Borden Chemical

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 6, 1973

202 N.L.R.B. 932 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

932 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Columbus Coated Fabrics, Division of Borden
Chemical , Borden , Inc. and Textile Workers
Union of America , Local 487 , AFL-CIO.
Cases 9-CA-6850-1, -2, -3, -4
April 6, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND PENELLO
On December 8, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Bernard Ness issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed
limited exceptions and a supporting brief, and
Respondent filed a brief in support of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided- to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
' In absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that deferral to arbitration is not warranted in this case. We
note that the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently referred to Segraves
as Baker in stating that Segraves persisted in denying that Likely had any
intention of assaulting Baker.
Member Fanning would not, in any event, defer to arbitration in this
case. See his dissenting opinions in Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf and
Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB No. 150, and subsequent decisions.
DECISION
activities as stewards and, (b) maintained, enforced, and
gave effect to an unlawful no-solicitation rule designed to
prohibit the access of its employees to the Union. The
complaint alleges that the aforesaid conduct violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
'
More specifically, the General Counsel contends that
during the 10(b) period preceding the filing of the charge,
the Respondent maintained and enforced an oral unlawful
no-solicitation rule, limited to stewards and not applied to
other employees. The rule, as viewed by the General
Counsel, prohibited union stewards from talking to other
employees during working time, regardless of the subject of
the conversation. Stewards were not permitted to leave
their departments for any reason without permission of
their foremen, whereas other employees were permitted
freedom of movement. In Respondent's enforcement of the
rule, a number of stewards were warned and threatened
and one steward received a written employee performance
report for violations of the rule. The General Counsel
further alleges that, on one occasion, a steward was refused
permission to process a grievance. The thrust of his
position is that stewards were singled out and restricted in
their movements during working time and the enforcement
of'the rule resulted in threats and warnings to stewards.
Such conduct, the General Counsel asserts, was designed
to destroy the Union's ability to represent its members and
to harass and interfere with the stewards in the processing
of grievances and in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Respondent maintains that the grievance provisions of
the contract prescribe the procedure to be followed by
stewards in the processing of grievances. This was enforced
by Respondent. But apart from union business, stewards
were treated no differently than other employees. Respon-
dent contends that there is a practice or rule that no
employee was permitted to leave his own department or
enter another department to engage another employee in
conversation on either employee's working time without
permission of the foremen of both employees. In the
enforcement of this practice, Respondent says, stewards
were treated no differently than were any other employees.
As an alternative defense, Respondent's counsel moved
that the Board defer to the grievance-arbitration proce-
dures in the existing contract between the parties. This
motion is disposed of below.
Upon the entire record,2 including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the briefs filed by all the parties, I make the following:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES
BERNARD NESS, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard at Columbus, Ohio, on August 23-24, 1972,
pursuant to charges and amended charges filed on March 1
and March 20, 1972, respectively, by Textile Workers
Union of America, Local 487, AFL-CIO, herein called the
Union, and a consolidated complaint issued April 18,
1972.1 The gravamen of the complaint is that Respondent
(a) threatened and warned union stewards because of their
The complaint was orally amended at the hearing in minor respects.
2 Corrected by an order dated November 10, 1972.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT AND THE
UNION INVOLVED .
The Respondent, engaged at its Columbus, Ohio, plant
in the business of fabrication of plastic-coated fabrics,
annually ships products valued in excess of $50,000 from
its plant directly to points outside the State, and is engaged
202 NLRB No. 133
COLUMBUS COATED FABRICS 933
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the,
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
If. THE DEFERRAL ISSUE
Respondent's counsel contends that the collective-bar-
gaining agreement contains a grievance and arbitration
procedure culminating in final and binding arbitration and
that the conduct alleged as unlawful in the complaint raises
issues best resolved through arbitration under the applica-
ble provisions of the contract, citing the "no union
discrimination clause,"3 the "rule making" clause,4 the
broad grievance definition,5 binding arbitration,6 and the
exclusivity clause.?
Respondent's counsel relies on National Radio Company,
Inc., 198 NLRB No. 1. He is prepared to waive the time
requirements in the contract for processing of the griev-
ances filed as a result of some of the conduct alleged to be
unlawful. He concedes the bargaining relationship is not
an amicable one but contends it is a working one and the
purposes of the Act would be effectuated by deferral.
Both the General Counsel and the Union contend that
the Board should not defer to arbitration. Among other
arguments in support of their contention, they stress that
.the bargaining relationship is not amicable, which Respon-
dent concedes, and that the collective-bargaining process
has broken down. In their view, arbitration would be
fruitless.
That the bargaining relationship between the parties is
not amicable is clear from the record. The parties have
maintained a collective-bargaining relationship since 1961
when Respondent purchased the plant. Even before such
purchase, the Union had for some years represented the
employees. During 1971, the Union had 34 stewards and at
the time of the hearing about 26. In 1967, two wildcat
strikes occurred, lasting I and 2 weeks, respectively. Also
in 1967, a 16-week economic strike occurred. In 1969, two
wildcat strikes occurred, the first lasting only a few hours
and the other, a period of 11 days. In 1972, a wildcat strike
began on March 1 and was terminated on March 6 when
the Company obtained a district court injunction. An
unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union resulted in
an informal settlement agreement, approved by the
Regional Director for Region 9 on April 2, 1971.8
In the calendar year 1971, 302 grievances were filed. Of
this number, 98 were withdrawn before being resolved in
the fourth step, the last step prior to arbitration. Of the 204
3 Art. VII, sec. 3. That the Company agrees that there shall be no
discrimination against any employee because he serves on any committee
coming under the terms of this agreement.
4 Art. IX, sec. I. That the management of the work and the direction of
the working forces, including the right to hire, suspend , discharge for proper
cause, and the regular customary functions of management are vested
exclusively in the Company, but shall not be used in violation of the terms
of this agreement or for the purpose of discrimination against any member
of the Union. Sec. 2. That the Company has the right to establish reasonable
plant rules. Questions concerning the application of these rules shall be
subject to the grievance procedure.
5 Art. VII, sec. 2. A grievance shall be defined as a controversy between
the Company and the Union or between the Company and the employees
covered by this agreement as to (1) any matter relating to working
conditions not specifically covered in this agreement and (2) any matter
involving interpretation or violation of any provision of this agreement.
grievances processed in the fourth step, 88, or 43 percent,
were sustained by the Respondent, in whole or in part.
During this same period, six grievances were taken to
arbitration-in five the Respondent prevailed, and one
resulted in a split decision. In 1972, up to the time of the
hearing in August, 297 grievances had already been filed.
No statistics were disclosed as to their disposition, but,
according to Tom Ness, assistant manager of labor
relations, not as many grievances have been withdrawn as
in 1971.
I have serious doubts that the basic controversy involved
here, the treatment of stewards, is bottomed on the
meaning or interpretation of contract provisions rather
than raising issues concerning an abridgement of Section 7
rights. But, in any event; I find it unnecessary to resolve
this question. Suffice to say the bargaining history of the
past several years has been a rocky one. It has been marred
by strikes, by distrust for each other,9 and by continual
bickering. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether the
Board or an arbitrator can provide much stability to the
bargaining relationship so sorely lacking here. A healthy
respect and mutual recognition of each other's legitimate
rights and obligations can best be provided by the parties
themselves. The Board has not yet deferred to the
arbitration machinery where the bargaining history has
been as controversial and disruptive as is present in this
case. I am therefore persuaded that abstention and deferral
to , an arbitrator for resolution is not warranted and
Respondent's motion is accordingly denied.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The. grievance procedure in the contract provides for the
first-step meeting to be held "when all involved can be
properly relieved but no later than the time immediately
subsequent to the shift the grievant is working." (Art. VII,
sec. 4, step 1) There is no dispute between the parties as to
the procedure to be followed. During working time, when a
grievant and a steward wish to discuss a possible grievance
with the foreman involved in the complaint, permission
was required of the respective foreman.'° The General
Counsel does not contend that such requirement for
permission was in itself unlawful. The determination to be
made here however is whether the Respondent unlawfully
extended the restriction of movement of the stewards so as
to infringe upon their Section 7 rights. The General
Counsel says the stewards were not permitted to leave their
department during worktime for any reason without the
0
Art. VIII, sec. 2. Powers of Arbitrators-The impartial arbitrator so
selected or appointed shall conduct a hearing on grievances submitted to
him and shall consider the evidence submitted. Such impartial arbitrator
shall not have the power to add to, subtract from or modify any of the terms
of this agreement. Sec. 3. The decision of the Impartial arbitrator shall be
final and binding on both parties hereto.
r Art. VII, sec. 7. That inasmuch as a grievance procedure has been
provided for, neither the Company nor the Union will use any other means
to settle a dispute or grievance.
8 The settlement agreement was received as an exhibit only to show the
lack of amity between the parties and not as proof that the Company had
committed unfair labor practices.
9 See, for example, the Union's newsletters to its members. (G.C. Exh. 4.)
10 Stewards processed grievances of employees in other departments, as
well as grievances arising in their own departments.
934 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
foreman's permission while other employees did not need
such permission. The Respondent's position is that no
employee, steward or otherwise, could go to another
department on either's working time without permission of
the foreman if it interferes with production. Roy Dillow,
manager of labor relations, testified that employees could
go freely to other departments, but not if the other
employee is working. Harry Tibbs, South Mill, superintend-
ent, and Quality Control Superintendent Norman Orr both
said they were not aware of any rule requiring union
stewards to get permission from the foreman to talk to
other employees for reasons other than union business
during worktime. The only qualification was that they, as
well as other employees, were not to converse with
employees while they were working.
Corwin Smith, an employee of almost 20 years, has held
various positions in the Union since 1961. He was a
steward in 1971 and again in 1972 until his resignation
from that position on March 3. Smith testified that he first
became aware of the broad restriction against stewards in
August 1971 when he was accused by his foreman,
Marple,11 of loafing in another department and was told if
he wanted to speak to anyone on union business he first
needed Marple's permission. According to Smith, he had
never requested permission in the past. In early September,
he was again admonished for being absent from his
department without permission and was given an employee
performance report.12 In late November he was told by his
foreman, McDonald,13 that Calvin Green foreman of the
embossing department had complained he was in that
department without permission and was disrupting the
work of the employees in that department.14 In December,
he was again warned by McDonald for talking to the
employees in the embossing department and disrupting
their work. As a result of this latest warning by McDonald,
Smith filed a grievance contending harassment and undue
interference with his 'duties as steward. The grievance was
processed through the fourth step and denied; the
Company's position was that the grievant was in the other
department without permission as required by the contrac-
tual procedure in conducting union business. Smith
testified that in the third-step meeting on January 4, 1972,
Harry Tibbs, department superintendent, said he had
complaints about Smith loafing in other departments and
disrupting work. Tibbs accused him of soliciting grievances
and "trying to stir up something." Tibbs said he was there
to work 8 hours a day- and warned him about getting
caught in another department and said Smith was "not to
speak to anyone in another department." 15 On January 6,
Tibbs handed him the Company's step 4 response to his
grievance. According to Smith, Tibbs asked him if he was
.keeping his nose clean. Smith responded, "Don't worry
about me. I will be here." Tibbs then remarked, "That is
what other people thought. Do you remember Aleshire and
Thacher?" 16
11 Marple is on a leave of absence for illness and-was not called as a
witness.
12 A written warning referred to by the witnesses as an "EPR." An EPR
may lead to further disciplinary action, depending on the nature of the
offense and the number of EPR's.
13 McDonald succeeded Marple as his foreman.
Neither McDonald nor Green were called as witnesses.
The General Counsel contends that Tibbs' remarks to
Smith on January 4 and January 6 constituted, respective-
ly, an unlawful warning that Smith cease his union
activities as a steward and an unlawful threat of discharge
because of his activities as a steward. (Par. 5(a)(i) and (ii)
of the complaint.) It should be noted that the discussion of
January 4 was related to the conduct of union business
during working time. Smith's grievance itself alluded to
interference with his duties as steward. It is.clear that when
Tibbs told Smith not to talk to anyone, he was cautioning
him to obey the rule-to adhere to the requirement that
permission first be obtained from the foreman to conduct
union business during working time. Tibbs' reference on
January 6 to the two employees who had been discharged
for excessive absenteeism is ambiguous and does not
constitute an unlawful threat. Viewing the context in which
the remark was made, i.e., the reference to unauthorized
absences from his department to conduct union business, it
is clear that the threat to discharge was for future
continued violations of the lawful rule pertaining to the
conduct of union business-indeed a rule provided for in
the grievance procedure. .
On February 15, 1972, Smith had processed a step 1
grievance for an employee, Baker, with Calvin Green,
Baker's foreman. Smith then reduced the grievance to
writing for submission at the step 2 level and asked his own
foreman, Armbrust, for permission to discuss the grievance
with Green. At first, Armbrust refused permission, but
then said he could hand the grievance to Green but could
not talk to him.17 Smith then filed a grievance claiming
Armbrust deliberately interfered with his duties as a
steward by refusing to permit him to process a grievance.
The grievance was denied in the fourth step, the Company
pointing out that Smith was allowed to ultimately process
the grievance during the same shift.
According to Smith, after he resigned as steward in
March` 1972, he has talked to employees in other
departments without any restraints . Except for the Arm-
brust incident described above, Smith conceded he has not
.been denied permission to process grievances, although, at
times, he had to wait until the end of the shift. He said he
understood the oral rule to be that he had to have
permission to talk to anyone for any reason. When later
asked, whether any mention was made on limitations on
what he could talk about, his response was, "No, but
several times they implied I was discussing union busi-
ness."
The General Counsel alleges that Armbrust's refusal to
permit Smith to talk to Foreman Green in the second step
of the grievance procedure violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act (5(b) of the complaint). Pursuant to the contract
provisions, Green had 48 hours in which to respond to the
grievance at the second step after it had been- filed with
him. It can be argued that it was unnecessary for Smith to
discuss the grievances with him, but that only begs the
IS Union President Bailey was present during this meeting. Although he
was called as a witness by the General Counsel. he was not asked about
these remarks by Tibbs.
16 Two employees who had been fired for excessive absenteeism. I
discredit Tibbs' denial that he made the remarks attributed to him by Smith.
17 Armbrust was not called as a witness.
COLUMBUS COATED FABRICS 935
question. Here we have a situation where the foreman
-Armbrust-was actually impeding the orderly process-
ing of the grievance without any apparent concern other
than to make it difficult for the steward and to frustrate
him in his attempts to process the grievance. In any event,
the grievance was processed during the same shift. It
should be noted this was the only time Smith was refused
permission to process a grievance.
Robert C. Gillen served as steward from 1969 until his
resignation from that position in May 1972. In early
August 1971, he was told by his foreman, Sam Koepf, he
could not leave his department without permission for
union business, for breaks, or for any reason.18 He testified
this was the first time he was made aware of any such
restriction, and.no such restriction was imposed upon the
other employees in his section. On October 1, he had
completed his shift and an employee called him over to
talk about a job assignment. The other employee's machine
was shut down and he was on idle time 19 but not on break.
After this short conversation, Orr stopped him and
cautioned him about conducting union business and said,
"Bob, this is the first and last time for this. I do not want to
see any more of this. I am not going to tell you again."
Gillen filed a grievance contending Orr's remarks consti-
tuted discrimination against him in violation of the
nondiscrimination clause in the contract.20 The grievance
was denied in the fourth step.
The General Counsel alleges that this warning by On
was an unlawful threat of disciplinary action because of
Gilleo's protected activities as a steward (5(c) of the
complaint). Gillen was in fact conducting union business
-during working time. The other employee was not on
break. This was an impromptu conversation between the
two employees about a job assignment, but, nevertheless,
On's remarks were directed to following the procedure for
the conduct of union business during working time. Under
the circumstances, I do not find such warning unlawful.
Gilleo conceded that foremen never refused to discuss a
grievance with him. He had handled grievances even for
employees in other departments. He has been granted
permission to go to other departments to handle griev-
ances. He has discussed grievances with foremen on
working time and also at the end of the shift.
Kester Segraves has been a steward since October 1971.
He testified that prior to becoming a steward, he could take
breaks whenever he chose and could talk to employees
without first getting permission from his foreman. When he
became steward, he was told by his foreman, Baker,21 that
if he wanted to talk to an employee, or an employee
wanted to talk to him, permission would first have to be
obtained from the respective foremen. Segraves understood
this restriction pertained to union business. According to
Segraves, other employees could talk freely.
On January 21, 1972, Segraves heard that another
employee, Likely, had been taken to the office and was in
the'process of being discharged for allegedly attempting to
cut the foreman. He entered the office and attempted to
intervene in the dispute. Orr told Segraves to getout of the
office, it was none of his business and Likely did not need
a steward.22 It was evident that the employee was accused
by his foreman of a serious offense and the atmosphere
was charged with tension. Segraves did not leave, contin-
ued to remonstrate in support of Likely, and the discussion
finally ended with Likely being returned to work. Later
that day Segraves approached Baker and told him Likely
did not have to talk to him without union representa-
tion-that Likely did not "have to be a social ball." Baker
said he was trying to establish a better relationship. When
Baker persisted in denying that Likely had any intention of
cutting Baker, Baker screamed, "You're pushing your luck
Segraves."
I do not find that Baker's remarks to Segraves about
"pushing your luck" constituted an unlawful threat as the
General Counsel alleges (5)(d)(iii) of the complaint). Theo
subject of the alleged cutting was a particular sensitive one
and, with the tension created in the office earlier that day,
it can hardly be said that Baker's remark tended to
unlawfully interfere with Segraves' stewardship.
On February 16, 1972, Segraves received an EPR from
his foreman, Baker, for visiting Local President Bailey in
another department without permission and disrupting
production. Segraves then filed a grievance. According to
Segraves' testimony, he had asked his foreman, Baker, for
permission to see Bailey on union business. Baker said he
would let him know. Some time later during the shift, not
having had a response from Baker, he again requested
permission of Baker. Calvin Green, Bailey's foreman, was
also present and refused to grant permission, stating Bailey
would be busy all evening. Later that evening, while on
break, Segraves approached Bailey who was standing by a
machine in his department, near the smoker. The conversa-
tion concerned union business. In the midst of the
conversation, Baker appeared and ordered Segraves back
to his department, stating that Green had reported
Segraves had been talking to Bailey without permission
and disrupting production. Bailey denied that he was
engaged in productive work, although admittedly he was
not on break. Segraves received an EPR the following day.
The General Counsel contends that Baker's remarks to
Segraves on February 16 and the issuance of the EPR on
February 17 constituted unlawful threats and a warning of
disciplinary action because of his activity as a steward.
(Par. 5(d)(i) and (ii) of the complaint .) Baker 's remarks to
Segraves and the EPR accused Segraves of being away
from his department without permission and disrupting
production. It is undisputed Segraves had been refused
permission by Green to visit Bailey and, despite this lack of
authorization, Segraves did stop and talk to Bailey, who
was not on break. Thus, Segraves did violate the union
business rule. Although it may be argued that Bailey was
not busy at the time and no serious disruption of
production was involved, I view Baker's directive to
Segraves and the issuance of the EPR as a strict
enforcement of the lawful rule and not illegal.
18 Gilleo testified he had not taken any breaks from that time until the 20 Art. VII, sec. 3.
day before the hearing. Nor had he requested permission. 21 Baker did not testify.
19 Gilleo explained idle time as a period when the machine is not 22 Corroborated by Likely. Although Orr denied ordering Segraves out
running . During this period, the employee is expected to do paper work, of the office, I credit Segraves and Likely.
match colors, or other work, unless he goes on break.
936 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The General Counsel contends that Roy Dillow, manag-
er of labor relations, threatened William Bailey, union
president, on February 4, 1972, with disciplinary action
because of his union activities (5(e) of the complaint). In
support of this. allegation, Bailey testified that on a number
of occasions after he became president, Dillow told him he
was spending too much time away from his job. On
February 4, during a grievance meeting, Dillow again
made reference to his being away from his work a great
deal conducting union business and, if the pattern
continued, it could affect his job. Bailey also testified that
Dillow feared that Bailey would become ill because of his
deep involvement in union affairs and not be able to
perform his work. Dillow suggested he delegate some of his
union functions.23
The General Counsel relies upon the reference to union
activities affecting Bailey's job as an unlawful threat.
Because of the context in which it was made, I do not view
such remark as unlawful. Rather, I picture it as a concern
by Dillow over production matters, particularly where
Dillow was suggesting that Bailey delegate some of the
union business to other representatives instead of attempt-
ing to handle too much on his own.
We now turn.to the alleged no-solicitation rule which the
General Counsel contends limited only the union repre-
sentatives in their movements in the plant and which the
Respondent. says does not exist. The General Counsel does
not contend the requirement for stewards to obtain
permission to conduct union business during worktime
itself was unlawful. As stated above, his position is that the
illegality stems from the extension to bar stewards from
leaving their departments during working time for any
reason or talking to other employees without the foreman's
permission while other employees did not need such
permission. He contends such restriction imposed on the
stewards was intended and designed to frustrate and harass
the stewards in carrying out their protected Section 7 rights
in the role of stewards.
We have the testimony of Smith that, before August
1971, he did not need permission to leave the department.
It was at that time that his foreman first limited his
movements. He was admonished several times as related
above, but in each instance it was because of being away
from his department on union business. Under the
circumstances, I am convinced he understood the Compa-
ny's concern was related to his absences from his
department for union business, rather than for other
reasons.
With respect to the restrictions put on Gilleo, in August
1971 Foreman Koepf instructed Gilleo he was not to leave
the department for any reason without permission. Gilleo
was a steward at the time. Although Koepf testified
permission was not required to take breaks, this apparently
was not made clear to Gilleo.24 Koepf testified this
restriction was ^ not limited to stewards but to other
employees in his department as well. Gus Indiciano, a
rebuttal witness for the General Counsel, testified he
worked in the inspection department for 24 years and held
the same position as Gilleo. He was not a. steward.
Although not very articulate, this much could be gleaned
from his testimony-that permission to take breaks is not
required, but, otherwise, permission is required from the
foreman before leaving the department. As Indiciano
stated, otherwise, "how would he know where I am at."
Albert Olena, another rebuttal witness who works in the
same department, testified that employees are not free to
leave the department except for breaks. Olena does not
hold any position in the Union.
It appears that the manner in which Koepf applied the
"freedom-of-movement" rule did not conform with the
understanding of the higher echelon of management,
Dillow, Tibbs, and Orr, whose testimony was to the effect
that employees were free to leave their department and talk
to other employees provided. the employees were not
working. But, regardless of any difference in application of
the rule, the question to be resolved is whether the broad
prohibition maintained by Koepf was limited to stewards.
Based on the testimony described above, I find that Koepf
applied the restrictions to the other employees in his
department as well as to stewards.
As for Segraves' admonishments for being away from his
department without permission, the record shows such
warnings were all related to violations of the rule governing
the conduct of union business during working time.
Analysis and Conclusions.
It appears that, prior to August 1971, the Respondent did
not enforce too rigidly the rule requiring permission to
conduct union business during worktime. Since then,
however, Respondent made the stewards toe the line and
observe the contractual procedure which required the
steward to first obtain permission to conduct union
business. That this tightening up may have been attributa-
ble to the vexations of the parties may be idle speculation.
In some respects, the conduct of the foremen appears to
have been petty and designed to frustrate the stewards,
e.g., Orr's warning to Gilleo on October 1', 1971, when
Gilleo was engaged in a short impromptu conversation
with another employee on union business ; Armbrust's
initial refusal in February 1972 to permit Gilleo to talk to
Green in the second step of a grievance during worktime;
and Green's refusal to permit Segraves to talk to Local
Union President Bailey on union business, also in
February 1972.
It is not the function of this Agency to insure that the
bargaining relationship between the parties be serene and
free from bickering with each other. Here we have a lawful
limitation on union representatives in their conduct of
union business during working time. The right to present
grievances by stewards on behalf of employees or to
discuss complaints with employees is expressly protected in
Section 7 of the Act. But this right does not carry with it a
license that such activities must be permitted during
working time. As the Board has said, working time is for
23 Dillow admitted having talked to Bailey about being away from his however, that the area where employees took their breaks for smoking or
job too much but was not questioned as to the substance. using the vending machines was on another floor and not in this same
24 Koepf testified that the restriction did not apply to breaks because he department.
did not consider this to be leaving the department. It should be noted,
COLUMBUS COATED FABRICS 937
work and "in the absence of contractual agreement
permitting the investigation'and prosecution of complaints
on working time, the rights of employees and union
stewards to undertake such activities may be. limited."
Russell Packing Co., 133 NLRB 192, 196. The intent of the
rule requiring permission for the conduct of union business
was designed obviously to provide an orderly processing of
grievances. The record does show that the supervisors were
very much concerned that union business not be conduct-
ed in the plant during working time.without permission
and took every opportunity to caution and, in some cases,
warn the stewards for such infractions. That the rule was
enforced strictly is not questioned. Respondent' s action in
enforcing the procedures in processing complaints was in
conformity with the agreed-upon grievance procedures in
the collective-bargaining contract. With respect to further
limitations on the freedom of movement of stewards, I am
persuaded that the stewards were not restricted more than
other employees in leaving their departments.
Based on the foregoing, I must. conclude that the
evidence does. not. support a finding that Respondent
maintained an unlawful no-solicitation rule, limited to
union representatives as alleged in the complaint, and,
accordingly, recommend this allegation of the complaint
be dismissed. With respect to the warnings to the. stewards,
alleged to have been violative of Section 8(a)(1), I am
persuaded they were related to the-enforcement of a lawful
rule governing the conduct of union business on working
time, and, under the circumstances, not unlawful. Con-
cerning the allegation that Armbrust refused to permit the
25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall,,as provided in Sec.
steward to talk to the foreman concerned, during working
time, when viewed against the total picture which disclosed
that stewards were given permission to conduct such
business, often on working time, I must conclude that this
single incident is too insubstantial to warrant a finding of
an 8(a)(1) violation.
CONCLUSIONS OF, LAW
1. Columbus Coated Fabrics, Division of Borden
Chemical, Borden, Inc., is, and at all material times has
been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of
the Act, engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Textile Workers Union of America, Local 487,
AFL-CIO, is, and at all material times has been , a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent has
engaged in or is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant toSection 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER25
It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its
entirety.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations . be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.