2019005931 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 22, 2021)

Brian Johnson et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 22, 2021

2019005931 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 22, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/579,404 10/14/2009 Brian M. Johnson IP-P988US1/281194 8242 150601 7590 02/22/2021 Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (eBay Inc.) Intellectual Property Department 2555 Grand Blvd. KANSAS CITY, MO 64108-2613 EXAMINER JOHNSON, JOHNESE T ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2168 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/22/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): shbdocketing@shb.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BRIAN M. JOHNSON, BHARAT KUMAR VENKAT, JENNIFER M. DANTE, RAFFI TUTUNDJIAN, KRISTINE CHIN ARONSON, and RICHARD D. HENDERSON Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 Technology Center 2100 Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JAMES B. ARPIN, and AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–19, all of the pending claims. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellant refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as eBay, Inc. Brief 3. Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claimed invention “relates to the technical field of data communications and, more particularly, to systems and methods to search a data source based on compatibility with an application.” Spec. ¶ 1. TheSpecification explains that, in an Internet marketplace for example, “Sellers may list a part without knowledge of different and varied applications that may be compatible with the part. This sometimes hinders the buyer who may search for the part by querying for the part in the context of an application or specification.” Id. ¶ 2. Referring to Figure 9, the Specification describes methods and systems in which [a] query 152 may be received from a user (e.g., buyer) who is shopping on a network-based marketplace 76. The query may include keywords that may be identified (e.g., inferred) as item information 156 describing an item or part that is being sought on the network-based marketplace 76, application information 158 that may describe an application that is compatible with the part such that the part “fits” the application, and specification information 160 that may describe a specification for the part such that the part is compatible with an application that shares the same or related specification. The keywords in the query are used to search for listings 78 in a database. . . . A listing may be identified based on a comparison of like information. For example, the item information 156 in the query 152 may be compared with the listing item information 80 in the listing 78; the application information 158 in the query 152 may be compared with listing application information 81 in the listing 78; and the specification information 160 in the query 152 may be compared with the listing specification information 82 in the listing 78. Id. ¶ 59. Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 3 Claims 1, 10, and 19 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative: 1. A method comprising: receiving a first query including keywords; using a data processor for identifying at least one keyword in the first query as application information describing a first application; inferring remaining keywords in the first query as item information describing a first item that a user is searching for on a network-based marketplace, the first item being a part that is compatible with the first application; generating a second query based on the application information and the item information, the generating the second query including generating structured item information from the item information that was inferred to leave a remainder of unstructured item information, the second query including the structured item information and the unstructured item information and the application information; and searching a data storage device based on the second query, the searching including identifying a first listing on the data storage device as matched, the first listing including an item offered for sale on the network-based marketplace, the first listing including listing item information being identified as matched based on the unstructured item information, the first listing including structured listing item information being identified as matched based on the structured item information, the first listing further including listing application information being identified as matched based on the application information. Brief 11 (Claims App.). Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 4 REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following references: Name2 Reference Date Adegan US 2005/0125261 A1 June 9, 2005 Piper US 2007/0219982 A1 Sep. 20, 2007 REJECTION The Examiner rejects claims 1–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)3 as obvious over the combined teachings of Piper and Adegan. Non-Final Act. 2–16. OPINION We have considered Appellant’s arguments and contentions (Brief 6–9) in light of the Examiner’s findings and explanations (Non-Final Act. 2– 16; Ans. 16–18). For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of the pending claims, and we, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection. Each of claims 1–10 is rejected under the same ground of rejection. Non-Final Act. 2. Appellant does not argue the patentability of any claim separately from independent claim 1, which directed to a method. See Brief 5–7. Independent claims 10 and 19 are directed to a system and to a non- transitory machine-readable medium, respectively, and recite limitations 2 All references are cited using the first-named inventor. 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. Because the present application was filed before March 16, 2013, the Examiner applies the pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability. See Non-Final Act. 2 (applying “pre-AIA first to invent provisions”). Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 5 corresponding to the disputed limitations of claim 1. Brief 13, 15 (Claim App.). Thus, claims 2–19 stand or fall with claim 1. The Examiner finds Piper teaches “receiving a first query . . . ,” “using a data processor for identifying at least one keyword . . . ,” “inferring remaining keywords . . . ,” and “generating a second query . . . ,” as recited in claim 1. Non-Final Act. 2–4. In particular, the Examiner relies on Piper’s disclosure of a user inputting a search string (such as “04 dodge ram turbo deisel [sic] f/inj”), which is then processed to correct misspellings (“deisel” to “diesel”) and to map keywords such as “04 dodge ram” to a vehicle model and “f/inj” to a part type (“Fuel Injector”), and then a second query is formed “based on the identified vehicle model(s), part description(s), and/or other description(s) (such as part number(s)).” See id. at 3–4 (citing Piper ¶¶ 72, 79, 100–102); see also Piper ¶¶ 71, 83. With regard to “generating a second query . . . ,” the Examiner relies on paragraphs 100–102 of Piper as disclosing both structured item information as well as unstructured item information. Id. at 3. Specifically, Piper discloses combining “the description query clause with other clause(s) pertaining to the context of the search,” and gives as an example “a vehicle model clause query . . . can be combined with the description search clause.” Piper ¶ 101. The Examiner finds Piper’s vehicle model clause corresponds to the claimed structured item information and Piper’s description search clause corresponds to the recited unstructured item information. Non-Final Act. 3. The Examiner cites Piper’s paragraphs 72, 79, and 84–102 as disclosing searching a storage device based on the second query (Non-Final Act. 4), but notes that Piper does not explicitly disclose the portion of that limitation reciting “the first listing including listing item information being Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 6 identified as matched based on the unstructured item information, the first listing including structured listing item information being identified as matched based on the structured item information, the first listing further including listing application information on being identified as matched based on the application information.” Id. For that portion of the limitation, the Examiner additionally relies on the teachings of Adegan. Id. Adegan discloses a system of dynamically matching used auto parts, using a numbering system set forth in the known “Hollander Interchange Manual,” with “Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM)” parts, such as may be needed to repair a vehicle. Adegan ¶ 3. In particular, Adegan discloses a system for “fully automat[ing] the used part identification and location process by systematically cross-referencing the existing OEM and aftermarket parts within a given estimate to that of their equivalent used parts, and intelligently searching and locating those parts.” Id. ¶ 14. As part of the process, Adegan’s system identifies a given vehicle and part-type from a query, and then performs a search of information derived from the Hollander Interchange Manual. Id. ¶¶ 78–79. If an entry is not found, the system takes another approach in which additional information comprising “free text” in the description field is used and compared with options specified in the Hollander Interchange Manual. Id. ¶¶ 81–82. Thus, Adegan teaches obtaining search results identified as based on matching unstructured item information (e.g., free text) from a user query, as well as structured item information (e.g., part type) and application information (e.g., vehicle model). See Ans. 16–17 (citing Adegan ¶¶ 79, 81). Appellant argues the Examiner’s findings are in error because Piper “does not generate a second query by ‘generating structured item Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 7 information from the item information that was inferred to leave a remainder of unstructured item information, the second query including the structured item information and the unstructured item information and the application information.’” Brief 7 (emphasis omitted). Rather, according to Appellant, Piper “simply parses a query to determine term(s) that identify an automobile model and term(s) that identify a part.” Id. Appellant acknowledges Piper discloses generating a query that combines a “vehicle model query clause” with a “description search clause,” but contends [a]t best, the “vehicle model query clause” corresponds with application information, and the “description search clause” generally corresponds with item information, but there is nothing in Piper indicating if the “description search clause” is structured or unstructured item information, and, moreover, there is nothing in Piper indicating using both structured item information and unstructured item information. Id. at 8. We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, as the Examiner’s findings are consistent with the Specification and supported by the cited teachings of Piper. The Specification describes “structured information” in the form of attribute-value pairs (“e.g., PART_TYPE=brake pad), and “unstructured information” as information “as entered by the seller.” Spec. ¶ 105. In other words, from the Specification, unstructured information is information that has not been processed into the form of an attribute-value pair. As the Examiner finds, and we agree, Piper discloses generating a query based on both structured information (e.g., information that has been recognized as having a particular attribute (e.g., a vehicle model clause)), as well as unstructured information (e.g., additional information that has been entered into the original search query (description Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 8 query clause)). Non-Final Act. 3 (citing Piper ¶¶ 100–102); Ans. 4 (same). In an example given in Piper, a user input of “04 dodge ram turbo deisel [sic] f/inj” is parsed and translated, and terms recognized as describing the vehicle model (“2004 Dodge Ram Turbo diesel”) are placed in a vehicle model clause. Piper ¶¶ 71, 72, 78, 83, 89. Such clause is similar to the “application information” in an example given in paragraph 157 of the Specification (“lenovo laptop”), as both describe where a searched-for item would be used. Piper discloses other possible clauses, such as “part number(s)” and “part description(s).” Id. ¶¶ 89–91. Piper also discloses combining a “description query clause” with other “clause(s) pertaining to the context of the search,” such as combining a “vehicle model query clause . . . with the description search clause.” Ans. 4 (citing Piper ¶¶ 100–102). Appellant argues, “there is nothing in Piper indicating if the ‘description search clause’ is structured or unstructured item information.” Brief 7. We disagree. As noted above, the Specification indicates that “structured item information” is information that has been identified as corresponding to a particular category. Spec. ¶ 105. Piper refers generally to the description search clause as a clause based on words that are searched in a dictionary based on a “standard vocabulary,” and, if found in the dictionary, the words are included in a “list of identifiers corresponding to the descriptions” of a searched-for item. Piper ¶¶ 98–102. As such, Piper distinguishes information in the “description query clause” from other information that has been recognized as matching a particular category, such as a “vehicle model query clause.” Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s finding that Piper’s disclosure of a “description query clause” corresponds to unstructured item information. Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 9 Appellant next argues: Although the Examiner asserts that Piper generates a second search query with all three pieces of information (i.e., (1) application information, (2) structured item information, and (3) unstructured item information), the Examiner indicates that Piper doesn't return an item based on all three pieces of information. The Examiner cites Adegan for the feature of returning an item based on: (1) application information; (2) structured item information; and (3) unstructured item information. Adegan does not have this feature and, as such, fails to cure the deficiencies of Piper. Brief 8. We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, which is based on the combined teachings of Piper and Adegan. As noted above, the Examiner relies on Piper as teaching a search query with all of the components recited in claim 1—unstructured item information, structured listing item information, and listing application information. Ans. 4. The Examiner finds Piper does not disclose the search returning a “first listing,” wherein the listing includes information identified as matched based on each of the three types. Id. at 4–5. The Examiner relies on Adegan to teach the returned listing includes information identified as matching particular parts of the search query. Id. at 5. We are not persuaded of error in this finding, as it is supported by the disclosure of Adegan. In particular, Adegan discloses a scenario in which a search query is generated based on particular categories, such as vehicle model and part-type (Adegan ¶ 78), but the search returns no entries, in which case the system “attempts to properly match the keywords in the DESCRIPTION field” of the user query (there, a vehicle-repair estimate form) with words in the “HOLLANDER INTERCHANGE DESCRIPTION Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 10 FIELD,” or vice versa, to find a match. Adegan ¶ 81. Adegan clarifies that “[t]he DESCRIPTION fields of the repair estimate often contain additional information in the form of free-text in the line-item describing the part type that needs to be replaced,” and further notes, [t]here are currently no automated means for cross-referencing of this free-text information with that of the options specified in the HOLLANDER INTERCHANGE DESCRIPTION fields for further identification of a given used part-type. The multiple approach to systematic part identification employed by the current invention takes into consideration this free-text information and attempts to cross-reference it with that of the HOLLANDER INTERCHANGE DESCRIPTION, and therefore to that of [its] corresponding HOLLANDER INTERCHANGE NUMBER that needs to be utilized to identify the correct used part for a given OEM and/or aftermarket part specified in the repair estimate’s line-item. Id. ¶ 82 (emphasis added). In other words, Adegan describes returning search results based on information identified as being in a particular category, such as a vehicle model (which, per the analysis above, corresponds to structured listing information) and also describes returning search results based on “free-text description” that has not been automatically cross-referenced. The Examiner finds this latter search corresponds to identifying listing item information as matching unstructured item information. See Ans. 4–5, 16–17. Appellant does not persuade us of error in this finding. Appellant further argues that the Examiner has provided “no explanation why it would have been obvious to combine the references” to result in the claimed invention. Brief 9. Appellant argues, in particular, that the recited combination of features “is not taught or suggested by the combination of Piper and Adegan, and the Examiner has failed to provide Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 11 any rationale why these features missing from the references would have been obvious to one skilled in the art.” Id. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of Examiner error because it is premised on the incorrect assertion that the Examiner’s combination of references fails to teach or suggest all of the recited limitations. Moreover, the Examiner has provided a rationale supporting motivation by a person of ordinary skill in the art to achieve the claimed subject matter. Non-Final Act. 5; Ans. 17–18. Specifically, the Examiner finds it would have been obvious to have modified the teachings of Piper with that of Adegan “to dynamically and automatically identify used vehicle (e.g., automobile/ truck) parts corresponding to new or Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM), or aftermarket automobile/truck parts (as seen in Adegan, paragraph 3).” Ans. 17–18 (emphasis added). Appellant does not provide persuasive evidence or a line of reasoning explaining why such rationale is erroneous or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had reason to combine the reference’s teachings as found by the Examiner. At most, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is premised on an incorrect reading of the applied references—an assertion with which we disagree, as noted above. Consequently, we are not persuaded that the Examiner fails to articulate a sufficient rationale for combining the teachings of the applied references. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 1, and we, therefore, sustain that rejection, along with the rejection of claims 2–19, not argued separately. Appeal 2019-005931 Application 12/579,404 12 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1–19 is sustained. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–19 103(a) Piper, Adegan 1–19 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED.