Bloomsburg Craftsmen, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 24, 1985

276 N.L.R.B. 400 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

400- DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Bloomsburg Craftsmen , - Inc. and Bloomsburg Print-
ing and - Graphic Communications Local 732.
Cases 4-CA-14310 and 4-'CA-14550'
- 24 September 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND JOHANSEN
On 27 February 1985 Administrative Law Judge
Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed. ex-
ceptions and supporting briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its -authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I, and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Bloomsburg Craftsmen, Inc., Blooms-
burg, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(a) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs.
"(a) Furnish the Union the requested personnel
file of employee James L. Walters, Sr."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge. .
' Since we agree with the judge that the Respondent did bargain to
impasse on the Union's midcontract demand for written job descriptions,
we find it unnecessary to decide whether in the circumstances of this
case the Respondent was under a duty to bargain on this subject
2 Contrary to-the judge and in accordance with our normal practice
where a party has withheld information in violation of Sec 8 (a)(5) and
(1) of the -Act, we shall order the Respondent to furnish the requested
information despite the conclusion of the grievance procedure for which
the Union originally requested it Washington Gas Light Co, 273 NLRB
116 (1984)
- APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
276 NLRB No! 43
WE WILL NOT refuse to-bargain collectively with
Bloomsburg Printing and Graphic Communications
Local 732 by failing and refusing- to furnish infor-
mation requested which is relevant and necessary
to the performance of its duties as exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union the 'requested per-
sonnel file of an employee. -
BLOOMSBURG CRAFTSMEN, INC.
Barbara C. Joseph, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
for the General Counsel. -
Ira H. Weinstock, Esq., of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for
the Charging Party. - -
Sheldon Rosenberg, Esq. (Rosenberg & UJberg), of Scran-
ton, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge. This
proceeding was heard by me on November 29, 1984, in
Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania, upon an original unfair labor
practice charge filed on March 26, 1984, and an order of
consolidation dated November 2, 1984, upon separate
complaints issued in Case 4-CA-14310, on May 8, 1984;
and in Case 4-CA-14550, oh September 21, 1984, respec-
tively. Said complaints alleged that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by (1) refusing, since
February 2, 1984, to provide certain requested informa-
tion both necessary and relevant to the Union's perform-
ance of duties as exclusive bargaining representative and
(2) by refusing, since May 14, 1984, on request, to meet
and negotiate with the Union concerning job descrip-
tions. In its duly filed answer Respondent denied that
any unfair labor practices had been committed. Follow-
ing close of the hearing briefs were filed on behalf of the
General Counsel, the Charging Party, and Respondent.
On the entire record in this proceeding,' including
consideration of the posthearing briefs, and my opportu-
nity directly to consider the testimony of the witnesses
and their demeanor, it is found as follows.
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in
the manufacture of books at its facility in Bloomsburg,
Pennsylvania. In the course of said operation, Respond-
ent, during the year preceding issuance of the complaints
herein, shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 direct-
ly to points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The complaints allege, the answers admit, and it is found
' Corrections to the transcript have been approved and noted accord-
ingly -
BLOOMSBURG CRAFTSMEN
that the Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaints allege, Respondent at the hearing stip-
ulated, and it is found that Bloomsburg Printing and
Graphic Communications Local 732 is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Preliminary Statement
This consolidated proceeding arises from two distinct
controversies between Respondent and the Union, with
the complaints alleging that Respondent in each instance
breached its statutory -obligation to bargain in good faith.
Thus, in Case 4-CA-14310 it is alleged that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and
refusing since February 2, 1984, to furnish the Union
with a complete copy of the contents of the personnel
file of a discharged employee, whose grievance was
awaiting arbitration. In Case 4-CA-14550 it is alleged
that Respondent, since May 24, 1984, violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to engage in fur-
ther negotiations in connection with union demands for
written job descriptions. The alleged refusals to bargain
occurred in the context of a bargaining history dating
back some 20 years and during the term of a recently ex-
ecuted full scale collective-bargaining agreement, having
an effective date of January 3, 1983, and•a- scheduled ex-
piration of January 5, 1986.
B. The Refusal to Provide Information
In late 1983, the Union was actively pursuing a griev-
ance with respect to the termination of bargaining unit
employee James L. Walters Sr. On December 9, 1983,•a
third-step grievance session was held in connection
therewith. The Union was represented by its president,
Joel Baker, International Representative Joseph Maurer,
Candy Smith, a member of the grievance committee,
James K. Romig Jr.,. the grievance chairman, and dis-
chargee Walters. Included on the management team was
George Blickens, Respondent's director of industrial re-i
lations. Maurer acted as spokesman for the Union. At the
time, through Maurer, the Union requested and was af-
forded the'date of Walters' 'termination and the reasons
on which the Company acted; namely, that he was dis-
charged for -"falsification of production • records and
"other infractions."- When Maurer requested copies of
the warnings falling within the • "other infractions," they
were provided forthwith.2
2 A conflict exists as to whether the Union requested Walter's person-
nel"file at this step - Grievance Chairman Romig was the sole witness pre-
sented by the General Counsel as to what transpired He related that
both prior to and during the meeting the Union requested that Blickens
provide the personnel file and that in each instance management failed to
respond . Blickens, on the other hand , when called by Respondent, testi-
fied that there was no such request Weighed against the total circum-
stances, including my assessment of the probabilities, I am-inclined to
give Blickens the benefit of the doubt, and his denial is credited over the
uncorroborated account of Romig, whose reliability in a number of areas
was considered questionable.
401
At that juncture, the grievance was denied Subse-
quently, at some 'point within the 30-day period pre-
scribed by section 15.5 of the subsisting collective-bar-
gaining agreement, the Union filed for-arbitration 3 On
February 2, 1984, while the arbitral submission was
pending, the Union forwarded the following to Industrial
Relations Director Blickens:
Dear Mr. Blickens:
This -letter is, a "formal request for a complete
copy of the contents of the personnel file of em-
ployee James L. Walters Sr. pursuant to the proc-
essing of the grievance filed on the termination of
said employee. -
The personnel records sought should include
records which show; (a) date of hire, (b) date of ter-
mination and reason therefor; (c) job classification;
(d) job description and department; (e) seniority
ranking by plant; department and job classification;
(f) all notices; letters and/or memoranda of warn-
ing, suspension, discharge, commendation, promo-
tion and/or increases in pay.
Such records are necessary to verify whether the
personnel actions of Bloomsburg Craftsmen, Inc
complied with the requirements of the collective
bargaining agreement.
Any,further communication between your office
and Local 732-C should be made directly to me. I
appreciate your cooperation in the handling of this
matter and look forward to the prompt submission
of employee Walters' personnel file.
Sincerely Yours,
Joel Baker Jr., President
Local 732-C G.C.I.U.
Shortly thereafter the Company responded as follows
To: Joel Baker, Jr., President
Local 732-C, G.C.I.U.
Subject : Personnel File of James L. Walters, Sr.
This is to acknowledge 'receipt of your letter
dated February 2, 1984. It is the policy of Haddon
Craftsmen, Inc. that an individual's personnel file is
not open to a third party.
George H. Blickens
Director of Industrial Relations4
Consistent with the above, Walter's personnel file was
never submitted to the Union.
The Employer's refusal must be evaluated in light of
settled authority that, as a corollary of the duty to bar-
gain in good faith, parties to a bargaining relationship are
required, on request, to, provide certain information
within their possession: The duty exists as to a labor or-
ganization where the requested data is relevant and nec-
3 See G C Exh. 2, p. 22
* Haddon Craftsmen, Inc is the parenf corporation of Respondent
herein. -
402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
essary to the latter's discharge of its duties in connection
with negotiation, enforcement, or administration of a col-
lective-bargaining agreement. See, e.g.; NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Indus-
trial Co, 385 U.S. 432. (1967); Detroit Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303 (1979). Pursuant to this obliga-
tion, in order to' facilitate full exchange of facts and
thereby to diminish confrontations triggered by misun-
derstanding or mistrust, the law has favored labor orga-
nizations with wide latitude in their quest for employ-
ment data. Thus, where the subject matter is "intrinsic"
to the "core of the employer-employee relationship," the
request is considered "presumptively relevant." See, e.g.,
San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB, 548 F.2d
863, 867 (9th Cir. 1977) In such cases , disclosure is re-
quired, absent a showing by the employer that the data
requested lacks relevance. See Prudential Insurance Co. v.
NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396
U.S. 928 (1969). However, even where the request tran-
scends that category, the burden of proof imposed on
labor organizations is readily satisfied on the theory that
"a long range of potentially useful information should be
allowed to the union for the purpose of effectuating the
bargaining process, unless it is . clearly -irrelevant." See
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310,
1315 (8th Cir. 1979). Indeed, the Supreme Court has ad-
monished that the Board need only find a "probability"
as to relevance, and that the information sought "would
be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties
and responsibilities." NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,
supra.
In the instant case, the formal request of February 2
was accompanied by express statement that the personnel
file was sought in conjunction with the pending griev-
ance and to "verify whether the personnel actions of
Bloomsburg Craftsmen, Inc; complied with the require-
ments- of the collective-bargaining agreement." At the
time of the request, the grievance in question was await-
ing arbitration. In this respect, the Board' in Pfizer, Inc.,
268 NLRB 916, 918 (1984), recently stated as follows:
In general, the Board and the courts have held that
information which aids the arbitral process is rele-
vant and should be provided . . . . For the goal
. . . of exchanging information is to encourage res-
olution of disputes, short.of an arbitration hearing,
briefs, and decision so that the arbitration system is
not "woefully over-burdened."
The relevance of a personnel file to the evaluation of
the dischargee's grievance and the employer action chal-
lenged thereby would appear indisputable. As the reposi-
tory of all documents tracking the employment history
of a particular worker, more frequently than not manage-
ment will levy discipline only after consideration of the
content of such a file. The impropriety of a particular act
of discipline might well be influenced not only by what
is in the personnel file, but by that which is omitted
therefrom. At the same time , such. documented items as
length of service, training, the number of skilled job clas-
sifications held in the past , attendance, promotions, ment
wage increases, and commendations might well signal
the harshness or equity underlying a particular act of dis-
cipline and, hence, might provide an important measure
of assistance, in weighing the pros and cons of the griev-
ance under consideration. As stated by the Board in
Pfizer, Inc. at 919: "Arbitrators routinely consider em-
ployee work records in deciding whether employers
have applied their disciplinary rules in a consistent, even-
handed, and nondiscriminatory- manner."
For the above reasons, it is found, contrary to the Re-
spondent, that the personnel file was relevant to the
Union's processing the grievance with respect to the dis-
charge of employee Walters. The fact that certain speci-
fied contents of the file had been turned over to the
Union previously and that others may not have existed
furnishes no defense to Respondent's obligation to pro-
vide, intact, the documentation which was available to,
and which one might reasonably assume was considered
by, the Employer in arriving at its determination to take
action against the grievant. See Kroger Co., 226 NLRB
512 (1976).,
Moreover, Respondent's stated reliance on an alleged
internal policy failed to give rise to a meritorious de-
fense. Even assuming that Respondent had an existing,
published policy of denying such information "to a third
party"-a fact not established on this record-Respond-
ent has failed to lay the factual groundwork necessary to
successfully maintain a claim of confidentiality under the
teachings of Detroit Edison Co. v.' NLRB. 440 U.S. 301
(1979). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 224 NLRB
-881, 890 (1976).
Accordingly, it is found that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing on and after February 2,
1984, to provide documentation relevant and necessary
to the Union's performance of its duty in connection
with a pending grievance.
C. The'Alleged Refusal to Bargain Concerning
Written Job Descriptions
Over the years, Respondent has failed to maintain
written job descriptions with respect to classifications
covered by the. collective-bargaining agreement.5 At no
time during contract renewal negotiations, in the course
of a bargaining history extending beyond some 20 years,
had the Union ever requested provisions requiring or fa-
cilitating the development of written job descriptions.
Shortly after execution of a new collective-bargaining
agreement on January 1, 1983, the parties met in March
1983 to consider several issues. At that time, the Union
informally inquired as to whether management would be
willing to sit down and draw up written lists of job
duties for various employees. The Union explained, that
employees had complained that they had been disci-
plined for neglect of duties which, according to the em-
ployees, were not previously considered part of their
jobs. Management responded that it would get back to
the Union on that request. Romig testified that thereafter
Romig testified that, in 1977, when he first worked for Respondent
"there were some descriptions for some classifications ." He acknowl-
edged , however , that he never saw any which were applicable to classifi-
cations he held Romig 's testimony was .not corroborated , nor was 'evi-
dence developed as to the foundation for his knowledge that written job
descriptions did in fact exist in the past
BLOOMSBURG CRAFTSMEN
as time went by he, on one or two occasions, inquired as
to the Company's position, but was simply told that no
position had been taken as yet.
The Union's first formal request for written job de-
scriptions was registered in a letter to Plant Manager
Robert Ciero dated February 9, 1984, which set forth as
follows:
Dear Mr. Ciero:
Recently there has been a rash of unilateral
changes in job duties and responsibilities for several
classifications within Bloomsburg Craftsmen , Inc. In
many cases employees have been required to sign
papers acknowledging these changes , other changes
have been verbal.
Some of these changes have been posted on the
bulletin board , many others have not. In no instance
have any of these changes been discussed with or
agreed to by the Union , nor have copies of all these
changes even been given to the Union.
If you will recall a meeting in your office on
March 31 , 1983 the Union specifically requested to
discuss and to draw up a written list of job duties
and responsibilities for each and every classification
in our plant . As of this date we have not had the
curteousy [sic] of any type of formal reply.
The Union hereby formally requests that the
Company meet within the Union and discuss and
draw up written lists of job duties and responsibil-
ities for each and every classification in all the de-
partments at Bloomsburg Craftsmen, Inc.
I appreciate your cooperation in handling this
matter and look forward to. a prompt written reply.
If I do not hear from you within ten days I shall
assume that you do not intend to honor this request.
Sincerely Yours,
Joel Baker Jr.
Local 732-C G.C.I.U.6
The Respondent answered in a timely fashion by letter
dated February 14, 1984,' and an agreement was made
to meet to discuss the issue in conjunction with other
grievances on March 1, 1984.
The March : 1 meeting was held as scheduled. Among
those present for the Company were Director of Indus-
trial Relations Blickens and Plant Manager Ciero. On
behalf of the Union , Romig explained to management the
Union 's desire to discuss and draft written job descrip-
tions . Blickens responded by observing that the Compa-
ny "did not want to put descriptions in writing ." Black-
ens was informed by Romig that since employees might
be discharged or given disciplinary layoffs for not doing
their jobs , the latter should be informed as to the limits
-of his or her responsibility . Blickens repeated that writ-
ten job descriptions were undesirable, as a "limiting
factor." The Company , in defining what it meant by
6 See G.C. Exh. 5.
7 See G C. Exh. 6.
403
"limiting factor," alluded to the possibility of future
"changes in technology," and its-concomitant need for
flexibility in modifying job categories dictated thereby.
To this, the Union responded that no problem would be
presented, as the Union would agree to probably 95 or
98 per cent of everything that would be suggested by the
Company in that eventuality." The discussion concerning
the job description issue continued for about 20 to 30
minutes. Before closing, the Union' requested that the
Company put its position in writing. Pursuant to this re-
quest, by letter of the same date; Blickens wrote the
Union as follows:
To: Joel L. Baker, President
Local 732-C, G.C.I.U.
Bob Ciero had sent me a 'copy of your letter to
him dated February 9, 1984 concerning job descrip-
tions. Today your Union committee asked me about
this matter and then asked me to give the Union a
letter concerning my response
As I said to your committee, the Company does
not intend to write job descriptions or duties on any
of the jobs in the bargaining unit because the Com-
pany will add to, subtract from, or modify duties
depending upon business, customer service, and
changes in technology.
It is the Company's position that a job descrip-
tion is utiltized by the Union as a limiting factor,
and the Company does not desire to-agree to any
such thing in these uncertain times.
George H. Blickens
Director of Industrial Relations"
Thereafter, by a letter dated May 14, 1984, the Union re-
sponded to the above by reiterating that since discipline
and bonus points depend "on how the Company inter-
prets each employee's unwritten job duties and responsi-
bilities theUnion wishes to have each and every employ-
ees [sic] job duties and responsibilities in writing." The
Union requested a further meeting on the matter.10
By letter dated May 24, 1984, the Company informed
the Union that the position expressed in its March 1,
1984 letter "is unchanged."i 1
Finally on August 10, 1984, the Union wrote Respond-
ent as follows: -
The Union hereby formally requests that the
Company meet with the Union and discuss whether
or not there should exist job descriptions for mem-
bers of the bargaining unit. I appreciate your coop-
eration in handling this matter and look forward to
a prompt written reply.
8 This interpretation of Romig', s testimony is preferred over that sug-
gested in the General Counsel's brief
8 See G C Exh 7
10 See G C Exh 8
11 See G C Exh. 9 -
-404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
If I do not hear from you within in 10 days, I
shall assume that you do not intend to honor this
request.
Very Truly Yours,
Joel Baker, Jr.
Local 7327C G.C.I.U.
The Company did not respond. .
The refusal of the Company to meet , directly , with the
Union on and after May 24 , 1984, is the focal point of
the instant allegation . With respect to the governing
principles , it would appear that the obligation to bargain
continues beyond negotiation , and extends, during the
term of a collective -bargaining agreement . NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 ( 1939). However, this duty
applies only to mandatory subjects -of collective bargain-
ing not previously waived by the statutory employee
representative , 12 which were neither discussed nor em-
bodied in the terms and conditions of the subsisting con-
tract . See NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., supra . Cf. Connecti-
cut Power Co., 271 NLRB 766, 767 ( 1984), wherein the
Board , without reference to Jacobs , while addressing a
different issue , broadly stated : "in the absence of reopen-
er language , we find Section 8(d) protects every party to
a collective bargaining agreement from involuntarily in-
curring any additional bargaining obligations for the du-
ration of the agreement." Absent clearer guidance, the
foregoing is regarded as nonbinding dictum herein, not
-intended to overturn Jacobs . Assuming that to be the
case , it is clear under the precedent that written job de-
scriptions covering employees in the appropriate bargain-
ing unit constitute conditions of employment within
"wages , hours , and other terms of employment ," recog-
nized traditionally as constituting mandatory subjects of
bargaining . See NLRB v. Borg- Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342 (1958).
With the foregoing in mind it is noted that although
the complaint is addressed to a period in which Re-
spondent refused to participate in face -to-face discus-
sions , Respondent was not guilty of either an across-the-
board refusal to meet and discuss the issue or rejection of
the principles of good-faith bargaining on a per se
basis . 13 For the Employer - did meet , and the Union was
extended full opportunity to explain its demand and to
provide underlying rationale . The latter's proposal was
considered , but the Company declined to agree , offering
12 Contrary to Respondent , the record fails to disclose a basis for con-
cluding that the Union waived its interest in the subject matter . The fact
that written job descriptions were neither required by prior collective-
bargaining agreements , nor previously discussed in renewal negotiations,
fails to give rise to a statutory waiver Perkins Machine Co, 141 NLRB
98 (1963); NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg Co., 196 F 2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952) Apart
from strictures of the Board's traditional waiver test , considerations of in-
dustrial peace would hardly be served if unions were required to demand
relief through collective agreements in anticipation of problems, on pain
of denying them access to the bargaining process in later years , should
the grievance eventually emerge . See, e g, GTE Automatic Electric, 240
NLRB 297 (1979)
19 There is a suggestion in the record that, at some point , Respondent
was accused by the Union of having effected changes unilaterally in the
content of jobs As there was neither allegation nor full litigation of any
refusal to bargain on that ground , no issue in that connection is appropri-
ate for resolution in this proceeding
a reasoned response as to why written job descriptions
would be incompatible with legitimate business objec-
tives. This response was neither inherently indicative of
bad faith nor unreasonable.
The foregoing is fully compatible with an accurate as-
sessment by the General Counsel to the effect that Re-
spondent was seeking "total capitulation by the Union to
its position of no written job descriptions," This, howev-
er, is simply descriptive of the ongoing deadlock, for an
identical intent is just as readily imputed to the Union.
Thus, the Union wanted written job descriptions, and it
never suggested that anything less would prove accepta-
ble. It is difficult to imagine that Respondent could
budge from its resistance to written classifications with-
out total capitulation to the Union's demand on that
score. In sum , total capitulation on the issue of written
job descriptions was the -objective pursued by each of
the respective parties, and was characteristic of no more
than a mutually held good-faith disagreement on an ex-
tremely narrow issue . To read bad faith into such a dead-
lock is to ignore the unmistakable congressional mandate
written into Section 8(d) to the effect that the bargaining
obligation "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession ... .1114
The disagreement was sufficiently significant to war-
rant reference to the cautionary expression in precedent
that "the Act does not encourage a party to engage in
fruitless marathon discussions at the expense of frank
statements and support of position." Indeed, to avoid this
consequence, the Board has held that the duty of bargain
is suspended during periods of impasse, i 5 a condition
which clearly existed on March 1, 1984,16 and thereafter
until broken by some supervening event removing the
element of futility from further discussion. i 7 Teamsters
14 As the Supreme Court admonished in NLRB v American National
Insurance Co, 343 U S 395, 404 (1952) "the Board may not, either direct-
ly or- indirectly , compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon
substantive terms . .11
is NLRB v Katz, 369 U S 736 (1962), Providence Medical Center, 243
NLRB 714 (1979)
16 In contesting impasse, - the General Counsel points initially to what
impressed me as self-serving, highly subjective testimony of Romig to the
effect that a mutuality of understanding as to the positions of the parties
was never reached On the contrary , neither the Union 's proposal , its un-
derlying reasoning, nor the Employer's response were complex and the
total circumstances bely the notion that the parties ' disagreement was en-
forced by any sense of confusion The General Counsel also points to
Romig 's testimony that "when the Union sought clarification from Re-
spondent as to what it meant by 'limiting factor ,' it was given no explana-
tion." Romig 's overall testimony in this regard was not entirely consist-
ent He later conceded that at the March 1 meeting Respondent opposed
written job descriptions , stating that it wished to make modifications of
jobs in the future in the event of technological change This reference
obviously was explanatory of the terms "limiting factor." In any event,
any reasonably held doubt as to the intended meaning of the phrase
would have been erased by the Employer's letter of March 1 See G.C
Exh 7 The General Counsel also contends that the position communicat-
ed by the Union on March 1 was not final This assertion lacks evidentia-
ry support As has been heretofore observed, the record fails to disclose
that the Union ever waivered from its initial demand for "written" de-
scriptions , or that it ever communicated an interest in compromise.
Indeed , Romig testified specifically that the Union never altered its posi-
tion
17 In general terms "[a] genuine impasse in negotiations is synonymous
with a deadlock . the parties have discussed the subject or subjects in
good faith, and, despite their best efforts to achieve agreement with re-
Continued
BLOOMSBURG CRAFTSMEN
Local 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
After March 1, the futility of further negotiations was as
much the fault of the Union as Respondent. Having de-
clared its position prior to March 1, the Union at no time
following the deadlock communicated any changes in
either its proposal or argumentation. No attempt was
made to counter the reasons offered by the Employer or
to alter the stalemate by counterproposal.' 8
In sum , there being no reasonable basis for concluding
that the Employer's resistance to written job classifica-
tions was in furtherance of union animus ' 9 or purpose to
undermine employee rights protected by the Act, it is
concluded that its duty to bargain in good faith was sus-
pended in consequence of the bona fide impasse reached
on March 1, 1984. Accordingly, there being no evidence
of any subsequent change in circumstances altering the
deadlock, Respondent's refusal to meet thereafter did not
violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Bloomsburg Craftsmen, Inc. is an employer engaged
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Bloomsburg Printing and Graphic Communications
Local 732 is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with
relevant information requested by the Union through its
letter of February 2, 1984, Respondent has engaged in
spect to such , neither party is willing to move from its respective posi-
tion " See Hi-Way Bill Boards, Inc, 206 NLRB 22, 23 (1973) Admittedly,
there is a dearth of precedent applying this test to bargaining dunng the
term of an existing agreement However, the conclusion that this was the
status of the negotations on and after March 1 warrants the further expla-
nation that , in my view , precedent construing "good faith" in the context
of initial contract or renewal negotiations furnishes -no clear guide to
evaluation of the Employer's conduct herein Obviously a good-faith
deadlock where a single narrow issue is involved , as in the processing of
a routine gnevance , is more speedily reached , and more readily identified
than in general contract negotiations, where impasse must be determined
by reference to a myriad of issues, which on the basis of volume and
interdependence , complicate the process of determining just when future
negotiations would prove futile See Thomas Sheet Metal Co, 268 NLRB
1189, 1190 ( 1984) Moreover, where negotiations have successfully
achieved a contract , deadlock dunng the term thereof has lesser impact
upon statutory considerations of stability than those cases presenting
issues as to whether an employer had engaged in surface bargaining with-
out intention of reaching agreement Cf NLRB v. Sharon Hats, Inc, 289
F 2d 628 (5th Cir 1961).
18 The General Counsel argues the impasse was broken by the Union's
letter of May 14, 1984 , in that the Union more broadly stated its reasons
for written job descriptions (See G C Exh 8) From this it is argued
that a change in circumstances was manifested by the Union, obligating
Respondent to return to the bargaining table. Contrary to the General
Counsel, the reasons expressed in the Union 's letter of May 14 parallel
the general description , as related by Romig under oath, of arguments ad-
vanced to Respondent on March 1 On its face the Union 's letter of May
14 appears to be nothing more than a reiteration of the views expressed
at that time . As heretofore stated, Romig also testified that there were no
changes in position Accordingly, the assertion by the General Counsel
that the Union's reasons for wanting to negotiate about job descriptions
"was broadened after March 1, 1984" is unsubstantiated
39 In so concluding , I have not overlooked a prior case involving the
Respondent See Bloomsburg Craftsmen , 187 NLRB 506 (1970) However,
that case was decided in 1970, and the unlawful conduct reflected therein
is too remote to support any'reasoned rejection of the Employer's right
to disagree in connection with this narrow dispute many years later
405
unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing to meet with the Union to discuss
demands for written job descriptions on and after May
14, 1984.
5. The unfair labor practice described in paragraph 3
above is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY -
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, it shall be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain - affirmative
action designed to effectuate the purposes and policies of
the Act.
The General Counsel and Charging Party urge 'that
Respondent be directed presently to supply the personnel
records of James L. Walters Sr. However, the formal re-
quest for that information, which is the subject of the
8(a)(5) finding herein, was made by the Union solely in
connection with the processing of a grievance concern-
ing the discharge of Walters. Prior to the instant hearing,
that grievance was upheld in arbitration and, in compli-
ance therewith, Walters was restored to his former posi-
tion, with backpay. Nevertheless, on behalf of the Union,
Grievance Chairman Romig testified that the Union still
wishes to examine the file out of fear of further retalia-
tion against Walters, a claim apparently predicated upon
Romig's assertion that, since Walters' reinstatement, he
has received disciplinary warnings . The Board has held
that the obligation to provide otherwise relevant infor-
mation expires when subsequent events render the issue
moot. See, e.g., Glazers Wholesale Drug Co., 211 NLRB
1063, 1066 (1974). The reinstatement of Walters created
such a condition. Any subsequent adverse action against
him has not been grieved, nor has the Union perfected a
new request in a fashion permitting objective evaluation
of relevance, so as to afford Respondent an opportunity
to voluntarily comply. Accordingly, on the instant
record, absent a formal request, it would be inappropri-
ate to provide the Union access to the Walters personnel
file at this time.
The Charging Party argues that the refusal to provide
the requested information was unsupported by "any
credible defense," and was "without any merit and clear-
ly frivolous." Accordingly, the Charging Party seeks an
award of attorney's fees and costs in accordance with
Tiidee Products, 194 NLRB 1234 (1972). For reasons
heretofore expressed , a reasonable question exists as to
Respondent's duty, in view of supervening events, pres-
ently to make such a return. Indeed, taking account of
standard Board settlement procedures, it does not appear
that this issue would have been susceptible to resolution
within any process outside the framework of litigation.
Moreover, capitulation by Respondent to Board remedy
was also beyond reasonable expectation because the com-
plaint was linked for prosecution with another, a fact
which often influences a party to insist on a settlement
resolving all outstanding issues . There is no indication
that Tiidee was intended to force settlements on parties
406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by impeding the balance of strategies which traditionally
have been brought to bear upon that process For these
reasons the claim for attorneys fees and cost is rejected
as nonmentonous
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record I issue the following recommend
ed20
ORDER
The Respondent Bloomsburg Craftsmen Inc
Bloomsburg Pennsylvania its officers agents succes
sors and assigns shall
1 Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Bloomsburg
Punting and Graphic Communications Local 732 by re
fusing on request to furnish information relevant to the
performance of said Union s duties as exclusive statutory
bargaining representatives of employees in the appropri
ate collective bargaining tout
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with re
straining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act
2 Take the following affirmative action deemed neces
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Post at its plant in Bloomsburg Pennsylvania,
copies of the attached notice marked Appendix 21
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Re
spondent s authorized representative shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered defaced or
covered by any other material
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re
spondent has taken to comply
20 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board s
Rules and Regulations the findings conclusions and recommended
Order shall as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all put
poses
21 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals , the words in the notice reading Posted by Order of the Na
tional Labor Relations Board shall read Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation
al Labor Relations Board