Brian Frey et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 18, 201913004595 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 18, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/004,595 01/11/2011 Brian Frey 87188-794744 (097400US) 1829 20350 7590 07/18/2019 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 EXAMINER CAMPEN, KELLY SCAGGS ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3691 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/18/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte BRIAN FREY and OGHIE SHEEHY ____________________ Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,5951 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before JON M. JURGOVAN, ADAM J. PYONIN and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–20, which are all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.2 1 Appellants identify First Data Corporation and FEXCO Merchant Services as the real parties in interest. App. Br. 2. 2 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed January 11, 2011, the Non-Final Office Action (“Non-Final Act.”) mailed September 7, 2016, the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed January 20, 2017, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed March 23, 2017, and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed May 19, 2017. Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 2 CLAIMED INVENTION In the claimed invention, a host computer system transmits to a client (purchaser) computer system a web page with prices of goods and services offered by a merchant computer system. Spec. ¶ 2. The host computer system also transmits a currency conversion plug-in received and used by a client (purchaser) computer system to convert prices in the base currency of the web page into prices in the purchaser’s currency for display. Id. The client computer system transmits purchase information to the host computer system, which responds by transmitting a purchase identifier linked to the purchase information. Id. The client computer system then sends the merchant computer system the purchase identifier in order to guarantee an equivalence of a purchase value between the purchaser’s currency and the base currency. Spec. ¶ 63. The price guarantee is between an entity operating the host computer system and the merchant. Id. Claims 1, 12, and 17 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for conducting an online payment using a currency other than a base currency of a webpage, the method comprising: providing a currency conversion plug-in to a client computer system; detecting a location preference of a user with the currency conversion plug-in using internet protocol (IP) detection; storing the location preference of the user with the currency conversion plug-in; receiving, by the client computer system from a merchant computer system, the webpage, wherein the client computer system is operated by a purchaser conducting an online purchase transaction; and Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 3 a merchant associated with the merchant computer system is offering goods and/or services for sale via the webpage; receiving, by the client computer system, an indication of a purchaser’s currency; identifying, by the client computer system, a plurality of prices on the webpage, wherein: the plurality of prices on the webpage are in the base currency of the webpage; and the base currency of the webpage is different from the purchaser’s currency; transmitting, by a host computer system a conversion rate between the base currency of the webpage and the purchaser’s currency; receiving, by the client computer system from the host computer system, the conversion rate between the base currency and the purchaser’s currency; converting, by the client computer system, the identified plurality of prices on the webpage listed in the base currency to a plurality of prices in the purchaser’s currency using the conversion rate received from the host computer system such that the webpage, as displayed by the client computer system, contains the plurality of prices in the purchaser’s currency; transmitting, by the client computer system to the host computer system, purchase information; receiving, by the client computer system from the host computer system, in response to the purchase information, a purchase identifier linked to the purchase information wherein the purchase identifier is used to guarantee an equivalence of a purchase value in the purchaser’s currency and the base currency between an entity operating the host computer system and the merchant; and transmitting, by the client computer system to the merchant computer system, the purchase identifier linked to the purchase information. App. Br. 13–14 (Claims App’x). Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 4 REJECTION (1) Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Non-Final Act. 2–7. ANALYSIS § 101 Rejection Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we review the Examiner’s § 101 determinations concerning patent eligibility under this standard. Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows: [w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent protection should not preempt “the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Benson”); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (“Mayo”); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (“Alice”). The rationale is that patents directed to basic building blocks of technology would not “promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience” under the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, but instead would impede it. Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not patent-eligible subject matter. Thales Visionix Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). The Supreme Court reiterated the Mayo two-part test for subject matter eligibility in Alice (573 U.S. at 217–218). The first step is to Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 5 determine whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77). If so, then the eligibility analysis proceeds to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test in which we “examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). There is no need to proceed to the second step, however, if the first step of the Alice/Mayo test yields a determination that the claim is directed to patent eligible subject matter. The Patent Office has recently revised its guidance for how to apply the Alice/Mayo test in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (January 7, 2019) (“the Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 55. A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent-eligible under § 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 6 integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate whether the claim provides an inventive concept. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We proceed with applying the patent eligibility framework in the following sections of this decision to the claims presented here on appeal. USPTO Step 1–Categories of Invention in 35 U.S.C. § 101 Step 1 of the patent eligibility analysis is to review the claims to ensure they fall within one of the enumerated categories of invention under § 101. Claims 1–11 recite “methods” which qualify as “processes” under § 101. Claims 12–20 recites “systems” which qualify as “machines” under § 101. Thus, the claims satisfy Step 1 of the subject matter eligibility analysis, and we proceed to Step 2A to determine whether the claims recite abstract ideas. Alice/Mayo—Step 1 (Abstract Idea) USPTO Step 2A–Prongs 1 and 2 identified in the Revised Guidance USPTO Step 2A—Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?) Turning to the first step of the Alice inquiry (Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance), the Examiner finds the claims recite the abstract idea of converting currency in a financial transaction. Non-Final Act. 7–8. We agree with the Examiner the claims recite this abstract idea and others, namely, conducting a financial transaction, and providing a price guarantee. In each of independent claims 1, 12, and 17, the recited steps or functions are connected to currency conversion. For example, the claim 1 limitations include providing a currency conversion plug-in, detecting and storing a user’s location preference, receiving an indication of a purchaser’s Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 7 currency, identifying prices on a web page in a base currency, transmitting and receiving a conversion rate, and converting the prices on the web page from the base currency to the purchaser’s currency using the conversion rate for display to the purchaser. Thus, as the Examiner finds, these claims recite converting currency in a financial transaction, which, in the Revised Guidance, falls within the category of abstract idea of “certain methods of organizing human activity” as a “fundamental economic principle or practice,” including “hedging, insurance, mitigating risk” and “commercial or legal interactions” including “agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations.” Non-Final Act. 7–8; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. These activities also fall under the category of a “mental process” under the Revised Guidance because currency conversion can be carried out in the human mind or using pencil and paper as steps of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion. In addition, each of independent claims 1, 12, and 17 recites a method of conducting payment involving transmitting and receiving purchase information. Thus, the claims recite the abstract idea of conducting a financial transaction, which also falls under the judicial exception of “certain methods of organizing human activity” as a “fundamental economic principle or practice,” including “hedging, insurance, mitigating risk” and “commercial or legal interactions” including “agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations.” A financial transaction may also be carried out in the human mind or with pen and paper as steps of observation, Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 8 evaluation, judgment, and opinion, and thus qualifies as a “mental process” as well. Independent claims 1, 12, and 17 further recite receiving and transmitting a purchase identifier used to guarantee an equivalence of a purchase value in the purchaser’s currency and the base currency. Thus, the claims further recite providing a price guarantee, which falls under the abstract idea of “certain methods of organizing human activity” as a “fundamental economic principle or practice” including “hedging, insurance, mitigating risk.” A price guarantee can also be carried out in the human mind using a pen and paper, and thus also qualifies as a “mental process” including steps of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion. In many similar cases, our reviewing courts have found the kinds of activities recited in the claims presented here to constitute abstract ideas. Examples of these cases include Alice, 573 U.S. 208 (intermediated settlement); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 598 (2010) (hedging against the financial risk of price fluctuations); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (verifying a credit-card transaction); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (guaranteeing online transactions); OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (offer-based price optimization); Smart Systems Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Authority, 873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting financial data); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (processing an application for financing a purchase); Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods). The parallels between these cases and the present claims Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 9 are apparent. Specifically, these cases involve online purchases and guarantees similar to the claims presented here. All were determined to recite abstract ideas. These cases overwhelmingly lead us to the conclusion that the claims at issue here also recite abstract ideas. We thus proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two of the subject matter eligibility analysis to determine whether the abstract ideas embodied in the claims are integrated into a practical application. USPTO Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application) Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we discern no additional element (or combination of elements) recited in claims 1–20 that integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”). For example, Appellants’ claimed additional elements (e.g., “client (purchaser) computer system,” “host computer system,” “merchant computer system,” “plug-in,” and “web page”) do not: (1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for a generic computer system); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). In claims 1–20, the computer systems, plug-in, and web page merely assist the human purchaser, merchant, and host entity in doing what they could do, mentally or physically, by themselves, by implementing the recited abstract idea on a computer. The claims here do not focus on a specific Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 10 improvement of computer capabilities, but instead merely invoke computers as a tool. This is insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the Alice inquiry [] asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities [] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.”); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for performing calculations.”). The claims do not recite any specifics of the computer systems, plug-in, or web page unique to carrying out the invention. Instead, they recite, at a high level of generality, components that merely assist in carrying out various financial tasks. Thus, the claims do no more than generally link the abstract ideas of currency conversion, purchase transaction, and price guarantee, to well-known computer system, plug-in, and web page technologies. This constitutes mere linking of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field of use, which is not sufficient to establish a practical application. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612, and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584, 588–590 (1978). Thus, the claims, when viewed as a whole, recite no additional elements or combinations thereof that amount to integration of the abstract ideas recited in these claims into a practical application. We conclude that Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 11 claims 1–20 recite the abstract ideas of currency conversion, purchase transaction, and price guarantee. We next proceed to Step 2B of the subject matter eligibility test where we determine whether the claims recite an inventive concept that is significantly more than the abstract ideas embodied therein. Alice/Mayo—Step 2 (Inventive Concept) Step 2B identified in the Revised Guidance Under Federal Circuit precedent, an “inventive concept” under Alice step 2 can be established by showing, for example, that the patent claims: (1) provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, e.g., a “solution . . . necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks” (see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); (2) transform the abstract idea into “a particular, practical application of that abstract idea,” e.g., “installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end- users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user” (see BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1352, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); or (3) “entail[] an unconventional technological solution ([e.g.,] enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem ([e.g.,] massive record flows [that] previously required massive databases)” and “improve the performance of the system itself” (see Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 12 Similarly, as recognized by the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” under Step 2B can be evaluated based on whether an additional element or combination of elements: (1) “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present;” or (2) “simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.” See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Specification mentions various problems the claimed invention is intended to overcome, namely, inconvenience in conducting a transaction in a different currency, not knowing the conversion rate, and the need to manually convert from the merchant’s to the purchaser’s currency. Spec. ¶ 1. The Specification also mentions the problem of covering the merchant for lost funds due to price discrepancies or incorrect or outdated conversion rates. Spec. ¶ 63. Although presented in the context of e-commerce, these problems are not technical in nature and existed long before e-commerce. Currency conversion, purchase transactions, and price guarantees are not modern phenomena, but instead have existed since ancient times. As mentioned, the claims recite technology including various computer systems, a plug-in, and a web page. We note that computer systems, plug-ins, and web pages, at a general level, are conventional technologies well-known before the claimed invention. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 66, 81–92. Computer systems and web pages have been used for currency conversion, financial transactions, and transaction guarantees. This Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 13 is demonstrated by prior art documents of record in this case, including US 2004/0167854 A1, published August 26, 2004 (e-commerce financial transaction/currency conversion/websites); US 2008/0109321 A1, published May 8, 2008 (e-commerce financial transaction/web pages/transaction guarantee); US 2003/0144922 A1, published July 31, 2003 (web sites and web pages/currency conversion); US 2003/0187792 A1, published October 2, 2003 (e-commerce financial transaction/currency conversion/web pages); US 2004/0024697 A1, published February 5, 2004 (e-commerce web sites/currency conversion/transaction guarantee). Plug-ins were also known in this art before the invention. See, e.g., https://www.britannica.com/technology/plug-in (last viewed 6/28/19). Accordingly, we conclude that claims 1–20 fail to recite an inventive concept sufficient to transform into patent-eligible subject matter the recited abstract ideas. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1– 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellants’ Arguments Appellants argue that the Examiner overgeneralizes the claims. App. Br. 6. We do not agree with Appellants’ contention. Patent eligibility analysis requires the Examiner initially to consider the claims at a level of abstraction by extracting elements from the claims to determine the abstract ideas that are recited therein. The remaining steps of the eligibility analysis consider the additional elements that were not considered in the first part of the analysis. Thus, we do not agree the Examiner errs by initially generalizing the claims when applying the Alice/Mayo framework. Further, Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 14 such argument is rendered moot by our analysis pursuant to the Revised Guidance, above. Appellants argue the claims solve an Internet-centric problem and are rooted in computer technology. App. Br. 6. For reasons explained in the previous sections of this decision, we do not agree. The problems the claimed invention overcomes have been known since ancient times. Appellants contend the present claims do not preempt all currency conversions or online business transactions. In the patent eligibility analysis under Alice/Mayo, however, “preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In any case, “the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. Appellants contend the Examiner gave little weight to the recited computer components and software elements of the claims (i.e., the plug-in). App. Br. 8, 10. As discussed in previous sections of this decision, we have given the claimed plug-in, web page, and computer systems due consideration in the patent eligibility analysis. We determine these components are not sufficiently detailed in the claims to define additional elements that implement the abstract ideas in the claims into a practical application, nor do they define a transformative “inventive concept.” Appellants argue that independent claims 1, 12, and 17 recite subject matter similar to Example 21 of Appendix 1 of the July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility. App. Br. 10–11. See https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-app1.pdf (last viewed 6/28/19). Appellants do not explain, however, why they consider the allowable claim of Example 21 to be similar to the independent Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 15 claims 1, 12, and 17 at issue here. Appellants also contend the claims address an Internet-centric problem by enabling potential customers to compare prices of and purchase products and services from merchant webpages around the world. Independent claims 1, 12, and 17 do not recite anything about price comparisons of goods or services of different merchants, and thus, Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate in scope with the claims. Limitations not appearing in the claims cannot be relied upon for patentability. In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). Furthermore, Appellants’ paraphrasing of the allowed claim in Example 21 leaves out much of what was recited in the actual example, which was not nearly as broad as Appellants’ paraphrasing would suggest. For all of these reasons, we find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive to show Examiner error. Appellants’ Reply Brief arguments are largely redundant to those presented in the Appeal Brief. Appellants do present a new argument, however, without a showing of good cause. We do not consider new arguments made in a reply brief without a showing of good cause why they were not earlier presented because the examiner has not had an opportunity to consider and respond to the argument. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Even if we could consider the new argument, however, we would find it unpersuasive. In particular, Appellants rely on McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) as supporting patentability of the claims. Reply Br. 3–4. We do not find McRO apposite to the facts of this case. In McRO, the claims improved the functioning of a computer or technical field by automatically animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-dimensional characters using complex Appeal 2017-008674 Application 13/004,595 16 processing involving morph weight streams, timed data files of phonemes, transition parameters, and other data. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53, fn. 18. McRO is very different from this case, where the claims involve known computer systems, web pages, and plug-ins claimed at a high level of generality to carry out the abstract ideas recited in the claims, namely, currency conversions, financial transactions, and price guarantees. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 82 (“simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”). Thus, we do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive to show the Examiner errs in the conclusion that the claims are directed to patent- ineligible subject matter as presented on appeal. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation