribed by Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, including surveillance of union meetings, coercive interrogation , and threats of economic reprisals in the event the Union became the employees ' bargaining representative , and (2 ) that Respondent was discriminatorily motivated in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in dis- charging eight named employees during the months of July, August, and September. Respondent denies that its agents and supervisors engaged in any conduct proscribed by the Act and that it was discriminatorily motivated in effecting the discharges, con- tending that the employees in question were discharged for cause. B. Interference , restraint , and coercion 1. S. K. Tanger S. K. Tanger is the vice president of the Creighton Shirt Corporation for which Respondent produces shirts under contract . Respondent admits that , at all times ma- terial herein , S. K. Tanger was and acted as an agent of Respondent within the meaning of the Act and that Respondent is liable for his conduct. a. The June 15 speech The parties stipulated that between 12 and 1 o'clock on June 15, 1960, S. K. Tanger gave a speech to the employees who were requested to assemble in the lunchroom . Seven witnesses i for the . General Counsel , and three for the Respond- ent,2 gave, some testimony concerning this speech . The recollection of all witnesses was somewhat meager on this matter. S. K. Tanger himself was not called to testify.. . , The preponderance of the credible testimony leads me to conclude, and I And, that , in substance , S. K. Tanger ( 1-) reviewed the benefits which the employees were receiving from , Respondent without a union , such as free insurance , choice of milk vending machines , and the "Goodwill Fund"; 3 ( 2) stated that he did not know whether . he would , be able to continue these benefits under a union contract; and (3) pointed out that if, a union came in, he did not believe they would have the same friendly relationship because the employees would not be able to, take up their problems directly with management as they had been doing. The General Counsel further contends , as several witnesses also testified, that the substance of S. K . Tanger's remarks on this occasion were similar to that contained in a letter sent to the employees on June 30, 1960, over the signature of S. Magid, Respondent 's executive vice president . In substance , this letter referred to the "secret meetings held, at which you are being promised all kinds of benefits 1 Mary Strader , Martha Bailey, Emma Bailey , Mary Sue Duggins , Josephine Ward, Jewelyn Crompton , and Hazel Hodges Sidney Magid , Isabell Whitner and Angelo Pelizzari s This fund was established from voluntary weekly contributions of 25 cents by em- ployees and the profits from the vending machines by Respondent , and was used for such purposes as sending flowers to sick employees and to make interest -free loans to employees It was administered by a committee composed of employees and supervisors. BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES , INC. 847' which the Union is going to make us give you"; emphasized that Respondent di& not want a union in the plant and would do its utmost to keep "Brookside free from all the trouble , arguments , quarrels, strikes , and other disturbances which would: come with Mr. Brigs [sic ]"; mentioned some of the current benefits such as vaca- tions and the "Goodwill Fund ," and stated that "no union contract calls for this. kind of thing ," referring to the "Goodwill Fund ," and that where the union is your bargaining agent , "we cannot discuss problems with you" as in the past because "you must handle it through the shop steward "; warned that "we do not intend to let any union ever make us do anything we think is bad for business ," that "if a. union ever gets in here and tries to force us to pay more than we think proper, the only thing the union can do is call you out on strike ," and that while the employees. cannot be discharged for striking , they could be permanently replaced; and promised; that as long as Respondent maintains a plant at Reidsville , it will "deal fairly and. honestly" with the employees , will listen to and try to work out their problems ands suggestions , and will do its best to keep wages , working conditions , and other benefits up to where the employees "will be glad to work at Brookside and be- proud" of their job . The last paragraph expressed the hope that the employees. will carefully study everything in the letter , discuss it with their friends , and let the union representative know that they are better off without paying dues to him, and, concluded with the reminder that "you will never have to join a union to keep your job at Brookside." b. Interrogation Sometime in June, 1960 , Dorothy Dotson , employed as , a utility girl , admittedly, on her own initiative volunteered to S. K. Tanger that she had heard that - some union, meetings were being held . Tanger thereupon asked if she had attended any. Dotson, truthfully replied that she had not. 2. Supervisors Adams and Hall Merle Adams was the supervisor -over the final inspection , with about 12 girls. under her supervision . Clarence Hall was the supervisor over the shipping depart- ment, with about 15 employees under his supervision . Respondent admits that, at all times material herein , both Adams and Hall were supervisors within the- meaning of the Act. a. The union meeting of June 23 Supervisors Adams and Hall admittedly attended the regular weekly union meeting, held at the Tobacco Workers Union Hall on Thursday night, June 23, ' and sat in the middle of the hall. About 20 of Respondent's employees were in attendance. Before opening the meeting , Union Representative Biggs asked if any supervisors. were present. Adams and Hall raised their hands. Biggs wanted to know if they had been sent by anyone, and they replied in the ' negative . Biggs then stated that they did not want any supervisors at the union meetings , that 'since they were- already there they could stay that evening , but that they , were not . to attend any more in the future . Hall and Adams stayed throughout the meeting and participated' in the refreshments served at its conclusion. ' ' - Hall and Adams admitted that they recognized some ' ,of'the -employees in attend- ance at this meeting. Adams also admitted that as she entered the hall some of the employees asked her what she was doing there and that she replied that she had as much right to attend as anyone , else and that she was there out of'curiosity. She- further testified that when she left work that evening she had received ' one of the handbills announcing the meeting , that a visiting niece of hers read it and ' suggestedt that they attend , and that she 'agreed to go because she wanted to see what a union meeting was all about. ' Hall testified ' that he attended the meeting at the - suggestion- of one of his , shipping clerks whose car had broken 'down and who was being given- a ride home by Hall., I At a supervisors' meeting held at the ' plant the next day , Adams and Hall were reprimanded by Respondent 's counsel, Douglas, for having attended the 'union. meeting; all supervisors in attendance were instructed by Douglas not to attend any union meetings .4 b. The union meeting of July 14 A regular weekly union meeting was held at the Tobacco Workers Union Hall on Thursday evening, July 44. As the first group of employees came out -of the- 4 The findings in this section are based on a' composite of the testimony of employees Strader , Bolden , Ward . Cochran, Crumpton , Hodges, and King, and Supervisors Hall ands Adams 848 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD hall after the meeting, they saw Merle Adams looking at some vegetables at a produce and curb market located across the street from the hall. There was sufficient electrical lighting both at the curb market and at the door of the union hall for Adams to recognize some of the employees. Adams left before all the employees came out of the hall. Adams testified that she was going for a ride that evening and stopped to buy some fresh vegetables at the curb market which she frequently patronized, that while she was looking at some vegetables she heard the union members coming out of the union hall located across the street, that they were hollering across the street and asking if she had their names and number, and that she left immediately.5 3. Attorney Julius Gwyn Julius Gwyn, an attorney practicing in Reidsville, was retained by Respondent in July. Respondent admits that, at all times material herein, Gwyn was and acted as an agent of Respondent within the meaning of the Act and that Respondent is liable for his conduct. a. Gwyn's speech and showing of film Shortly after being retained as Respondent's counsel, Gwyn was informed of the Union's efforts to organize the employees. He obtained a film from the Chamber of Commerce which he proposed to show to the employees. About the middle of July, the employees were assembled at the plant for that purpose shortly before quitting time. Gwyn made an introductory speech in which he told the employees that he had learned a lot from seeing this film and would like the employees to see and think about it. He also stated that employees who did not wish to see the film were free to leave. No one left. During the course of his introductory talk, Gwyn also told the employees that he had been informed that employees had been threatened with physical violence in connection with joining the Union, that the Company would not tolerate such conduct, and that if the Company learned of any such threats of physical violence against any employees, it would discharge the offending employee immediately. He also stated that he had been' informed of union organizers attempting to force their way into employees' homes, and informed them that they were free to entertain whomever they wished but were not required to permit people to force themselves into their homes. At the conclusion of his talk, the film was shown to the employees. The film was entitled "Everybody Knows." It depicted the shutdown of a certain plant, with a former employee who was a member of a union in that plant trying to figure out why the plant had closed. Different points of view were offered by characters por- traying a union representative, a grocery man, a company official, and a stockholder. The union representative stated that he had no explanation for it, that he had done the best job he could, and that his relations with the employees have been good. The discussion of the others was directed toward the cost of producing goods as com- pared to the prices at which the goods could be sold and the price squeeze on the employees. The scenes indicated that the plant,was closed because productivity and wages had gotten out of line.6 b. Interrogation Employee Minnie Louise Carter, a witness for the General Counsel, testified as follows on direct examination : Sometime in July she was called into the Company's office where Attorney Gwyn asked her if she had worked for a union at another plant and whether she knew anything about the Union in this plant. She replied in the negative to both questions. He then asked her if she had signed a union card. She replied that she had. Gwyn also asked if she knew any of the other girls who had signed union cards. She replied in the negative. When Gwyn further asked if she would cooperate and tell about the girls that got cards in, she replied that she would rather not. On cross-examination, Carter admitted that Gwyn had told her that someone had indicated that she had been threatened and had asked her if someone had 5 The findings in this section are based on the testimony of employee Strader and Supervisor Adams. It`is immaterial whether at that time. Adams was.facingand looking at the girls who came out of the union hall, as Strader testified, or whether she had her back to the girls and the union hall, as Adams testified 9 The findings in this section are based on the mutually consistent testimony of em ployees Bolden, Ward, and Crumpton, Vice President Magid, and Attorney Gwyn BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 849 threatened her to sign a union card. She further admitted that it was in response to this question that she replied in the negative and then voluteered the information that she had signed a union card without any threats. She testified that she did not remember Gwyn asking her if she knew anyone else who had been threatened in con- nection with signing union cards but admitted that "he may have, I wouldn't say that he didn't." After further questioning, she admitted that it "seems like I do remember him saying that" if she heard of anybody else being threatened, he would appreciate her letting him know. She was then asked if it was not true that sub- stantially all of Gwyn's conversation with her was about threats. In response to this question, Carter testified, "I don't know, I can't remember so good that day, because I was expecting this telephone call from my step-mother who was in the hospital and I was worried and upset that day so I couldn't just say what all was said." Attorney Gwyn testified that on July 21 he was called to the plant and informed by management that employee Mary Garringer had been threatened. Gwyn there- upon had an interview with Garringer. During this interview Garringer stated that Minnie Carter, a fellow employee who had previously worked with her at another plant, had been subjected to the same kind of pressures about the Union. He there- fore had Carter summoned to the office for the purpose of investigating the alleged threats. Gwyn testified that he asked Carter if anyone had threatened her with bodily harm if she did not sign a card, that she replied in the negative and then volunteered that she had signed a card, and that he then asked her if she knew of anyone else being threatened for failure to join the Union he would appreciate her letting him know. Gwyn specifically denied asking Carter about the union affiliations of any other employees. Upon consideration of all the foregoing, I credit Attorney Gwyn's version of his interview with employee Carter and find that he asked the questions and received the answers to which he testified. 4. Bessie Oliver Bessie Oliver was Respondent's head floorlady, directly over the supervisors in the stitching room. Respondent concedes that, at all times material herein, she was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and that Respondent was liable for her conduct. One day in July, employee Martha Bailey was called to the first aid room by her supervisor, Dot Breeze. When, she got there, Oliver asked Bailey if she was sick. When Bailey replied in the negative, Oliver asked, "How about being sick awhile?" Bailey remonstrated that she did not want to be sick. Oliver then asked Bailey if she knew anything about the Union. Bailey replied that she did not, although she had already signed a union card at that time. Oliver also asked Bailey if she knew any girls in the plant who had signed union cards. Bailey again replied that she did not know anything about it. Oliver asked if Bailey had ever been to a union meeting. Bailey said that she had not. Oliver then asked Bailey if she could find out if anyone else had signed a union card and to let her know about it. Bailey answered that she did not want to know anything about it and did not want to be "nosing about anybody else." Oliver stated that it might help Bailey in her job and also the other 'girls in the plant because she understood that Mr. Tanger would close the -plant down before he would let the Union come in. On the afternoon of August 10, Respondent's Attorney Douglas addressed all the girls in the plant. He told them that he had just learned that morning that Oliver 'had told one of the employees that the plant would close down if the Union came in, that Oliver was not speaking for the Company if she made that statement, and that they would not close the plant down if the Union came in but'that they would not let the Union run them out of Reidsville? 5. Lee Head Lee Head was employed by Respondent about July 25 as director of human rela- tions. Head testified that when he was employed he was informed by, Respondent that the Union was engaged in an organizational campaign, and that his general instructions from top management were to find out what was troubling the employees and to make recommendations as to what could be done to eliminate the trouble- 7 The findings in this section are based on the credited and undenied testimony of em- ployees Bailey and Hodges Oliver was not called to testify Althotiah Oliver had volun- tarily left Respondent 's employ on August 5, Respondent made no claim concerning her availability. - . . 624067-62-vol 133-55 850 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD some situations. He further testified to his belief that when employees reached the, point where they are willing to sign up with a union, there had been a failure of communications between them and management and a. dissatisfaction with existing conditions. His job, according to his testimony, was to correct that situation by eradicating the conditions which resulted from a failure of such communication. Respondent admitted that, at all times material herein, Head was, and acted as, Respondent's agent within the meaning of the Act and that Respondent was liable for his conduct. Head held meetings with groups of 20 to 25 girls in the lunchroom during working hours. At these meetings, he stated that some of the girls had asked him what they could do about getting their union cards back, and explained that the only way he knew it could be done was to write to the union representative and ask to have their cards back. He also stated that some employees had asked him how they could indicate their "loyalty" to the Company and that they did not want the Union. He told them that in his opinion they had a right to circulate a petition among the employees to that effect just like the union girls were circulating cards .8 On August 5, employee Thelma Morris was made a supervisor, admittedly within the meaning of the Act. Shortly thereafter, she told Head that before she had been made a supervisor she had signed a union card and had written to get it back. Head asked Morris if she knew any of the girls who had signed cards. When she replied in the negative, Head stated that she could tell the girls to see him if they wanted to get their cards back. She then told all the girls under her supervision, about 10 in number, to see Head if they were interested in getting their union cards back .9 Employee Jewelyn Crumpton joined the Union on June 9, attended all the union weekly meetings, and actively talked to employees about the Union and solicited their signatures to union cards. On August 19, the day after she had attended one of the regular union meetings, Head spoke to her while she was working at her machine. Head asked Crumpton "how many were at the meeting last night?" Crumpton said, "Why ask me?" Head replied, "I want to keep up with your prog- ress" and again asked how many had attended the meeting. Crumpton then stated, "All right, union buster." When Head denied that he was a "union buster," Crump- ton asked, "If the Union is not going to do us any good why is the Company paying you a large sum of money to come in here and disorganize us?" Head then stated that they could not talk there and that he would get Crumpton's supervisor to permit her to go into the cafeteria with him. In the cafeteria, Head bought Crumpton a cup of coffee and again asked her how many had attended-the union meeting the previous night. She stated, "You know you're not supposed to ask me that question, don't you." When Head replied in the affirmative, Crumpton told him not to ask her anymore because she was not going to tell him. Head told Crumpton about some of the disadvantages of a union. They also discussed Crumpton's job, with Head asking her if she liked her job. 10 6. Concluding findings a. As to S. K. Tanger and Sidney Magid I find nothing unlawful in S. K. Tanger's speech to the assembled employees on June 15. Tanger did not threaten the employees with a possible discontinuance of existing benefits if the Union were selected as their bargaining representative. His statement that he did not know whether such benefits would be continued under a union contract was tantamount to a statement that their continuance would depend on the outcome of collective bargaining and the resulting terms of the contract agreed upon. This does not constitute a threat of reprisal but is in effect a statement of the uncertainties of the terms which would eventuate as a result of the give and take involved in the collective-bargaining process." Nor do I find anything unlawful in the June 30 letter to the employees over the signature of Vice President Magid. Respondent was lawfully privileged to be op- posed to, and not to want, a union in the plant, and to inform its employees to that s The findings in this paragraph are based on the mutually consistent testimony of em- ployees Emma Bailey, Mary Sue Duggins , and Lee Head., 6 The findings in this paragraph are based on the credited and undenled testimony of Thelma Morris 1"The findings in this paragraph are based on the credited and undenled testimony of Jewelyn Crumpton. Head admitted that he had complete faith in Crumpton's "honesty and integrity " and would not deny her testimony although he did not remember the conversation. 12 See, e .g., Armstrong Tire & Rubber Company, Test Fleet Branch , 119 NLRB 382, 393. ;BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, 'INC. i 851 effect. The letter contained no threats of reprisals or promises of benefits; mentioned some facts which reflected the true status of the law with respect to the replacement of strikers; and, in sum, constituted Respondent's views, arguments, and opinions as to why the employees should not select the Union as their bargaining representative. As such, it was a permissible exercise of Respondent's right of free speech protected by Section 8(c) of the Act. With respect to S. K. Tanger asking an employee, Dotson, on one occasion in June if she had attended any union meetings, it was Dotson who initiated the con- versation and first volunteered the information that she had heard that union meet- ings were being held. Tanger's response under these circumstances impressed me as being in the nature of a passing comment. On this state of the record, I find that S. K. Tanger did not engage in unlawful interrogation on this occasion. b. As to Supervisors Adams and Hall It is now well settled that the mere attendance by management representatives at union meetings of employees has the effect of interfering with, restraining, and coerc- ing employees in the exercise of their self-organizational rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, the Board has held that an employer violates Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by such conduct of its supervisors, unless they were expressly invited to attend. And this is so even though the supervisors attended on their own initiative and the meetings may have been open to all employees.12 In the instant case, there was no express invitation to Adams and Hall, or to super- visors in general, to attend the union meeting of June 23, and Respondent admits in its brief that they should not have been present. They admittedly recognized some of the employees in attendance, and the employees were all aware of their presence. That the employees felt that Respondent's supervisors had not been invited and had no business to attend the meeting, is demonstrated by their questioning of Adams as to what she was doing there. The situation is not cured by the fact that Representative Biggs stated that while they were not welcome they could remain that evening as long as they were already there. The damage had already been done. Certainly, the situation would have been no worse if they had been requested to leave and had left. Nor was the coercive effect of their attendance dissipated by Respondent's subse- quent admonition to them not to attend any more meetings; Respondent made no such announcement to the employees nor took any steps to disabuse the employees of the coercive effect of their attendance at the meeting. Under all the circumstances, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by the attendance of Super- visors Adams and Hall at the union meeting of June 23, 1960.13 With respect to the union meeting of July 14, I find that Supervisor Adams' presence at the produce and curb market across the street from the union meeting hall was coincidental and not for the purpose of surveying the meeting hall or observing the employees who were leaving. Accordingly, I find that Respondent did not violate. the Act by Adams' conduct on this occasion.14 c. As to Attorney Gwyn The record does not warrant any findings that the film shown by Attorney Gwyn carried any veiled or implied threats of a shutdown of the plant or loss of jobs in the event the Union became the employees' bargaining representative. Nor is there any evidence that the employees received such an impression. On the contrary, Cliffie Bolden, the General Counsel's own witness, testified that "my estimation of the 12 See, e g., Brenner Tanning Co., Inc., 50 NLRB 894, enfd. 141 F 2d 62 (C.A. 1) ; David W Onan, et at, 50 NLRB 195; The Royal Bank of Canada (San Juan Branch), 67 NLRB 403 ; Joseph Solomon, an individual , d/b/a The Solomon Company, et at, 84 NLRB 226; W. T. Carter and Brother, at at (a partnership), 90 NLRB 2020, 2061. 13 The General Counsel also contends that Respondent was equally liable for the attend- ance of Joe Ann Shelton at a union meeting on July 14. It is the position of the General Counsel that she was acting as an agent of the Respondent within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(13) of the Act. The record shows that Shelton was employed in Respondent's office as a clerk-typist and also took shorthand and dictation from Respondent's executives and agents She also formulated and edited the Respondent 's weekly newspaper called Brookside Briefs For this purpose, she would circulate among the employees on the work floor to find out if'they had any news items. I find that the' preponderance of the record evidence does not warrant a finding that Shelton was an agent of Respondent within the meaning of the Act. 14 Cf Walter Walker, 51 NLRB 753, 7)iflerential Steel Car Company, 75 NLRB 714; Empire Pencil Company, Division of Hassenfeld Bios., Inc., 86 NLRB 1187. 852 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD movie was that the reason the plant had closed was because wages had gone up so high that it put the man out of business." The most that might be said about the film is that it indicated that, regardless of what a union might promise or do a plant cannot continue to operate when the cost of production becomes so high that the products cannot be sold for a satisfactory profit. Nor do I find that Gwyn's questioning of employee Carter, under the circumsiancra hereinabove set forth, constituted unlawful interrogation. His questioning was prompted by a report of threats of bodily harm to Carter and his questions were di- rected to her in that context. d. As to Head Floorlady Oliver Bessie Oliver had employee Martha Bailey summoned during working hours from her machine by her supervisor and, in the isolation of the first aid room, questioned her as to what she knew about the Union, as to whether she had attended any union meetings, and as to the union activities of other fellow employees. She also asked Bailey if she could find out if any other employees had signed union cards and to report the names to her. This was not a mere passing inquiry but a deliberate singling out of Bailey for the express purpose of ascertaining the extent of her own union activity as well as that of other employees and enlisting her aid in ascertaining the names of her fellow employees who were supporting the Union. Oliver was not the lowest supervisor in Respondent's hierarchy. Coming from a management repre- sentative of Oliver's standing, such interrogation of an employee and request for her surveillance of and report of the union activities of fellow employees constituted, under all the circumstances disclosed by the record, interference, restraint, and coercion pro- scribed by the Act. I find that by Oliver's conduct in this respect, Respondent vio- lated Section 8 (a),(1) of the Act. During the same interview, Oliver stated that it might help Bailey in her job as well as the other girls at the plant because she understood that Tanger would close the plant down before he would let the Union come in. While this obviously consti- tuted an unlawful threat of economic reprisal, Respondent's attorney repudiated this statement to the employees as soon as it came to Respondent 's attention,15 as pre- viously set forth. Under these circumstances, I will make no finding of a violation because of this threat. e. As to Lee Head and Supervisor Thelma Morris If Head had confined himself to informing the individual employees, who had in- quired of him how they could get their union cards back, to write to the union repre- sentative and ask for their return, his conduct in this respect would not have been unlawful 16 However, Head went further when he volunteered this information to employees who had made no such inquiries. Thus, at the group meetings of employees in the lunchroom,,Head broached the subject about the girls getting their union cards back and informed them that the only way he knew about was to write to the union representative and ask for their return. On another occasion, Head also asked Thelma Morris, who had recently been made a supervisor, if she knew any of the girls who had signed cards. When she replied in the negative, he told her that she could tell the girls to see him if they wanted to get their cards back. Pursuant to this suggestion, Morris told all the girls under her supervision to see Head if they were interested in getting their cards back, although none of the girls h^d indicated any such interest. I find that the conduct of Head and Morris, considered as a w',ole under all the circumstances, constituted solicitation of employees to withdraw from the Union, with unsolicited advice as to how to effect such withdrawals. By such conduct, Respondent violated Section 8 (a)( 1) of the Act.17 Despite her unwillingness to answer, Head persistently interrogated employee Crumpton, a known union adherent, to get her to disclose how many employees had attended the union meeting held the preceding evening because he wanted to know how much progress the Union was making in its organizational campaign. He persisted in his efforts even though he admittedly knew he was not supposed to interrogate her in this manner . I find that Head's interrogation, under the circumstances previously set forth, constituted interference, restraint, and coercion proscribed by the Act. By such conduct, Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 16 There was, however, no repudiation of Oliver's other conduct herein found violative of the Act. - I , 16 See, e g , W E Lipshutz, 56 NLRB 1749, 1750-1751 17 F. 0 Huyck & Sons, 125 NLRB 271. BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 853 C. Discrimination with respect to hire and tenure of employment 18 1. Mary Strader and Lillian May Adkins Mary Strader: She was first employed by Respondent in February 1959 and worked until September, when she was laid off because she was under age to work on a Gov- ernment contract. She returned to work in December 1959, upon Respondent's solici- tation and agreement to allow her to retain her seniority standing and to give her vacation pay. Thereafter, she worked continuously until her discharge on July 15, 1960. Early in June , she received a raise from $1 to $1.10 per hour, and Superin- tendent Angelo Pelizzari admittedly told her at that time not to mention it to the other girls.19 At the time of her discharge, her job was closing cuffs. Strader joined the Union at the first organizational meeting held on June 9, and thereafter attended all weekly meetings, including the meeting of June 23 when Supervisors Adams and Hall were present, and the meeting of July 14, when she saw Supervisor Adams at the conclusion of the meeting standing at the curb market across the street from the union hall. She also solicited employees at the plant to sign union authorization cards and was successful in obtaining about 12 to 15 signed cards. Employees kept a record of the bundle, size, and lot number on which they worked. On July 13, Merle Adams, supervisor over final inspection, brought a bundle of repairs for Strader to work on. Strader protested that, according to her records, it was not her bundle and refused to do the repairs. When Adams insisted that they were hers, Strader asked her immediate supervisor, Louise Moore, to check in the office to see if Strader had worked on that bundle. Moore checked and re- ported back that it was Strader's bundle; whereupon Strader acknowledged that she had made an error in her notations, took the bundle and worked on the repairs, stating that she felt like "a two cent stamp" for having made such an error.20 There- after, no one ever again mentioned this incident to Strader. About 10 minutes before quitting time on Friday, July 15, Strader was told to i eport to Pelizzari's office, where he told her he was sorry but that he was going to have to let her go. In response to her inquiry as to why he was letting her go, the only reason he gave was that she was talking. Strader did not know what incident Pelizzari had in mind and he did not mention any specific incident . Strader asked why he was letting her go for talking, inasmuch as he had never said anything to her about it. When he replied that she did not need to be told, she stated that if he was letting her go for talking he would have to let everyone on the floor go for talking. When he handed her her check and separation papers, Strader accused him of discharging her because she was helping to get the Union into the plant. Pelizzari replied that he did not know anything about that. When she left the office, she noticed that her separation papers listed "insubordination" as the reason for her termination. Lillian May Adkins: She was first employed by Respondent in September 1958 and worked continuously under'the immediate supervision of Louise Moore until her discharge on July 15, 1960. At that time, her job was closing cuffs. She made production fairly regularly when sufficient work was available. She joined the Union at the first organizational meeting on June 9. Thereafter, she talked about the Union to the other girls during the lunch period and succeeded in getting two girls to sign union authorization cards. About Tuesday, June 12, 1960, employee Dot Dotson was talking to Adkins when Superintendent Pelizzari came over and asked her what she was talking about. When Adkins stated that it was a little bit of everything, he told her to slow down on the talking. Other employees in the section had also been talking at that time. About 5 minutes before quitting time on Friday, July 15, Adkins was summoned to Pelizzari's office . When she got to the office, she overheard Mary Strader ac- cusing Pelizzari of firing her because of the Union. When Strader left, Pelizzari told Adkins that he was discharging her for talking. Adkins stated that she did not talk any more than the others did. He gave her her check and termination slip which listed "insubordination" as the reason for her termination. is Unless otherwise indicated, the factual findings in this section are based on credited evidence which is either admitted or undisputed 11 Pelizzari further testified, and Strader denied, that he told Strader he was giving her the raise to encourage her to do better work and to stop talking so much. Pelizzari did not impress me as a credible witness and I do not credit his disputed testimony in this respect. "I credit Strader' s denial that Adams told her not to do so much talking when she brought her the bundle of repairs . Adams contradicted herself in her testimony and impressed me as not being a candid witness. 854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The following Tuesday, Louise Moore, the immediate supervisor of Adkins, visited Adkins at her home. Moore told her that it was "foolish" for them to have fired Adkins because she was the only one who could make production on that job. Respondent's Contentions and Concluding Findings Respondent contends in its brief that Strader and Adkins were discharged for talking too much. Yet, at the hearing Superintendent Pelizzari testfied that the rea- sons he had in mind when he discharged Strader were for talking and refusing to fix the repairs when she was told that they were hers. At another point, he testified that Strader's low production was also one of the reasons he decided to discharge her. However, Respondent did not introduce any production records to substantiate this latter claim, and Pelizzari admitted that Strader was a "fairly good worker." He further admitted that the only reason he gave to Strader for discharging her was her talking. With respect to the repairs incident, previously described, Pelizzari admitted telling the girls that they did not have to fix repairs which did not belong to them, that it was not uncommon for girls to put up an argument as to the identity of their repairs, and that it was necessary to prove to them that it was their repairs. Despite these admissions, Pelizzari had Supervisor Adams write up a reprimand report on this incident. Adams testified that she wrote the comments to paragraph No. 5 on this report entitled "Supervisor's reaction and remarks"; whereas, Pelizzari testified that he was the one who wrote it. Moreover, contrary to the admitted practice in existence at that time, this report was admittedly never shown to Strader nor was the usual practice followed of asking her to sign it. At the hearing, Pelizzari testified that he discharged Adkins "mostly for talking." When he was asked what other reasons there were, he testified, "I can't remember, I believe that talking might have been the only reason." Considerable testimony was adduced about the conduct of employees in talking while at work and as to whether Strader and Adkins talked more than the other girls. One of twenty-two rules, contained in a bulletin distributed to the employees and posted on the bulletin boards, forbids "talking or chatting during period of work" except where necessary in the performance of such work. The preponderance of the evidence convinces me, and I find, that this rule was honored more in its breach than in its observance, that most of the employees openly talked while work- ing, that many of them besides Strader and Adkins had been warned to slow down on talking, and that Strader and Adkins were really not any worse offenders in this respect. While some of Respondent's witnesses testified that they heard Strader and Adkins talk more than the other girls near them, some also candidly admitted that they could not say whether they talked more than the other girls in the section who did not work near them and whom they could not overhear. The undisputed testi- mony further shows that many girls were reprimanded for talking, both before and after these discharges, without being discharged or warned of any disciplinary action. Thus, Beatrice Setliff admitted having been reprimanded for talking by her super- visor, Louise Moore; Isabell Whitner admitted having been reprimanded more than once for talking; Kathleen Smith admitted having been reprimanded about 2 weeks before the hearing in this proceeding and about two or three times prior to that ,time; Barbara Huskey admitted having been reprimanded for talking both before and after Strader's discharge; Supervisor -Margaret Hart, who was first employed by Respondent on September 6, admitted that she warned all the girls under her supervision not to talk too much and that she still has to warn them occasionally. The foregoing employees were called to testify as witnesses for the Respondent. In addition, witnesses called by the General Counsel testified to the same effect. No employees, including Strader and Adkins, were ever warned that they might be discharged for talking. And, despite the fact that it was still necessary to warn employees against talking after the discharge of Strader and Adkins, none were ever informed that these employees had been discharged for talking. Indeed, Frances Bello, Respondent's payroll clerk in charge of the office records, testified that the only employee she could think of who was ever discharged for "continuous talking and hindering work of employees around her" was Pella Goard on April 15, 1960. However, the undisputed evidence shows that Goard had an uncontrollable temper; that whenever anything went wrong, she would pull the shirts, throw them on the floor, stomp on them, jerk her machine and try to tear things up, and curse terribly; and that her conduct in this respect was known throughout the plant and yet was tolerated by Respondent ever since her employment in July 1959 because she was a good producer. Yet, despite the fact that Respondent admittedly was at this time plagued with the problem of employee failures to produce satisfactorily and in fact discharged some employees for low production, it nevertheless seized upon BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 855 their talking as the alleged reason for terminating ' Strader , an admittedly fairly good producer who was given a raise early in June, and Adkins, whose discharge was characterized by her immediate supervisor as "foolish" because she was the only one who could make production on that job. Respondent admittedly was opposed to having a union at the plant and specifically opposed to the Charging Union herein, and early announced that "we shall do our utmost to keep Brookside free from all the trouble, arguments, quarrels, strikes, and other disturbances" which would come with the Union represented by Mr. Biggs, as Vice President Magid stated in his letter to the employees on June 30. Respondent also unlawfully interrogated employees about their union membership and activities, sought to enlist their aid in ascertaining the identity of other union adherents, and solicited employee withdrawals from the Union with advice as to how to effect such withdrawals, all as previously found. Strader and Adkins joined the Union at its first organizational meeting, and thereafter openly spoke at the plant on its behalf to the other employees and succeeded in getting some of them to sign union authorization cards. Some of Respondent's supervisors and agents made efforts to ascertain the names of employees who had signed cards or were for the Union, as previously found. In his speech to the assembled employees on June 15, S. K. Tanger stated that it was no use for the employees to hide the fact that they were holding union meetings and that the Company knew all about it. S. K. Tanger was aware of the identity of some of the union adherents and mentioned their names to Head after he became employed. At one of the supervisors' meetings early in July, the supervisors were given lists of employees with instructions to check off the names of those who were for or against the Union. Supervisors Adams and Hall attended the union meeting of June 23 and recognized at least some of the employees in attendance. Supervisor Adams was present across the street from the union hall when Mary Strader left the meeting hall that evening. And Superintendent Pelizzari admitted that "it would be impossible to be in a plant where union activities would be going on but what you didn't hear some sketches of it or be aware of what was going on in the plant." From all the foregoing, I infer and find, contrary to their denials, that Respondent's supervisors and agents, including its superintendent, were aware of the union membership and activities of Strader and Adkins. Upon consideration of all the foregoing and the entire record as a whole, I am convinced and find that the talking of Strader and Adkins was seized upon as a pretext to cloak Respondent's dis- criminatory motivation for their discharge, and that the true motivating cause for their discharge was Respondent's opposition to its employees' efforts to get the Union established at the plant as the employees' bargaining representative. By such conduct, Respondent discriminated with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Mary Strader and Lillian May Adkins, thereby discouraging mem- bership in the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. 2. Cliffie Bolden Cliffie Bolden was employed by Respondent from September 1959 until her discharge on July 28, 1960. Her job was to make buttonholes for flap and shoulder straps. Respondent stipulated that Bolden was a good operator, made good pro- duction, received pay increases, and that her work was entirely satisfactory. Moe Tanger, the president of Creighton Shirt Corporation for whom Respondent was producing shirts under contract and who discharged Bolden, stated on one occasion that Bolden was one of the best workers he had. Her name was listed in the "Brookside Briefs," Respondent's weekly newspaper, as being on the 100 percent production club. She made her full production quota even during her last month of employment. Bolden joined the Union sometime in June and attended all weekly meetings thereafter, including the one of June 23, when Supervisors Adams and Hall were present. She solicited employees at the plant to sign union authorization cards and succeeded in getting about eight or nine employees to sign such cards. She also visited some employees' homes with Union Representative Rachel Barnes. Shortly after Mary Strader's discharge, Bolden, Dot Breeze, who was Bolden's immediate supervisor at the time, and Fay Strader, who was Mary Strader's sister-in-law, had a conversation in a supermarket. Bolden asked Fay Strader if she knew that her sister-in-law had been discharged. Fay replied that they had told Mary that she was fired for talking but she thought it was because she was helping to organize a union. Bolden replied that if that were the case they would fire her too because 856 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD she was just as much for the Union as Mary was. Supervisor Breeze remarked at that point that she was satisfied with her job and that the Company had always been good to her. Bolden then stated, "Well, I believe they need a union down there." As previously found, during the course of Attorney Gwyn's speech to the as- sembled employees about the middle of July, he stated that he had been informed that employees had been threatened with physical violence in connection with joining the Union and that if the Company learned of any such threats against employees it would immediately discharge the offending employees. Gwyn testified that on July 21, employee Mary Garringer reported that she felt she had been threatened with physical violence by employees in connection with the Union, that one morning in the course of comments about the activities of the Union, Cliffie Bolden had "looked at her like she could cut her ears off or something like that," that on another occasion Bolden and employee Josephine Ward had crowded in behind her as she was leaving the building and had made comments, which she felt were directed to her, to the effect that they "were going to beat the hell out of the scabs" and "people who didn't like the union," and that she had encountered similar experiences with Bolden in the lunchroom, although, on none of the occasions had there been any direct conversations between her and Bolden. Gwyn reported this to management but admittedly did not feel that there was "any sound evidence of a threat." Gwyn further testified that he asked Garringer whether anyone had threatened her about signing a union card and whether she had been forced to sign a card, and that Gar- ringer replied in the negative, that she had not and did not want to sign a card, and that the employees knew it. No investigation was made of Garringer's complaint and nothing was ever said about the matter to Bolden. Bolden denied that she had ever threatened Garringer in any way on any occasion or at any place or that she had made the remarks attributed to her by Garringer, as set forth in Gwyn's testimony. Employee Ward corroborated Bolden in this re- spect. Garringer did not testify. Bolden and Ward impressed me as straightfor- ward, candid, and honest witnesses whose testimony I credit. Accordingly, I find that Bolden at no time threatened employee Garringer in any manner in connection with any union activity or in any other connection. During the morning break on July 26, Cliffie Bolden was sitting at a table in the lunchroom together with employees Garnet Barhan, Emma Bailey, and Kizzie Walker. Bailey told Walker that at the union hall they had Walker's first name spelled the way Bailey used to pronounce it when she started to work there, and that it was spelled "Hizzie." Walker laughed about it. About that time the bell rang and the four girls got up to leave the lunchroom. Bolden and Bailey were walking right behind Barhan and Walker. Walker turned around and asked Bailey why they had her name written down in the union hall. Barhan turned around, saw that Bailey was clowning, and laughingly said that it was to enable them to know who had not signed a union card so that they could go to their homes or call them up and threaten them just like the lawyer had said. At that point Bolden laughed, put her finger to Walker's back, and in a "kidding" manner stated that she believed she would stick a knife in her back if she did not sign a union card. Walker stated that she would never sign a union card. On a previous occasion , Bolden had asked Walker if she had signed a union card, and Walker had replied that she did not want to get mixed up in that mess. Bolden, Barhan, and Bailey testified that they were all joking and laughing on this occasion, that their remarks were made in a "kidding" manner, and that Bolden's statement was made in the same vein and not taken seriously. Walker admitted that they had all been chatting in a friendly manner at the time. Walker's testimony that Bolden was not laughing is contrary to the preponderance of the testimony and hence is not credited. Shortly thereafter, Walker told Barhan that she was going to report that Bolden had threatened her. Barhan expressed amazement that Walker had taken Bolden's remark seriously and pointed out that Bolden did not mean it literally. Barhan then went over to Bolden and told her that Walker was going to report Bolden for having made that statement. Bolden stated that she was "kidding" and did not mean it. Barhan replied that she knew it and that they were all laughing at the time. Barhan went back and told Walker that Bolden had just told her that she did not mean it. When this did not satisfy Walker, Barhan pointed out that she and Bailey had said things also and that if Walker was going to report Bolden she should also report Barhan and Bailey. Walker replied that she was not going to bring up their names but that she did not like Bolden and that Bolden did not like her. After Barhan had returned to her machine, Walker hollered to her, "I'm going to kill You." Bailey thereupon noted that Walker had just threatened Barhan just BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 857 as much as Bolden had threatened Walker. Barhan replied, "I know it but she was just kidding"; whereupon Bailey said, "So was Cliffie" Bolden 21 Immediately after the lunch period, Bolden went over to Walker's machine, told Walker that she was "kidding" her, that she was sorry if she had given her the wrong impression, that she had not threatened her, and that she did not mean to do her any harm. Walker testified that she had believed Bolden at the time she made the statement about sticking a knife in her back if she did not sign a union card and that, when Barhan told her that Bolden was "kidding" her, she replied that Bolden "looked serious" to her. In response to the Trial Examiner's question at that point as to how she knew that Bolden "looked serious" when Bolden admittedly was behind her, Walker explained that she meant Bolden was serious when she came back to apologize to her. Shortly before quitting time that day, Walker informed Vice President Magid that Bolden had threatened to stick a knife in her back if she did not sign a union card. Magid told her to come into the office after quitting time. When Walker arrived in the office, Moe Tanger and Magid were present, but Magid only stayed a few min- utes. Walker told Tanger that after the morining break Bolden had threatened to stick a knife in her back if she did not sign a union card. Tanger asked Walker if she would make a written statement to that effect. Walker did so in longhand and signed it. She testified that she did not remember whether she told Tanger or put in her statement that Bolden had apologized to her. Tanger did not testify and the written statement was not produced at the hearing. Albert Cohen, an employee of the Creighton Shirt Corporation stationed in Re- spondent's plant and an admitted agent of Respondent, testified that he was in Moe Tanger's office shortly after Kizzie Walker had left and that the following transpired: At Tanger's request, Cohen read Walker's statement. Tanger stated that he had put in a call to Douglas, Respondent's attorney, in regard to it. At that point, Douglas called back. Tanger read Walker's statement over the telephone to Doug- las. After the telephone conversation, Tanger told Cohen that Douglas had sug- gested the discharge of Bolden in view of the Mary Garringer incident in which Bolden "was alleged to have made threats against" Garringer and the signed state- ment by Walker of the incident which occurred that day. Moe Tanger did not testify. Bolden did not work the following day, July 26. When she came to work on July 27, her card was missing from the rack. She asked Superintendent Pelizzari about it and was told that Moe Tanger wanted to see her in the office. When she entered the office, Moe Tanger, Cohen, Pelizzari, and Joe Ann Shelton were present. Tanger stated that he was releasing Bolden because he had heard about some threats being made by her. Bolden stated that she knew the girl to whom he was referring, that she had been friendly with that girl, that she had apologized to her for what she had said and had told her that she had no malice in her heart, and that she was not the type of person to threaten anyone. She admitted that she had made the statement about sticking a knife in Walker's back but explained that she was not threatening to do her any bodily harm because she was only "kidding," and that all the girls were joking. Tanger stated that "evidently you aren't happy with us, and I think it best to discharge you." No one made any mention to Bolden at that time or at any other time about Mary Garringer having complained about her. Contentions and Concluding Findings The General Counsel contends that (1) Moe Tanger did not, under the circum- stances, entertain a good-faith belief that Bolden had really threatened Walker with physical harm, (2) even if he did entertain such a good-faith belief, it was no de- fense because Bolden did not in fact threaten Walker with physical harm in view of the evidence that the entire incident occurred in a joking and "kidding" manner and the statement was not intended literally, and (3) Bolden's discharge was therefore discriminatory and violative of the Act under the cited applicable Board decisions 22 In his brief, counsel for Respondent agrees that if the evidence had shown that Bolden had not in fact made the alleged threat, the good-faith belief of the employer a The findings in this paragraph are based on the credited testimony of Barhan and Bailey. I do not credit Walker's testimony to the extent that it may be construed as a denial of having made the above statement to Barhan. 22The General Counsel relies on such cases as Hall & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 120 NLRB 101, 102; and Troy C. Friend, d/b/a Friend Lumber Company, 121 NLRB 62. 858 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD would not be a sufficient defense to the discharge , relying on the same line of cases cited by the General Counsel. Respondent's counsel however contends that since Bolden admitted having made the alleged statement , the discharge was not unlawful. I do not believe that the line of cases, relied upon by the General Counsel and Respondent , are applicable to the facts in the instant case . For the cited cases apply only to a situation where the alleged misconduct is part of a union or concerted activity . In such situations, when the Board finds that the alleged misconduct did not take place , what remains is a discharge for a protected union or concerted activity. In the instant case, Bolden was not engaging in any union or concerted activity either during the alleged Garringer incident or the Walker incident., Her statement to Walker was not an attempt to solicit her to sign a union card , as I have found that the statment was made in lest, not literally intended, and was part of an incident in which the three employees were joking and "kidding" Walker. Hence, even though I do find that Bolden's statement was not intended to, and did not under all the circumstances , amount to a threat of physical harm , it does not follow from that finding alone that her discharge was unlawful. I am, nevertheless , convinced that Respondent was discriminatorily motivated in effecting Bolden 's discharge . Respondent 's admitted opposition to the Union and the respects in which it engaged in unlawful conduct, have already been described. Bolden was an active union solicitor and an outspokenly staunch union adherent. Her activities in this respect were known to Respondent , as its counsel admits in his brief, and particularly to Moe Tanger and Supervisor Dot Breeze. In the discharge interview, Bolden explained to Tanger that her remark to Walker was made in a joking and "kidding" manner, with no malice in her heart, and that it was not an actual threat of physical harm. She also pointed out that she had apologized to Walker and had told her that the statement had been made in jest with no threat of actual physical harm being intended. Tanger made no effort to interview the other two employees involved in the incident. Such an investigation would have cor- roborated Bolden's version, and would have made it obvious that in its true per- spective her statement was but the tail end of an incident in which three employees were "pulling Walker 's leg" and engaging in some good natured and harmless banter, and that Walker's complaint was really motivated by her personal pique against Bolden . 23 Bolden admittedly was one of Respondent 's best production workers, being in the small group which made 100 percent production. Yet, Tanger ignored Bolden's record and her explanations and seized upon this incident to summarily discharge this valued employee at the very time when Respondent was pressing its employees for production and terminating those whose production was unsatis- factory. Tanger's statement at the time of Bolden's discharge that "evidently, you aren't happy with us," persuasively points to some other factor as the true motivating cause for her discharge. The pretextuous nature of the Walker incident is made further apparent by Respondent's efforts to bolster its position by grasping at Mary Garringer's alleged complaint as an added reason for Bolden's discharge. A mere reading of Gwyn's testimony in this respect discloses the vague, rambling, almost in- coherent and ludicrous nature of the complaint made by Garringer, another anti- union employee. That this complaint was admittedly never mentioned to Bolden indicates the lack of substance attached to it by Respondent itself. Upon consideration of the foregoing and the entire record as a whole, I am convinced and find that the Walker incident was seized upon as a pretext for dis- charging Bolden because of her union activities and Respondent's opposition to the employees' efforts to get the Union established in the plant as their bargaining rep- resentative.24 By such conduct, Respondent discriminated with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Cliffie Bolden, thereby discouraging membership in the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7, in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 3. Virginia Cochran, Jewelyn Crumpton, Ethel King, and Dollie Mae Shorter Cochran, Crumpton, and King were discharged by Superintendent Pelizzari. Be- fore effecting the discharges he consulted and reviewed their records with Vice 23 Thus, Walker admitted that she did not like Bolden and that she told Bolden that she was still going to report her even if she was "kidding " On the other hand, she refused to implicate Barhan and Bailey, although challenged to do so 24I note that the Unemployment Insurance Division of the Employment Security Divi- sion of North Carolina found on August 17, 1960, that there was insufficient evidence to show that Bolden was discharged for misconduct in connection with her work BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC . 859 President Magid because their discharges might affect his production schedule. Shorter was discharged by Cohen. Respondent had established certain production standards for each operation, con- sisting of the number of shirts , collars, or whatever the item might be that should be completed in a working day. The pay scale was based on the respective quotas for the job. Under the Wage and Hour Law,. an employee had to be paid 40 times her hourly rate for a 40-hour week. Employees who fell substantially below their production quotas were paid on a piece rate. However, the Company had to pay such employees an additional amount to comply with the 40-hour weekly pay rate. The additional amount which the Company paid the girls over and above the amount actually earned according to their piece rate, was known as "make-up pay." Some- time in February or March 1960, as an incentive to get the employees to attain their production quotas, Respondent raised the employees' base rate from $1 to $1.10 per hour and also paid them a certain bonus, whenever they first achieved 85 percent of their quota during a full week. Thereafter, Respondent con- tinued to pay such employees these rates even if they fell below 85 percent of their quota. After this system had been in effect-about 3 or 4 months, it became apparent that many employees exerted themselves and worked hard to achieve 85 percent of their quota for 1 full week, or put out poor quality in order to produce that amount, and thereby received the added pay. Thereafter, they would relax and fall con- siderably below the 85 percent, since their pay remained the same. This problem became more acute during the months of July, August, and September. As a result of this situation, among others, Respondent began tightening up on production and pressing the employees to improve their production in quantity and quality during the period in question. Moreover, Respondent expected employees who had been working a longer period to show greater improvement in production than newer employees. In addition, Respondent's goal was to try to get the employees to reach 100 percent of their quotas. Thus, Superintendent Pelizzari testified that Moe Tanger was pressing him for production and consequently he had to press the em- ployees for production. The record also shows that, as of the time of the instant hearing, other employees in addition to the alleged discriminatees were put on pro- bation for low production . It is in this setting that the following discharges must be viewed. Virginia Cochran: She was employed about 2 months in 1958 and then worked from August 1959 until August 19, 1960, when she was terminated allegedly for low production and her general attitude toward her work. Magid testified that Cochran reached 85 percent of her production quota only -1 week out of 6 months. About June 20 there was a slight change in the nature of her operation. She admitted that after this change her production dropped down to about 300 units per day although her quota was 480 units. While she claimed that her low production was attributable to the change in the operation, she admitted that Nina Woods, who worked on the same operation and started to work after she did, got back up to production not long after the change was made. She also admitted that Moe Tanger, S. K. Tanger, Head Floorlady Oliver, and the superintendent all spoke to her about her low production. She admitted that Moe Tanger and Superintendent Pelizzari spoke to her almost every day for the last 3 weeks of her employment, and that she told them that she was doing the best she could and that she did not feel that anyone could make production. She further admitted that she was given a final week in which to get her production up. Magid testified that Cochran was discharged for low production and her general attitude that no one could make production. According to Pelizzari's testimony, he discussed with Magid what should be done about raising the production in that section and that they agreed that, in view of the fact that more recently employed girls were putting out more work than Cochran, it appeared to them that Cochran was not trying any more. Jewelyn Crunipton: She was employed in the operation of boxing plackets from December 15, 1959, until her discharge on September 13, 1960. Magid testified that she was discharged for low production and bad quality of work after repeated warnings After the change in her operation about June 20. previously noted, Crumpton ad- mittedly drooped down from 85 nercent of her quota of 480 rairs a day to 240 nairs a day. She admitted that Nina Woods, who had not worked there as long as Crump- tnn, made production not long after the change in operation. Her emplovment file shows that she had been reprimanded for low production on August 23 and 29 and on Sentember 2, 6. and 13 Yvonne Smith, who was Crumnton's imme"iate supervi,eor from shout July 7 throueh August and who was a friendly witness called to testify by the General Counsel, admitted that she had to reprimand Crumpton for 860 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD bad quality and had a report written up on it . On several occasions , Crumpton blamed her low production on her machine and complained about it to Mrs. Hart, a newly hired supervisor who replaced Yvonne Smith on September 6. Crumpton admitted that Hart let her sew on two other machines while Hart tried her machine and found nothing wrong with it . Indeed, she admitted on cross-examination that she no longer thought the trouble was with her machine but that "evidently it was me." Hart , who impressed me as a credible witness, testified that Crumpton's work was worse than that of the other girls and that "we had to make seconds" out of some of her repairs. Crumpton testified that on one occasion, about 2 weeks before her discharge , Tanger called her into his office and offered to explain how the quotas were set up and to go over her situation with her, that she told him she could not stay for such a discussion at that time , that he suggested she come in another time, and that she never availed herself of that opportunity. Crumpton admitted that she had been put on probation for low production. Finally on September 13, Supervisor Hart reported to Pelizzari that Crumpton was continuing to put out poor work , that she had been on probation for the past 2 weeks in the hopes of making an operator out of her , and that she was of the opinion that Crumpton would never make a good operator . She was terminated that day. Ethel King: She was first employed on October 16 , 1957, as an operator on a sleeving machine . She testified that after about a month and a half, it made her so nervous to work on a machine that she asked for an inspection job. When an open- ing occurred , she was made an inspector in final inspection where she remained until sometime in early 1959 when she was assigned to operate a felling machine. She performed this operation until her discharge on September 23, 1960. Magid testified that she was terminated for consistent low production , considering the length of time she had been on this operation , and that other girls who had started the same work long after King showed far better improvement. King admitted that on various occasions she told both Magid and Pelizzari that she just could not sew , that she could not work on a machine , that she was a nervous type person and did not think she would ever make production on the felling machine, and that she would like to be relieved of a machine operation. She was discharged after having been put on probation . She admitted that in her discharge interview Pelizzari told her that out of the 10 girls to whom he had talked King was the only one who had not shown any improvement . She also testified that she did not think there was anything personal in Pelizzari pushing her for production or discharging her. Dollie Mae Shorter : She was employed as a presser in the pressing department from December 1, 1958, to April 3 , 1959 , and from June 2, 1959 , until her discharge on September 2, 1960. She was discharged by Al Cohen , who was a supervisor for Creighton Shirt Corporation but worked in Respondent 's plant to expedite the pro- duction of shirts in the pressing department for Creighton 's customers . Magid had given him the authority to discharge Respondent 's employees in the pressing depart- ment. The parties stipulated that Shorter was deceased at the time of the hearing in this proceeding. In connection with Shorter 's discharge , Cohen testified as follows: Cohen had con- tacted Thelma Morris, the pressing supervisor , several times to complain that they were falling behind on the pressing of shirts. About a month before Shorter's dis- charge, he told Morris that the bins were filled up and he would like to know what the trouble was . They proceeded to check the production records of the pressers. Several girls were new and were not expected to produce too much at that time . Some of the older girls were either making production or were improving sufficiently to warrant re- taining them, at least a little while longer. Shorter's record stood out as noticeably poor and Cohen asked Morris to talk to her . A few weeks later, Cohen went over the records again and noticed improvement among the girls, including the newer ones. However, Shorter's records showed that there was a constant fluctuation , which in- dicated to Cohen that she could make production but was not applying herself to her fullest extent . He thereupon had Shorter called into the office and went over her records. He explained that her records showed improvement at times but a failure to apply herself to her fullest extent . He then told Supervisor Morris that if Shorter did not improve to a certain extent by the following week, she should let her go. The following week , Morris reviewed Shorter's record with Cohen again and stated that Shorter had not improved too much . Cohen thereupon directed Morris to discharge Shorter. Concluding Findings All four employees signed union authorization cards in June 1960 .. All, except Shorter, attended the June 23 union meeting at which Supervisors Hall and Adams were present. In addition , Crumpton and King attended other regular weekly union meetings , solicited union memberships among the employees , succeeded in getting a BROOKSIDE INDUSTRIES, INC. 861 number of employees to sign union cards, and visited employees at their homes to- gether with Union Representative Barnes. For reasons previously indicated in the cases of Strader and Adkins, I am convinced and find that Respondent was aware, or believed, that these four employees were union adherents. The foregoing plus Re- spondent's admitted opposition to the Union and the unlawful conduct in which it engaged, as previously found, points favorably in the direction of the General Coun- sel's position that Respondent was discriminatorily motivated in effecting their dis- charge. However, considering, as I must, the additional evidence relating to their discharge, set forth in the preceding paragraphs, which strongly detracts from and militates against such a finding, I am persuaded to conclude upon the entire record as a whole that the preponderance of the evidence raises no more than a suspicion of discriminatory motivation.25 I will, accordingly, recommend the dismissal of the complaint in so far as it alleges that Respondent violated the Act by discharging these four employees. 4. Yvonne Smith Yvonne Smith was employed by Respondent from September 11 to October 15, 1958; from April 29 to November 13, 1959; and from April 18 until her discharge on September 2, 1960. Her terminations prior to September 2, 1960, were due to, pregnancies. She had always been a machine operator until July 7, 1960, when she was promoted by Head Floorlady Oliver to the position of a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Smith joined the Union in June and attended the weekly meetings until she be- came a supervisor, including the June 23 meeting at which Supervisors Adams and Hall were present. She admitted, however, that after becoming a supervisor on July 7, she no longer attended union meetings and engaged in no further union activities. A few days before her discharge, Smith told Superintendent Pelizzari that she would like to be relieved as a supervisor. Pelizzari admitted that on this occasion he told Smith that he thought she had done "a pretty good job" as a supervisor and that if she were to continue she would make "a good floorlady." Smith replied that she did not want to be a supervisor and would like to go back to her former machine operation of setting plackets. Pelizzari stated that he did not have a machine available in her operation, and told her to work on repairs until he decided what to do with her. The next few days Smith worked full time on repairs and performed no supervisor's functions. Pelizzari testified that on Friday morning, September 2, he decided to discharge Smith "because I had nothing for the girl to do and she didn't want to be a super- visor." He discharged her at quitting time that day. He testified that he told her he was discharging her because "she didn't want to be a floorlady, and I didn't have anything else for her." However, the reasons given on her termination papers were "lack of skill, ability and aptitude." Considerable testimony was introduced on the issue of whether Smith was still a statutory supervisor during the last few days of her employment when she was working on repairs. The General Counsel contended that she was no longer a supervisor during that period but was a rank-and-file employee at the time of her discharge. The Respondent contended that she had never been relieved of her supervisory duties and was still a supervisor when she was discharged. For reasons hereinafter indicated, I find it unnecessary to resolve this issue. Contentions and Concluding Findings The General Counsel contends that Smith was discharged because of Respondent's opposition to her union activities in which she engaged prior to becoming a super- visor, and that at the time of her discharge she was no longer a supervisor. The Respondent contends that she was discharged because her work as a supervisor was unsatisfactory and because no work was available for her as a machine oper- ator, and that she was still a supervisor at the time of her discharge. If Smith were in fact discharged because of union activities in which she engaged while she was a nonsupervisory employee, such a discharge would be unlawful whether or not she was a supervisor at the time of her discharge.26 Respondent's asserted reasons for Smith's discharge and the reasons indicated in her termination zs A consideration of the contents of Shorter's pretrial affidavit, assuming that I were to reverse my ruling and receive it in evidence, does not change my conclusion with respect to her discharge 26 This would seem to be the logical result of the Board's decision in the converse situa- tion in Gibbs Automatic Division, Pierce Industries, Inc., 129 NLRB 196. 862 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD papers are materially contradicted by Pelizzari's testimony, hereinabove set forth. This would tend to point to some other factor as the true motivating cause for her discharge. On the other hand, the reasons asserted by the General Counsel must presuppose knowledge or belief on the part of Respondent of Smith's union activi- ties . Respondent's promotion of Smith to a supervisory position with such knowledge or belief strongly negates the existence of any discriminatory motivation in effecting her discharge 2 months later. When asked by the Trial Examiner during the oral argument before the close of the instant hearing as to how he explained the appoint- ment of Smith as a supervisor, the General Counsel conceded that he could not explain it under his theory of her case. The explanation offered by counsel for the Union that "it is quite possible" that she was made a supervisor in order to "promote her out" of the potential bargaining unit, is not convincing in this case. On this state of the record, I am constrained to conclude that the General Counsel had failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Yvonne Smith's discharge was discriminatorily motivated in violation of the Act. I will accordingly recommend the dismissal of the allegation in this respect. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec- tion with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the discharge of Mary Strader, Lillian May Adkins, and Cliffie Bolden, I will recommend that Respondent be ordered to offer them immediate and full reinstate- ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of such discrimination, by pay- ment to each of a sum of money equal to that which each normally would have earned as wages from the date of her discharge to the date of said offer of reinstate- ment, less her net earnings during such period, such sums to be computed in accordance with the formula established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294. In view of the nature of Respondent's violations, and because discriminatory dis- charges, as in the instant case, go to the very heart of the Act,27 I am convinced that it may be anticipated from Respondent's past conduct that Respondent may commit other violations of the Act in the future. Accordingly, I find it necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act to recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing "in any other manner" upon the rights of its employees as guaranteed in the Act, in addition to those rights found to have been violated herein 28 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Mary Strader , Lillian May Adkins, and Cliffie Bolden , and thereby discouraging mem- bership in the aforesaid labor organization , the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. 3. By the above conduct and by the attendance of Supervisors Adams and Hall at a union meeting, by interrogating an employee concerning her attendance at a union meeting and concerning her own and other employees ' union membership and activities , by interrogating an employee as to the number in attendance at a union meeting, by asking an employee to report and inform concerning the union member- ship and activities of other employees , and by soliciting employees to withdraw from 27 N.L R B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4) 28 See, e.g ., Caroline M. Layton White, d/b/a Layton Oil Company, 128 NLRB 252. NEW ENGLAND LEAD BURNING COMPANY, INC. 863 the Union , with unsolicited advice as to how to effect such withdrawals, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the discharge of Virginia Cochran, Jewelyn Crumpton, Ethel King, Dollie Mae Shorter, and Yvonne Smith, and has not engaged in independent unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by the conduct of S. K. Tanger, Moe Tanger , Sidney Magid, and Joe Ann Shelton. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] New England Lead Burning Company, Inc. and Charles A. Hos- ford, Darrel Bettcher , Fred R . Coffie, Joe V. Munoz, and Glen E. Renfro Lead Burners and Plastics, Local No . 812, of the United Asso- ciation of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL- CIO and Charles A. Hosford, Darrel Bettcher, Fred R. Coffie, Joe V. Munoz, and Glen E . Renfro. Cases Nos. 20-CA-1947-1, 20-CA-1947-2, 20-CA-1947-3, 20-CA-1947-4, 20-CA-1947-5, 20- CB-813-1, 20-CB-813-2, 20-CB-813-3, 20-CB-813-4, and 20-CB- 813-5. October 10, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER Upon charges duly filed by Charles A. Hosford, Darrel Bettcher, Fred R. Coffie, Joe V. Munoz, and Glen E. Renfro, the General Coun- sel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region, issued a consolidated complaint, dated De- cember 22, 1960, against New England Lead Burning Company, Inc. (herein called Respondent Employer, in Cases Nos. 20-CA-1947-1, 20-CA-1947-2, 20-CA-1947-3, 20-CA-1947-4, and 20-CA-1947-5), and Lead Burners and Plastics, Local No. 812, of the United Associa- tion of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fit- ting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (herein called Respondent Union, in Cases Nos. 20-CB-813-1, 20-CB-813-2, 20-CB-813-3, 20-CB-813-4, and 20-CB-813-5). Said complaint al- leged that Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act (as to Respondent Employer), Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) (as to Respondent Union), and affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended. 133 NLRB No. 93. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation