Boyd R. Tyson, Complainant,v.John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 8, 2011
0120110381 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 8, 2011)

0120110381

04-08-2011

Boyd R. Tyson, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Boyd R. Tyson,

Complainant,

v.

John M. McHugh,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120110381

Hearing No. 480-2110-00213X

Agency No. ARCELA09MARY02028

DECISION

On October 14, 2010, Complainant timely filed an appeal from the

Agency's September 24, 2010, final order concerning his equal employment

opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final

order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether the EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision without a hearing; and (2)

whether the AJ correctly found that Complainant was not subjected to

discrimination based on race, sex, age, and reprisal for prior protected

EEO activity as alleged.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Program Support Assistant at the Agency's Regulatory Division,

District Corps of Engineers in Los Angeles, California. Report of

Investigation (ROI), EEO Complaint, at 1. On April 15, 2008, Complainant

was transferred from the Agency's Information Management Office (IMO) to

the Regulatory Division. Fact-Finding Conference Transcript (FFC. Tr.),

at 8-9. Complainant and a coworker (CW) (Mexican-American, female, age 42)

were the only Program Support Assistants in the Regulatory Division. ROI,

CW Appraisal Data, at 1. From April 15, 2008, to September 30, 2008, the

Agency methodically increased Complainant's duties and responsibilities,

including making him responsible for public notices, supply duties, and

electronic posting of public notices after August 2008. FFC Tr., at 79-80

On April 14, 2009, Complainant received his Base System Civilian

Evaluation Report for the rating period of March 1, 2008, through

February 28, 2009. FFC. Tr., at 6. The report rated Complainant in the

following areas: technical competence, adaptability and initiative;

working relationships and communications; and responsibility and

dependability. ROI, at 2. Complainant received a fully successful

rating of "3" for all four of above areas. Id. CW also received a fully

successful rating of "3" for the same period. ROI, CW Appraisal Data, at

1. Thereafter, on April 28, 2009, Complainant participated as a witness

and provided testimony at a Fact-Finding Conference relating to another

coworker's EEO complaint. ROI, at 2.

On June 23, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the

Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (African-American),

sex (male), age (64), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity

when:

1. On April 14, 2009, he received a "3" rating on his Base System Civilian

Evaluation Report for March 1, 2008, through February 28, 2009; and

2. He performed the duties of two employees during the rating period of

April 1, 2008, through September 30, 2008, and management did not take

these duties into account in his performance rating.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing. After both parties submitted motions for a

decision without a hearing, the AJ assigned to the case issued a decision

without a hearing on September 7, 2010. The Agency subsequently issued

a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove

that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The AJ found

no direct or circumstantial evidence that Complainant was discriminated

against based on race, sex, or age. AJ's Decision, at 6. With respect to

retaliation, the AJ found that Complainant was given his performance

rating before he engaged in protected EEO activity. Id. at 6-7.

Therefore, the AJ found no evidence of discrimination and granted the

Agency's motion for Summary Judgment. Id.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contends that the Agency did not allow him to

attend a conference called "Black in Government." Complainant's Appeal

Brief, at 2. Complainant further contends that the Agency submitted false

statements, concealed evidence, and obtained his personal information

without his authorization. Id. Also, Complainant contends that other,

less qualified employees in the Regulatory Division were promoted while

he was not. Id. Also, Complainant contends that employees who abused

their time and attendance were never disciplined. Id. Further, Complainant

contends that his requests for training were denied on numerous occasions,

while other employees' requests were granted. Id. at 3.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de

novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal

from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .");

see also EEO Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),

Ch. 9, � VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999) (providing that an administrative judge's

"decision to issue a decision without a a hearing pursuant to [29C.F.R. �

1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo"). This essentially means that we

should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free

to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's,

factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact

of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of

whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See

id. at Chap. 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review

"requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the

factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and

that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record,

including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and

. . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of

the record and its interpretation of the law").

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Decision without a Hearing

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he

or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R.

� 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary

judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is

appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal

and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function

is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are

genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving

party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable

inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An

issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact

finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d

103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential

to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to

properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could

order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion

for a decision without a hearing).

After a review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's issuance

of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. The record has been

adequately developed, Complainant was given notice of the Agency's motion

to issue a decision without a hearing, he was given an opportunity to

respond, he was given a comprehensive statement of undisputed facts,

and he had the opportunity to engage in discovery. In addition, the

Commission finds that, even assuming all facts in favor of Complainant,

a reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant's favor, as

explained below. Therefore, we find that no genuine issues of material

fact or credibility exist. Under these circumstances, we find that the

AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.

Disparate Treatment

In the absence of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined

under the three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the

adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Tex. Dep't of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has

met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade

the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted

on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502 (1993).

Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case

of discrimination based on race, sex, age, and reprisal, we find

that the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions. With respect to claim 1, the Agency explained that

Complainant was received the fully successful rating of "3" because

he, among other things, had difficulties maintaining professional,

positive relationships with office staff. FFC. Tr., at 74-76. Further,

the Agency explained that Complainant sent emails that were difficult to

understand that needed to be edited and resent. Id. Regarding claim 2,

the Agency explained that Complainant was methodically assigned more

responsibilities because he became more familiar with the Regulatory

Division. Id. at 58, 79-80. The Agency explained that after August 2008,

public notices, supply duties, and electronic posting of public notices

became part of Complainant's duties because he became more familiar with

the Regulatory Division. Id. at 79-80.

At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Complainant

to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the Agency's

proffered explanation was not the true reason for its actions, but that

the Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory animus. Complainant

failed to carry this burden. Although Complainant contends that he

was given a lower performance rating than other employees, the record

reflects that CW, also a Program Support Assistant, received the same

fully successful rating of "3" for the same rating period. ROI, CW

Appraisal Data, at 1. We also note that Complainant's April 28, 2009,

protected EEO activity occurred after he was given his performance rating

on April 14, 2009. Further, even though Complainant may have performed

more duties than other coworkers, there is no evidence establishing that

the Agency intentionally assigned him additional duties based on his

race, sex, age, or in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. Lastly,

notwithstanding Complainant's contention, there is no evidence that the

Agency submitted false statements or concealed evidence.1

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's

final order adopting the AJ's decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 8, 2011

Date

1 The Commission notes that Complainant raises new allegations

on appeal. Complainant is advised to initiate contact with an EEO

Counselor if he wishes to pursue the additional allegations he raises

for the first time on appeal. If Complainant wishes to pursue these

claims, he is advised to contact an EEO Counselor within 15 days of the

date he receives this decision. For timeliness purposes, the date of

Complainant's initial EEO Counselor contact in regard to these matters

will be deemed to be the date on which the instant appeal was filed.

??

??

??

??

2

0120110381

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120110381