Britt S.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 27, 2016
0120140060 (E.E.O.C. May. 27, 2016)

0120140060

05-27-2016

Britt S.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southern Area), Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Britt S.,1

Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Southern Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120140060

Agency No. 4G-752-0091-13

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's August 14, 2013 final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

BACKGROUND

During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a City Carrier at the Agency's Valley Ranch Station in Irving, Texas.

On February 27, 2013, Complainant filed the instant formal complaint. Therein, Complainant alleged that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (male), disability (knee), and age (over 40) when:

on or about December 14, 2012, he requested a modified job offer within his medical restrictions and management has not provided a job offer for him.

The record reflects that on January 10, 2012, Complainant had a bilateral knee replacement and following the surgery, he was classified as permanently disabled in both knees with a 31% disability in each knee. Complainant also stated he had rotator cuff surgery with a 7% disability rating. The record further reflects that he submitted CA-17 "Duty Status Report" which showed his restrictions were as follows: no prolonged sitting, standing or walking greater than 2 hours/day, limited climbing and kneeling, bending/stooping, twisting for more than 2 hours/day. Complainant stated that when he returned to work in August 2012, he did not receive a job offer.

After the investigation of the claims, Complainant was provided with a copy of the report of the investigation and with a notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or a final decision within thirty days of receipt of the correspondence. Complainant did not respond.

On August 14, 2013, the Agency issued the instant final decision, finding no discrimination. The Agency found that Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of race, sex, disability and age discrimination.2 The Agency further found that assuming Complainant established a prima facie case of race, sex, disability and age discrimination, Agency management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which Complainant failed to show were a pretext.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal. The instant appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Agency management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Postmaster stated that as a Carrier, Complainant has to case and carry mail everyday. The Postmaster stated at that time he was aware that Complainant had work limitations as "he has a time limit on the amount of time he can walk, stand and drive. I am not aware of the specific time limits."

The Postmaster stated that after Complainant gave him a written request for light/limited duty dated December 14, 2012, he handed him an offer of modified assignment on December 19, 2012. Specifically, the Postmaster stated that he informed Complainant "that I had to look over his medical restrictions because he stated he could only carry a certain class of mail - and I felt I could not give him an offer only for specific types of mail. I have never done that." The Postmaster stated at that time Complainant stated that he was not going to sign it because "he wanted his lawyer to look at it at first. He left and I have not heard from him since with regard to responding to the modified job offer."

Neither during the investigation, nor on appeal, has Complainant proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Therefore, after a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0815)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 27, 2016

__________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

2 For purposes of this analysis, we assume, without so finding, that Complainant was a qualified individual with a disability.

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