Bridgestone/Firestone

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 29, 2000

332 N.L.R.B. 575 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 575
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and Automotive and Al-
lied Industries Employees, Teamsters, Local
481, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Cases 21–CA–31471 and 21–CA–31592
September 29, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On September 19, 1997, Administrative Law Judge
Gerald A. Wacknov issued the attached decision. The
Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging
Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs, as well as
answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified and set forth in full below.
During the relevant period the Union represented em-
ployees of the Respondent in two separate bargaining
units, the “ten-store unit” and the “three-store unit.” On
July 31, 1996, the Respondent withdrew recognition
from the Union in the ten-store unit, to be effective Au-
gust 1, 1996.2 On September 24, the Respondent with-
drew recognition from the Union in the three-store unit,
to be effective October 31. The withdrawals of recogni-
tion were based on petitions that the Respondent received
stating that the employees no longer wanted union repre-
sentation. We agree with the judge’s conclusions, inter
alia, that the petitions were tainted by the Respondent’s
unfair labor practices. As explained below, we conclude
that the petition in the ten-store unit was tainted by unfair
labor practices that occurred in that unit, and that the
petition in the three-store unit was tainted by unfair labor
practices which occurred in both units.
As an initial matter, we reject the position of the Re-
spondent and our dissenting colleague that certain of the
alleged unfair labor practices found by the judge are time
barred by Section 10(b). At the close of hearing, the
judge permitted the General Counsel to amend the com-
plaint to add allegations that the Respondent: (1) engaged
in direct dealing by telling employees that it would not
release their addresses to the Union unless the employees
authorized it to do so; and (2) unlawfully solicited em-
ployees to initiate or sign a decertification petition. Our
dissenting colleague contends, however, that these new
allegations were not closely related to any timely allega-
tions, including the refusal to bargain allegation, set forth
in the underlying charges. However, contrary to our dis-
senting colleague, as all of the conduct alleged in the
amended complaint occurred within a period of several
months and was essentially alleged to be part of an over-
all plan for the Respondent to rid itself of the Union, the
conduct satisfies the tests of relatedness with respect to
legal theory, factual circumstances, and the Respondent’s
defenses. See Ross Stores, 329 NLRB 573, 574–575
(1999).

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 All dates hereafter are 1996 unless otherwise indicated.
Our dissenting colleague also would dismiss these al-
legations because they were not included in the com-
plaint. We reject this argument. Where a complaint fails
to allege that specific conduct violates the Act, the Board
may find a violation provided that the matter was fully
litigated at the hearing. See Cherry Hill Textiles, 309
NLRB 268 (1992), enfd. 7 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 1993). See
also Atlanta Newspapers, 264 NLRB 878, 879 (1982).
Here, the Charging Party announced in its opening
statement that it anticipated that the Respondent would
take the position that its withdrawal of recognition was
justified by a loss of majority status reflected in the em-
ployee petitions. The Charging Party stated that, once
the Respondent presented this evidence, the Charging
Party would present evidence showing that supervisory
personnel had “participated in precipitating (sic) those
documents.” Further, the Charging Party stated that it
would be willing to give the Respondent the names of the
supervisors involved in that conduct. At the end of the
hearing the judge granted the General Counsel’s motion
to amend the complaint, as noted above. Over the course
of the hearing all the facts relevant to the allegations had
been fully litigated. The judge, nonetheless, offered the
Respondent an extension of time, including a recess, to
produce other evidence with regard to new allegations,
specifically direct dealing and soliciting employees to
initiate or sign a decertification petition. After a recess,
the Respondent restated its objections to the timeliness of
the amendment but explicitly stated that it did not request
a postponement to present additional evidence. Accord-
ingly, the Respondent cannot claim that it is prejudiced
by the finding that it violated Section 8(a)(1), as alleged.
Having found that certain of the unfair labor practices
found by the judge are not time barred, we turn to the
issue of whether those and other unfair labor practices
tainted the petitions. In Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB
78, 84 (1984), the Board weighed the following factors
in determining whether there was a causal relationship
332 NLRB No. 56
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 576
between unfair labor practices and a petition for decerti-
fication:

(1) The length of time between the unfair labor prac-
tices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature
of the illegal acts, including the possibility of their det-
rimental or lasting effect on employees; (3) any possi-
ble tendency to cause employee disaffection from the
union; and (4) the effect of the unlawful conduct on
employee morale, organizational activities, and mem-
bership in the union. Id.

Applying these factors here, we find a causal relation-
ship between the Respondent’s unfair labor practices and
the expressions of employee dissatisfaction with the Un-
ion upon which the Respondent based its withdrawals of
recognition from the Union. While it may not have been
the Respondent’s conduct that first sparked employee
dissatisfaction with the Union, the Respondent nurtured
the initial spark into fire when, on May 10, Johan Gallo,
the Respondent’s West Coast human resources manager,
and District Manager Scott Hook seized upon employee
Troy Foster’s report of some employee discontent in the
ten-store unit and commenced a course of unlawful con-
duct that reasonably tended to cause the employees in
both units to reject the Union as their bargaining repre-
sentative.
With respect to the ten-store unit, beginning in mid-
May, Gallo and Hook visited seven of the stores in the
unit and, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, di-
rectly solicited employees to sign decertification peti-
tions. As the judge found, this solicitation included
unlawful promises of better benefits, including enhanced
holiday and sick leave, if the employees went nonunion.
The Respondent also unlawfully refused to comply fully
with the Union’s May 6 information request concerning
the ten-store unit, and, in disregard of the Union’s status
as the employees’ exclusive representative, unlawfully
dealt directly with employees in May, June, and July
over the Union’s request for their home addresses.3
These unfair labor practices commenced less than 3
months prior to the Respondent’s July 31 withdrawal of
recognition in the ten-store unit and continued unreme-
died through that date. See Americare Pine Lodge Nurs-
ing & Rehabilitation Center, 325 NLRB 98, 98–99

3 The collective-bargaining agreement for the ten-store unit was due
to expire on July 31. By letter dated May 6, the Union communicated
its desire to reopen the agreement to the Respondent and requested
certain information, including employees’ home addresses. The Re-
spondent told the employees that it would not release their addresses to
the Union unless they signed statements authorizing it to do so. This
occurred in spite of the fact that the Respondent had previously pro-
vided employees’ addresses to the Union without such authorization.
(1997), enf. denied in relevant part sub nom. Americare
Pine Lodge Nursing & Rehabilitation Center v. NLRB,
164 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 1999) (employer’s direct dealing
with employees throughout July and August tainted
withdrawal of recognition announced in September and
made effective in December).
The Respondent’s unfair labor practices—particularly
its solicitation of employees to sign and circulate the
decertification-type petitions, promises of enhanced
benefits, and direct dealing with employees—clearly are
of a type that tend to have a lasting effect on employees
and cause employee disaffection from a union. See
Anderson Enterprises, 329 NLRB 760, 764 (1999) (di-
rect dealing and promise of bonus if employee circulated
antiunion petition “are clearly likely to undermine sup-
port for a union”). Indeed, although employee Foster
had suggested to the Respondent in late April or early
May that there was some employee discontent with the
Union, the first dated signature on the petitions was not
obtained until 2 days after the commencement of Gallo’s
and Hook’s unfair labor practices on May 10.4
Further, the Respondent’s unlawful conduct is of a
character that reasonably tends to have a negative effect
on organizational activities and union membership.
Promises of enhanced benefits in the absence of a union
tend to discourage union activity because such promises
send the unmistakable message that union representation
is not only unnecessary, but that it is an obstacle, as op-
posed to a means, to achieving higher wages and bene-
fits. Direct dealing with employees, moreover, tends to
exacerbate this negative impact on union activity because
it confirms the employer’s willingness to deal with em-
ployees outside the collective-bargaining process. See
Americare Pine Lodge Nursing, 325 NLRB at 98–99
(direct dealing taints subsequent withdrawal of recogni-
tion because it leads employees to believe that rejection
of union representation is the turnkey to better benefits).
For all of these reasons, we agree with the judge that
the Respondent’s unfair labor practices tainted the peti-
tions underlying the Respondent’s July 31 withdrawal of
recognition from the Union in the ten-store unit, thereby
making that withdrawal violative of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
For substantially similar reasons, we agree with the
judge’s further conclusion that the Respondent’s Sep-
tember 26 withdrawal of recognition from the Union in
the three-store unit was unlawful as well. Significantly,
the Respondent engaged in much of the same unlawful
conduct in the three-store unit. The Respondent dealt
directly with members of the three-store unit by telling
4 Some of the signatures are undated.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 577
them that it would not release their addresses to the Un-
ion unless they signed statements authorizing it to do so.5
Thus, as it did in the ten-store unit, the Respondent inter-
jected itself between the Union and the employees in the
three-store unit in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act, causing the same negative effects on the Union
and its relationship with the employees described above.
The Respondent’s unlawful refusal to comply with the
Union’s August 26 request for information concerning
the three-store unit likewise had a reasonable tendency to
induce dissatisfaction with the Union. John Gill, the
Respondent’s senior union relations representative, ad-
mitted that he did not respond to the Union’s request
because he had information that the employees were con-
sidering getting “rid of the Union.” But at the time, in
late August and through September, Gill had no objec-
tive basis for questioning the Union’s majority support.
Thus, he consciously and unjustifiably delayed in re-
sponding to the Union’s request to give employee
discontent with the Union, which the Respondent had
helped to create, time to fester.
It is reasonable to conclude, moreover, that Gill’s ac-
tions actually further stoked employee discontent with
the Union during this period because the information was
requested specifically to help the Union to prepare for
negotiations. The parties had scheduled a bargaining
session for October 9 and, as noted above, the contract
was due to expire on October 31. By refusing to provide
the requested information, the Respondent impeded the
Union’s ability to contact employees and to prepare for
the upcoming negotiations. That conduct too thus rea-
sonably tended to create the impression among employ-
ees that the Union was ineffectual.
In sum, the Board has stated that “an employer who
engages in efforts to have its employees repudiate their
union must be held responsible for the foreseeable con-
sequence of its conduct.” Hearst Corp., 281 NLRB 764,
765 (1986), enfd. 837 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1988), rehear-
ing denied 840 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1988). Here, in accor-
dance with Master Slack, supra, we have considered the
timing and nature of the Respondent’s unfair labor prac-
tices, and have found that, by this misconduct, the Re-
spondent set in motion a chain of events that resulted in
the employees in both units signing petitions repudiating
the Union. Accordingly, we conclude that the Respon-
dent’s withdrawals of recognition from the Union based
on those petitions violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.

5 This occurred before the Union, on August 26, requested from the
Respondent home addresses for the employees in the three-store unit.
The collective-bargaining agreement for the three-store unit was due to
expire on October 31.
Finally, we also agree with the judge, for the reasons
fully set forth in Caterair International, 322 NLRB 64
(1996), that an affirmative bargaining order is warranted
in this case as a remedy for the Respondent’s unlawful
withdrawal of recognition from the Union. We adhere to
the view, reaffirmed by the Board in that case, that an
affirmative bargaining order is “the traditional, appropri-
ate remedy for an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain with the law-
ful collective bargaining representative of an appropriate
unit of employees.” Id. at 68.
In several cases, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit has required that the
Board justify, on the facts of each case, the imposition of
such an order. See, e.g., Vincent Industrial Plastics v.
NLRB, 209 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Lee Lumber &
Building Material v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1462 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); and Exxel/Atmos v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243,
1248 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In the Vincent case, the court
summarized the court’s law as requiring that an affirma-
tive bargaining order “must be justified by a reasoned
analysis that includes an explicit balancing of three con-
siderations: (1) the employees’ § 7 rights; (2) whether
other purposes of the Act override the rights of employ-
ees to choose their bargaining representatives; and (3)
whether alternative remedies are adequate to remedy the
violations of the Act.” 209 F.3d 738.
Although we respectfully disagree with the court’s re-
quirement for the reasons set forth in Caterair, we have
examined the particular facts of this case as the court
requires and find that a balancing of the three factors
warrants an affirmative bargaining order.
(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case vindi-
cates the Section 7 rights of the unit employees who were
denied the benefits of collective bargaining by the em-
ployer’s withdrawal of recognition. At the same time, an
affirmative bargaining order, with its attendant bar to
raising a question concerning the Union’s continuing
majority status for a reasonable time, does not unduly
prejudice the Section 7 rights of employees who may
oppose continued union representation because the dura-
tion of the order is no longer than is reasonably necessary
to remedy the ill effects of the violation.
Moreover, we note that, in addition to unlawfully
withdrawing recognition, Respondent failed to furnish
information requested by the Union; promised better
benefits to employees if they rejected the Union; dealt
directly with employees by requiring them to sign forms
to release their home addresses to the Union; and solic-
ited employees to initiate and sign decertification peti-
tions. These actions clearly signaled to the employees
the Respondent’s continuing disregard for their bargain-
ing representative. Although several years have elapsed
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 578
since these unfair labor practices were committed, the
seriousness of these violations in undermining employee
support for the Union would likely have a long-lasting
effect.
We further note that, as found by the judge, the March
12, 1996 decertification petition did not reflect employee
free choice under Section 7, but rather the effect of the
Respondent’s serious prewithdrawal unfair labor prac-
tices described above. We find that these additional cir-
cumstances further support giving greater weight to the
Section 7 rights that were infringed by the Respondent’s
unlawful withdrawal of recognition.
(2) The affirmative bargaining order also serves the
policies of the Act by fostering meaningful collective
bargaining and industrial peace. That is, it removes the
Respondent’s incentive to delay bargaining or to engage
in any other conduct designed to further discourage sup-
port for the Union. It also ensures that the Union will not
be pressured, by the possibility of a decertification peti-
tion, to achieve immediate results at the bargaining table
following the Board’s resolution of its unfair labor prac-
tice charges and issuance of a cease-and-desist order.
(3) A cease-and-desist order, without a temporary de-
certification bar, would be inadequate to remedy the Re-
spondent’s violations because it would permit a decerti-
fication petition to be filed before the Respondent had
afforded the employees a reasonable time to regroup and
bargain through their representative in an effort to reach
a collective-bargaining agreement. Such a result would
be particularly unfair in circumstances such as those
here, where litigation of the Union’s charges took several
years and many of the Respondent’s unfair labor prac-
tices were likely to have a continuing effect, thereby
tainting any employee disaffection from the Union aris-
ing during that period or immediately thereafter. We
find that these circumstances outweigh the temporary
impact the affirmative bargaining order will have on the
rights of employees who oppose continued union repre-
sentation.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find that an affirma-
tive bargaining order with its temporary decertification
bar is necessary to fully remedy the allegations in this
case.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, we shall
order the Respondent to recognize and, upon request,
bargain with the Union as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in each bar-
gaining unit and, if an understanding is reached, to em-
body the understanding in a signed agreement. We shall
also order the Respondent to furnish the Union with the
information requested on May 6, 1996, for the ten-store
unit and on August 26, 1996, for the three-store unit. In
addition, the Respondent shall make whole all employees
who suffered financial loss as a result of unilateral
changes to be computed in accordance with Ogle Protec-
tion Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502
(6th Cir. 1971), with interest as computed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1978).6
We shall also modify the judge’s cease-and-desist re-
medial provisions to provide for a narrow order as the
Respondent’s unfair labor practices do not warrant impo-
sition of a broad order. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357
(1979).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., San Diego,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting employees to sign decertification peti-
tions and promising employees more favorable benefits
if they signed such petitions.
(b) Dealing directly with employees and bypassing the
Union by requiring employees to sign authorization
forms specifically permitting disclosure of requested
necessary and relevant bargaining unit information be-
fore providing it to the Union.
(c) Withdrawing recognition from the Union in the
ten-store bargaining unit and in the three-store bargain-
ing unit and thereafter refusing to bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in those units.

6 The parties, at hearing, stipulated that there were changes in the
wage rates paid to some employees in the ten-store unit after July 31
and changes in the wage rates paid to some employees in the three-store
unit after October 31.
The Charging Party has also excepted to the judge’s failure to pro-
vide that it be made whole for the Respondent’s failure to honor its
dues-checkoff obligations after withdrawing recognition from the Un-
ion. The complaint does not allege such an allegation, nor was the
issue fully and fairly litigated in the course of this proceeding. More-
over, there are no exceptions to the judge’s findings that the collective-
bargaining agreements in the ten-store and three-store units expired
July 31 and October 31, 1996, respectively. Because the checkoff
provisions do not survive expiration of the contracts, the Respondent
has no obligation, under the collective-bargaining agreements at issue,
to continue to check off dues after these dates. See Hacienda Resort
Hotel & Casino, 331 NLRB No. 89 (2000). Accordingly, we find no
merit in the Charging Party’s exceptions.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 579
(d) Failing and refusing to furnish the Union with in-
formation it has requested which is necessary and rele-
vant to the Union in the performance of its duties as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the appropriate unit.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in each of the following appropriate units
concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if
an understanding is reached, embody the understanding
in a signed agreement.
(1) The following employees of Respondent (the ten-
store unit), constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:

All mechanics and tire service employees employed by
the Respondent at its facilities located at 2531 Plaza
Boulevard, National City, California (store #2241),
8788 Navajo Road, San Diego, California (store
#2242), 830 Broadway, Chula Vista, California (store
#2243), 5577 Lake Murray Boulevard, La Mesa, Cali-
fornia (store #2244), 943 Highland Avenue, National
City, California (store #2245), “A” Bernardo Drive,
Rancho Bernardo, California (store #2246), 1136 “C”
Street, San Diego, California (store #2247), 9690
Reagan Road, Mira Mesa Shopping Center, San Diego
California (store #2249), 1245 Garnet Avenue, San
Diego California (store #2250), and 9763 Mission
Gorge Boulevard, Santee, California (store #2251); ex-
cluding salesmen, office and clerical employees,
watchmen, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.

(2) The following employees of Respondent (three-
store unit), constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:

All mechanics and tire service employees employed by
the Respondent at its facilities located at 1454 Union
Street, San Diego, California (store #2253), 435 North
2nd Street, El Cajon, California (store #2254), and
4161 Convoy Street, San Diego, California (store #
2255); excluding salesmen, office and clerical employ-
ees, watchmen, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.

(b) Furnish the Union with information requested on
May 6, 1996, for the ten-store unit and on August 26,
1996, for the three-store unit: A list of all current bar-
gaining unit employees, their current home addresses,
dates of hire, job classification, company seniority, clas-
sification seniority, and current rates of pay, including
premium pay where applicable.
(c) Make whole the employees in the ten-store unit and
the three-store unit, with interest, for any loss of earnings
and other benefits they may have suffered by the Re-
spondent’s unlawful refusal to apply the terms and condi-
tions of employment set forth in the collective-
bargaining agreements, which expired July 31, 1996, and
October 31, 1996, respectively, until such time as Re-
spondent bargains in good faith to impasse or enters into
a collective-bargaining agreement, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
all its facilities in the appropriate bargaining units de-
scribed above, copies of the attached notice marked “Ap-
pendix.”7 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any
time since May 10, 1996.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting in part.

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 580
My colleagues conclude that the Respondent engaged
in 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) violations which allegedly tainted
decertification petitions. However, as discussed below, I
conclude that these allegations are not properly a part of
this case. First, the complaint does not allege these
violations. Second, even if the complaint were deemed
to allege these violations, such complaint allegations are
not supported by a timely charge.
I. DEFICIENCIES OF THE COMPLAINT
As to the allegations in the complaint, a promise of
benefit was never alleged. Further, allegations of direct
dealing and solicitation of decertification petitions were
alleged only at the very end of the hearing. Of course, it
is essential to due process that a respondent be given
notice of the allegations before the respondent is called
upon to present its defense. In that way, a respondent
can defend itself. This was not done in this case. As
noted in my dissent in Dico Tire, Inc, 330 NLRB 1252,
slip op. at 4 (2000), the General Counsel should make
any amendments to the complaint before the hearing or,
at least, at the conclusion of his case-in-chief, so as to
give the respondent adequate time for defense prepara-
tion. Here, the amendment came at the close of the hear-
ing. Further, in his opening statement, the General
Counsel pointed only to the alleged refusal to furnish
information as the unfair labor practice which tainted the
decertification petition. My colleagues note that the
Charging Party stated, at the opening of the hearing, that
it (Charging Party) intended to adduce evidence of the
Respondent’s supervisors’ involvement in the instigation
of the decertification petitions. Of course, it is the Gen-
eral Counsel who controls what is to be alleged to be
unlawful. Here, the General Counsel did not include the
allegation in the complaint, and declined to amend the
complaint to include the allegation after the Charging
Party mentioned it.
Concededly, the General Counsel later sought to
amend the complaint, but only after the conclusion of the
hearing. I recognize that, at that point, the Respondent
could have asked for more time to rebut the new allega-
tions. However, my point concerns the orderliness of
litigation. A complaint should make the appropriate al-
legations, and then the evidence should be heard, not
vice-versa. Particularly where, as here, the General
Counsel knows (before the evidence is adduced) of the
alleged misconduct, he should not wait until after the
evidence is adduced to make his allegations.1

1 Cherry Hill Textiles, 309 NLRB 268 (1992), enfd. 7 F.3d 221 (2d
Cir. 1993), is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the original com-
plaint alleged the facts constituting the violation. That is not true in the
instant case. Similarly, Atlanta Newspapers, 264 NLRB 878, 879
(1982), is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the original complaint
II. DEFICIENCIES OF THE CHARGE
Even assuming arguendo that the complaint was effec-
tively amended to include the allegations of solicitation
to sign decertification petitions, promises of benefits, and
direct dealing, these allegations are not contained in the
charges.
The underlying charges in this case allege only that the
Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Un-
ion. There is also included in the charges a “boilerplate”
allegation that the Respondent “by these and other acts
and conduct” interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act. As to the “refusal to bargain” alle-
gation, the charge regarding each of the units was filed
on the heels of the withdrawal of recognition, and thus
these charge allegations have reference to that conduct.
As to the “boilerplate” allegations, the Board stated in
Nickles Bakery, 296 NLRB 927, 928 (1989), that allow-
ing the boilerplate “other acts” language to support
8(a)(1) complaint allegations contravenes Section 10(b)’s
mandate that the Board “not originate a complaint on its
own initiative.” Thus, the conduct that allegedly tainted
the petition was not included in the allegations of the
charges.
Nor are the complaint allegations (assumed arguendo)
“closely related” to the charge allegations. Under Redd-
I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988), the Board examines
three factors to determine whether an allegation is
closely related to the allegations in a timely filed charge:
(1) whether the allegations involve the same legal theory
and the same Section of the Act; (2) whether the allega-
tions arise from the same factual circumstances or se-
quence of events; and (3) whether a respondent would
raise similar defenses to the two sets of allegations.
As to the first factor, the charge alleges an 8(a)(5)
withdrawal of recognition. The complaint alleges vari-
ous 8(a)(1) violations. The 8(a)(5) allegation is based on
the legal theory that the Union is the legal representative,
and that the withdrawal of recognition was unlawful.
The 8(a)(1) allegations are based on the principle that
statements were made, and that they interfered with Sec-
tion 7 rights.
As to the second Redd-I factor, the allegation of the
charge was a refusal to bargain. Such refusals occurred
on August 1 and September 24. The complaint allega-
tion of direct dealing was based on a letter, signed by
Manager Hook and faxed to each store on June 5, in-
forming employees of the Union’s information request

alleged an 8(a)(3) discharge. The General Counsel was permitted to
allege later that the same discharge also violated Sec. 8(a)(1). That
situation bears no resemblance to the instant case.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 581
and stating that it would not release the addresses unless
the employees authorized it to do so. The alleged prom-
ise of benefit occurred in May, as did the solicitation of a
decertification petition and the direct dealing.
Finally, the defenses to each of these allegations also
differ materially. The defense to the allegations of re-
fusal to bargain is a showing that a majority of unit em-
ployees in each unit had signed decertification petitions.
Defenses to the allegation of direct dealing would in-
clude evidence that the conduct at issue did not occur or
evidence that the Respondent had a genuine basis for
being concerned for the safety and confidentiality of em-
ployees if the information fell into the hands of the Un-
ion. With respect to the 8(a)(1) allegations, the defense
would be evidence that the conduct had not occurred, or
that it did not interfere with, coerce or restrain the exer-
cise of a Section 7 right.2
Thus, under the test of Redd-I, I conclude that the
complaint and amendment to the complaint went beyond
the scope of the charges and are not closely related to any
timely filed charge. They are therefore barred by Section
10(b).
As I have concluded that the alleged tainting conduct
is not properly before the Board (except perhaps the re-
fusal to give information), I find that the petitions were
not tainted by unfair labor practices. I therefore find that
the Respondent had a good-faith doubt as to the majority
status of the Union in both of the units, based on decerti-
fication petitions signed by a majority of employees in
those units. Therefore I would dismiss the allegations
that the Respondent has unlawfully withdrawn recogni-
tion from the Union.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection

2 The refusal to give information is arguably “closely related” to the
withdrawal of recognition. However, there is no showing that this
alone caused the disaffection.
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT solicit our employees to sign a petition
to decertify the Union.
WE WILL NOT deal directly with employees and by-
pass the Union by requiring employees to sign authoriza-
tion forms specifically permitting disclosure of re-
quested, necessary, and relevant bargaining unit informa-
tion before providing it to the Union.
WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from, or refuse
to bargain collectively with, Automotive and Allied In-
dustries Employees, Teamsters, Local 481, International
AFL–CIO as the representative of our employees in the
appropriate units described as follows.
(1) The following employees of Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. (the ten-store unit), constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All mechanics and tire service employees employed by
us at our facilities located at 2531 Plaza Boulevard, Na-
tional City, California (store #2241), 8788 Navajo
Road, San Diego, California (store #2242), 830
Broadway, Chula Vista, California (store #2243), 5577
Lake Murray Boulevard, La Mesa, California (store
#2244), 943 Highland Avenue, National City, Califor-
nia (store #2245), “A” Bernardo Drive, Rancho
Bernardo, California (store #2246), 1136 "C" Street,
San Diego, California (store #2247), 9690 Reagan
Road, Mira Mesa Shopping Center, San Diego Califor-
nia (store #2249), 1245 Garnet Avenue, San Diego
California (store #2250), and 9763 Mission Gorge
Boulevard, Santee, California (store #2251); excluding
salesmen, office and clerical employees, watchmen,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(2) The following employees of Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. (the three-store unit), constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All mechanics and tire service employees employed by
us at our facilities located 454 Union Street, San Diego,
California (store #2253), 435 North 2nd Street, El
Cajon, California (store #2254), and 4161 Convoy
Street, San Diego, California (store # 2255); excluding
salesmen, office and clerical employees, watchmen,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

WE WILL NOT refuse and fail to furnish the Union
with the following information requested on May 6,
1996, for the ten-store unit and on August 26, 1996, for
the three-store unit: A list of all current bargaining unit
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 582
employees, their current home addresses, dates of hire,
job classification, company seniority, classification sen-
iority, and current rates of pay, including premium pay
where applicable.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the bargaining units described above concerning terms
and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agree-
ment.
WE WILL, furnish the Union with the following in-
formation requested on May 6, 1996, for the ten-store
unit and on August 26, 1996, for the three-store unit: A
list of all current bargaining unit employees, their current
home addresses, dates of hire, job classification, com-
pany seniority, classification seniority, and current rates
of pay, including premium pay where applicable.
WE WILL make whole the employees in the ten-store
unit and the three-store unit, with interest, for any loss of
earnings and other benefits they may have suffered as a
result of our unlawful refusal to apply the terms and con-
ditions of employment set forth in the collective-
bargaining agreements, which expired July 31, 1996, and
October 31, 1996, respectively, until such time as we
bargain in good faith to impasse or enters into a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC.

Neil A. Warheit, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Brian West Easley, Esq. (Jones, Day, Revis & Pouge), of Dal-
las, Texas, for the Respondent.
Richard D. Prochazka, Esq. (Prochazka & Associates), of San
Diego, California, for theCharging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GERALD A. WACKNOV, Administrative Law Judge. Pur-
suant to notice a hearing in this matter was held before me in
San Diego, California, on June 12 and 13, 1997. The original
charge in Case 21–CA–31471 was filed on July 31, 1996, by
Automotive & Allied Industries Employees, Teamsters, Local
481, AFL–CIO (the Union), and the original charge in Case
21–CA–31592 was filed by the Union on September 26, 1996.
On February 28, 1997, the Regional Director for Region 21 of
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a con-
solidated complaint and notice of hearing alleging violations by
Bridgstone/Firestone, Inc. (the Respondent) of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The
Respondent, in its answer to the complaint, denies that it has
violated the Act as alleged.
The complaint was amended at the hearing and two addi-
tional items alleged to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act, litigated fully during the course of the proceeding,
were included: that the Respondent unlawfully engaged in
direct dealing with the employees by requesting them to sign a
statement if they did not want their addresses furnished to the
Union pursuant to the Union's request for information; and by
soliciting employees to sign decertification petitions.
The parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to
call, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
relevant evidence. Since the close of the hearing, briefs have
been received from counsel for the General Counsel (the Gen-
eral Counsel) and counsel for the Respondent. On the entire
record,1 and based upon my observation of the witnesses and
consideration of the briefs submitted, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation, is engaged in the retail sale
of tires and the servicing of automobiles, and operates retail
stores throughout the United States. In the course and conduct
of its business operations, the Respondent derives gross reve-
nues in excess of $500,000, and receives at its California loca-
tions goods valued in excess of $50,000 either directly from
points outside the State of California, or directly from other
enterprises located in the State of California which, in turn,
purchase and receive the same goods directly from points out-
side the State of California. It is admitted and I find that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
It is admitted and I find that at all material times the Union
has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
The principal issue raised by the pleadings is whether the
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
causing employees to sign decertification petitions and thereaf-
ter withdrawing recognition from the Union in two separate
units at a time when the Union continued to be the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of the employees in each
unit; and by failing to furnish certain employee information
requested by the Union for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing.
B. The Facts
The Respondent has maintained a collective bargaining rela-
tionship with the Union for approximately 40 years. The Union
has represented certain mechanics and tire service employees of
the Respondent in two separate units in the San Diego, Califor-
nia area (the ten-store unit) and (the three-store unit). Separate

1 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript
is granted.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 583
collective-bargaining agreements for each unit expired at dif-
ferent times, the contract in the ten-store unit expiring on July
31, 1996, and the contract in the three-store unit expiring on
October 31, 1996.2
On May 6, Business Agent and Organizer Bruce Darby sent
the Respondent, in the same envelope, a contract reopener letter
and a separate letter requesting the following bargaining unit
information:

In preparation for negotiations. . . . lease furnish the
Union with the following information:
A list of all current bargaining unit employees, their
current home addresses, dates of hire, job classification,
company seniority, classification seniority, and current
rates of pay, including premium where applicable.

Darby testified that in about mid-May, he received several
phone calls from unit members who advised him that represen-
tatives of the Respondent were going around to some of the
stores in the ten-store unit and soliciting members to decertify
the Union. On about June 12, Darby phoned John Gill, the
Respondent’s labor relations representative, and informed him
that District Manager Scott Hook and Human Resources Man-
ager Johan Gallo were attempting to cause employees to decer-
tify the Union, and that Darby wanted them to stop such unlaw-
ful interference. Gill said that he would contact Hook and Gallo
and tell them to discontinue such activities. During the same
conversation, Darby told Gill that he wanted the requested bar-
gaining unit information he had asked for in his May 6 letter as
the initial negotiating session for the ten-store unit had been
scheduled for July 24, and Darby wanted to communicate with
the employees prior thereto in order to prepare bargaining pro-
posals. Up to that point he had received no information. Gill
replied, according to Darby, that the Union was entitled to the
information and that he would contact the San Diego District
Office and tell them to provide the information.
Darby did not receive such information until July 15, by fax
from Kim Garcia, administrative assistant at the San Diego
district office. The list was not complete and only contained 51
names, although there were known to be over 60 unit members
in the ten-store unit; further, the addresses of many named em-
ployees were not included. Because of frequent employee turn-
over and the fact that the Respondent did not regularly forward
accurate monthly information to the Union, Darby did not
know how many unit employees were in the ten-store unit at
the time, or their current addresses. In earlier bargaining nego-
tiations, in 1993, similar information was requested and ad-
dresses were not deleted. Nor had the Respondent ever raised
any issue of employee privacy or confidentiality with Darby
during the many years of the collective bargaining relationship.
A bargaining session in the ten-store unit was held on July
24, as scheduled. Scott Hook, John Gill and Johan Gallo repre-
sented the Respondent. Apparently, the meeting was simply an
introductory session and bargaining, if any, was abbreviated.
Another meeting was scheduled for August 27.

2 All dates or time periods hereinafter are within 1996 unless other-
wise specified.
However, no further meetings were held, as on July 31,
1996, Darby received a letter from the Respondent canceling
the scheduled bargaining meeting and stating that subsequent to
the July 24 bargaining session the Respondent had received
petitions signed by a majority of unit employees stating that
they no longer wished to be represented by the Union and that,
“[p]ursuant to the petitions and other objective considerations
showing absence of majority support, the law prohibits us from
negotiating for a successor agreement, and the Company with-
draws recognition of Local 481 effective August 1, 1996.”
Regarding the three-store unit, Darby sent a similar reopener
letter dated August 26, and also, in order to prepare for negotia-
tions, requested similar bargaining information, namely, “A list
of all current bargaining unit employees, together with their
current home address, date of hire, job classification, company
seniority, classification seniority, and current rate of pay
including premium pay where applicable.”
A meeting was set up for bargaining in this three-store unit
but it was not held, as the Respondent, by letter dated Septem-
ber 24, stated that it had received a petition signed by a major-
ity of the unit employees that they no longer desired to be rep-
resented by the Union; therefore the Respondent canceled the
negotiating session scheduled for October 9, and stated that it
would continue to recognize the union and honor the agreement
only through its October 31 expiration date.
Kim Garcia is administrative assistant for District Manager
Scott Hook. Garcia testified that in May the Respondent re-
ceived a request for information from the Union regarding the
ten-store unit, and that she contacted Human Resources Direc-
tor Gallo about the request. Gallo, in turn, referred Garcia to
John Gill. It was ultimately decided that the Respondent should
send out an authorization request to the employees prior to
volunteering their addresses to the Union. Garcia testified that
in other situations, not involving the Union, she customarily
does not give out such information without authorization.
Thereupon, a notice issued by District Manager Hook was
faxed to each store wherein the Respondent asked for permis-
sion of each employee prior to giving out their address to the
Union. The notice, dated June 5, is as follows:

In preparation for the upcoming negotiations, the Un-
ion (Local 481) has requested your current address, date of
hire, job classification, company seniority and current rate
of pay.
In compliance with the Union’s request, we will be
glad to furnish them with all the information they request,
EXCEPT, your home address. In order to provide the Un-
ion with your home address, it will take your authorization
for Firestone to release that information..
If you agree to authorize Firestone to release your
home address, please sign and date below and return it to
your Store Manager for mailing to the District Office.

Thereafter, each union employees was required to sign a state-
ment either giving permission or denying permission for the
Respondent to disclose his or her home address to the Union,
Garcia testified that a similar request for information was re-
ceived for the three-store unit on August 26, and Garcia again
contacted Gallo. Gallo told her that the Respondent had broken
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 584
off negotiations with the Union and had declined to recognize
the Union, and that there was to be no further contact with the
Union unless she was notified otherwise. Therefore, she did not
furnish any information to the Union regarding the three-store
unit.
According to Garcia, the process of obtaining employee au-
thorization from employees in the ten-store unit took some time
and it was not until July 3, that she faxed the requested infor-
mation, except for the addresses of employees who did not
authorize such disclosure, to the Union. After a subsequent
conversation during which the Union denied having been fur-
nished the information, she again faxed the same information
on July 15.3
Garcia testified that at some point she began receiving some
phone calls from employees who asked her “how to get out of
the Union.” She advised Hook about the calls, and Hook, after
inquiring about what to do, later told her to refer such employ-
ees to the National Labor Relations Board; however, it appears
that, instead, employees were referred to the Respondent’s
headquarters.
In May, June, and July, according to Garcia, the following
problem arose. Employees were not signing up with the Union
as they were required to do under the union-security clause in
the contract. Thus, during the new hire orientation Garcia
would tell them that it was their obligation to go to the union
hall and sign up. They were also told the amount of their initia-
tion fee and monthly union dues. However, many of the new
hires neglected to do this, and the Union, discovering that such
employees had been hired but had not become union members,
began sending out letters to the various store mangers telling
them that certain employees had not signed up. The store man-
agers then required these employees to sign up, after which the
Union assessed them back dues from the time they became
employed; sometimes such back dues amounted to as much as
$200. Later, according to Garcia, the union representative
brought the registration cards and payroll authorization cards to
her so that she could have the employees fill them out during
the orientation and mail them in. This process was initiated in
about late May. The registration cards contained the em-
ployee’s name, address, phone number, store number, classifi-
cation code, and the amount they were earning. Garcia had
these forms filled out by all new employees and provided the
information to the Union in May, June, and July.
Garcia admitted that the list of names of unit members in the
ten-store unit that she sent to the Union was not complete.
Thus, Garcia testified that two new unit employees had not
signed up with the Union and were not on the list. Further, the
list may not have been “real accurate” because terminated
employees may have been inadvertently left on the list. How-
ever, Garcia testified that, “I would say it’s about 90 percent
accurate.”
Garcia testified that the payroll department would provide
the Union with an employee’s change of address only if the
Union asked for it; therefore the Union would not automatically
receive such information and, unless notified directly by the

s.

3 Garcia testified that although she has the fax confirmation for July
15, she does not have the July 3 confirmation.
employee, would not know the employee’s current address.
Further, Garcia’s policy in not automatically disclosing such
information might have been different than the policy of the
payroll department. She was unable to explain the rationale for
the two conflicting policies, and maintained that it had always
been her practice to ask employees for their permission to give
the Union any personal information.
Troy Foster, called as a witness by the Respondent, is cur-
rently employed by the Respondent and has been a technician
at the Pacific Beach store for 3 years. Foster testified that dur-
ing the course of general conversations over lunch or a cigarette
with five or six employees at the store, certain of them began
expressing their opinion that the Union wasn’t doing them any
good, that there was no contact with the Union, that they re-
ceived nothing in the mail from the Union, and that they were
basically unhappy with the union representation they were pay-
ing for. As a result, Foster asked his store manager what could
be done, and subsequently the manager gave him a phone num-
ber to call. The number was that of the Respondent’s Rolling
Meadows, Illinois headquarters and, according to Foster, upon
talking with someone4 “they faxed me basically the words that
are in the petition that I wrote.” He did this of his own volition
and had no meetings with management representatives; nor
were there any promises or threats made.
Foster testified that in about the beginning of June, he went
around to four other stores and talked to the employees there.
He would ask some of the store managers whether he could talk
to the people and he was given permission to speak to them
during their working time; however, according to Foster, the
employees didn’t want any involvement with the petition and
there were only one or two employees who signed the petition
in his presence. Thus, according to Foster, “Most of the stores
that I went to nobody would sign [the petitions].” However, he
believes that his efforts “started a lot of talk about the Union
and all that.” At some point Foster obtained an employee bene-
fits booklet from Garcia containing the benefits for employees
of the Respondent’s nonunion stores, as the unit employees
were concerned about the benefits they would receive as
nonunion employee
Foster left one petition at one of the stores he visited and
mailed another petition containing some signatures to the Re-
spondent’s headquarters in Rolling Meadows where the Com-
pany’s labor relations department is located.
Although Foster testified that he could not recall whether he
circulated the petitions before or after Hook and Gallo came to
his store, infra, to talk about the situation, the petition he circu-
lated is dated June 6.5 However, according to Foster, at some
point Hook and Gallo did come out to his store and spoke to the
employees: Foster testified that “I believe it was about the
benefits of non-Union stores I think. They didn’t really speak
about it but they told us there’s things in the works about it. . . .
Yeah. That they were putting it together or something . . . The
company was putting it together.”
4 Foster did not know the identity of the individual to whom he was
referred.
5 In fact, it appears that none of the petitions were signed earlier than
May 12, 2 days following the visit to the stores by Gallo and Hook.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 585
Roger Lutz, since December 1, has been the manager of ve-
hicle services at the C Street store, and through July was a lead
technician in one of the stores in the ten-store unit. Lutz testi-
fied that he helped with the petitions, as he “has never been
appreciative of what the Union has done for the employees,”
and didn’t feel that he was getting his money’s worth. He
called Troy Foster to find out where to mail the petition.
Charles Cooper was lead technician in the Chula Vista store
and has been employed by the Respondent for the past 15
years. Currently, he is a manager of vehicle services, a mana-
gerial position. Cooper testified that in May, Scott Hook and
Johan Gallo came to his store and asked to meet with him per-
sonally. The three of them met in the backroom during working
hours. Cooper testified that Hook and Gallo told him that
“[t]hey wanted to give us better benefits and stuff,” and that if
the stores went nonunion “they would be able to give us more
benefits.” They also told him that, “[t]here’s so much more they
could do for us.” While, according to Cooper, they did not tell
him how to get rid of the Union, they did tell him to write a
letter to Rolling Meadows about the matter. Cooper testified
that he was “a little bit intimidated and nervous” during this
meeting as it was the first time either Hook or Gallo had ever
approached him for any purpose. Cooper did not testify that
Gallo asked him anything about his prior injury or workers’
compensation claim, as testified to by Gallo, infra.
Cooper testified that after the meeting with Hook and Gallo
he talked to other people in the Chula Vista store about getting
rid of the Union. He also talked to an employee named “Jeff”
at another store. On May 29, he signed the following document
for the Union:

Was given address to send letter to decertify Union. On or
about May 10, 1996 company representatives Mr. Scott Hook
and Mr. Johan Gallo asked me to decertify the union. I de-
clare under the penalty of perjury according to the laws of the
State of California that the foregoing is true.

Jeffrey Jornlin worked at the National City store as a techni-
cian. Jornlin testified that Hook and Gallo came to the store
sometime in May and had a meeting with the employees during
working time. He listened to only “some of the meeting” as he
had cars to work on. He heard Hook or Gallo say that the bene-
fits would not change and would stay the same “if we signed
something to get the Union out.” At least three other employ-
ees were present. Jornlin refused to sign any petition that one of
the employees began circulating. Several months later, his
store manager asked him what the Union had done for him
lately, or words to that effect. Jornlin signed the same state-
ment as Cooper, namely, that on or about May 10, Hook and
Gallo asked him to decertify the Union; however, Jornlin testi-
fied that they did not use the term “decertify.”
Damian Spears was a technician at the National City store.
He no longer works for the Respondent. Spears testified that
Hook and Gallo came to the store in May and had a meeting
with the employees. Jornlin was present. Gallo identified him-
self as a negotiator. Spears testified that Hook said that the
employees didn’t need the Union, that Hook’s nonunion stores
had better sick leave and better holidays, and that there was no
advantage to having a union in his company. And Gallo said,
“What do you need the Union for, they’re no good. They’re
going to be gone anyhow. And there was really no purpose for
the Union there.”
According to Spears, either Hook or Gallo said during the
meeting that “[b]ecause since we were a Union store that we
would have to work three years in order to get three days sick
leave. But if I was in a non-Union store you get it within the
first year, or something like that, 90 days or the first year.” It
was also said that the nonunion stores have better holidays.
Spears asked where the employees’ union representative was,
and was told that this was just an unexpected visit and, “it was
just between us talking off the record like thing.” There was
some discussion about benefits and one employee asked what
the benefits were in the non-union stores, and Hook and Gallo
referred to a benefits booklet that they had with them. Accord-
ing to Spears, “They both kept rattling on about the Union
wasn’t needed . . . There’s no purpose—you know, what are we
gaining out of having a Union.” Spears asked what was the
benefit of not having a union, and Hook replied that things
would be better because they would have better benefits. After
they left employee Arturo Abenes began circulating a petition
to get rid of the Union. Spears told Abenes that he wasn’t go-
ing to sign anything, and then telephoned Union Representative
Darby to advise him of the visit by Hook and Gallo.
Spears testified that a couple of days after the meeting his
store manager, Art Estrada, said to him, “Well, they want to get
rid of the Union.” Spears said that he was not signing the peti-
tion and Estrada said, “You do what you’ve got to do but, you
know, they are probably going to get rid of the Union.”
Aurturo Abenes Sr., called as a witness by the Respondent, is
a lead technician. He has worked for the Respondent for 13
years. He was at the meeting in May, with Hook and Gallo;
Spears and Jornlin were also present. Abenes testified that that
he did not pay attention to what was being said and was “kind
of far” from the discussion, and doesn’t recall anything about
the discussion that took place. While he “believes” that things
were said about what it would be like if there were no union, he
was unable to recall any details of the meeting, although he
acknowledged that Spears did ask some questions. According
to Abenes, neither Hook nor Gallo had an employee booklet or
referenced such a booklet. Abenes received a wage increase in
about March 1997, of $2 per hour. In 1996, before the with-
drawal of recognition, he received a 20-cent-per-hour wage
increase.
Matthew Cleland has worked for the Respondent for 9 years.
He is a lead technician in the El Cajon store, one of the stores in
the three-store unit. Cleland testified that he prepared a petition
to remove the Union because he got tired of not being taken
care of by the Union and because of dissatisfaction with the
prior contracts negotiated by the Union. He talked to all of the
employees who signed his petition and physically circulated it
among the employees at the three stores on his own time. A
total of 14 employees worked at the 3 stores; 7, 3, and 4, re-
spectively. Cleland testified that he had heard about the peti-
tions being circulated in the ten-store unit and phoned an em-
ployee, Roger Lutz, who was a bargaining unit employee at one
of the stores in that unit, “because I had heard that other stores
had sent a petition in and I wanted to do the same.” Cleland
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 586
testified that he had no discussions with management about the
petition, and that no promises or threats were made to him. He
got the wording of the petition and the address of the Respon-
dent’s headquarters from Lutz. In September he received a
wage increase of $1.65 per hour. Prior to that time he had been
receiving annual wage increases of 10 to 15 cents per hour in
accordance with the union contract.
Jeffrey Prowant is lead technician at the Convoy store, one
of the stores in the three-store unit. He signed a petition but did
not circulate it. He also signed a demand that the company
bargain in good faith.
John Gill was a senior union relations representative with the
Respondent until he retired on June 1, 1997. He is now a con-
sultant with the Respondent. Gill testified that he received the
decertification petitions near the end of July; each petition was
received at the Respondent’s headquarters individually, over a
period of time. He was aware that there were employees who
were not happy with the Union, but did not talk with any em-
ployees directly; rather, his information came from Johan
Gallo. According to Gill, about 34 out of a unit of about 60
signed the petitions in the ten-store unit, and about 11 out of 15
signed the petition in the three-store unit. Gill testified that at
the time of the July 24 negotiating meeting for the ten-store unit
the Respondent did not have petitions from a majority of em-
ployees. Gill testified that neither he nor his “cohort,” Mr.
Deadkey, would have given any employee the Respondent’s
address in Rolling Meadows, Illinois, for the purpose of
submitting decertification petitions. Regarding the three-store
unit, Gill testified that he prepared a letter withdrawing recog-
nition before he went on vacation because, according to
information he received from Gallo, it appeared that a majority
of those employees were in favor of decertification.
Johan Gallo is the West Coast human resources manager for
the Respondent, and handles all of the human resource func-
tions for the 300 stores in the 10 western States. Gallo testified
that the first time he became aware of the decertification issue
was when he was contacted by Troy Foster, an employee of the
Respondent’s Pacific Beach store, during the latter part of April
or first part of May.
During this conversation Foster advised Gallo that he had
contacted the district office and had been referred to Gallo.
Foster said, according to Gallo, that he felt he was expressing
the concerns of several employees who believed that they were
not being adequately represented by the Union, “and wanted to
know what he should do as far as, basically talking to the other
employees, what to do to get rid of the union because they were
fed up.” At some point, Gallo told Foster that one thing he
could do would be to contact the NLRB. The other thing to do,
according to Gallo, would be to talk to those employees who
are disgruntled and have them sign a piece of paper stating that
they no longer wanted to be represented by the Union; he did
not give Foster specific language. He told Foster to mail the
paper to the Respondent’s union relations department in Roll-
ing Meadows, Illinois, and that the union relations people
would address the matter from that point on. It was a fairly
short conversation, during which Gallo apparently gave Foster
the address and phone number of the Respondent’s headquar-
ters, and thereafter Gallo had no further inquiries from any
other employees about the matter. Gallo then called John Gill in
Illinois to report and discuss the inquiry by Foster.
About 2 weeks later, on about May 10, Gallo came to the
San Diego area to visit the stores and talk with the employees
about some of the questions they might have concerning the
matters raised by Foster. At this time no petitions had been
submitted by Foster. District Manager Hook, who had appar-
ently received other inquiries, told Gallo that the employees
had a lot of questions, and he really didn’t know how to answer
them. They went to Foster’s store first and met with him indi-
vidually. Foster indicated that that he had spoken to several co-
workers and there seemed to be growing concern over their
frustration with the Union as they were fed up and did not feel
that they were getting anything for their money. Foster also
said that the employees had questions and invited the two of
them to meet with the employees. Gallo testified that his pur-
pose in first going to Foster’s store was to follow up on Foster’s
phone call and answer any questions and, “if that’s not needed
then I can just leave.” Foster, according to Gallo, was the one
who requested that he speak with the employees, and Gallo
simply acquiesced, saying, “[T]hen let’s get on with it.”
Gallo then spoke to the store manager and asked if he and
Hook could take a couple of minutes to answer questions that
the employees might have. He told the manager not to involve
himself in any way with the decertification matter. During the
meeting with the employees Gallo simply asked whether the
employees had any questions about decertification, after advis-
ing them as follows: “From our company’s perspective it’s
really their decision whether or not they want the union or don’t
want the union. From, you know, we felt that we’d had a good
relationship with the union over the years. We’d negotiated in
the past and, you know, it was really their call. I was there at
the request of one of the employee’s overgrowing concerns of
numerous employees and I was there to answer any of their
questions.”
According to Gallo, the employees wanted to know what
would happen if “the Union was voted out what specifically
would the company do with regards to benefits and wages and
those types of issues.” And Gallo replied, “I can’t answer those
questions, you know.” Gallo simply responded, “We’ll work
with union/non-union stores, it doesn’t matter.” Gallo told
them that fewer than 300 of the Respondent’s 1500 stores are
union, and whatever the employees want is up to them. He did
not distribute any documents and had no employee benefit
booklets. Gallo emphasized that he “made it very clear to them
that it’s inappropriate during the phase that they were at to dis-
cuss anything with regards to benefits, wages, vacations, holi-
days, and of those types of issues and basically as I told them, I
said, you know, I’m not going to stand here and promise things
to you, that’s not the purpose of my visit . . . The purpose of my
visit is to make sure that I understand any of the questions that
you may have about the petition that’s going around.” Thus,
Gallo repeatedly testified that he was just there to answer ques-
tions about the petition process, and he told the employees that
if a majority of them in the unit didn’t want the Union, then
“whenever the petition is circulated and the signatures are gath-
ered and mailed in, then we will advise the Union that the em-
ployees no longer want to be represented.”
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 587
Gallo testified that he and Hook visited a total of seven
stores in the ten-store unit that day with the same message:
They told each store manage not to get involved in a dialogue
about benefits, and during each meeting with the employees
Gallo said that they were there because of a contact from Troy
Foster regarding the growing concerns of employees who no
longer wanted to be represented by the Union, and that they
were there to answer any questions the employees may have
about this matter.
Gallo testified about his meeting with Charles Cooper at one
of the stores. According to Gallo he specifically wanted to go
to that store to talk with Cooper because of an accident Cooper
had incurred, in order to find out how his recovery was pro-
gressing and whether all of the Workers’ Compensation bene-
fits to which he was entitled were being furnished him. Gallo
and Hook spoke with Cooper for a few minutes about his in-
jury, and then there was discussion about the Union. And,
according to Gallo, “it basically got into the dialog of, you
know, about the petition that was going around.” He told Coo-
per, “[You] know, you’ve got an employee in this store that has
a petition that he’s circulating out of frustration . . . I’m here to
answer any questions you have and so if there’s anything spe-
cific I can answer regarding that I’ll be more than happy to do
that.” Cooper asked him, “Well what’s the difference between
the company’s programs and the union’s programs. And, you
know, do I have any booklets or anything that I can give him so
he can show in contrast what would be the better of the two.”
And Gallo replied, “[We’re] in no position at this point, in this
process to talk about benefits, wages, or any of things (sic); and
it would be inappropriate to do so.”
According to Gallo, Cooper asked for a copy of the em-
ployee handbook for nonunion employees, and Gallo said that
it would be inappropriate to give it to him as, “what we’re just
trying to ascertain at this point is if people have questions about
he petition that’s being circulated.” Cooper said that he had
questions about benefits and insurance, and Gallo repeated that
that it was too early to talk about that right now. Gallo did not
provide Cooper with any papers, or suggest that he send a letter
to any address or give him any phone numbers. He told Cooper
that the company would go with what the majority of the unit
employees wanted. Cooper was the union steward in the store
at the time. This conversation lasted about 10 minutes.
Gallo testified that he and Hook visited the National City
store and spoke with Damian Spears and two other employees,
including Art Abenes. Spears was concerned with the issue of
progressive discipline and discharges in the event there was no
union to protect the interests of employees. Gallo told him that
the Company’s disciplinary policy applies whether or not there
is a union, and that each of the Respondent’s 1500 stores have a
similar progressive discipline policy. This discussion was initi-
ated by Spears. There were two other shop employees present.
Gallo described the foregoing meetings as generally “pretty
much a standard drill,” where employees wanted to know about
benefits and Gallo and Hook cut them off and responded that
they could not talk about such things and were not there for that
purpose as, “We were not going to discuss benefits or wages
until we found out what the majority of employees wanted.”
Gallo testified that during the meetings he did not make any
representations to the employees about what might happen to
wages or benefits if the employees decided they no longer
wanted to be represented by the Union; nor did he refer to any
employee benefits booklet or provide any information about
benefits in non-union stores. Gallo had no meetings with em-
ployees in the three-store unit.
District Manger Scott Hook, who, together with Gallo visited
each of the seven stores and participated in the foregoing meet-
ings with employees, did not testify in this proceeding. How-
ever, he was present in the hearing room for the duration of the
hearing, and the only reason given for not calling him as a wit-
ness was that his testimony would be “substantially duplica-
tive” of the testimony given by Gallo.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The record evidence is clear that shortly after an initial in-
quiry from one employee regarding decertification, the Re-
spondent faxed to that employee the wording of a petition to be
used for such purposes, and requested that the petition be sub-
mitted to the Respondent’s headquarters.6 However, even prior
to the time any such petitions were submitted to the Respon-
dent or, insofar as the record shows, even before any employee
began circulating a petition, Human Resources Manager Johan
Gallo and District Manger Scott Hook visited seven of the ten
stores in the ten-store unit and conducted meetings with the unit
employees. What was said to employees during these visits is
of determinative significance. Thus, it is the Respondent’s
contention that Gallo and Hook answered questions only about
the decertification process, and refrained from answering other
questions about benefits, or what the employees could expect in
the absence of union representation, as such matters were
deemed to be strictly “off limits” at that early point in time.
Contrary to the contentions and evidence proffered by the
Respondent, I find that the visits by Gallo and Hook constituted
a blatant and unequivocal attempt to capitalize on the alleged
dissatisfaction of a limited number of employees, namely, Fos-
ter and, as indicated by Foster to Gallo, several others, and
thereupon the Respondent undertook the solicitation of all em-
ployees in order to get them to initiate petitions to get rid of the
Union. This solicitation included promises that employee bene-
fits in the absence of a union would be more favorable or at
least would not be different than those they enjoyed under the
union contract. I specifically do not credit the extensive testi-
mony of Gallo, uncorroborated by any other witness, that Gallo
and Hook did not discuss benefits with the employees or at-
tempt to persuade employees that they would be better off
without the Union. Indeed, even Foster, a current employee
who was disenchanted with the Union and initiated the first
contact with the Respondent, testified that Gallo and Hook
talked “about the benefits of non-Union stores I think. They
didn’t really speak about it but they told us there’s things in the
works about it . . . Yeah. That they were putting it together or
something . . . The company was putting it together.”
And I credit the testimony of Cooper, a current employee,
and find that Hook and Gallo told him during a private conver-
sation that “[t]hey [the Respondent] wanted to give us better

6 I credit Foster's account of this initial conversation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 588
benefits and stuff,” and that if the stores went nonunion “they
would be able to give us more benefits,” because, “There’s so
much more they could do for us,” if the employees were no
longer represented by the Union. Thereafter, Cooper solicited
other employees to decertify the Union.
And I credit the testimony of Jornlin who heard Hook or
Gallo say that certain employee benefits would not change and
would stay the same “if we signed something to get the Union
out.”
And I credit the testimony of Spears who testified that Hook
said that the employees didn’t need the Union; that his non-
union stores had better sick leave and better holidays; and that
there was no advantage to having a union in his company.
Further, I find that Gallo reiterated this theme and said, “What
do you need the Union for, they’re no good. They’re going to
be gone anyhow. And there was really no purpose for the Un-
ion there.” Additionally, according to Spears, either Hook or
Gallo said that in the nonunion stores the sick leave and holiday
benefits were better and both of them kept “rattling on about
the Union wasn’t needed . . . There’s no purpose—you know,
what are we gaining out of having a Union.” Indeed, when
Spears directly asked what the employees could expect in the
absence of a union, Hook directly replied that things would be
better because the employees would have better benefits.
In addition to crediting the testimony of the aforementioned
employees, it is highly significant that Hook was not called as a
witness to corroborate Gallo’s denials that any such things were
said. I find that the Respondent’s failure to call Hook as a wit-
ness despite clear and determinative credibility conflicts, under
the circumstances, warrants the adverse inference that Hook’s
testimony would not corroborate the denials by Gallo and in
fact would have supported the testimony of those employees
who testified adversely to Gallo. International Automated Ma-
chines, 285 NLRB 1122 (1987).
Accordingly, I find that by such conduct the Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the act by providing unlawful assis-
tance and support for the decertification petitions and by prom-
ising similar or more favorable benefits in the event the em-
ployees initiate and sign such petitions. Clinton Food 4 Less,
288 NLRB 597, 605 (1988); Central Washington Hospital, 279
NLRB 60, 64–65 (1986); Fabric Warehouse, 294 NLRB 189
(1989), enfd. 902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990). As a result of such
unlawful assistance, the Respondent’s reliance upon the peti-
tions is impermissible and its withdrawal of recognition in the
ten-store unit is violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Further, I find that the Respondent’s failure to furnish the re-
quested bargaining unit information to the Union in a complete
and timely fashion is violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The Union is clearly entitled to such information as it is pre-
sumptively relevant. Tom’s Ford, Inc., 253 NLRB 888, 895
(1980). Moreover, the Respondent has given no persuasive
reason for deviating from past practice and for precipitously,
without any prior notification to or bargaining with the Union,
requiring employees to sign authorization forms in order to
release their addresses to the Union. See Burkart Foam, 283
NLRB 351, 356 (1987), enfd. 848 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1988).
Further, under the circumstances, and particularly in light of the
other concurrent unfair labor practices, the requirement that
employees sign such an authorization is tantamount to taking an
unlawful poll of employees in order to ascertain the Union’s
strength among the unit members and is violative of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. Northwest Pipe & Casing Co., 300 NLRB
726, 733 (1990).
Moreover, in agreement with the contentions of the General
Counsel, as supported by the record evidence, I find that the
Respondent was in a much more favorable position than the
Union to know the current addresses of unit employees and that
it is reasonable to presume, under the circumstances, that the
Respondent’s failure in not timely and completely providing
such necessary information to the Union, even in the absence of
any other unlawful conduct, is, standing alone, sufficient to
invalidate the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition. Thus,
in the ten-store unit it appears that, at best, a bare majority of
unit employees signed such petitions,7 and the Respondent
presented evidence that a common reason for signing such peti-
tions was because employees felt abandoned due to an alleged
lack of communication from the Union. It is reasonable to
assume that had the Union been able to communicate with all
the unit employees in a timely fashion at this critical juncture in
the bargaining relationship, as it attempted to do by writing to
those unit members whose addresses it had in order to obtain
their input for the upcoming bargaining negotiations, at least
some employees may have refrained from signing the petition.
Indeed, in the absence of any other convincing rationale for the
change in policy, it is probable that the Respondent failed to
comply with the Union’s request for information not for any
reasons of privacy or confidentiality, but for the very purpose
of precluding the Union from communicating with the employ-
ees it represented, and for the further purpose of implying to
employees that communication from the Union would not be in
their best interests. I find that failing to timely provide such
information, withholding the addresses of employees from the
Union, and bypassing the Union and dealing directly with em-
ployees by requiring that they sign an authorization form in
order to release their addresses to the Union, are each inde-
pendent violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, as alleged. See
Detroit Edison Co., 310 NLRB 564, 564–565 (1993).
There remains the matter of the three-store unit. The limited
record evidence shows that the petition for decertification in the
three-store unit, as a result of which the Respondent withdrew
recognition from the Union, was signed by a majority of em-
ployees and that it followed shortly after the withdrawal of
recognition in the ten-store unit. While there is no independent
evidence showing that the Respondent directly solicited such a
petition or engaged in the same course of conduct as in the
much larger ten-store unit, it is reasonable to assume that there
was a causal relationship between the earlier withdrawal of
recognition in the ten-store unit and the subsequent circulation
of the deauthorization petition in the three-store unit.
Indeed, the record shows that the two units, each located
within the same geographic area, were distinct only because of
historical happenstance. The employees in the two units were

7 The Union argues that in fact the petitions lacked majority of
signatures. It appears unnecessary to analyze this issue under the
circumstances, as it is not determinative of the result herein.
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. 589
governed by identical contracts and maintained contact with
one-another, and employees in the three-store unit received
assistance in the decertification process from members of the
ten-store unit; in practicality, they shared a total community of
interest except for the separate expiration dates of their con-
tracts. Moreover, it is reasonable to presume that employees in
the smaller unit would likely follow the lead of the employees
in the larger ten-store unit for the sake of uniformity because
both units had such identical interests and experience over a
lengthy period of time. Finally, the Respondent has not pre-
sented any evidence to show that its blatantly unlawful solicita-
tion of employees in the ten-store unit did not also taint its
withdrawal of recognition in the three-store unit. Under the
circumstances a causal connection between the Respondent’s
unlawful conduct in the ten-store unit and subsequent employee
disaffection in the three-store unit is clear. I therefore find that
the Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition in the three-store
unit, and its failure to furnish the Union with requested bargain-
ing information for such unit employees, is violative of Section
8(a)(5) of the Act. Guerdon Industries, 218 NLRB 658, 660–
662 (1975); Lee Lumber & Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175,
177 (1996).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act as alleged in the complaint, as amended at the hearing,
and as found above.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated and is violat-
ing Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I recommend that it be
required to cease and desist therefrom and from in any other
manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees
in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. The
Respondent shall be required, upon request, to recognize and
bargain in good faith with the Union in each unit, and if an
understanding is reached, to embody such understanding in a
collective-bargaining agreement. In addition, the Respondent
shall be required, upon request, to furnish the Union with cur-
rent bargaining unit information in a timely fashion. Also, the
Respondent shall be required to post an appropriate notice,
attached hereto as “Appendix” at each of its stores involved
herein.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]