Brandfolder, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 24, 2020

2020004120 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/129,312 09/12/2018 Ajaykumar Rajasekharan BFD-0006 1954
50437 7590 12/24/2020
DUFT & BORNSEN, PC
1319 W BASELINE RD
SUITE 100A
LAFAYETTE, CO 80026
EXAMINER
DURAN, ARTHUR D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3688
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@db-iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte AJAYKUMAR RAJASEKHARAN, LOGAN SEARS, and
JIM HANIFEN, BRETT NEKOLNY, LUKE BUTTERFIELD BEATTY
____________

Appeal 2020-004120
Application 16/129,312
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
THE INVENTION
Appellant claims a system for multitrack performance scoring for
assets comprising digital media for provisioning digital content and in
particular scoring digital content based on the manner in which the digital
content has been accessed and/or utilized by an audience. (Spec. ¶ 1, Title).
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
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1. A system comprising:
a brand management server comprising:
a memory that stores assets comprising digital
media; and
a controller that distributes the assets for
consumption by members of an audience at remote devices,
for each of the assets, the controller automatically
determines a look-back period, acquires metrics indicating at
least two different types of consumption of the asset by the
audience during the look-back period, and calculates an asset
score for the asset that indicates a popularity of the asset and is
based on the metrics indicating the at least two different types
of consumption, wherein the asset score comprises a weighted
combination of the metrics of the at least two different types of
consumption, and each of the metrics has its own weight,
wherein asset scores for assets in different brands are
calculated concurrently in real-time using different weighted
combinations of the metrics, and
the controller presents asset scores via a Graphical User
Interface (GUI) for review by a user.

Appeal Br. 27 (Claims Appendix).

THE REJECTION
Claims 1–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1, 3, 9, 11, 17, and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Komuves (US 2013/0066885, published March 14,
2013) in view of Brotman (US 2009/0048860 A1, published February 19,
2009).
Claims 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Komuves in view of Brotman and in further view of
Abboa-Offei (US 2010/0121682 A1, published May 13, 2010).
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Claims 4, 7, 12, 15, 20 and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Komuves in view of Brotman and in further view of
Federov (US 2013/0073568, published March 21, 2013).
Claims 5, 13, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Komuves in view of Brotman and in further view of
Overhultz (US 2007/0257795 A1, published November 8, 2007).
Claims 8, 16, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Komuves in view of Brotman and in further view of Shen
(US 2017/0294010 A1, published Oct. 12, 2017).
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. . . . If so, . . . then
ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” .
. . To answer that question, . . . consider the
elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the
additional elements “transform the nature of the
claim” into a patent-eligible application. . . . [The
Court] described step two of this analysis as a
search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is
“sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon
the [ineligible concept] itself.”
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Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–218 (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012))
(citations omitted).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the
focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or
on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 FR 50, pp 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to determining
popularity of an asset based on consumption metrics in a previous time
period. The Examiner considers this to be a certain method of organizing
human activity including advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors (Non-Final Act. 7). The Examiner finds the generically recited
computer elements do not add a practical application or meaningful
limitation to the abstract ideas because they amount to simply implementing
the abstract idea on a computer and that the claims do not include limitations
amounting to significantly more than the abstract idea. (Id. at 8).
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The Specification discloses that brand managers are the chief
marketing officers of a company and help to ensure a desired level of public
awareness for one or more brands. The embodiments of the present
invention provide brand management tools that are capable of quantitatively
assessing the worth of a given asset by using an asset score. (Spec. 2, 6).
The asset score is based on multiple types of metrics indicating how the
asset is being consumed by an audience. As such, the Specification supports
the Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to marketing and
sales activity since the claims are directed to managing data related to the
marketing and sale of goods and services.
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites “controller
automatically determines a look-back period, acquires metrics” and
“calculates an asset score for the asset that indicates a popularity of the
asset.”
We thus agree with the Examiner’s findings that the claims are
directed to determining popularity of an asset based on consumption metrics
in a previous time period. We also agree with the Examiner that this is a
certain method or organizing human activity such as advertising, marketing
or sales activities or behaviors that falls in the judicial exception category.
Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Also, we find the steps of storing assets comprising digital media,
distributing assets, calculating asset scores and displaying scores constitute
“analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain
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arrangements involving contractual relations are directed to abstract ideas).
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a method of
organizing human activity and in the alternative, a mental process.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to test”, claim 1 requires
a “brand manager server.” The recitation of the words “brand manager
server” does not impose “a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
judicial exception” and as such does not integrate the judicial exceptions into
a practical application. Guidance 84 Fed, Reg. at 53. In this regard, we find
no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any
indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke any
inventive programming, require any specialized computer hardware or other
inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
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In this regard, the recitation does not affect an improvement in the
functioning of the server or other technology, does not recite a particular
machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, and does not transform
or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing. Id. Thus, claim 1
recites judicial exceptions that are not integrated into a practical application
and thus claim 1 is directed to “abstract ideas.”
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas, the claim must include an “inventive
concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice
amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
The introduction of a server computer into the claim does not alter the
analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea
“while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough
for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological
environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while
adding the words “apply it with a computer”
simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a
computer amounts to a mere instruction to
“implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a
computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the
preemption concern that undergirds our § 101
jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers,
wholly generic computer implementation is not
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generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that
provides any “practical assurance that the process
is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Instead, the relevant question is whether claim 1 here does more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract ideas on a generic
computer. Id. at 225. It does not.
Taking the claim 1 elements separately, the function performed by the
brand management server at each step of the process is purely conventional.
Using a computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and
modify the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—
one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer
functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the trading industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see
also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”). In short,
each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
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access/display is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be
abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification,
generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was
abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the brand management server itself. As we stated above, claim 1 does not
affect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The
Specification spells out different generic equipment and parameters that
might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such
conventional processing would entail based on the concept of information
access under different scenarios. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 91–93). Thus, claim 1
at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than instructions to apply the
abstract ideas using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our
precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 6–15; Reply Br. 2–
5) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of emphasis, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
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We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the precise technique recited in claim 1 enables
the asset’s effectiveness to be compared to other assets which allows brand
managers to rapidly identify assets that are underperforming. Appellant
argues that prior techniques for comparing assets relied on human judgment
and perception and were necessarily biased, inconsistent and vague (Appeal
Br. 9, 11). By making this argument Appellant appears to be arguing that
the present invention has advantages over the prior art methods of
comparing the effectiveness of assets. To the extent Appellant maintains
that the limitations of claim 1 necessarily amount to “significantly more”
than an abstract idea because the claimed system is allegedly patentable over
the prior art, Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent. Although
the second step in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search for an
“inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-
obviousness, but rather, a search for “‘an element or combination of
elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice,
573 U.S. at 217. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract
idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument, relying on DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), that claim 1 is rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks. According to Appellant, claim 1 provides a new
technique that actively distributes assets, tracks their consumption and
determines and reports popularity of each of those assets. (Appeal Br. 10).
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In DDR Holdings, the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims
“address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to
the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol,
would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR, 773 F.3d
at 1257. There, the Court found that the claims were patent eligible because
they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to
resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The
Court cautioned, however, “that not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. For example, in
DDR Holdings the Court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue
from claims found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See DDR,773 F.3d
at 1258–59 (citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 7 0 9 , 715–16 (Fed. Cir.
2014)). As noted there, the Ultramercial claims were “directed to a
specific method of advertising and content distribution that was
previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before.” Id. at
1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16). Nevertheless, those
claims were patent ineligible because they “merely recite[d] the abstract
idea of ‘offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,’
along with ‘routine additional steps such as updating an activity log,
requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public
access, and use of the Internet.’” Id.
Appellant’s asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible in
Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings.
The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] media product
for sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to said
media product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a]
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sponsor message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query.” Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant’s asserted
claims recite receiving data, analyzing data (calculating an asset score), and
transmitting data (presenting asset score to user). This is precisely the type
of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are eligible because there is no risk of
preemption. “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-
63 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 701, 193 (2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”). And, “[w]here a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose
patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in
this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa,
788 F.3d at 1379.
We do not agree with Appellant that claim 1 reflects an improvement to
technology by enabling real-time analysis, reporting, and distribution for
digital assets, such that brand managers are capable of administering
hundreds of thousands of assets and the server handles multiple users
because there is no recitation of hundreds of thousands of assets and
multiple users in claim 1.
In regard to claim 2, Appellant argues that the dynamic monitoring and
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notification processes described facilitates the ability of brand managers to
respond to critical periods in a timely manner and therefore claim 2 recites a
practical application. This argument is not persuasive because the Appellant
does not focus on the “additional elements” in claim 2 that are considered in
an analysis of whether the claims recite a practical application. See
Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 53. In addition, Appellant does not address the
various factors which are considered when making a determination of
whether the claim integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical
application such as improvement to the functioning of the recited server
itself, improvement to any other technology, recitation of a particular
machine or transformation of a particular article to a different states of thing
as required by the Guidance. Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 55.
In regard to claims 4 and 7, Appellant argues that generating a model
that correlates weights and relevancy based on periodic feedback from a user
is too complex to be performed in the human mind and that it is not possible
for a human to simulate the operations of a machine learning model. This
argument fails because Appellant does not explain why generating the
recited model or simulating the operations of a machine learning model is
too complex for the human mind. In addition, as the Federal Circuit has
made clear, “the basic character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea
is not changed by claiming only its performance by computers, or by
claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a computer
readable medium.” See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA
1982)).
In regard to claim 6, Appellant argues that the manner described in this
claim provides a practical application by bounding the expected range of
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values for an asset in a known period of time which enhances predictability
when planning the use of an asset in the future. Appellant also argues, in
regard to claim 7 that the use of shared features in images to predict asset
scores is a complex technique that provides a real-world benefit in
enhancing the ability of a user to product the score of newly created assets.
Appellant’s arguments, however, rely on the ineligible concept itself of
determining popularity of an asset based on consumption metrics in a
previous time period to establish that the claims recite an inventive concept.
But “[i]t has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the
ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept
that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.”
BSG Tech LLC, 899 F.3d at 1290. Moreover, “[n]o matter how much of an
advance in the marketing field the claims recite, the advance lies entirely in
the realm of abstract ideas, with no plausibly alleged innovation in the non-
abstract application realm.” SAP America, Inc., 898 F.3d at 1163; see also
id. at 1168.
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection as it is
directed to claim 1 and claims 3 and 8 dependent thereon and claims 2, 4, 5,
6, and 7. We will also sustain the rejection as it is directed to the remaining
claims because Appellant has not argued the separate eligibility of these
claims.

REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C § 103(A)
We will not sustain this rejection because we agree with Appellant
that the prior art does not disclose “wherein asset scores for assets in
different brands are calculated . . . using different weighted combinations of
metrics” as is recited in claim 1.
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The Examiner relies on Brotman at paragraphs 29, 30, 126 and 87 for
teaching this subject matter. According to the Examiner, Brotman’s
teaching of different categories having different weightings is a teaching of
this subject matter. (Non-Final Act. 13) Therefore, the Examiner explains
that Brotman teaches different weighing factors for each different content
provider or different brands.
The problem with this finding is that Brotman does not disclose that
the term “categories” relates to brands of products. Rather we find that
Brotman discloses that these categories are “categories of use” which relate
to how the product is used not the brand of the product. These categories of
use include all uses above the line, below the line, internal, editorial, and
Web Only. ( Brotman 71). These levels of use are depicted in Table 1 of
Brotman and relate to how the asset can be used in advertisements and
promotions. We find that the categories of use disclosed in Brotman does
not relate to brands of the products. As such, the description of the different
weighting factors for different categories of use in Brotman is not a
description of asset scores for assets in different brands being calculated
using different weighted combinations of metrics as is required by claim 1.
In view of the foregoing, we will not sustain this rejection as it is
directed to claim 1 and claims 2–8 dependent therefrom. We will not sustain
the rejection as it is directed to the remaining claims for the same reason.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–24 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We conclude the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 1–24 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
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DECISION

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–24 101 Eligibility 1–24
1, 3, 9, 11,
17, 19
103 Komuves,
Brotman
1, 3, 9, 11,
17, 19
2, 6, 10, 14,
18, 22
103 Komuves,
Brotman, Abboa-
Offei
2, 6, 10, 14,
18, 22
4, 7, 12, 15
23
103 Komuves,
Brotman, Federov
4, 7, 12, 15
23
5, 13, 21 103 Komuves,
Brotman,
Overhultz
5, 13, 21
8, 16, 24 103 Komuves,
Brotman, Shen
8, 16, 24
Overall
Outcome
1–24

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED