Bishop Randall Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 28, 1975

217 N.L.R.B. 1129 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL - _ 1129
Bishop Randall Hospital and Wyoming Nurses' As-
sociation, Inc., Petitioner . Case 27-RC-4960
May-28, 1975
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the
National Labor, Relations Act, as amended, a hearing
was held before Hearing Officer Wayne L. Benson of
the National Labor Relations Board on January 15 and
16, 1975. Following the hearing and pursuant to Sec-
tion 102.67 of the National Labor Relations Board
Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, and by
direction of the Regional Director for Region 27, this
proceeding was transferred to the Board for decision.
Thereafter, the Employer and the Petitioner filed
briefs.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the Hearing Officer's rul-
ings made at the hearing and finds that they are free
from prejudicial error. They are hereby affirmed.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding the Board
finds:
1. A question is presented whether the Lutheran
Hospitals and Homes Society of America, herein called
the Society or the Employer, is an "employer" within
the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. The Society, a
North Dakota corporation with headquarters in Fargo,
North Dakota, is lessee-operator of the Bishop Randall
Hospital facility2 in Lander, Wyoming. At the hear-
ing, the Employer acknowledged that it "is an organi-
zation engaged in interstate commerce to such a degree
that it would meet the jurisdictional standards of the
National Labor Relations Act were it to be found an
Employer in this case."
The Employer contends that it is exempt from cover-
age of the Act because: (1) the Hospital is a county
funded and controlled political subdivision of the State
of Wyoming;3 (2) the government of Fremont County
is, at least, a joint employer with the Society; or (3) a
"unique relationship" exists between the Society and
I The record fails to substantiate Petitioner's allegation that the Em-
ployer's brief was untimely filed or service made in noncompliance with the
Board's Rules and Regulations. Employer's brief and a written statement of
service on the parties were timely received by the Board on February 18,
1975 Simultaneous, i e., same day, service of a copy of the Employer's brief
was made upon the Petitioner. We therefore deny Petitioner's motion to
strike the Employer's brief from the record.
2 Hereinafter referred to as "the Hospital."
3 Sec 2(2) of the Act excludes from the definition of "employer" "any
wholly owned Government corporation. or any State political subdivi-
sion thereof .11
Fremont County, Wyoming, in respect of which the
Board, assuming it had technical jurisdiction, ought to
exercise its discretionary authority to refuse to assert
jurisdiction.
The Hospital was constructed at public cost with
funds appropriated for that purpose by the Board of
Commissioners of Fremont County. In accord with the
state law, the Hospital is officially designated a county
memorial hospital, and Fremont County retains title to
the Hospital's land, buildings, and an estimated 95 per-
cent of the equipment therein. Furthermore, the board
of county commissioners is authorized to levy taxes and
declare special bond issues in order to sustain a fund for
maintenance, improvements, and expansion of the
Hospital plant. Capital expenditures from this fund
have amounted to an estimated $60,000 to $250,000 per
annum. Responsibility for direct oversight of the Hos-
pital's operation has been delegated to the board of
trustees, a five-member panel selected by the county
commissioners to serve without compensation for in-
dividual 5-year terms. The board of trustees is required
to submit annual and periodic interim financial reports,
on the Hospital to the board of county commissioners.
In addition, the trustees are empowered, subject to the
approval of the county commissioners, to contract with
other parties for the operation of the Hospital.
The Hospital was opened in 1960 and has been exclu-
sively operated since that date by the Society pursuant
to the terms of a 15-year lease agreement.4 At the
hearing, the parties stipulated that the Society:
... has day-to-day operation and control of this
hospital within the terms of the lease, or subject to
the terms of the lease, that includes day-to-day
decisions to hire, to fire, to institute personnel
rules or regulations ... .
It was further stipulated that the examples of opera-
tional control were "riot totally inclusive." Record evi-
dence indicates that employees at the Hospital are
hired directly by the Society, paid entirely from the
Society's own operational funds, and subject to the
Society's own personnel policies. The Hospital ad-
ministrator, Roger Lehr, is clearly the individual re-
tained by the Society and answerable thereto for the
overall daily operation and control of the Hospital.
In light of the above evidence and the record as a
whole, it is our opinion that the Hospital as a functional
entity is controlled and administered by the Society.
We further conclude that the Hospital does not qualify
for exemption from coverage under the Act as a gov-
ernmental subdivision, since it is neither (1) directly
created by the State, so as to constitute a department
4 The original lease expired in February 1975, but the record indicates that
the parties to the agreement have negotiated its renewal in substantially the
same form
217 NLRB No. 185
1130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or administrative arm of the state government, nor (2)
administered by individuals who are responsible to
public officials or to the general electorate.' Actual
operations and characteristics of the Hospital under the
Employer's administration reveal that it functions es-
sentially as a private enterprise. In addition, the 'em-
ployees of the Employer charged with administrative
duties at the Hospital are only incidentally responsible
to public officials, in much the same way, as directors
of any business subject to licensure and inspection by
public authorities are responsible to those authorities.
The Employer, however, contends that certain statu-
tory and lease requirements make Fremont County or
its instrumentality, the board of trustees, at least a joint
employer indispensable to labor relations matters and
therefore exempt from the Board's jurisdiction. The
Board's determination of such jurisdictional allegations
depends on the extent of control exercised by the undis-
putedly exempt governmental authority over the opera-
tions and labor relations of the Employer.' We find
the evidence of such control in this case to be insubstan-
tial. The effect of the lease agreement has clearly been
to establish the Employer as an independent lessee-
operator for the Hospital. Responsibility and control
vested in the -Hospital's board of trustees relates only
to the general purpose of insuring the physical condi-
tion of the Hospital and its continued use as the health
care facility it was designed to be. To that end, the
trustees have the legal authority to allocate funds ap-
propriated and approved by the county for use in capi-
tal projects. In addition, the board of trustees has incor-
porated certain statutory safeguards as terms within
the lease to guarantee satisfactory performance by the
Employer of its agreement to operate the Hospital in
accord with its conceived purpose. Therefore, the Em-
ployer must: (1) present to the trustees detailed peri-
odic accountings of its Hospital business; (2) operate
the Hospital continuously as a duly accredited institu-
tion pursuant to certain written and established stand-
ards cited by the lease; (3) avoid "excessive or exorbi-
tant" ratemaking by charging patient fees comparable
to those of other accredited Wyoming hospitals of com-
parable size; and, (4) accept indigent patients regardless
of their inability to pay for treatment. Breach of any
lease provision is ground for cancellation of the lease
pursuant to the notice procedures provided therein.
We find that the independence of the Employer's
enterprise is not substantially affected by any of the
above alleged "controls." The financial reporting re-
quirement is no-more than a bookkeeping and moni-
toring device which does not impose any actual control
5 See N.LR.&. v. Natural Gas UtthtyDistnctof Hawkins County, Tennes-
see, 402 US 600, 604 (1971).
- 6 Ohio Inns, Inc, 205 NLRB 528 (1973), Servomation Mathias-Pa.,
Inc. 200 NLRB 1063 (1972); Slater Corporation, 197 NLRB 1282 (1972)
on the operations referred to in the reports. The ac-
creditation and practitioner standards mentioned in the
lease appear upon examination to be no less than those
required of any similarly sized public health facility in
the State of Wyoming whether maintained as a public
or private, profit or nonprofit business . The rate limita-
tions are general in nature and seem to afford the Em-
ployer considerable latitude in setting its own patient
service fees. Finally, the Employer failed to note, in
urging the financial -restrictiveness of the obligation to
accept indigent patients, that the Employer need only
accept these patients "whenever financially feasible"
and that Wyoming law provides for remuneration of
the Employer by the board of trustees for services thus
rendered.'
The Employer contends that the provisions noted
above impinge to a substantial degree on its ability,
absent the approval and cooperation of Fremont
County, to bargain collectively concerning emplooyee
wages and benefits, and on the ability of employees to
engage in an effective protected bargaining strike, or,
alternatively, the ability of the Employer to engage in
an effective protected bargaining lockout. We disagree
with this contention, dependent as it is on speculative
and irrelevant premises.
It is clear from the record that the Employer has
exclusive control over its personnel with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
terms and conditions of employment. A basis for the
collective-bargaining relationship therefore exists. The
alleged inability of the Employer, subject as it is to a
moderate rate or revenue ceiling, to be a "wage leader"
or respond effectively to employee wage and benefit
demands is not probative of the jurisdictional issue
herein. Once the Board has ascertained whether the
employer meets established interstate commerce stand-
ards, it does not base its assertion of jurisdiction on
financial indicia predictive of strength at some fuiture
bargaining table. The parties concede, and we find, that
the Employer is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act. Furthermore, we will not deny jurisdic-
tion on the speculative chance that in the event of an
employee strike or employer lockout the board of trus-
tees would consider the Hospital's operations so im-
paired as to be in breach of the lease requirement of
"continuous operation" according to prescribed stand-
ards and would therefore invoke its discretionary right
to cancel the contract and assert direct couilty control
over the Hospital and its employees. It is by no means
an inevitable consequence of the collective-bargaining
relationship that strikes or lockouts should occur or
that their occurrence in as yet unknown circumstances
would automatically motivate the representatives of
Fremont County to terminate, after a 60-day notice
7 Wyoming Stats Sec 18-323
BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL 1131
period , what has to date apparently been a successful
and satisfactory long-term lease -arrangement.
In sum, we find that the Society is not a political
subdivision of the State of Wyoming, nor subject to any
substantial degree of state control in its operations, and
is accordingly an employer within the meaning of the
Act. In addition, we find no support in the record for
the contention of the Society and our dissenting col-
league that the Board should decline to assert jurisdic-
tion because of a "special relationship" or "intimate
connection" between the services provided by the So-
ciety and the allegedly exempt operations of the
Hospital.'
Contrary to our colleague, we do not find that the
operation of a hospital is necessarily a "government
function ," or that the Hospital herein is an exempt
institution . In finding that the Hospital is an exempt
institution our dissenting colleague relies on the fact
that the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that the
operation of county memorial hospitals under the state
statutes is a "governmental function ." As the Supreme
Court stated in N. L.. R.B. v. Natural Gas Utility District
of Hawkins County, Tennessee, 402 U.S. 600, 602-
603 (1971):
Federal , rather than state, law governs the deter-
mination , under §2(2), whether an entity created
under state law is a "political subdivision" of the
State and therefore not an "employer" subject to
the Act.
We are satisfied, for the reasons set forth above,
which are based on the record herein , that the Society
operates the Hospital as an essentially private venture,
with insufficient identity with or relationship to the
State of Wyoming to support the conclusion that the
Hospital is an exempt governmental employer under
the Act. Our colleague's reliance on Rural Fire Protec-
tion Company, supra, is thus misplaced as the services
provided by the Society are not by the aforesaid analy-
sis intimately connected with the operation of an ex-
empt institution . Accordingly , since the Employer is
engaged in commerce within the meaning ,of the Act,
we find it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to
assert jurisdiction herein.
2. The labor organization involved claims to repre-
sent certain employees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning
the representation of certain employees of the Em-
ployer within the meaning of Sections 9(c)(1) and 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
4. As to the appropriate unit, there is no history of
collective bargaining for the employees sought to be
represented here.
8 Rural Fire Protection Company, 216 NLRB No. 95 (1975)
The Petitioner seeks a unit of approximately 32 regis-
tered nurses and professional employees employed by
the Employer in its nursing services at the Hospital.
The Employer contends that the appropriate unit
should be expanded to include the allegedly profes-
sional employee classifications of pharmacist and medi-
cal technologist.' In addition, the Employer contends
that four nurse supervisors and three head nurses
should be excluded from the unit because they are al-
legedly supervisory personnel within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act.10
While we have repeatedly recognized and honored
the need to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining
units in the health care industry, it has been the Board's
policy, subject to the facts in each case, to find appro-
priate a separate bargaining unit for registered nurses
when such a unit has been requested by the
petitioner." The registered nurses sought to be repre-
sented herein are all employed within a single depart-
ment and subject to the single overall supervision of the
director of nursing services . They are all graduates of
an accredited 2- or 3 -year nursing school program and
the parties have stipulated to their professional status.
While four medical technologists and one pharmacist
at the Hospital may have some daily contact with regis-
tered nurses , they are subject to different supervision
and pay scales, and their primary duties , educational
prerequisites , and job backgrounds are distinguishable
from those which all registered nurses have in common.
We conclude that the requested separate unit for regis-
tered nurses constitutes an appropriate unit . We shall,
therefore, exclude medical technologists and pharma-
cists from the unit found appropriate.12
The Hospital 's nursing service department is subject
to the overall supervision of Director Godtfring, who
is answerable to the Hospital administrator. A chart
introduced into evidence by the Employer purported to
show that the supervisory line of authority over the 25
staff registered nurses and approximately 17 nonunit
auxiliary employees in nursing services runs from the
director through the nurse supervisor position to the
head nurses . Other record evidence relative to the al-
leged supervisory status of the Hospital 's nurse supervi-
9 At the hearing , the Employer raised the issue whether licensed practical
nurses ought also to be made part of the appropriate unit- In its posthearing
brief, however, the Employer concedes that the inclusion of such employees
in a professional unit is unlikely, unless the Board reverses its present posi-
tion which holds that licensed practical nurses are not considered to be
professionah mployees within the meaning of the Act. E g ., Waterloo Surgi-
cal & Medical Group, 213 NLRB 321 (1974); Pikeville Investors, Inc. d/b/a
Mountain Manor Nursing Home, 204 NLRB 425 (1973 ) In accord -with this
precedent, we shall exclude licensed practical nurses from the professional
unit found appropriate herein.
10 The parties stipulated that Director of Nursing Services Catherine
Godtfnng is a supervisor and should be excluded from the unit
11 Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento, Inc., 217 NLRB No. 131 (1975).
12 Accordingly, we need not and will not decide whether the medical
technologists and pharmacist are professional employees within the mean-
mg of the Act
1132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sors and head nurses is almost entirely limited to the
credible and undisputed portions of testimony given by
Director Godtfring. None of the employees whose in-
clusion in the unit is challenged appeared at the Board's
hearing. From the record as a whole we find the follow-
ing facts.
The position of nurse supervisor is a long-established
one at the Hospital and is currently held by four regis-
tered nurses, three of whom are assigned duties on the
three separate shifts of the Hospital's 24-hour workday.
The fourth nurse supervisor has shift duty in the oper-
ating room. The three head nurses are all assigned
separate area responsibilities within the same shift. One
head nurse works within the intensive care/coronary
care unit and the other two work in separate wings of
the Hospital. We are not persuaded by the Petitioner's
argument that the elevation of three staff nurses to the
newly created head nurse positions upon or near the
September 18, 1974, filing date of the petition in this
case indicates the artificiality of head nurse authority
or the Employer's spurious design in creating the posi-
tion. The record reveals that Director Godtfring and
the nurse supervisors had felt and communicated a
need for additional staff coordination at least 6 months
prior to the Hospital administrator's final authoriza-
tion of the thrice-requested head nurse positions, which
were immediately filled. The perceived need stemmed
from increased demands on nursing services, especially
after the new second wing of the Hospital was opened.
Furthermore, the actual authority exercised by head
nurses belies the premise that their supervisory powers
are solely pretextual.
It is true that nurse supervisors and head nurses
continue to spend a significant part of their workweek
in attending to patient care responsibilities. We find,
however, that these individuals also spend a substantial
amount of time in functions which conclusively indi-
cate supervisory status within the meaning of Section
2(l1) of the Act. We specifically rely on the unrebutted
evidence that all nurse supervisors and head nurses (1)
adjust the grievances of other employees, and (2) effec-
tively recommend merit raises for other employees and
whether probationary employees will be permanently
employed. With respect to the adjustment of griev-
ances, employees in nursing services have been told
that in accord with Step 1 of the Employer's written
grievance procedure (which is included in the booklet
of personnel rules and regulations given to every em-
ployee) they are to discuss their grievances with a head
nurse or nurse supervisor. The designated adjustors of
grievances understand they are to serve in such a
capacity and have apparently done so. In reference to
the second function cited above, both nurse supervisors
and head nurses prepare written employee work evalu-
ation statements which Director Godtfring stated,
without subsequent contradiction, are independently
determinative of whether merit raises are granted or
probationary employee status is changed to permanent
employment. In addition, the evaluator is responsible
for discussing the report with the employee affected.
Every departmental employee is evaluated at least once
a year. Nurse supervisors evaluate head nurses. ,
In our opinion, the above primary indicia of supervi-
sory status are conclusive. There is, however, additional
evidence which strongly shows that individual nurse
supervisors and head nurses have the supervisory au-
thority to assign work and to effectively recommend
the discharge and discipline of other employees. Fi-
nally, we note these secondary indicia of supervisory
status: the employees at issue have been told they are
supervisors; they attend regular bimonthly meetings
with Director Godtfring at which no staff nurses are
present; nurse supervisors outearn staff nurses of equal
seniority by $50 to $100 per month; and, head nurses
outearn staff nurses of equal seniority by $35 per
month.
Based on the foregoing, and the record as a whole,
we find and conclude that nurse supervisors and head
nurses are supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
We shall therefore exclude them from the unit found
appropriate hereiri.13
Accordingly, we find that the following employees of
the Employer constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All registered nurses employed by the Employer
at the Bishop Randall Hospital Facility in Lander,
Wyoming; excluding medical technologists, phar-
macists, licensed practical nurses, supervisors as
defined in the Act, guards, and all other em-
ployees.
[Direction of Election omitted from publication.]"
MEMBER KENNEDY , dissenting:
I disagree with my colleagues' assertion of jurisdic-
tion in this case . Whether the "employer" is deemed to
be the Bishop Randall Hospital itself (Hospital), or the
Lutheran Hospital and Homes Society of America
which administers it (Society), Board and court prece-
dent requires a dismissal of the RC petition on jurisdic-
tional grounds.15
13 The Employer has requested the exclusion of persons holding the
position of "relief supervisor," alleging their statutory supervisory status
According to the record, two relief supervisor positions have been newly
authorized but remain unfilled. Conclusions as to the actual authority and
functions of relief supervisors are therefore purely speculative, and we will
adhere to the Board's policy in refusing to pass on such open classifications
See Trans World Airlines, Inc, 211 NLRB 733 (1974),
14 [Excelsior fn omitted for publication.]
15 The petition names Bishop Randall Hospital as the Employer. At the
hearing, however, counsel for the Employer stipulated that the Society was
BISHOP RANDALL HOSPITAL
Bishop Randall Hospital is operated by Fremont
County (county) as a "county memorial hospital" pur-
suant to the Wyoming state statutes.16 The Hospital
was constructed largely at public expense and the
building, land, and-95 percent of the-equipment are
county owned. Should the Hospital require physical
expansion in the future, the funds for such a project
could be acquired by the county through issuance of
revenue securities, and the land acquired through emi-
nent domain. Each year, between $60,000 and $200,000
in county tax money (derived from property taxes) is
appropriated for the Hospital's maintenance and oper-
ation.
Statutory control over the Hospital resides in a five-
member board of trustees. The trustees-each of whom
must be a county resident-are appointed by the Fre-
mont Board of County Commissioners, an elected
body. The trustees are subject to removal from office in
precisely the same manner and for precisely the same
reasons as are other county officials.
State law provides that the trustees may operate the
Hospital directly or may lease its operation to another
organization. As noted, the trustees at Bishop Randall
have elected to lease the administration of the Hospital
to the Society, a private, nonprofit organization.
Both the state and county governments exercise di-
rect financial regulation over the Hospital. For exam-
ple, an annual comprehensive fiscal plan and budget, as
well as quarterly reports of appropriations, expendi-
tures, and balances, must be submitted to a state exam-
iner. In addition, the Hospital is statutorily required to
provide free care for indigents so long as it is "economi-
cally feasible" to do so. Finally, under the Society's
lease with the county, fees charged for Hospital services
must be "comparable to the fees and charges of other
accredited or registered hospitals of comparable size
Assuming Bishop Randall Hospital to be the "em-
ployer," I would find it to be a "political subdivision"
and therefore not an "employer" within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act. In N.L.R.B. v. National Gas
Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee, 402 U.S.
600 (1971), the Supreme Court discussed the "political
subdivision" language of Section 2(2) in the context of
determining whether the Board had ]properly asserted
jurisdiction over a county utility district.
The Supreme Court in Hawkins County noted Board
precedent holding that "political subdivisions" include
engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of our Act "were it to
be found an Employer in this case " It is unnecessary for me to resolve this
question, since, in either event, I would not assert jurisdiction. In addition,
since I would dismiss the petition, it is unnecessary for me to determine the
appropriateness of the unit limited to registered nurses sought by Petitioner
For a discussion of my views on this question, see my separate opinion in
Mercy Hospitals of Sacramento, Inc., 217 NLRB 765 (1975).
16 Wyo Stats., Title 18, Ch. 9, Sees 18-315 to 18-325 (Cum Supp, 1973)
1133
entities which are "administered by individuals who are
responsible to public officials or to the general
electorate." 17 Since the utility district there was ad-
ministered by a board of commissioners who were both
appointed by an elected county judge and subject to
statutory removal proceedings, the Court determined
that the Board's test had been satisfied. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the Board's assertion ofjuris-
diction over the district had been improper even under
its own precedent. Likewise in the instant case, the
Hospital is administered by a board of trustees who are
also both appointed by elected county commissioners
and subject to statutory removal proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Hawkins County, however,
went beyond the Board's test and determined that the
utility district's administration "in the light of other
`actual operations and characteristics' " sufficiently es-
tablished an identity with the government so as to make
the district a "political subdivision." Many of the "ac-
tual operations and characteristics" relied on by the
Court are likewise present here. For example, the Hos-
pital has been established as a public corporation pur-
suant to state law" and has been officially designated
a "public county hospital."" Annual and quarterly fi-
nancial reports are required by state law20 and all
records are available for public inspection. Finally, as
noted earlier, the Hospital may-through the
county-levy taxes and acquire additional property
through eminent domain.
In light of the above, I cannot agree with my col-
leagues' finding that the Hospital "functions essentially
as a private enterprise ." I am inclined , instead , to agree
with the Supreme Court of Wyoming that the opera-
tion of county memorial hospitals under the state stat-
utes is a "governmental function."" The governmen-
tal nature of its operation, when combined with the fact
that it is administered by "individuals [the trustees]
who are responsible to public officials [the board of
county commissioners] or to the general electorate,"
convinces me that Bishop Randall Hospital is a "politi-
cal subdivision" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of
the Act.
If it is assumed that the "employer" herein is not the
hospital but rather the Lutheran Hospitals and Homes
Society of America which administers it, the Board still-
lacks jurisdiction. The parties stipulated that the So-
ciety:
17 402 U S. at 605
1s Wyo Stats., supra, In. 2, at Sec 18-318
19 Id at Sec 18-320
20 Wyo Stats., Title 9 (referred to in the record as the Wyoming Munici-
pal Budget Act).
21 Bondurant v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital, 354 P.2d 219
(1960) In Bondurant, the court held that, since the operation of county
memorial hospitals is a governmental function , the hospitals share in gov-
ernmental immunity from tort liability
1134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD-
. . . has day-to-day operation and control of this
hospital within the terms of the lease, or subject to
the terms of the lease, that includes day-to-day
decisions to hire, to fire, - to institute personnel
rules or regulations ... .
In Rural Fire Protection Company,22 the Board re-
cently reaffirmed its policy of refusing to assert juris-
diction over nonexempt providers of services to exempt
institutions in situations where the services provided
are "intimately connected" with the exempt operations
of the institution.23 As has already been indicated, I
22 216 NLRB No 95 (1975).
23 The Board in Rural Fire Protection Company also indicated that appli-
cation of the "intimate connection " test was in no way dependent upon the
would find Wyoming's county memorial hospitals to be
exempt institutions. Since there is little doubt that
providing both direct and indirect patient care is "in-
timately connected" with the operation of a hospital,24
Board precedent requires a finding that the Society
shares in the exemption enjoyed by Bishop Randall
Hospital.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from my col-
leagues' assertion of jurisdiction in this case.
exempt institution exercising control over the labor relations policies of the
nonexempt provider of services
24 Compare Bay Ran Maintenance Corporation of New York, 161 NLRB
820, 821 (1966), where the Board asserted jurisdiction over a company
providing janitorial services to an exempt hospital because, inter alta, "the
cleaning work performed by the Employer has no direct relationship to
patient care."
r U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1977-201-952