Brenda D. Baker, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 16, 1999
01971049 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 16, 1999)

01971049

09-16-1999

Brenda D. Baker, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas Agency.


Brenda D. Baker, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01971049

v. ) Agency Nos. 1D-231-1046-94

William J. Henderson, ) 4D-230-1076-94

Postmaster General, ) 4D-230-1201-94

United States Postal Service, )

(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas ) Hearing Nos. 120-95-6713X

Agency. ) 120-95-6711X

) 120-95-6715X

Decision

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. Appellant

alleged she was discriminated against based on her race (Black), sex

(female), and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when: (1) on December 27,

1993, she was denied a detail to the Contract Technician, Administrative

Services position; (2) on December 29, 1993, she was denied a detail to

the Personnel Office, and (3) on May 14, 1994, she was not selected to

the Contract Technician position. The appeal is accepted in accordance

with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following reasons, the agency's

decision is AFFIRMED.

Following each investigation, appellant requested a hearing before an

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ).

Following a hearing on all three complaints, the AJ issued a Recommended

Decision (RD), finding no discrimination. The agency's FAD adopted

the AJ's findings of no discrimination. It is from this decision that

appellant now appeals.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was

employed by the agency as an Accountable Paper Clerk, PS-5, and a

Distribution Clerk, PS-5, at the Richmond District Main Post Office,

Richmond, Virginia. On November 9, 1993, appellant was notified that her

job would be abolished effective December 25, 1993, and that she would

then be assigned to Mail Processing. On November 10, 1993, appellant

submitted requests for details to numerous offices and units within the

Richmond District Post Office.

Detail to Contract Technician Position

The AJ concluded that appellant established a prima facie case of race and

sex discrimination when she was denied a detail to the Contract Technician

position (position). A similarly situated White male employee, not in

her protected classes, was treated more favorably, and granted a detail

to the position. The AJ determined that appellant failed to establish

a prima facie case of reprisal. Since appellant established a prima

facie case of race and sex discrimination, and assuming, arguendo, that

appellant established a prima facie case of reprisal, the AJ found that

the agency articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for denying

appellant a detail to the position. The responsible management official

(RMO) did not detail appellant to the position because he did not want to

give her, or anyone else an advantage when this position was posted to be

filled permanently. Also, the RMO detailed the comparator employee (C)

to the position to perform the duties of an illustrator, not a contract

technician. C's position as an Illustrator was abolished, and the RMO

needed C to continue performing the illustrator duties. The only way

to accomplish this was to detail C to the contact technician position,

which was vacant. The AJ found that appellant failed to establish that

the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Detail to Personnel Office

The AJ concluded that appellant established a prima facie case of race

discrimination. Appellant was denied a detail to the Personnel Office

(PO), and a similarly situated White female employee, not in her protected

class, was treated more favorably, and granted a detail to the PO. The AJ

found that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal.

However, since appellant established a prima facie case of race and sex

discrimination, and assuming, arguendo, that appellant established a prima

facie case of reprisal, the AJ concluded that the agency articulated

legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for denying appellant a detail

to the PO. The RMO did not consider appellant for a detail because

the RMO had already chosen the selectee for the only available detail,

and made a prior commitment to the selectee to detail her to the PO if a

vacancy became available. Prior to appellant's request to be detailed,

the selectee had spoken to the RMO and requested to be detailed to the

PO on several occasions.

The AJ found that appellant failed to establish that the agency's

articulated reasons for denying her the detail was a pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Appellant did not provide any evidence that the agency

discriminated against her when she was not detailed to the PO.

Selection for Contract Technician Position

The AJ determined that appellant established a prima facie case of race

discrimination and reprisal. With respect to race, appellant applied,

qualified, and was not selected for the contract technician position

(position). Whereas, a similarly situated White female employee, not in

her protected class, was selected for the position. Regarding reprisal,

appellant had filed a prior EEO complaint, and she suffered an adverse

action when she was not selected for the position.

The AJ concluded that the agency articulated a legitimate

non-discriminatory reason for not selecting appellant. The selecting

official (SO) selected the selectee because she was the best qualified

candidate. Under the SO's evaluation system, the selectee had the

highest score due to her performance during the interview, and the �other

factors� considered during the selection process. Appellant had the

second highest score.

The AJ found that appellant failed to establish that the agency's

articulated reason for not selecting her was a pretext to mask unlawful

discrimination. Appellant did not provide sufficient evidence that

she was the best qualified candidate for the position, and the selectee

was not.

After a careful review of the entire record, including appellant's

contentions on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, the Commission finds that the AJ's RD

summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws. We note that appellant failed to present evidence

that any of the agency's actions were in retaliation for appellant's

prior EEO activity or were motivated by discriminatory animus toward

appellant's race and sex. We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's

findings of no discrimination which were based on a detailed assessment

of the record and the credibility of the witnesses. See Esquer v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950096 (September 6, 1996);

Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Therefore, the Commission discerns no

basis to disturb the AJ's findings of no discrimination. Accordingly,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

9/16/99

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations