Binder, Yehuda

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 18, 2020

2019003193 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/890,888 09/27/2010 Yehuda Binder BINDER-004-US18 9333
131926 7590 11/18/2020
May Patents Ltd. c/o Dorit Shem-Tov
P.O.B 7230
Ramat-Gan, 5217102
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
WOO, STELLA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2652
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/18/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte YEHUDA BINDER

Appeal 2019-003193
Application 12/890,888
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before ADAM J. PYONIN, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4–24, 26–30, 32–46, 48, 49, 51–
76, 78–84, 86–121, 123–133, 136–139, and 142–159, constituting all claims
pending in the current application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as May Patents
Ltd. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant’s invention generally relates to “a method, device and
system for obtaining information from a remote location to an information
device.” Spec. 1. Independent claims 1, 62, 82, 93, 99, and 123, reproduced
below, are representative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A telephone set operative for making and receiving
telephone calls via, and for being powered from, a cable, the
cable being connected for concurrently carrying digital data
including digital data and a DC power signal, said telephone set
being further operative for displaying the digital data, and said
telephone set comprising:

a connector for connecting to the cable;

a transceiver coupled to said connector for transmitting
digital data to, and receiving digital data from, the cable;

a video display coupled to said transceiver for visually
displaying the digital data;

software and a processor for executing said software, said
processor being coupled to control at least said transceiver and
said video display; and

a single enclosure housing said connector, said processor,
said transceiver and said video display;

wherein the telephone set is addressable in a digital
network, and said telephone set is at least in part powered from
the DC power signal carried over the cable.

Appeal Br. 94, Claims App.

62. A telephone set operative for making and receiving
telephone calls via, and for being powered from, a cable, the
cable being connected for concurrently carrying digital data,
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including digital data, and a DC power signal, said telephone
set being further operative for displaying information stored in
a unit, said telephone set comprising:

a first connector for connecting to the cable;

an adapter mechanically attachable to the unit, said
adapter including a second connector for connecting to the unit
when the unit is mechanically attached thereon;

a transceiver coupled to said second connector for digital
data communication with the unit;

a display for visually presenting information, said display
being coupled to said transceiver for displaying information
received from said unit;

a power supply coupled to said first connector for being
powered by the DC power signal, said power supply being
coupled to supply DC power to said transceiver and said
display; and

a single enclosure housing said first connector, said
adapter, said transceiver and said display, wherein said power
supply is coupled to said second connector for supplying DC
power to the unit when the unit is connected to said second
connector.

Id. at 103.

93. A television set for storing and displaying digital content
and for receiving a television signal, said television set
including a flat screen for displaying images provided in the
received television signal, and said television set being enclosed
in a single enclosure and comprising, in said single enclosure:

a non-volatile memory for storing digital data content;

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a converter coupled between said digital memory and
said screen for converting the digital content stored in said
digital memory to an analog video signal; and

software and a processor for executing said software, said
processor being coupled to control at least said non-volatile
memory and said converter,

wherein said television set is operative in a first state to
couple the television signal to said screen for displaying
television content, and said television set is operative in a
second state to couple the analog video signal to said screen for
displaying the digital content.

Id. at 109.

82. A system for obtaining digital content from a server via
the Internet, and for storing and displaying the digital content
on a television set, said system comprising:

a server organized as a web site, storing digital content,
and including web pages as part of the World Wide Web
(WWW), connected to the Internet and identified using a web
site Uniform Resource Locator (URL);

a television set for receiving television signals and
comprising a screen for displaying images provided by the
received television signals, said television set further
comprising a first analog video connector for receiving a first
analog video signal for display on said screen;

a LAN cable at least in part in walls of a building and
connected for concurrently carrying digital content from said
server and a power signal; and

a device connected for storing the digital content and for
displaying images based on the stored digital video content on
said screen, said device comprising, in a single enclosure:

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a LAN connector connected to said LAN cable;

a LAN transceiver for transmitting digital data to, and
receiving digital data from, said LAN cable;

a digital memory coupled to said LAN transceiver for
storing digital content received from said server via said LAN
cable;

a second analog video connector connected to said first
analog video connector for transmitting the first analog video
signal to said television set; and

a converter coupled between said digital memory and
said second analog video connector for converting the digital
data content stored in said digital memory to said first analog
video signal;

wherein:

said device is addressable in the Internet; and said device
is operative for automatically and periodically communicating
with the server via the Internet through said LAN cable for
receiving and storing the digital content therefrom, and for
transmitting and displaying the received digital content in
analog form on said screen of said television set, and wherein
said device is powered only by the power signal carried over
said LAN cable.

Id. at 106–107.

99. A device for displaying digital data, for use with a cable
connected for concurrently carrying high-definition digital data
and a power signal, the device comprising in a single enclosure:

a digital connector for connecting to the cable;

a high-definition video display for presenting images, the
video display being coupled to said digital connector for
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displaying the high-definition digital data carried over the
cable;

software and a processor for executing said software, said
processor being coupled to control the device operation; and

a non-volatile memory storing digital data identifying
said device;

wherein said non-volatile memory is coupled to said
digital connector for being powered from said power signal
carried over said cable.

Id. at 111.

123. A telephone set operative for making and receiving
telephone calls in a telephone network over a wired connection,
said telephone set being further operative for receiving digital
data from a first remote information server using wireless
communication and for displaying the digital data, said
telephone set comprising:

a first memory storing a digital address uniquely
identifying the telephone set in a digital data network;

an antenna for transmitting and receiving digital data
over the air;

a wireless transceiver coupled to said antenna for bi-
directional packet-based digital data communication with a
mating wireless transceiver of the same type over the air;

a display component coupled to said wireless transceiver
for displaying an image based on digital data received via said
wireless transceiver; and

a single enclosure housing said first memory, said
antenna, said wireless transceiver, and said display component,
wherein said telephone set is further operative for transmitting
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the digital address and for receiving and displaying the digital
data received from the first remote information server.

Id. at 115.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 4–24, 26–30, 32–46, 48, 49, 51–76, 78–84, 86–121, 123–
133, 136–139, and 142–159 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.2
Claims 1–24, 26–29, 33–46, 48, 49, 51–54, 58, 59, 62, 64–76, 80, 81,
158, and 159 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Bell et al. (US 2004/0044785 A1;
published Mar. 4, 2004) (“Bell ’785”), Shneidman (US 2006/0038794 A1;
published Feb. 23, 2006), and Ulrich (US 4,803,719; issued Feb. 7, 1989).3
Claims 30, 32, 60, 61, 78, and 79 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Shneidman, Ulrich,
and Bell et al. (US 2004/0044723 A1; published Mar. 4, 2004) (“Bell
’723”).

2 Claims 2, 4–12, 14–23, 26, 33–44, 46, 55–58, 64, 65, 68–72, 74–76, 80, 81,
83, 84, 86, 90, 92, 94–98, 101–106, 109–114, 116, 119–121, 126, 127, 130–
133, 136, 137, 139, 142–152, 155, 156, and 158 are listed in the heading of
the rejection, but not in the body of the rejection. We understand these
claims to be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 by virtue of their
dependence on claims 1, 62, 82, 93, 99, and 123.
3 Claims 47 and 50 are listed in the heading of the rejection, but do not
appear in the Claims Appendix or the body of the rejection. Final Act. 14,
22; Appeal Br. 100–101, Claims App. Claims 47 and 50 were canceled in a
May 1, 2017 amendment. Thus, these claims are not subject to our review.
Claims 80 and 81 are not listed in the heading of the rejection, but are
addressed in the body. Final Act. 21, 23. We find this to be harmless error.
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Claims 55–57 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Shneidman, Ulrich, and Yamada et al.
(US 2004/0100460 A1; published May 27, 2004) (“Yamada”).
Claim 63 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Shneidman, Ulrich, and Rabenko et al. (US
2002/0003873 A1; published Jan. 10, 2002) (“Rabenko”).
Claims 82–84, 87–92, 99, 101–104, 107–109, 115–121 stand rejected
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and
Lu (US 7,506,035 B1; issued Mar. 17, 2009).4
Claim 86 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Lu, and Wang et al. (US 2004/0228070 A1;
published Nov. 18, 2004) (“Wang”).5
Claims 93–96 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Bell ’785 and Casey et al. (US 2004/0160460 A1;
published Aug. 19, 2004) (“Casey”).
Claim 97 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Casey, and Fong (US 2003/0095152 A1;
published May 22, 2003).

4 Claim 119 is not listed in the heading of the rejection, but is addressed in
the body. Final Act. 29. We find this to be harmless error. Claim 101 is
listed in the heading of the rejection, but is not addressed in the body. Final
Act. 25–29. As pending claim 101 has not been addressed by the Examiner
in the obviousness rejections, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 101 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
5 The heading of the rejection incorrectly refers to Casey, not Wang. See
Final Act. 29; Appeal Br. 79. We find this to be harmless error.
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Claim 98 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Casey, and Lavaud et al. (US 2004/0057576
A1; published Mar. 26, 2004) (“Lavaud”).
Claim 100 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Lu, and Bell ’723.
Claims 105 and 106 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Lu, and Fong.
Claims 110–114 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell ’785, Lu, and Masterson et al. (US 2003/0018755
A1; published Jan. 23, 2003) (“Masterson”).
Claims 123–126, 128, 130–133, 136–139, 142–152, and 155–157
stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Bell ’785 and Shneidman.
Claims 127 and 129 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Lu.
Claims 153 and 154 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Bell ’723.

ANALYSIS

35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 Rejections

In addition to arguments specific to particular limitations, Appellant
makes two general arguments with respect to the written description
rejection. First, Appellant argues that the Examiner did not make similar
rejection in previous office actions in different, co-pending applications
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having the same priority date and Specification. See Appeal Br. 10–49.6
Second, Appellant argues the prior art rejections are inconsistent with the
written description rejections. See id.; Reply Br. 4.
The test for compliance with the written description requirement is
“whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to
those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed
subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “[T]he test requires an
objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the
perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the
specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled
artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.”
Id.; see also AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co., KG v. Janssen Biotech, Inc.,
759 F.3d 1285, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The essence of the written
description requirement is that a patent applicant, as part of the bargain with

6 Appellant also argues the Examiner is showing bias toward the applicant
and/or applications. Reply Br. 2. The Board’s role is to review the
rejections on the record. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (“The Patent Trial and Appeal
Board shall—(1) on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions
of examiners upon applications for patents pursuant to section 134(a)”).
Whether the Examiner is showing bias toward the applicant and/or
applications is a petitionable matter, and we do not address it in our opinion.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a) (“Petition may be taken to the Director: (1) From
any action or requirement of any examiner in the ex parte prosecution of an
application . . . which is not subject to appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board or to the court”); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 1201 (“The line of demarcation between
appealable matters for the Board and petitionable matters for the Director of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Director) should be carefully
observed.”).
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the public, must describe his or her invention so that the public will know
what it is and that he or she has truly made the claimed invention.”);
Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for
Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, 84 Fed. Reg. 57, 61, 62 (Jan. 7, 2019).
“[W]hile the description requirement does not demand any particular form
of disclosure, or that the specification recite the claimed invention in haec
verba, a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not
satisfy the requirement.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352 (citation omitted).
“Adequate written description means that, in the specification, the
applicant must ‘convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that,
as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the [claimed]
invention.”’ Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(alteration in original) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,
1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “When no such description can be found in the
specification, the only thing the PTO can reasonably be expected to do is to
point out its nonexistence.” Id. (citing In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1175 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)). “In the context of the written description requirement, an
adequate prima facie case must therefore sufficiently explain to the applicant
what, in the examiner’s view, is missing from the written description.” Id.
The burden then shifts to the applicant to demonstrate where adequate
written description can be found. Id. at 1371.
Because the test for written description in the present case has no
bearing on the Examiner’s handling of different claims in different
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applications,7 or on the disclosure in the references cited in the prior art
rejections, we do not find Appellant’s general arguments to be persuasive as
to Examiner error. We now turn to each of Appellant’s more specific
arguments.8
“the telephone set is addressable in a digital network, and said telephone set
is at least in part powered from the DC power signal carried over the
cable”– Claim 1

The Examiner finds claim 1 lacks written description for the claimed
telephone set being “addressable in a digital network” and “being powered
from, a cable, the cable being connected for concurrently carrying digital
data . . . and a DC power signal” because the Specification describes that
when a telephone connection is used for connecting the server and device, a
telephone number is used to address the device, whereas an IP address is
used to address the device when the Internet is used as the connection. Final
Act. 7–8 (citing Spec. 16:1–17:2; 26:1–7; 25:28–30). The Examiner finds
“Applicant’s disclosure does not describe connection to both networks in
one embodiment.” Id. The Examiner further explains that the Specification
“describes extracting power only in reference to a dial-up telephone line

7 We note Appellant has not identified, with specificity, the reasons why the
Examiner would be precluded from making a valid rejection herein, merely
based on previous Examiner decisions.
8 The current application is related to and has the same Specification as
application 12/358,551, which was the subject of Appeal No. 2016-000622,
where a Decision was mailed on February 2, 2017, and application
15/253,915, which was the subject of Appeal No. 2019-002199, where a
Decision was mailed on August 11, 2020. In those cases, the Examiner
made similar written description rejections as here. We affirmed those
rejections. Here, Appellant makes many similar arguments as in the
previous appeals, which we do not find persuasive for similar reasons as set
forth in those Decisions.
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during an off-hook state . . . obviating the need for AC power connection . . .
[and,] [t]herefore, the ‘cable’ corresponds with a dial-up telephone line with
no AC power connection.” Ans. 3 (emphasis omitted) (citing Spec. 16:1–
17:2; Fig. 9).
Appellant argues that the rejection is unclear because the Examiner
admits the Specification discloses “addressability using the telephone
number” and “addressability using an IP address in a digital network
(Internet)” and “claim 1 only discloses a single connection to a digital
network.” Appeal Br. 13.
Appellant does not persuasively address the Examiner’s rejection.
Appellant does little more than point out that “addressability using the
telephone number” and “addressability using an IP address” are generally
described in the Specification, which is undisputed. However, the
Examiner’s rejection finds that Appellant has not provided sufficient written
description for the embodiment recited in claim 1, specifically with respect
to the claimed telephone set being “addressable in a digital network” and
“being powered from, a cable, the cable being connected for concurrently
carrying digital data . . . and a DC power signal.” Even assuming the
disclosure reasonably conveys possession of (1) addressability with a
telephone number and (2) addressability using an IP address in a digital
network, as Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 13), Appellant has not
persuasively argued that the disclosure reasonably conveys possession of the
particular claimed combination of features as recited in claim 1. Cf. Hyatt,
492 F.3d at 1371 (holding Examiner’s rejection proper based on written
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description not supporting a particular claimed combination of elements
despite discussing each element individually).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred and we agree
with the Examiner’s findings. See Final Act. 8; Ans. 3–4.
“digital network” and “digital connector” –
Claims 24, 45, 73, 99, 107, 117, 118

The Examiner finds “digital network” and “digital connector” are “not
described in the specification as being used in combination with a cable
carrying digital data, i.e. a dial-up telephone line.” Final Act. 8.
Appellant contends that dial-up connection technologies, such as ITU-
T V.34, V.90, and V.92, disclosed in the Specification, “are known to be
digital networking technologies, which use digital signalling for
communicating over the PSTN infrastructure (which was indeed designed
for analog telephone communication).” Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Spec.
9:15–17).9 Appellant also argues that the Specification “clearly discloses
connection over a telephone wiring using various XDSL (Digital Subscriber
Line) technologies.” Id. at 15 (citing Spec. 23:1–25).
In response, the Examiner “maintains that the [described] dial-up
PSTN network is an analog network, not a digital network. Digital data is
communicated over the analog network after being converted into analog
signals using a modem.” Ans. 5.
The Specification describes that the dial-up modem “may use standard
common protocols such as ITU-T V.34, V.90 and V.92 known in the art.
The dial-up modem 15 connects to a telephone outlet 24 by telephone plug

9 Appellant appears to have intended to cite to page 6, lines 15–17 of the
Specification.
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22 via cable 21.” Spec. 6:15–17. The Specification also describes “it will
be appreciated that any connection may be used” and “[o]ne common
telephone-line based broadband connection uses xDSL (Digital Subscriber
Line) technology.” Id. at 23:3–6.
Although this Decision elsewhere discusses other similar terms or
combinations that may be lacking sufficient support in the Specification,
here, we agree with Appellant that, on this record, the Examiner does not
adequately explain why the foregoing disclosure does not reasonably convey
that Appellant had possession of a “digital network” or “digital connector.”
Accordingly, on this record, we are persuaded the Examiner erred.
“LAN” or “WLAN” – Claims 27–29, 82, 87–89, 91, 108, 128, 129
Claim 27 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the cable is part
of a Local Area Network (LAN) in a building.” Appeal Br. 98, Claims App.
Claim 1 recites the “cable [is] concurrently carrying digital data including
digital data and a DC power signal,” and the telephone set is “at least in part
powered from the DC power signal carried over the cable.” Id. at 94.
Claims 28 and 29 depend from claim 27. Id. at 98. Claim 82 is independent
and recites “a LAN cable at least in part in walls of a building and connected
for concurrently carrying digital content from said server and a power
signal.” Id. at 106. Claims 87–89 and 91 depend from claim 82. Id. at 107–
108. Claim 108 ultimately depends from claim 99, and recites “wherein said
digital data network is a Local Area Network (LAN) or on the Internet.” Id.
at 112. Claim 99 recites a device “for use with a cable connected for
concurrently carrying high-definition digital data and a power signal” and
“power signal carried over said cable.” Id. at 111. Claim 128 depends from
claim 123 and recites “wherein the wireless communication is over a
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Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), said antenna is a WLAN antenna
and said wireless transceiver is a WLAN transceiver.” Appeal Br. 116,
Claims App. Claim 129 depends from claim 128. Id.
The Examiner finds the “LAN” and “WLAN” as claimed are not
described in the Specification. Final Act. 8, 12; see Ans. 5.
Appellant contends that the Specification describes connecting to a
server over the Internet via various examples. Appeal Br. 16 (citing Figs. 1,
7, 8a, 12, 16, 17; Spec. 2:14–20). Appellant also argues a “local area
network” (LAN) is described for connection, as well as an Ethernet
transceiver and Ethernet network. Id. (citing Spec. 24:16–31).
Outside of the claims, the sole place in the Specification where a LAN
or WLAN is mentioned occurs on page 24, lines 16–31:
While the invention has been so far described with
respect to modem embedded within the information device 10
which connects directly to the remote server 32, it will be
appreciated that such external connection (either narrow or
broadband, Local- or Wide area network) may be shared with
other networked appliances over a home network. As known in
the art, in such a configuration a single device, commonly
known as Residential Gateway connects to the external
connection, whereby multiple in-home appliances share this
external pipe by means of an in-home network. Home networks
may use dedicated wiring commonly known as ‘structured
wiring’ and employing Ethernet IEEE802.3 protocols. Other
implementations involve wireless RF based network such as
standardized in IEEE802.11x or BlueTooth. Other alternatives
involve using existing wiring structure such as telephone wiring
(e.g. HomePNA technology), powerlines (e.g. HomePlug) and
CATV wiring. Adapting the information device 10 to support a
home network basically requires substituting the dial-up
modem 15 with a modem appropriate for the home network
media, such as Ethernet transceiver for wired Ethernet network,
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IEEE802.11x wireless transceiver or HomePlug compliant
transceiver.
This passage describes sharing an external connection with other
networked appliances over a local network using a Residential Gateway,
which does not persuasively indicate that Appellant was in possession of an
embodiment of a telephone set with a LAN cable that carries both power and
data/content, as recited in claims 27–29, 82, 87–89, 91, and 108. See Ans. 5.
Moreover, although the Specification provides broad, “catch-all” statements
indicating that “any connection may be used,” (e.g., Spec. 23:4; 2:14–20),
we are not persuaded this disclosure indicates that Appellant was in
possession of the embodiments claimed. In particular, the Specification
describes that the information device may be AC powered, powered by
batteries, by “extracting power from the telephone line,” or any combination
thereof. Spec. 16:1–5, 15–26. However, claims 27–29, 82, 87–89, 91, and
108 recite a LAN cable that carries both power and data. See Ans. 5.
Appellant has not persuasively challenged the Examiner’s findings as to
claims 27–29, 82, 87–89, 91, and 108, and, therefore, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred as to these claims.
In contrast, claims 128 and 129 do not recite similar limitations
pertaining to the cable carrying power and data/content, and the Examiner
has not provided sufficient findings as to the written description rejections of
these claims. Accordingly, on this record, we are persuaded the Examiner
erred as to claims 128 and 129.
“High Definition” – Claims 30, 32, 78, 79, 99, 100, 115, 153, 154
Claim 30 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said telephone set
is further operative to receive High Definition (HD) video, and said video
display is operative for displaying the High Definition (HD) video.” Appeal
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Br. 98, Claims App. Claim 78 depends from claim 77 and recites similar
limitations, and claim 153 depends from claim 123 and recites similar
limitations. Id. at 105, 119.10 Claim 32 depends on claim 31 and recites
“wherein the High Definition (HD) video is High Definition Television
(HDTV).” Id. at 98. Claim 79 depends from claim 78, and claim 154 depends
from claim 153 and recite similar limitations. Id. at 105, 119. Claim 99 is
independent and recites “a high-definition video display for presenting
images.” Id. at 111. Claims 100 and 115 depend from claim 99. Id. at 111–
113.
The Examiner finds “the specification does not describe the integrated
display as being an HDTV display, but rather an analog display (page 6, lines
19-21), and specifically describes the requirement of an adapter when
connecting to an HDTV display in order to provide conversion to HDTV
signals (page 6, lines 22-25).” Final Act. 8.
Appellant argues the cited passage is not limited to an external display,
and explicitly mentions an LCD and an FED display, which are known to be
digital displays. Appeal Br. 27 (citing Spec. 6:20–21). Appellant also argues
the disclosure “clearly teaches integrating with other display appliances such
as [a] television set.” Id. (citing Spec. 3:12–14).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The Specification states

[t]he display means 13 may be alpha-numeric only or analog
video display, and may use technologies such as LCD (Liquid

10 There is no claim 77 in the Claims Appendix and was canceled in a May
1, 2017 amendment. In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may
wish to consider whether claims dependent thereon should be rejected as
incomplete. See MPEP § 608.01(n) (“If the base claim has been canceled, a
claim which is directly or indirectly dependent thereon should be rejected as
incomplete.”).
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Crystal Display), FED (Field Emission Display,[)] or CRT
(Cathode Ray Tube). The memory may be volatile or non-
volatile type, such as Flash, DRAM and RAM. In many cases,
an adaptor (not shown) is required in order to connect the
analog display to digital data device. For example, the adaptor
may convert to composite video (PAL, NTSC) or S-Video or
HDTV signal.

Spec. 6:19–25. Outside of the claims, the only mention of “high definition”
or HDTV in the Specification is with respect to use of an adaptor to convert
an HDTV signal. Id. at 6:24–25. However, the adaptor described in the
Specification refers to connecting the device to an external analog display.
See id. at 6:22–25 (“In many cases, an adaptor (not shown) is required in
order to connect the analog display to digital data device. For example, the
adaptor may convert to . . . HDTV signal.”); id. at 18:18–20 (“The
information device 110 shown in the figure does not comprise any display
means 13, but rather only employ a video adapter 111, connectable to any
external video monitor”); id. at 24:1–2 (“The [information] device 170
shown comprises video adapter 111 for connecting to an external video
display.”). Claims 1, 99, and 123 recite a device with a single enclosure that
includes a display, not a connection to an external display. See Appeal Br.
94, Claims App., 111, 115. We, therefore, are not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that the disclosure reasonably conveys possession of the
particular claimed combination of features as recited in the claims.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
“connected unit,” “receiving/transmitting” – Claims 48, 49, 51–54

Claim 48 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein: said telephone
set is further operative to receive and display information from a connected
unit; said telephone set further comprises a second connector coupled to said
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processor for connecting to, and controlling, the unit; and said telephone set
is operative to receive digital data comprising information from the unit and
displaying the information on said display.” Appeal Br. 100–101, Claims
App. Claim 49 depends from claim 48 and recites “wherein said telephone
set is further operative to transmit digital data to the unit.” Id. at 101. Claim
51 depends from claim 48 and recites “the unit has a battery for powering
the unit; and said telephone set further comprises a charger . . . for charging
the battery [of the battery operated unit]; and said charger is coupled to be
powered from the DC power signal.” Id. Claim 52 depends from claim 48
and recites “wherein the unit is a handheld unit, and said telephone set is
further adapted to mechanically dock, supply power to, and communicate
with the handheld unit.” Id. Claim 53 depends from claim 52 and recites
“in combination with a cradle for detachable mounting of the handheld unit
. . . .” Id. Claim 54 depends from claim 53 and recites “wherein said
handheld unit is a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), or a cellular telephone.”
Id.
The Examiner finds the disclosure does not describe the recited
subject matter. Final Act. 9. Specifically, the Examiner finds:
On page 21, line 16 - page 22, line 26, the specification
describes coupling with a handheld unit, but these embodiments
(depicted in Figs. 13-15b) do not include the device coupling to
a digital network or the PSTN. Rather, the handheld unit itself
provides the sole communication means via its built-in cellular
modem, wireless modem or wired network connection (page
21, lines 28-30; page 22, lines 20-26), which conflicts with the
transceiver in parent claim 1.

Final Act. 9; see also Ans. 6–7. In addition, the Examiner finds, “[a]s to
claims 48-49, 52-54, information is received from the remote information
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server 32 (page 2, lines 4-12), not from a locally connected handheld unit.
Therefore, the specification fails to describe the information device
receiving information from or transmitting information to the connected
unit.” Final Act. 9–10.
Appellant argues the Examiner “admits that a connected unit
according to claim is described, but not in the context of the claim.” Appeal
Br. 28. Appellant also argues that “while the present disclosure describes in
detail a single example, it should not exclude other variants.” Id. at 29.
Appellant contends “the specification clearly supports using multiple
attachable devices to the information device, and further supports using
multiple communication devices, means, and protocols.” Id. (citing Spec.
20:6–811 (“multiple devices may be employed either independently or in
combination, as shown in FIG. 15b describing an information device 155
and both a PDA 151 and cellular telephone set 132”), 2:16–17 (“Other
telephony connections or any other medium may also be employed . . .”),
31:7 (“The invention embraces any combination of the above embodiments
. . .”)) (emphasis omitted). In addition, Appellant argues the Specification
describes communication with cellular telephone 132 and PDA 151. Appeal
Br. 32 (citing Spec. 21:9–22:30, Figs. 15, 15a, 15b).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. In addition to the
recitations in claim 1 requiring the claimed telephone set comprising a single
enclosure housing the connector, transceiver, processor, and video display,
claim 48 requires, inter alia, that the telephone set “receive and display
information from a connected unit,” comprise “a second connector coupled
to said processor for connecting to, and controlling, the unit,” and “operative

11 Appellant appears to have intended to cite to Spec. 22:28–30.
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to receive digital data comprising information from the unit and displaying
the information on said display.” Appeal Br. 100–101, Claims App. As
Appellant points out, and we agree, the Specification describes that the
information device described in the Specification may connect to other
devices, such as a PDA and cellular telephone set. See Appeal Br. 29.
However, Appellant has not identified where the Specification describes that
the claimed single enclosure telephone set (e.g., Fig. 10) is receiving and
displaying information from these connected devices, where the claimed
single enclosure telephone set comprises a second connector coupled to the
processor for connecting to, and controlling, these connected devices, and
where the telephone set is operative to receive digital data comprising
information from the connected devices and displaying the information on
said display, as recited in claim 48.12 Rather, the embodiments Appellant
relies upon merely describe that the information device uses a cellular
telephone set or PDA as the communication means to connect to the
information provider. Spec. 21:20–22:19.
We, therefore, are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
disclosure reasonably conveys possession of the particular claimed
combination of features as recited in the claims, as to claim 48, as well as

12 Appellant equates the claimed “telephone set” of claim 1 with the
“information device” described in the Specification. See Appeal Br. 4
(citing Fig. 1; item 90 in Fig. 9; item 100 in Fig. 10). However, Appellant
also refers to “telephone set 132” throughout the Specification, which is
“used as the communication means,” and may be separate from, partially, or
fully integrated with the information device. See Spec. 21:20–22:19.
Appellant has not explained the conflicting uses of this term in the claims
and the rest of the Specification, and such use creates ambiguity in the
disclosure. In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to
determine whether the claims are sufficiently definite under § 112.
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dependent claims 49 and 51–54, for the same reasons. Accordingly, we are
not persuaded the Examiner erred.
“charger . . . powered from the DC power signal” – Claim 51
Claim 51 depends from claim 48, which itself depends from claim 1,
and further recites “wherein: the unit has a battery for powering the unit;
and said telephone set further comprises a charger coupled to said connector
for charging the battery; and said charger is coupled to be powered from the
DC power signal.” Appeal Br. 101, Claims App.
The Examiner finds “in the embodiment involving a battery operated
unit (wireless handheld unit 132 in Fig. 14) and a charger (charger 141), the
charger is powered from the local AC power via power plug 18, not from a
DC power signal carried over a cable.” Final Act. 9. The Examiner further
finds that the Specification “does not explain how DC power is extracted
from a LAN cable to power a charger.” Ans. 7.
Appellant argues the AC power connection is an example, and “any
powering scheme may be equally used.” Appeal Br. 31 (citing Spec. 16:1–
17:12, 3:6–7).
The Specification describes:
Since cellular telephone sets 132 commonly require periodic
charging time, the device 130 may be modified to comprise such
a charger. In such configuration, attaching a cellular telephone
set 132 to an information device supports two functions:
charging and communication. Such a device 140 is shown in
Figure 14. The power supply 13 feeds a charger 141,
connected to the cellular telephone 132 via the adaptor 131. An
exemplary pictorial view is shown in Figure 15. Mechanical
adaptor 152 is shown, enabling attaching and detaching the
cellular telephone set 132 to the information device 140. Upon
attaching the telephone set 132, the telephone is charged and
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may be also used by the device 140 for communication
purposes.

Spec. 22:1–9 (emphasis added); see also Figs. 14, 15. The Specification
also describes:
The information device 10 is powered by the local AC power
(110VAC in North America, 220VAC in Europe) from a
standard wall outlet 25, connected thereto by a power plug 18
and power cable 19, feeding a power supply 12 within the
information device 10. The power supply converts the AC
power to the various voltages, usually DC type, required for
proper operation of the active circuits within the device 10. In
one or more embodiments, a small outlet plugin transformer
may be used.

Spec. 6:25–7:2 (emphasis added). Although we agree with the Examiner
that Appellant has failed to show sufficient written description for the terms
discussed above in independent claim 1, we find the foregoing disclosure
reasonably conveys to one of ordinary skill in the art that Appellant was in
possession of the recited additional limitations in dependent claim 51.
Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner erred.
“media signal” – Claim 61
Claim 60 depends from claim 1 and recites “further comprising a
digital to analog converter coupled to said transceiver for converting digital
data received by said transceiver to an analog signal.” Appeal Br. 102,
Claims App. Claim 61 depends from claim 60 and recites “wherein the
analog signal is an analog media signal for connecting to an analog media
unit.” Id.
The Examiner finds “the information received by Applicant’s
information device 10 is not a media signal but text data.” Final Act. 10
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(citing Spec. 12:19–31; Fig. 6a).13
Appellant argues “[t]he specification clearly describes any type of
information and any media signal.” Appeal Br. 33 (citing Spec. 1:13–14).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The portion of the
Specification cited by Appellant, which is part of the Background of the
Invention, states:
In modem life there is a continuous need for updated
information, such as weather forecasts, traffic reports, stock
market quotes, sports results and general news. Such
information may be obtained in various ways using many types
of media and communication means. Such communication
means may include physical delivery such as newspapers, or
using networking such as landline telephony, cellular
telephony, radio and television. The Internet is gradually being
recognized as an important, reliable and rich source of
information.

Spec. 1:9–17. We agree with the Examiner that the term “media,” as used
here, means “the communication means by which information is obtained,
not the type of information signal.” Ans. 8. We, therefore, are not
persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the disclosure reasonably conveys
possession of the claimed “media signal.” Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred.
“adapter” – Claims 62, 67
The Examiner finds that the Specification “describes mechanically
docking a handheld unit, but these embodiments . . . do not include

13 The Examiner’s rejection incorrectly identifies claim 59, but the text
makes it apparent the Examiner is referring to claim 61. See Appeal Br. 102,
Claims App. We find this to be harmless error.

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connecting to a cable, as required by claim 62. Rather, the handheld unit
itself provides the communication means via its built-in cellular modem,
wireless modem or wired connection . . . which conflicts with the cable
being connected to make and receive telephone calls and carry digital data
and a DC power signal.” Final Act. 10–11; Ans. 8–9.
Appellant argues the disclosure is merely an example, and the
Examiner “improperly limit[s] the disclosure to a specific example.” Appeal
Br. 34.
While it is true that “examples are not necessary to support the
adequacy of a written description,” Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2006), “the specification itself . . . must demonstrate possession,”
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. Appellant has not provided persuasive argument
rebutting the Examiner’s findings, or persuasive argument that the disclosure
reasonably conveys possession of the claimed “adapter,” as recited in claims
62 and 67. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred.
“Frequency Division Multiplexing” – Claim 63
Claim 63 depends from claim 62 and recites “wherein said cable is
connected to concurrently carry the digital data and the power signal using
Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM).” Appeal Br. 103, Claims App.
The Examiner finds “the specification does not specifically describe
sending data with power using FDM.” Ans. 9; see Final Act. 11.
Appellant argues “[t]he power over the telephone connection is DC,
and the dial-up data is clearly above DC, hence forming FDM as recited in the
claim.” Appeal Br. 36. Appellant argues its response “is based on the
Rabenko reference that teaches the same mechanism of carrying data and
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power carrying over telephone lines.” Reply Br. 6.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Appellant has not
identified anywhere in the Specification where Frequency Division
Multiplexing (FDM) is described, or persuasive argument that the disclosure
reasonably conveys possession of “FDM” as claimed. Appellant’s
arguments as to Rabenko are not persuasive, as the written description
requirement is dependent on the disclosure in Appellant’s Specification, not
the disclosure in other references. See Examining Computer-Implemented
Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 62 (“It is not enough that one skilled in the art could theoretically
write a program to achieve the claimed function, rather the specification
itself must explain how the claimed function is achieved to demonstrate that
the applicant had possession of it.”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred.
“via the Internet” – Claim 66
Claim 66 depends from claim 62 and recites “wherein said [first]
telephone set is operative for communicating with a first remote information
server via the Internet.” Appeal Br. 104, Claims App.
The Examiner finds “the information device 10 communicates with a
first remote server 32a over the PSTN 31, not over the Internet 33.” Final
Act. 11 (citing Fig. 3); see also Ans. 9 (citing Spec. 2:10–15). The
Examiner finds “the disclosure shows the Internet 33 connecting the first
remote information server 32a with other remote information servers 32b,
32c, 32d.” Ans. 9.
Appellant argues “[t]he information device connects to the Internet
via the server 31.” Appeal Br. 36 (citing Spec. 8:11–20; 1:18–24; 2:19–20;
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10:24–31).
The Specification describes “[a]n information device according to the
present invention . . . periodically and automatically initiates a
communication session with the information-storing server in the remote
location” as follows:
The communication with the remote site may use the
PSTN, to which the information device is connected, by a dial
up modem or a cellular network, to which the device connected
thereto by a cellular modern. Other telephony connections or
any other medium may also be employed. Connection to a
telephone outlet may either use cable or be cordless. In addition
to narrowband, any broadband connection such as ADSL or
cable modem may be employed. The communication may be
direct point-to-point connection (such as in telephony) or via
the Internet.

Spec. 2:8–20 (emphasis added). The Specification also describes that “[i]n
other embodiments, the Internet is used for communication between the
information device 10 and the information server 32.” Id. at 28:3–4.
We find the foregoing disclosure reasonably conveys to one of
ordinary skill in the art that Appellant was in possession of the recited “via
the Internet” in claim 66. Accordingly, we are persuaded the Examiner
erred.
“second memory . . .” – Claims 73, 124
Claim 73 depends from claim 62 and recites “further comprising a
second memory connected for storing a digital address uniquely identifying
said telephone set in the digital network or in a Wide Area Network
(WAN).” Appeal Br. 105, Claims App. Claim 124 depends from claim 123
and recites in part “a second memory housed in said enclosure for storing the
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website URL identifying the first remote information server.” Id. at 115–
116.
The Examiner finds the Specification describes memory 11, but does
not describe a second memory separately storing a unique digital address.
Final Act. 11, 13.
Appellant contends “[t]he Action seems to admit that a memory that
stores a digital address is properly disclosed, but that a separate second
memory is not disclosed. However, the claim does not disclose that the two
memories are in different enclosures or any other physical arrangement,
rendering the rejection moot.” Appeal Br. 36–37, 43.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively address the Examiner’s
rejection. The Examiner’s rejection is not based on “the two memories
[that] are in different enclosures or any other physical arrangement” (id.),
but that the Specification does not describe a second memory storing a
digital address, as claimed. Appellant does not direct our attention to any
disclosure in the Specification that describes the claimed “second memory
. . . for storing a digital address . . . .” To comply with the written
description requirement, the Specification must show the inventor had
possession of the full scope of the claim. See, e.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth
Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MPEP
§ 2163.05. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
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“television set” – Claims 82, 93
The Examiner finds the Specification “does not describe a television
set storing digital content from a server.” Final Act. 11; see also Final Act.
12.
Appellant argues the Specification “explicitly teach[es] the integration
of an information device (which may be any described embodiment of such
device, independent of any of the interfaces used for communication)[] in a
television set.” Appeal Br. 38 (emphasis omitted) (citing Spec. 3:8–15,
18:13–29, Fig. 17).
Claim 82 recites, in part, “[a] system for obtaining digital content
from a server via the Internet, and for storing and displaying the digital
content on a television set,” said system comprising (1) “a television set for
receiving television signals and comprising a screen for displaying images
provided by the received television signals, said television set further
comprising a first analog video connector for receiving a first analog video
signal for display on said screen,” and (2) “a device connected for storing
the digital content and for displaying images based on the stored digital
video content on said screen, said device comprising, in a single enclosure[,]
. . . a digital memory . . . for storing digital content received.” Appeal Br.
106, Claims App. (emphasis added).
The language in claim 82 recites that the digital content is stored on
the single enclosure device, not the television set. Therefore, the Examiner
has not provided sufficient findings as to the written description rejection of
claim 82. We do not sustain this rejection.
Claim 93, however, recites “[a] television set for storing and
displaying digital content and for receiving a television signal, . . . said
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television set being enclosed in a single enclosure and comprising, in said
single enclosure: a non-volatile memory for storing digital data content
. . . .” Appeal Br. 109, Claims App. Claim 93, therefore, does recite the
television set storing digital content.
Appellant is correct that the Specification describes that the
“information device may be integrated within a . . . television set.” See
Spec. 3:12–14. However, the examples provided in the Specification of
integration with a television set both involve using the television set as the
display, where the information device does not include any display means of
its own. See Spec. Figs. 11, 17; Spec. 18:13–29. In both of these
embodiments, the memory is included in the information device, not the
television set. See Spec. Figs. 11, 17. We note that claim 93, unlike claim
82, does not separately claim a “device.” We, therefore, are not persuaded
the disclosure reasonably conveys possession of the claimed “television set,”
as recited in claim 93.
Accordingly, on this record, we are persuaded the Examiner erred as
to claim 82, but we are not persuaded the Examiner erred as to claim 93.
“wired and wireless connections” – Claims 123, 157
Claim 123 recites, in part, “[a] telephone set operative for making and
receiving telephone calls in a telephone network over a wired connection”
and “operative for receiving digital data from a first remote information
server using wireless communication.” Appeal Br. 115, Claims App. Claim
157 depends from claim 123. Id. at 119.
The Examiner finds the Specification “does not teach the information
device being connected to both a wired connection for telephone
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communication and a wireless connection for digital data communication.”
Final Act. 13; see Ans. 11.
Appellant argues “[a] review of the present application reveals that the
specification does not limit the information device to a single interface or
connection, and also describes a device having multiple interfaces.” Appeal
Br. 40. Appellant argues that the information device may be integrated with
another device or appliance, where the other device may include its own
communication interface. Id. at 40–42 (citing Spec. 2:16–19; 3:10–14;
21:9–22; 22:1–4; 22:8–11; 22:28–29; 24:20–23; 26:3–5).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The citations to the
Specification provided by Appellant do not describe an embodiment where a
telephone set is operative to make and receive calls over a wired connection
and to receive digital data from a remote server over a wireless connection.
Rather, the Specification appears to contemplate one or the other. See Spec.
2:15–19 (“dial up modem or a cellular network, . . . [o]ther telephony
connections or any other medium may also be employed”) (emphasis
added); 3:12–14 (“the information device may be integrated within a
telephone set (either landline or cellular), a PDA or a television set”)
(emphasis added); 21:9–22 (“the invention has been so far described with
respect to wired telephone connection, . . . the invention can be equally
applied to any other telephone connection, including non-wired based
telephone service such as cellular telephony,” “modified to use a cellular
telephone service rather than wired telephony as shown in Figure 12”)
(emphasis added); 22:8–9 (“[u]pon attaching the telephone set 132, the
telephone is charged and may be also used by the device 140 for
communication purposes”); 22:10–11 (“the information device 120 is
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partially or fully integrated with the cellular telephone set 132”); 22:28–29
(“multiple devices may be employed either independently or in
combination”); 24:20–24 (“in such a configuration a single device,
commonly known as Residential Gateway connects to the external
connection, whereby multiple in-home appliances share this external pipe by
means of an in-home network”); 26:1–3 (“[i]n the case wherein telephone
connection (such as landline or cellular telephony) is used . . . an inherent
unique telephone number is assigned to each such connection”). We agree
with the Examiner that Figure 15b, and its associated description, refers to
docking the PDA and cellular telephone and using the cellular telephone
and/or PDA’s built-in communication means as the communication means.
See Ans. 11; Spec. 21:20–22:22.
We, therefore, are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
disclosure reasonably conveys possession of the particular claimed
combination of features as recited in claims 123 and 157. Accordingly, we
are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
“spread spectrum modulation” – Claim 138
Claim 123 recites, in part, “said telephone set being further operative
for receiving digital data from a first remote information server using
wireless communication.” Appeal Br. 115, Claims App. Claim 138 depends
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from claim 123 and recites “wherein the wireless communication is based on
spread spectrum modulation.” Id. at 117.
The Examiner finds “spread spectrum modulation communication is
described only with regard to cordless telephone communication . . . not
digital data communication from a remote server.” Final Act. 13.
Appellant argues the Specification discloses “the communication may
use Digital Spread Spectrum (DSS) scheme.” Appeal Br. 46 (citing Spec.
15:4–5). Appellant also argues “cellular communication is long known in
the art to use spread spectrum techniques. Similarly, ITU-T v.90 protocol,
mentioned in page 6, line 16, involves using spread spectrum technology.”
Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner that the cited portion of the Specification refers to cordless
telephone communication between a handset and a base set, and not wireless
communication between the claimed telephone set and remote information
server. Ans. 12. Appellant has not persuasively identified where the
Specification describes “spread spectrum modulation,” as claimed, or
provided persuasive argument that the disclosure in the Specification
reasonably conveys possession of “spread spectrum modulation,” as
claimed. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
“serial data” – Claim 159
Claim 159 depends from claim 158 and recites “wherein the digital
data signal is carried as a serial data stream over the cable.” Appeal Br. 120,
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Claims App. The Examiner finds this is not described in the Specification.
Final Act. 14.
Appellant identifies page 7, lines 13–16 of the Specification as
supporting this claim limitation, which states “coupling to the other
components may be serial or shared bus type.” Appeal Br. 47 (emphasis
omitted).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. We agree with the
Examiner that this citation “describes the use of a serial bus for coupling
between components within the information device, not between the
information device and a connected data unit.” See Ans. 12 (emphasis
omitted). Appellant has not persuasively identified where the Specification
describes a “serial data stream,” as claimed, or provided persuasive
argument that the disclosure in the Specification reasonably conveys
possession of a “serial data stream” as claimed. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred.
Summary as to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 Rejections
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 1 rejection of independent claims 1, 62, 93, and 123. We also
sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 rejection of dependent claims 2,
4–24, 26–30, 32–46, 48, 49, 51–61, 63–76, 78–81, 94–98, 124–133, 136–
139, and 142–159 either by virtue of their dependence on one of the
foregoing claims, or for the reasons stated above. We do not sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 rejection of independent claim 82, and, for
the same reasons, its dependent claims 83, 84, 86, 90, and 92. Dependent
claims 87–89 and 91 are sustained for separate reasons, as stated above. We
do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 rejection of independent
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claim 99, and for the same reasons, its dependent claims 101–107, 109–114,
and 116–121. Dependent claims 100, 108, and 115 are sustained for
separate reasons, as stated above.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over
Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Ulrich

Claims 1, 62
Appellant contends that the Examiner combines two distinct
embodiments from Bell ’785 in the obviousness rejections. Appeal Br. 57.14
Specifically, Appellant argues there are two distinct entities described in
Bell ’785, and the Examiner relies on the features of both to disclose the
claimed device: (1) processor-based device 40, which connects to both local
network 64 and WAN 65 and (2) peripheral devices such as Digital Picture
Frame 66, Digital Appliance 67, and other devices 68, which are connected
only to local network 64, and are different from the primary device 40. Id.
at 57–58.
We do not find this argument persuasive. The Examiner relies on Bell
’785’s processor-based device 20/40 to disclose the claimed device. See
Final Act. 14; Ans. 14–15. Bell ’785 discloses various examples of
processor-based devices or computing devices, including digital picture
frames, and further discloses that these devices can access a network, such
as the Internet:
Many other types of processor-based devices or
computing devices 20 may be used to implement one or more
embodiments of the present invention. These include any
devices that can access a network, such as the Internet, that
contains sources of information arranged in a tag-based

14 Appellant makes the same arguments with respect to independent claim
82. Appeal Br. 77.
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language or structure, such as HTML. Such devices may take
the form of a computer (e.g., desktop, laptop, handheld, etc.), a
wireless communications device (e.g., cellular phone, 2-way
pager, etc.), a digital picture frame, a personal entertainment
device (e.g. a radio), audio-visual equipment, a personal digital
assistant, Internet appliance, electronic book, and the like.

Bell ’785 ¶ 30 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 29 (“Computing device 20
may be or include a personal computer 24 or any other processor-based
device.”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Appellant contends that Bell ’785 does not teach a “connector for
connecting to the cable,” as recited in claims 1 and 62. Appeal Br. 58
(emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 8.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Bell ’785 discloses that
“[p]rocessor-based device 40 can operate in a networked environment using
physical and/or logical connections to local network 64 and/or wide area
network (WAN) 65. The connections to these networks can be wired and/or
wireless.” Bell ’785 ¶ 56 (emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner
that Bell ’785’s description of a physical connection discloses the claimed
“connector for connecting to the cable.” Final Act. 14; Ans. 15.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Appellant further contends that Bell ’785 does not teach a “video
display,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 59; Reply Br. 9.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. We agree with the
Examiner that Bell ’785 discloses the claimed “video display.” Final Act.
15; Ans. 15. For example, Bell ’785 explicitly discloses a video display.
See Bell ’785 ¶ 26 (“a displayed Web page may comprise a plurality of
objects”); ¶ 30 (“computer,” “digital picture frame”); ¶ 48 (objects “can be
displayed on the computing device’s display”); ¶ 52 (“display 46”); ¶ 106
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(“the object, and any associated object(s), are displayed or rendered on the
computing device”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Appellant argues Bell ’785 does not teach “said telephone set . . .
addressable in a digital network,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 59.
Appellant argues that “at the time of the Bell ’785, many devices were
addressable by a connected device, where the address was assigned by a
service provider (ISP).” Id. at 60.
The Examiner finds that “Bell ’785 discloses the device 40 having the
network interface unit 54 (para. 0052) and operating in a local network 64
(para. 0056-0057, 0072, 0088). The examiner submits that a LAN network
interface unit inherently comprises a MAC address stored in a ROM of the
NIC at the time of manufacture in order to receive data addressed to it.”
Ans. 15; see also Final Act. 4. In support, the Examiner cites to paragraphs
29 and 30 of Angelo.15 Ans. 15.
In response, Appellant argues that Angelo “only teaches the use of
MAC addresses in a network, but is silent regarding inherency of such
addressing scheme in general.” Reply Br. 9. Appellant further argues that
Angelo “does not exclude a case where the address is EXTERNAL to a
computer, such as in an external NIC.” Reply Br. 9–10.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. “[I]nherency may
supply a missing claim limitation in an obviousness analysis.” PAR Pharm.,
Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
However, inherency
may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The
mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of

15 US 2004/0002877 A1 (published Jan. 1, 2004).
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circumstances is not sufficient. . . . If, however, the disclosure is
sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the
operation as taught would result in the performance of the
questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the
disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.

In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981) (emphasis added) (quoting
Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (CCPA 1939)).
Appellant cites to page 20, lines 1–10 of the Specification as
describing this limitation. Appeal Br. 4. This portion of the Specification
states:
In alternative embodiments, the information 10 device
transmits its identification as part of the communication
session, during the start session step 64. The identification may
consist of:

a. A unique identification code (‘address’), associated with a
single information device 10. Such mechanism may be based
on the popular and standard IP/Ethernet MAC / IP address
structure, or may be of a proprietary nature. Similarly, a user
name, password and other personalization techniques known
in the art may be used.
b. A code identifying the type of information requested. In this
configuration, the information device 10 transmits a code that
identifies the required info rather than the individual user. For
example, a device 10 may request the info about the weather
in a specific location, and the results of a specific sport event.
Spec. 19:29–20:9.
The portions of the Angelo reference relied upon the Examiner
describe “an identifying number known as the media access control address
(or ‘MAC address’) 123.” Angelo ¶ 29. Angelo goes on to discuss the
MAC address is “used to uniquely identify the NIC 122 in a networked
computing environment.” Id. Angelo states that “[a]ll computers in a given
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network must have unique MAC addresses or the likely result is that neither
will function correctly on the network. This is true because each computer
on the network must have a unique MAC address to correctly receive data
addressed to it.” Id. ¶ 30 (emphasis added). Angelo teaches using the
unique MAC address of a NIC as a verification tool for warranty service.
See id. ¶ 32. Moreover, Bell ’785 clearly shows a network interface unit 54
attached to system bus 42 of the machine or processor-based device 40. Bell
’785 ¶¶ 51–52. We find the Examiner has sufficiently shown via the
disclosure in Angelo that the network interface unit of Bell ’785 inherently
is addressable so that it can correctly receive the data addressed to it. Bell
’785 is directed to retrieving network information, so it is reasonable, in
light of the disclosure in Bell ’785, that the machine or processor-based
device must be able to correctly receive the data that it requests from the
remote server, and it would have been obvious to do so through the use of an
address as described in Angelo. Appellant has not persuasively argued that
Bell ’785’s processor-based device is not addressable. We, therefore, agree
with the Examiner that Bell ’785 teaches the claimed “addressable in the
digital network.” Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 15. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred.
Appellant further contends Bell ’785 does not teach an “adapter
mechanically attachable to the unit, said adapter including a second
connector for connecting to the unit when the unit is mechanically attached
thereon,” as recited in claim 62. Appeal Br. 60–61 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant argues “connecting via cable to an external hard drive unit” does
not teach this limitation. Appeal Br. 61.
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The Examiner’s findings as to this limitation state “a cable can
connect to an external hard drive unit.” Final Act. 15. The Examiner further
finds “Bell ’785 teaches connection to various external storage devices
which necessitates a mechanical connection.” Ans. 16 (citing Bell ’785
¶ 52).
We find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. On this record, the
Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Bell ’785 teaches or suggests
an “adapter mechanically attachable to the unit, said adapter including a
second connector for connecting to the unit when the unit is mechanically
attached thereon,” as recited in claim 62. Accordingly, on the record before
us, we are persuaded the Examiner erred.
In summary, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of independent claim 1, but do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of independent claim 62.
Claims 5, 58
Claim 5 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said single
enclosure is dimensioned and has an appearance of a conventional flat, wall-
mountable framed picture.” Appeal Br. 95, Claims App. Claim 58 depends
from claim 1 and similarly recites that the telephone set comprises a “single
enclosure [that] is constructed to have . . . wall mounting elements
substantially similar to those of a standard picture frame for hanging on a
wall.” Id. at 102.
In the Final Action, the Examiner relies on the digital picture frame
disclosed in Bell ’785 to teach claims 5 and 58. Final Act. 17 (citing Bell
’785 ¶¶ 30, 114). In the Answer, the Examiner states “the rejection of
claims 5 and 110 [sic] under 35 USC 103 relies upon Shneidman, not Bell
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’785, to teach configuring the device for wall mounting (para. 0124).” Ans.
16.16
Appellant argues Bell ’785 does not teach “wall mounting,” but does
not address the Examiner’s findings with regard to Shneidman. See Appeal
Br. 61 (emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 10–11.
Paragraph 124 of Shneidman states “FIG. 14 shows how the
Telescreen unit 1 may be mounted in a wall 50. This would be particularly
useful when the unit is dedicated to a security system use.” We agree with
the Examiner that this disclosure in Shneidman teaches the claimed “wall
mounting.”
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. We,
therefore, sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 5
and 58.
Claim 68
Claim 68 depends from claim 67 and recites “wherein said telephone
set is operative for automatically and periodically communicating with the
first remote information server at all times when said telephone set is in
operation.” Appeal Br. 104, Claims App.
The Examiner relies on paragraphs 76, 83–97, and 102 of Bell ’785 to
disclose the limitations in claim 68. Final Act. 18; Ans. 16–17.
According to Appellant, the citations relied upon by the Examiner
only teach “periodically locally retrieving and displaying, and fails to teach
any automatic and periodic external communication in general.” Appeal

16 The heading to this section of the Answer refers to “claims 5, 58,” so we
interpret the Examiner’s reference to “claim 110” as a harmless
typographical error. See Ans. 16.
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Br. 62–63.17 Appellant argues “[w]hile the Bell ’785 discloses both local
and from server data fetching, the automatic and periodic operation clearly
relates to the LOCAL loading.” Reply Br. 11.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Bell ’785 explicitly
describes automatically and periodically retrieving an HTML object from a
remote server:
FIG. 9 is a flow diagram illustrating a method to
automatically retrieve an HTML object at a desired time
interval, in accordance with one or more embodiments of the
present invention. This method, or a similar embodiment, can
be used by a user’s computing device to retrieve and, if desired,
display or otherwise render a desired HTML page object.
Object retrieval may occur whenever requested by the calling
device. It can occur periodically on a regular basis, or it can
occur only once or sporadically.

Bell ’785 ¶ 93. Bell ’785 further discloses that “the current
instantiation of the object” is downloaded to the calling device from
“the Web server that sources the selected object.” Bell ’785 ¶¶ 97, 95;
see also id. ¶¶ 94, 102. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s
analysis. See Ans. 16–17. However, by virtue of its dependence on
independent claim 62, we, nonetheless, do not sustain the Examiner’s
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 68.
Claims 15, 16
Claim 15 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein communication
with the first remote information server is based on Internet Protocol suite.”
Appeal Br. 96, Claims App. Claim 16 depends from claim 15 and recites

17 Although Appellant’s header for this section of argument identifies claims
7, 8, and 68, Appellant only argues the limitations in claim 68.
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“wherein communication with the first remote information server is based
on TCP/IP.” Id.
The Examiner relies on paragraphs 37 and 40 to disclose the
limitations in claims 15 and 16, specifically that Bell ’785 discloses using
HTTP Web protocol. Final Act. 19. The Examiner also relies on Squire18 to
show what was known in the art, that “HTTP is a request/response protocol
that is typically used in conjunction with the Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP).” Ans. 17 (citing Squire, 6:25–27).
Appellant argues that HTTP is an application layer protocol, relating
to information formatting, while the recited IP and TCP/IP protocols are
link/network layer and transport layer protocols. Appeal Br. 64. Appellant
contends that Squire’s disclosure is not sufficient to show inherency; that
Squire only suggests that TCP or TCP/IP may be used with HTTP
communication. Reply Br. 11–12.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner is not
relying on inherency. See Final Act. 19; Ans. 17. Bell ’765 describes the
use of HTTP Web protocol to format and transmit objects, which Squire
describes as “well-known.” Bell ’765 ¶ 40; Squire, 6:31. Squire also
describes that “HTTP is a request/response protocol that is typically used in
conjunction with the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet
Protocol (IP).” Squire, 6:25–27 (emphasis added). Given this disclosure in
Squire, we agree with the Examiner that Bell ’785 teaches, or at least
suggests, the limitations in claims 15 and 16. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 15 and 16.

18 US 7,080,158 B1 (issued July 18, 2006).
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Claims 24, 45, 46
Claim 24 depends from claim 10 and recites “wherein: said telephone
set has a digital address in the digital network; and said telephone set is
operative to send the digital address and a request for information, and to
receive and display information received from the first remote information
server in response to the sent request for information.” Appeal Br. 97,
Claims App. Claim 45 depends from claim 1 and recites “a non-volatile
memory operative for storing a digital address for uniquely identifying said
telephone set in the digital network or on the Internet.” Id. at 100. Claim 46
depends from claim 45 and recites “wherein the digital address is either a
MAC address or an IP address.” Id.
The Examiner relies on paragraphs 40, 43, 44, 56, 58, and 97 of Bell
’785 to teach the limitations in claim 24. Final Act. 20. In particular, the
Examiner relies on paragraph 40 of Bell ’785, and states “an HTTP
command inherently includes the source IP address.” Id. The Examiner
also finds that “an HTTP request transmitted by a sending device to a web
server necessarily includes a source IP address, whether it is static or
assigned by a service provider, in order for the server to know where to send
the response message” and relies on Squire.19 Ans. 19–20. The Examiner
also relies on Angelo in finding “the network interface unit of Bell ’785
inherently includes a MAC address assigned at the time of manufacture in
order to ‘function correctly on the network’ and ‘correctly receive data
addressed to it.’” Ans. 17–19 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant argues “Bell ’785 does not teach addressing schemes.”
Appeal Br. 64 (emphasis omitted). Appellant further argues the Examiner

19 US 7,080,158 B1 (issued July 18, 2006).
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has not provided evidence establishing that Bell ’785 inherently discloses
this feature, or that Squire teaches that such a feature is inherent. Id. at 64–
65; Reply Br. 12–13.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that Bell ’785 does not
inherently teach a source IP address. Bell ’765 describes the use of HTTP
Web protocol to format and transmit objects, which Squire describes as
“well-known.” Bell ’765 ¶ 40; Squire, 6:31. However, Squire describes that
a “HTTP is a request/response protocol that is typically used in conjunction
with the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol
(IP).” Squire, 6:25–27 (emphasis added). Given this disclosure in Squire,
we agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not sufficiently shown that
Bell ’785 inherently discloses an IP source address. However, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that Bell ’785 does not teach or suggest
a MAC address, and therefore, the claimed “digital address,” for the reasons
set forth in claim 1 above. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 24, 45, and 46.
Claim 26
Claim 26 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the cable is a
telephone wire pair connected to a PSTN, and said transceiver is a dial-up
modem.” Appeal Br. 98, Claims App.
The Examiner finds Bell ’785 discloses a dial-up wired connection
and a modem. Final Act. 20 (citing Bell ’785 ¶¶ 10, 52); see also Ans. 20
(citing Bell ’785 ¶ 56; Shneidman ¶ 57).
Appellant contends the reference in Bell ’785 to the “dial-up”
connection is in the background section, and the reference is “silent
regarding any dial-up connection of the device.” Appeal Br. 65–66.
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Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. There is no requirement in
an obviousness analysis for the prior art to “contain a description of the
subject matter of the appealed claim in ipsissimis verbis.” In re May, 574
F.2d 1082, 1090 (CCPA 1978). That Bell ’785 does not explicitly use the
words “dial-up modem” is not dispositive. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner that Bell ’785’s disclosure of communication “through a dial-up
wired connection” and a “modem” sufficiently teaches or suggests the
limitations in claim 26. See Bell ’785 ¶¶ 10, 52, 56.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 26.
Claims 27–29
Claim 27 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein the cable is part
of a Local Area Network (LAN) in a building.” Appeal Br. 98, Claims App.
Claim 28 depends from claim 27 and recites “wherein the cable is a LAN
cable connected for carrying a LAN signal, said connector is a LAN
connector, and said transceiver is a LAN transceiver.” Id. Claim 29
depends from claim 28. Id.
Appellant contends Bell ’785 does not teach a “LAN,” as recited in
claims 27 and 28. Appeal Br. 66. Specifically, Appellant argues that Bell
’785 “is directed to two different and distinct connections,” one “for locally
communicating with client devices such as [digital picture frame] 66,” and
“an additional distinct connection to WAN / Internet 65, for communication
with a remote server.” Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 14.
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Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive.20 Rather, we agree with the
Examiner that Bell ’785 discloses a wired connection to and communication
over a LAN. See Ans. 20–21 (citing Bell ’785 Fig. 3, ¶¶ 83, 88, 91); Final
Act. 20 (citing Bell ’785 ¶¶ 56–57). For example, paragraph 88 of Bell ’785
provides an example of a digital picture frame as the computing device, and
describes “a Webcam feed application for a [digital picture frame] could
access the Webcam every 5 minutes and send the data across the LAN to the
[digital picture frame].” See also Bell ’785 ¶ 56 (“Processor-based device
40 can operate in a networked environment using physical and/or logical
connections to local network 64 and/or wide area network (WAN) 65. The
connections to these networks can be wired and/or wireless.”); ¶ 72 (“a user
runs an application on his or her computing device” and “embodiments of
the invention can work with information residing on any type of remote
resource on any type of network, including a LAN, or a WAN such as the
Internet”); claim 20 (“wherein the resource is one of the Internet, an intranet,
a wide area network, a local memory store, and a local area network”).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred, and we sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claim 27.
Appellant further contends Bell ’785 does not teach a “LAN
connector” and “LAN transceiver” as recited in claim 28. Appeal Br. 68–69
(emphasis omitted).
The Examiner addresses claim 28 with claim 27, and finds “Bell ’785
discloses: wherein the cable is part of a Local Area Network (LAN) in a

20 We note that in a separate section of the Appeal Brief, Appellant states
“the Bell [’785] reference specifically teaches general WAN and LAN
connectivity. Local networking is explicitly taught, for example in
paragraphs 0015, 0024, 0031, 0050, and 0088.” Appeal Br. 55.
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building (wired connection to and communication over a local network 64;
para. 0056-0057).” Final Act. 20.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. As discussed above,
paragraph 56 of Bell ’785 states “[p]rocessor-based device 40 can operate in
a networked environment using physical and/or logical connections to local
network 64 and/or wide area network (WAN) 65. The connections to these
networks can be wired and/or wireless.” We agree with the Examiner that
this teaches or suggests the claimed “LAN transceiver” and “LAN
connector.” See Final Act. 20; Ans. 20–21. Accordingly we sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 28 and 29.
Claims 71, 73, 74, 93
Claim 71 depends from claim 70 and recites “wherein said first
memory is non-volatile memory that is based on a Flash memory.” Appeal
Br. 104, Claims App. Claim 93 is independent, and likewise recites “non-
volatile memory.” Id. at 109.
The Examiner relies on paragraphs 52 and 59 of Bell ’785 and finds
“memory 50 includes Flash memory” and “received content can be stored in
. . . any suitable type of memory 34 such as non-volatile, flash memory, etc.”
Final Act. 23, 30.
Appellant argues Bell ’785 does not teach “non-volatile.” Appeal Br.
71. According to Appellant, “while the Bell ’785 reference may disclose
various types of non-volatile memory, the Bell ’785 reference and the
Action are both silent regarding using non-volatile memory for storing
information received from the digital network.” Id. Appellant further
argues that memory 50 and memory 34 in Bell ’785 are not the same, so,
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even if memory 50 includes Flash memory, it is not relevant to memory 34,
which is relied upon by the Examiner. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner that Bell ’785 teaches that web objects can be retrieved from a
web server and stored in any suitable type of memory 34/50 so that they may
be displayed on computing or processor-based device 20/40’s display. See
Ans. 22; Bell ’785 ¶ 48 (“objects 35 can be stored in any suitable type of
memory 34 (e.g. random access memory (RAM), a hard drive, and/or in a
video display memory) in order that they can be displayed on the computing
device’s display”); ¶ 52 (“memory 50, which can include any suitable
memory device(s) like read only memory (ROM); random access memory
(RAM); hard drive . . . and other types of data storage; or the like”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 93. Appellant makes similar arguments as to the “digital address”
recited in dependent claims 73 and 74, which are not persuasive for the same
reasons. Appeal Br. 71–73. However, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 71, 73, and 74, based upon
their dependence on independent claim 62.
Additional Claims
Appellant further argues that Bell ’785 does not teach a “battery”
(claims 158, 159) for the same reasons as have been argued above. Appeal
Br. 92. We do not find these argument persuasive for the reasons discussed
above. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 158 and
159. Appellant does not present separate arguments for dependent claims 1–
4, 7–14, 17–23, 33, 34, and 37–44. Accordingly, we also sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of those claims.
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Combination of References
The Examiner primarily relies on Bell ’785 to teach or suggest the
recited limitations in independent claims 1 and 62, but relies on Shneidman
to teach that the device is a “telephone set” that is “operative for making and
receiving telephone calls,” and relies on Ulrich to teach “said telephone set
is at least in part powered by the power signal or DC power signal carried
over the cable.” Final Act. 16–17. The Examiner finds it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art “to modify Bell ’785 with
Shneidman in order to increase the functionality of the device and
convenience for the user by incorporating both data and voice
communications within a single device.” Id. at 16. The Examiner further
finds that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art “to
incorporate the teaching of Ulrich within the disclosure of Bell ’785 in view
of Shneidman so that the device can operate in the event of a power outage,
as taught by Ulrich.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 4 (citing Ulrich, 1:48–59,
3:17–25).
Appellant presents several arguments against the combination of Bell
’785, Shneidman, and Ulrich. Appeal Br. 49–57. With respect to the
combination of Bell ’785 and Shneidman, Appellant asserts that the
Examiner’s rationale is conclusory, does not explain why the combination is
warranted, and is based on impermissible hindsight. Id. at 49–50. Appellant
further argues that Bell ’785 is “directed to simple and reduced resources
device,” so modifying Bell ’785 “requir[es] complicated hardware additions,
and renders the device described by the Bell reference improper for its
intended use of being simple and ‘low/reduced resources.’” Id. at 51.
Appellant argues modifying Bell ’785 “to support telephony . . . clearly
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changes its configuration and requires major changes.” Id. Appellant
further argues that Bell ’785 “is clearly directed to a data device,” while
Shneidman “is directed to a telephone device,” and there is no “teaching or
motivation for any telephonic functionality in general, and real-time
operation in particular, as required for telephone functionality.” Id. at 51–
52. As such, Appellant contends the modification will “chang[e] the
principle of operation of the Bell ’785 reference.” Id. at 52. Appellant also
argues that Bell ’785’s disclosure that the processor-based device may take
the form of a cellular phone indicates that Bell ’785 already includes support
for “both data and voice communications within a single device,” which
renders the combination moot. Id.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Bell ’785 relates to
processor-based devices, and, more specifically, “to apparatus and methods
to select and subsequently access information from a network.” Bell ’785
¶ 6. Bell ’785 discloses, and Appellant acknowledges (Appeal Br. 55), that
such processor-based devices take the form of “any” processor-based device,
which includes “any devices that can access a network” and make take the
form of “a wireless communications device (e.g., cellular phone, 2-way
pager, etc.).” Id. ¶¶ 29–30; see also id. ¶ 10 (“Internet-capable cellular
telephones can communicate with a remote server through a wireless
connection . . . to retrieve digital media.”). Bell ’785 also describes that
“connections to [the] networks can be wired and/or wireless.” Id. ¶ 56. Bell
’785 explains the “need for better and more user-friendly ways to retrieve
network information, such as Internet Web objects.” Id. ¶ 12.
Shneidman more explicitly describes an integrated communication
system that “perform[s] the functionality of a telephone (including wire
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connected, cellular phone, and satellite) . . . [and] a personal computer with
internet access.” Shneidman ¶¶ 45, 49; see also id. ¶ 57 (“a multiprocessing,
multitasking communications device featuring a touch sensitive handset and
screen, and the current telephony, IP Internet, and entertainment distribution
infrastructure”); ¶ 104 (“[t]he versatility of the Telescreen 1 and handset unit
2 and the interaction of the two provide the user with a multi-functioning
device to manage the many kinds of digital information and
communication”). Shneidman describes advantages to integrating various
information sources, in order to “take advantage of the synergies that may be
achieved between the various types of communications available.” Id. ¶ 8.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner’s
rationale for combining Bell ’785 and Shneidman is based on impermissible
hindsight as it does not include knowledge gleaned only from Appellant’s
disclosure, but rather takes into account the teachings of Shneidman, i.e.,
knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the claimed invention was made. See Ans. 12 (citing Shneidman ¶ 8); see In
re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971).
We also are not persuaded that the modification (i.e., more explicitly
incorporating Shneidman’s telephone capabilities for integrated voice and
data) renders Bell ’785 improper for its intended use. Although Bell ’785
acknowledges that some types of processor-based devices have “relatively
limited capabilities” and “relatively limited processing and/or memory
capabilities,” we do not agree with Appellant that this represents the full
scope of Bell ’785’s intended use, rather than one disclosed embodiment.
Bell ’785 ¶¶ 9, 11, 114 (“in an embodiment . . . for display on a processor-
based device with minimal or reduced resources”). Rather, Bell ’785 is
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more broadly directed to selecting and accessing information over a
network. See, e.g., id. at Abstract, ¶¶ 6, 12, 24. In fact, Bell ’785 explicitly
states that its processor-based devices may include devices that do not
generally have relatively limited processing or resource capabilities, such as
a “computer (e.g., desktop, laptop, handheld, etc.).” Bell ’785 ¶ 30; see also
id. ¶ 29 (“Computing device 20 may be or include a personal computer 24 or
any other processor-based device”). We are also unpersuaded by
Appellant’s argument that the modification requires “complicated hardware
additions” to Bell ’785, and modifications to “support telephony,” including
“voice support hardware (e.g., microphone and speaker),” see Appeal Br. 51,
because Bell ’785 explicitly discloses that its processor-based device may
include a cellular phone. See Bell ’785 ¶ 30; see Final Act. 3. For the same
reasons, we are not persuaded that the modification changes Bell ’785’s
principle of operation.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the
Examiner has failed to provide sufficient rationale for combining Bell ’785
and Shneidman. Rather, we find the Examiner has provided sufficient
rationale to combine the references pursuant to the guidelines in KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See Final Act. 16; Ans. 12.
Appellant makes further arguments as to the combination with Bell
’785, Shneidman, and Ulrich. Ulrich generally describes powering a
telephone apparatus directly from the telephone lines and without external
power sources. Ulrich, Abstract, 1:8–10. Ulrich describes various
advantages to powering directly from the telephone line and without
auxiliary power, such as operability in the event of a power outage. Id. at
1:49–51.
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Appellant argues that Ulrich is not analogous art because Ulrich “is
silent regarding any video or text data, regarding any server connection, or
regarding Internet connection.” Appeal Br. 53–54.
Appellant’s arguments do not address the Examiner’s findings with
respect to Ulrich; rather, Appellant’s arguments address the combination of
Bell ’785 and Shneidman. See Appeal Br. 53–54. The Examiner has made
specific findings as to why Ulrich is analogous art to the claimed invention,
see, e.g., Final Act. 3, Ans. 13, which Appellant has not persuasively
challenged.
Appellant also argues that Bell ’785 is based on a “cellular phone,” so
it “teach[es] away from any connection to any wired connection in general,
and use[s] dial-up connection in particular.” Appeal Br. 54, 55.
This argument is not persuasive. A teaching away requires a
reference to “criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage” modifying the
reference to arrive at the claimed invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195,
1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appellant has not identified any disclosure in Bell
’785 that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages using a wired
connection. To the contrary, Bell ’785 explicitly discloses that “connections
to [the] networks can be wired and/or wireless.” Bell ’785 ¶ 56; see Final
Act. 3; see Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 737 F.3d 731, 738 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (“A reference does not teach away, . . . if it merely expresses a
general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize,
discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention
claimed.”).
Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s rationale for modifying Bell
’785 and Shneidman with Ulrich is conclusory and based on impermissible
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hindsight. Appeal Br. 54–55. Appellant further argues Ulrich’s cable
connection renders the device disclosed by Bell ’785 inoperative for its
intended use (1) in wireless/mobile applications; and (2) because the
combination with Ulrich results in “ONLY connection via WAN” via
“telephone wiring/dial-up connection.” Id. at 55. Appellant further asserts
that the references cannot be combined because “Bell ’785 . . . is silent about
any telephone devices or about connecting to a telephone wiring as taught by
Ulrich.” Id. at 56. Appellant also argues that the constraint of connecting to
telephone wiring and using a dial-up modem, as well as the “additional
complex powering-related hardware required by the Ulrich reference, clearly
makes the device less ‘user friendly.’” Id. Appellant further contends that
adding the powering mechanism of Ulrich with “complicated hardware
additions,” renders Bell ’785 improper for its intended purpose of “being
simple and ‘low/reduced resources.’” Id. at 57.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner’s
rationale for combining Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Ulrich is based on
impermissible hindsight as it does not include knowledge gleaned only from
Appellant’s disclosure, but rather takes into account the teachings of Ulrich,
i.e., knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the
time the claimed invention was made. See Final Act. 4 (citing Ulrich, 1:48–
59, 3:17–25).
We also are not persuaded that the modification (e.g., incorporating
Ulrich’s powering a telephone set from the DC power signal carried over the
cable) renders Bell ’785 improper for its intended use because Bell ’785
explicitly states that its processor-based device “can operate in a networked
environment using physical and/or logical connections to local network 64
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and/or wide area network (WAN) 65. The connections to these networks
can be wired and/or wireless.” Bell ’785 ¶ 56 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s arguments that Bell ’785 “is silent about any analog
telephone device or any connection to any telephone wiring” (Appeal Br.
56) is also not persuasive because, as discussed above, Bell ’785 describes
that its processor-based device may be, for example, a cellular telephone and
that the connections to the network may be wired and/or wireless. Bell ’785
¶¶ 10, 56. Further, as discussed above, the Examiner combines Bell ’785
with Shneidman, which more explicitly discloses integrated telephone
capabilities, including landline/wired. See Final Act. 16; Ans. 8. Appellant
effectively ignores the combination with Shneidman in its arguments against
the combination with Ulrich. We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s
argument that the modification requires “complicated hardware additions” to
Bell ’785, and therefore renders Bell ’785 “improper for its intended use of
being simple and ‘low/reduced resources,’” (Appeal Br. 57) for the same
reasons as discussed above.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner has provided no rationale for
modifying Bell ’785 with the additional references for a number of the
dependent claims, and only relies on the rationale as provided for the
corresponding independent claim. See Appeal Br. 62, 69, 70, 78, 82 (claims
6, 29, 35, 36, 48, 49, 51–54, 59, 64, 65, 67, 72, 75, 90, 96, 103). In the
Answer, the Examiner provides reasoning for combining the references,
which Appellant does not challenge. See Ans. 16, 21–22, 25, 27–29; see
generally Reply Br. Because Appellant does not persuasively address the
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rationale proffered by the Examiner, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred. See Reply Br. 11, 14–15, 19, 23.21
Appellant does not present separate arguments for dependent claims 6,
35, 36, 48, 49, 51–54, 59, 90, 96, and 103. We, therefore, sustain the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 6, 35, 36, 48,
49, 51–54, 59, 90, 96, and 103. However, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 64, 65, 67, 72, 75, and 80
by virtue of their dependence on independent claim 62.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over
Bell ’785, Shneidman, Ulrich, and Bell ’723; and
Bell ’785, Lu, and Bell ’723

Claims 30, 32, 78, 79, 100
Claim 30 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said telephone
set is further operative to receive High Definition (HD) video, and said video
display is operative for displaying the High Definition (HD) video.” Appeal
Br. 98, Claims App. Claim 32 depends from claim 31 and recites “wherein
the High Definition (HD) video is High Definition Television (HDTV).” Id.
Claims 78, 79, and 100 recite similar limitations. Id. at 105, 111.
Appellant argues Bell ’723 does not teach “HDTV” because Bell ’723
refers to HDTV in an external display, rather than an internal display.
Appeal Br. 73.

21 Appellant argues that the Examiner has provided the explanation “for the
first time.” Reply Br. 11, 14–15, 19 (emphasis omitted). The question of
whether an Answer impermissibly raises a new rejection is a matter that is
petitionable pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 rather than appealable.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because they do not
address the combination of references as relied upon by the Examiner.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
disclosures. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
The Examiner relies on Bell ’785 to teach a video display in a single
enclosure and on Bell ’723 to specifically teach an HDTV display. See Final
Act. 15, 23; Ans. 23. Appellant’s arguments, therefore, do not address the
Examiner’s findings. Thus, we are not persuaded of Examiner error on this
record.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claims 30, 32, and 100. However, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 78 and 79, based upon their
dependence on independent claim 62.
Appellant does not separately argue claims 60 and 60, so we sustain
the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 60 and 61.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over
Bell ’785, Shneidman, Ulrich, and Yamada

Claims 55–57
Claim 55 depends from claim 1 and recites “wherein said telephone
set is further operative as a clock for maintaining and displaying the current
hour, minute and second.” Appeal Br. 101, Claims App. Claim 56 depends
from claim 55 and recites “wherein said telephone set is further operative to
display the current year, the current month and the current day of the
month.” Id. at 102. Claim 57 depends from claim 55 and recites “wherein
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said telephone set is further operative to display the time of a last
information update or a last communication session.” Id.
The Examiner relies on Yamada to teach the limitations in claims 55–
57. Final Act. 24 (citing Yamada Fig. 8, showing date and time). The
Examiner “takes Official Notice that it was well known at the time of the
invention to display time up to the second. It would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill [in the art] to incorporate” Yamada’s features into Bell
’785 “to inform the user of the displayed information state relative to current
date and time.” Id.
Appellant argues Yamada “is directed to a navigation system to be
used in a vehicle while travelling,” while “the claim explicitly recite[s] a
tethered (LAN) connection to a network via a connector to a cable,” and Bell
’785 “expressly shows . . . a stationary desktop computer.” Appeal Br. 74.22
Appellant argues that the “references are directed towards respectively
different fields and purposes, and are based on respectively different
structures, and thus are not analogous to one another and cannot logically be
combined.” Id. Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s rationale for the
combination provides no link to the application and is conclusory. Id. at 74–
75.

22 Appellant captions this argument as “Teaching away”; however, Appellant
merely summarizes contentions as to what Yamada is directed to, what the
claim recites, and what Bell ’785 expressly shows. Appellant has not
addressed where the references criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage
the Examiner’s proposed modification with Yamada. See Fulton, 391 F.3d
at 1201 (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does
not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such
disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution
claimed.”).
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Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. A reference is analogous
art to the claimed invention if: (1) the reference is from the same field of
endeavor as the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem);
or (2) the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the
inventor (even if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed
invention.). In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Appellant’s invention is generally described as “a method, device[,]
and system for obtaining information from a remote location to an
information device.” Spec. 1:8–9. Appellant’s “information device” is
described as comprising “a communication unit for connecting to the remote
location, an info memory for storing the information obtained and a display
unit for displaying the stored obtained information.” Spec. 2:8–11.
Yamada is generally directed to “[a]n information display system for
displaying a map.” Yamada, Abstract, ¶ 2. Yamada generally describes
storing and displaying information, based on input by a user. See Yamada
claim 1, Abstract, ¶ 11. Yamada discloses that its information terminal 12
may be of any apparatus, such as a stationary telephone, a personal
computer, or a digital television and connected to a wired network. Yamada
¶¶ 43, 45; see Ans. 23–24. Yamada’s information terminal is also connected
to an information providing server via a network. Yamada ¶ 45.
We agree with the Examiner that Yamada is analogous art. Ans. 23–
24. Both Appellant’s claimed invention and Yamada are directed to
retrieving, storing, and displaying information on a device connected to a
network. The Examiner finds “the disclosure of Yamada is reasonably
pertinent to both Applicant’s claimed invention and the Bell reference”
because unlike Bell ’785, Yamada “explicitly teach[es] a clock for
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maintaining and displaying the time and date” and it was “notoriously well
known in the art to display the current time and date on a personal
processor-based device.” Id. Appellant has not persuasively rebutted these
findings by the Examiner; rather, Appellant does little more than provide
conclusory statements. See Reply Br. 16–17. We also find the Examiner
has provided sufficient rationale to combine the references pursuant to the
guidelines in KSR. Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively address the
Examiner’s rationale.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 55–57
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over
Bell ’785, Shneidman, Ulrich, and Rabenko

Claim 63
Claim 63 depends from claim 62 and recites “wherein said cable is
connected to concurrently carry the digital data and the power signal using
Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM).” Appeal Br. 103, Claims App.
The Examiner relies on Rabenko to teach using FDM “to prevent a
power signal from interfering from voice and data . . . and the power being
supplied from the telephone line.” Final Act. 25 (citing Rabenko ¶¶ 35, 67).
The Examiner further finds that it would have been obvious to incorporate
Rabenko’s teachings with Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Ulrich “in order to
prevent interference.” Id.
Appellant argues that “combining with the Rabenko reference is moot
. . . [because] the primary reference already had the capabilities that the
secondary reference provided with its added disclosures.” Appeal Br. 76.
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Appellant also argues “[c]learly the Rabenko reference is not in [the defined
field of the retrieval of audio, video, and text data from a remote server via
the Internet by wired and/or wireless communication networks] . . . and thus
non-analogous to this application.” Id. Appellant also argues that the
Examiner’s definition of the “field of endeavor” has varied throughout the
Answer. Reply Br. 17.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Rabenko was relied upon
to teach Frequency Division Multiplexing, and Appellant’s arguments do not
identify where any of the other three references disclose that capability. See
Ans. 24. With respect to the analogous art arguments, Appellant again does
not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings, but, instead, provides
conclusory statements without explanation as to why the Examiner has
erred. We agree with the Examiner that Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Rabenko
are directed to electronic devices which receive data via a home wired
network. See Ans. 24. For example, Rabenko describes that it is a system
and method “for supplying power over a home phone line network in a
manner that is interoperable with other voice and data services operating on
the same network.” Rabenko, Abstract. We also do not agree with
Appellant that the Examiner has applied an inconsistent “field of endeavor”
throughout the Answer. Although the Examiner does not use identical
wording, the “field of endeavor” is defined in a substantially similar manner
throughout the Answer.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in citing to
Rabenko. However, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of dependent claim 63, due to its dependence on independent claim
62.
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35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Lu
Claim 82
Claim 82 is independent, and the Examiner primarily relies on Bell
’785 to teach the limitations. Final Act. 25–27. The Examiner relies on Lu
to teach “wherein said device is powered only by the power signal carried
over said LAN cable.” Id. at 27. Specifically, the Examiner finds “Lu
teaches the use of a power line network in a communication network for
carrying data to an Internet appliance,” and “[i]t would have been obvious
. . . to modify Bell by using any of the well-known communication networks
taught by Lu as the wired connection in Bell, including the power line
network already installed in most homes.” Id. In the Answer, the Examiner
finds “Lu teaches the use of a power line network as an alternative or in
addition to other types of wired and wireless networks” and “the claimed
elements were known in the prior art and . . . could have [been] combined
. . . as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective
functions, and the combination yields nothing more than predictable results.”
Ans. 24.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rationale is conclusory and incorrect,
and the Examiner has not explained why Bell ’785 would be modified to
make use of such a networking scheme. Appeal Br. 77. Appellant also
argues the Examiner’s findings are generic and do not provide sufficient
reasoning. Reply Br. 18–19.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Lu describes various
examples for a wired LAN, including a power line network. Lu, 6:40–49.
Appellant has not provided persuasive evidence or explanation showing the
Examiner’s modification — modifying Bell ’785’s wired communication
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with the alternative power line network disclosed in Lu — is anything other
than a combination of familiar elements yielding no more than predictable
results. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416–17. Nor has Appellant shown that
combining the prior art was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior
art.” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19). We find that the Examiner has
articulated how the claimed features are met by the proposed combination of
the reference teachings with some rational underpinning, consistent with the
guidelines stated in KSR. Final Act. 27; Ans. 24.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner has improperly combined two
distinct embodiments in Bell ’785 and that Bell ’785 does not teach a
“LAN.” Appeal Br. 77–78. We do not find these arguments persuasive for
the same reasons as discussed above with respect to claim 1. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claim 82 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Claim 89
Claim 89 depends from claim 88 and recites “said LAN cable, and
communication over said LAN cable, are based on IEEE802.3 standard; said
LAN connector is a RJ-45 type connector; and said LAN transceiver is an
Ethernet transceiver.” Appeal Br. 108, Claims App.
The Examiner relies on Lu to teach the limitations in claim 89. Final
Act. 28 (citing Lu, 6:43–44); see Ans. 25.
Appellant argues Lu does not teach “LAN cable,” “IEEE 802.3,” and
“RJ-45.” Appeal Br. 78; Reply Br. 19. Specifically, Appellant argues the
combination with Lu is based upon its disclosure of a “power line network,”
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so is not relevant to the LAN cable, IEEE 802.3 standard, and RJ-45
connector. Appeal Br. 78.
The Examiner cites to column 6, lines 42–49 of Lu, which describes a
“wired LAN[,] such as, for example, an Ethernet network” and “a wireless
LAN using one or more wireless networking standards.” Final Act. 28; Ans.
25. We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not sufficiently
explained how Lu teaches the limitations in claim 89.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claim 89
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Claim 119
Claim 119 depends from claim 99 and recites “wherein the power
signal is a Direct current (DC) signal.” Appeal Br. 114, Claims App.
The Examiner relies on Lu to teach the claim limitations, specifically
that “Lu teaches connection with a powerline network.” Final Act. 29
(citing Lu, 6:44).
Appellant argues the power line network carries AC power, so it is not
relevant to the claim. Appeal Br. 79. In addition, Appellant argues the
Examiner “admits that the combination ‘does not specifically teach the
power signal is a DC signal.’” Id.
The Examiner responds in the Answer that “Appellant’s specification
describes a DC signal as being locally converted from an AC power signal to
supply power to the information device . . . , AC power from a powerline
network is necessarily converted to power a connected device.” Ans. 26
(citing Spec. 6:25–7:2).
Claim 86, which will be discussed further below, similarly recites
“wherein the power signal is a Direct Current (DC) signal.” Appeal Br. 107,
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Claims App. In the rejection of claim 86, the Examiner states “Bell ’785 in
view of Lu differs from claim 86 in that it does not specifically teach the
power signal is a DC signal.” Final Act. 29. Therefore, the Examiner relies
on Wang to teach the limitation. Id. We are unable to reconcile the
Examiner’s findings between these two claims given that the Examiner has
stated that Bell ’785 and Lu do not teach “wherein the power signal is a
Direct current (DC) signal” with respect to claim 86.
Accordingly, on the record before us, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 119 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Additional Claims and Arguments
Appellant further argues that Bell ’785 does not teach “wall
mounting” (claims 83, 104), “non-volatile” (claim 102), “digital address”
(claims 107–109), and “TCP/IP” (claim 92), for the same reasons as
discussed previously. Appeal Br. 78. We do not find these argument
persuasive for the same reasons as discussed above. We, therefore, sustain
the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 83, 92, 102, 104, and
107–109. Appellant does not separately argue claims 84, 87–91, 99, 103,
115–118, 120, and 121. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) rejections of those claims.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785, Lu, and Wang
Claim 86
Claim 86 depends from claim 82 and recites “wherein the power
signal is a Direct current (DC) signal.” Appeal Br. 107, Claims App.
The Examiner relies on Wang to teach the limitation, finding that
“Wang teaches a powerline networking adapter which converts AC power
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signals to DC power signals for powering LAN devices.” Final Act. 29
(citing Wang ¶¶ 20–21).
Appellant argues Wang is not analogous art because it is not relevant
to the field of endeavor of Bell ’785 and Lu because it “does not even
mention any ‘video’, ‘audio’, ‘text’, ‘server’, or ‘Internet.’” Appeal Br.
79.23 Appellant also argues that the “field of endeavor” of the various
references has been inconsistent in the Answer. Reply Br. 20. Appellant
further argues “while Wang may disclose converting Ac to Dc power, the
Wang reference is silent regarding concurrently carrying DC power and data
over the same cable as recited in the claim.” Appeal Br. 79–80.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The test for obviousness is
“what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). Appellant’s arguments as to Wang alone do not persuasively address
the Examiner’s findings, which are reliant on the combination of Bell ’785,
Lu, and Wang. The Examiner relies on Wang to teach the “power signal is a
DC signal,” (Final Act. 29), and Appellant admits that Wang “disclose[s]
converting Ac to Dc power.” Appeal Br. 79–80. Therefore, Appellant’s
arguments that Wang does not teach concurrently carrying DC power and
data over the same cable are not persuasive.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that Bell ’785, Lu, and Wang
“are all directed to data communication via a home wired network” and are
analogous art to the claimed invention. Ans. 26. Wang generally describes

23 With respect to this argument, Appellant referred to Bell ’785 and
Shneidman. See Appeal Br. 79. Given that the combination is Bell ’785,
Lu, and Wang, we assume Appellant meant to refer to Lu rather than
Shneidman.
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a power apparatus with a built-in powerline networking adapter that
provides the functions of a LAN connection and electrical power
transportation. Wang ¶¶ 1, 8. Wang’s powerline networking adapter
connects an “electrical plug to transport the signal and data packets along the
data line.” Wang ¶ 9. Appellant, therefore, has not persuasively rebutted
the Examiner’s findings as to Wang’s field of endeavor. In addition, we also
do not agree with Appellant that the Examiner has applied an inconsistent
“field of endeavor” throughout the Answer. Although the Examiner does
not use identical wording, the “field of endeavor” is defined in a
substantially similar manner throughout the Answer.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 86 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over Bell ’785 and Casey
Claim 93
Claim 93 is independent, and the Examiner primarily relies on Bell
’785 to teach its limitations, but relies on Casey to teach “a converter
coupled between said digital memory and said screen for converting the
digital content stored in said digital memory to an analog video signal” and
“wherein said television set is operative in a first state to couple the
television signal to said screen for displaying television content, and said
television set is operative in a second state to couple the analog video signal
to said screen for displaying the digital content.” Final Act. 29–31 (citing
Casey ¶¶ 17–19). The Examiner further finds that it would have been
obvious to incorporate Casey’s converter and display modes with Bell ’785
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“to adapt the received content for display in the television set embodiment of
Bell ’785.” Final Act. 30; see also Ans. 26–27 (citing Casey ¶¶ 4–5).
Appellant argues that the combination of Bell ’785 and Casey “does
not teach memory and converter in the single enclosure.” Appeal Br. 81
(emphasis omitted).
The Examiner finds “that in the same way that Appellant’s disclosure
(Fig. 17) shows the converter and memory being external to the television
set 115, the Casey reference teaches the converter and memory in an
external device.” Ans. 27.
Claim 93 recites “[a] television set . . . being enclosed in a single
enclosure and comprising, in said single enclosure: a non-volatile memory
for storing digital data content; a converter coupled between said digital
memory and said screen for converting the digital convent . . . .” Appeal Br.
109, Claims App. The claim, therefore, recites that the memory and
converter are within the single enclosure of the television set. As the
Examiner’s findings indicate that Casey teaches the converter and memory
are external to the television set, we find the Examiner has not sufficiently
shown that Casey, or the combination of Bell ’785 and Casey teaches the
foregoing limitations in claim 93.
Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by
Appellant, we need not address Appellant’s other arguments as to this claim.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of independent claim 93.
Additional Claims and Arguments
Appellant further argues that Bell ’785 does not teach “wall
mounting” (claims 95) and “non-volatile” (claim 94), for the same reasons
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as discussed previously. Appeal Br. 82. We do not find these argument
persuasive for the reasons discussed above. Nonetheless, by virtue of their
dependence on independent claim 93, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 94 and 95. Similarly, we do not sustain
the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 96, which was not
separately argued.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections Over
Bell ’785, Casey, and Fong; and
Bell ’785, Lu, and Fong

Claims 97, 105–106
Claim 105 depends from claim 99 and recites, in part, “wherein said
single enclos[ure] is constructed to have at least one of the following: a
form substantially similar to that of a standard picture frame; wall mounting
elements substantially similar to those of a standard picture frame for
hanging on a wall; and a shape to at least in part substitute for a standard
picture frame.” Appeal Br. 112, Claims App. Claim 97 depends from claim
93 and recites similar limitations. Id. at 110. Claim 106 depends from claim
99 and recites “wherein said single enclosure is configured for wall
mounting in a building.” Id. at 113.
The Examiner finds that Fong teaches “a digital picture device having
a frame component that is configured for mounting to a wall within a
building structure.” Final Act. 31 (citing Fong claim 1). The Examiner
further finds that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art “to incorporate the teaching of Fong within the disclosure of Bell ’785
and Casey in order to simulate a conventional picture frame which is
mounted on a wall.” Id. (citing Fong ¶¶ 2–4); Ans. 28 (“digital picture
frame that can be viewed on a wall . . . as taught to be desirable by Fong”).
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Appellant presents three arguments: (1) it is not clear what teaching
of Fong the Examiner incorporates into Bell ’785; (2) Fong is directed to a
device with a “flat panel display,” which is similar to, and looks like, a
picture frame, whereas Bell ’785 is silent about any flat display, and,
therefore, “teaches away from any wall mounting or any conventional
picture frame simulation”; and (3) the rationale provides no link to the
present application, and, therefore, lacks “some articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning,” as required under KSR. Appeal Br. 83
(emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. First, the Examiner clearly
states the teaching of Fong being applied, and further cites to claim 1 of
Fong, which recites “a frame component that is configured for mounting to a
wall within a building structure and for supporting the flat panel display unit
for viewing when mounted to the wall unit,” which sufficiently establishes
the teachings to be combined with Bell ’785. See Final Act. 31; Ans. 28
(“the application of a frame component that is configured for mounting a
digital picture device to a wall” and the combination “combin[es] prior art
elements according to known methods to yield predictable results”).
Second, Bell ’785 explicitly discloses a digital picture frame.
Bell ’785 ¶ 30. A teaching away requires a reference to “criticize, discredit,
or otherwise discourage” modifying the reference to arrive at the claimed
invention. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. Appellant has not identified any
disclosure in Bell ’785 that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages
mounting the disclosed digital picture frame on the wall, as the Examiner
proposes.
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Finally, the Examiner has provided a reason to combine the references
in the manner proposed — the desirability of hanging a digital picture frame
on a wall, in the same way that a framed picture can be used to decorate a
wall — which we find sufficiently meets the guidelines under KSR. See
Ans. 28–29. Appellant’s arguments as to the Examiner’s rationale do not
persuasively challenge the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 105 and
106 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). However, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 97, which depends from claim 93, for the same reasons as
set forth above for claim 93.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections over Bell ’785, Lu, and Masterson
Claims 110–114
Claim 110 depends from claim 99 and recites “wherein the digital
data identifying the device is personalized information.” Appeal Br. 113,
Claims App. Claim 111 depends from claim 110 and recites “wherein the
personalized information is a user name or a password.” Id. Claim 112
depends from claim 110 and recites “wherein the personalized information is
set by the user.” Id. Claim 113 depends from claim 110 and recites
“wherein the personalized information is associated with the physical
geographical location of said device.” Id. Claim 114 depends from claim 99
and recites “wherein the digital data identifying the device is set during
production of said device.” Id.
The Examiner relies on Masterson to teach the limitations in claims
110–114, and finds that “it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention to incorporate the teaching of
Masterson within the disclosure of Bell in view of Lu in order to provide
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additional security and personalization.” Final Act. 32–33 (citing Masterson
¶¶ 40, 44–45).
Appellant presents seven arguments: (1) Masterson is not analogous
art because it “ONLY involves retrieving from the Internet ‘configuration
data’ relating to a specific person[al] device, and is silent regarding any
‘audio’, ‘video’, or any ‘text’”; (2) “the motivation of Masterson is NOT
security or personalization, but rather ease of configuration of a device”; (3)
the Examiner’s rationale is conclusory and provides no link to the present
application, and, therefore, lacks “some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning”; (4) “since ‘additional security and personalization’
is long required, the rationale, in fact, confirms that the modification
amounts to a solution to a long-felt need that serves as a secondary
consideration further supporting nonobviousness”; (5) the modification
renders Bell ’785 improper for its intended use “of being simple and ‘low /
reduced resources’” because the modification requires added hardware and
software; (6) Bell ’785 teaches away from the combination because the
Masterson reference teaches using two distinct devices and because the
content retrieved by Bell ’785 is “publicly freely available information” and
thus no additional security is required; and (7) Masterson teaches away from
the combination because it describes a digital audio recorder, not a display
as recited in the claims. Appeal Br. 84–87 (some emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. First, we agree with the
Examiner that Bell ’785, Lu, and Masterson are directed to processor-based
devices which receive data from a remote server over a network, and are
thus analogous to the application. Ans. 29. For example, Masterson
describes that it is generally directed to “an online system that facilitates”
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configuring and administering electronic devices. Masterson ¶ 4. Masterson
describes “servers coupled to the Internet . . . providing a web page interface
that allows owners of electronic devices to access and change the
configuration information of their electronic devices.” Masterson, Abstract.
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner’s findings as to
Masterson’s field of endeavor. In addition, we also do not agree with
Appellant that the Examiner has applied an inconsistent “field of endeavor”
throughout the Answer. Although the Examiner does not use identical
wording, the “field of endeavor” is defined in a substantially similar manner
throughout the Answer.
Second, Appellant presents various arguments regarding the rationale
for combining the relied upon functionality of Masterson with Bell ’785 and
Lu. We find the Examiner has articulated how the claimed features are met
by the proposed combination of Bell ’785, Lu, and Masterson with some
rational underpinning (e.g., additional security and personalization)
consistent with the guidelines stated in KSR. See Ans. 29. While the
Examiner must establish that “there was an apparent reason to combine the
known elements in the fashion claimed,” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, the apparent
reason to combine references need not come from the references themselves.
See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,
464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Appellant’s argument that Masterson
was not motivated by security or personalization is therefore unpersuasive.
Moreover, we also agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s argument is
additionally incorrect because Masterson requires a log-in and password,
which indicates that Masterson was concerned with security, and, therefore,
Masterson itself provides the rationale to combine the references. Ans. 29.
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Regardless, “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time
of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining
the elements in the manner claimed.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. Appellant has
not persuasively challenged the Examiner’s rationale for the combination.
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner’s rationale (“additional
security and personalization”) indicates a long-felt need that serves as a
secondary consideration of non-obviousness is likewise unavailing.
“Establishing long-felt need requires objective evidence that an art-
recognized problem existed in the art for a long period of time without
solution.” Ex parte Jellá, 90 USPQ2d 1009, 1019 (BPAI 2008)
(precedential). Appellant does not explain how the “additional security and
personalization,” as disclosed in Masterson, establishes a problem that
existed in the art for a long period of time without a solution.
Third, we are also unpersuaded that the modification proposed by the
Examiner renders Bell ’785 improper for its intended use. Appellant argues
that Bell ’785’s intended use is “being simple” and “low/reduced resources,”
and the modification would require adding hardware and software. Appeal
Br. 85–86. As discussed above, we disagree with Appellant as to Bell
’785’s intended use. Rather, we find Bell ’785 is more broadly directed to
selecting and accessing information over a network. See, e.g., Bell ’785,
Abstract, ¶¶ 6, 12, 24. We are not persuaded that adding additional security
or personalization to an apparatus or method that is selecting and accessing
information over a network would change Bell ’785’s principle of operation
or render it improper for its intended purpose.
Finally, Appellant’s teaching away arguments are, essentially,
arguments that Bell ’785 and Masterson do not teach the recited limitations.
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However, teaching away requires a reference to “criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage” modifying the reference to arrive at the claimed
invention. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. Appellant has not identified any
disclosure in Bell ’785 or Masterson that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages adding additional security or personalization, as the Examiner
proposes. We are also not persuaded that the content retrieved by Bell ’785
is limited to content that is “publicly freely available information,” as
Appellant argues. Appeal Br. 87.
Appellant further argues that Masterson does not teach “that the
claimed device itself (either equated to an end device such as the digital
picture frame or to the local combination with PC 34) sends any information
to the server.” Appeal Br. 87 (emphasis omitted). Appellant also argues
that Masterson teaches “device related data,” rather than “personalized
information.” Id. at 87–88 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Masterson describes that
“the device connects to the server,” “the server 302 receives an information
file from the device” that “preferably includes at least a device identifier and
serial number, and may also include security information, a proposed user
password, and various configuration values and state indications of the
device.” Masterson ¶ 40; see also id. ¶ 36 (“[t]he device 202 may also
provide an initial user password to server 302”). The Examiner relies on
Masterson to teach storing an information file comprising a device identifier,
serial number, security information, user password, configuration values,
and state indications of the device, where the username and password can be
set by the user or automatically provided. Final Act. 32–33. Appellant’s
arguments as to the “claimed device,” therefore, do not address the
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combination of references as relied upon by the Examiner (e.g., Bell ’785,
Lu, and Masterson). Therefore, Appellant’s arguments addressing
Masterson alone are not persuasive. Moreover, we are not persuaded that
Masterson does not teach “personalized information,” because it teaches that
a user may “choose a username and password.” Masterson ¶ 45; see also id.
¶¶ 36, 40; Ans. 29.
Appellant further argues that neither Bell ’785 nor Masterson teaches
“geographical location,” as recited in claim 113. Appeal Br. 88. Claim 113
recites that “the personalized information is associated with the physical
geographical location of said device.” Appeal Br. 113, Claims App.
We agree with the Examiner that both Lu and Masterson teach
sending personalized information associated with the physical geographical
location of the device. See Ans. 29–30. For example, Masterson describes
providing “weather” and “personalized traffic information.” Masterson
¶¶ 42, 55. Lu also describes providing traffic, weather, and news
information that is selected based on a user profile that may contain the
user’s residential address or business address. Lu, 4:19–31.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 110–114
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections over Bell ’785 and Shneidman
Claims 123–125
Appellant argues Bell ’785 does not teach “local connecting to a
‘server’ or to [I]nternet.” Appeal Br. 88 (emphasis omitted). Appellant
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argues “LAN 64 is used only for local connections and NOT for connecting
to the Internet.” Id.
Appellant’s argument appears to relate to claim 123’s recitation of
“using wireless communication,” for which the Examiner finds Bell ’785
teaches “via Internet 65 over a LAN 64, which can be wireless.” See Final
Act. 33 (citing Bell ’785 ¶¶ 56–58, ¶ 88).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments for the same reasons
as set forth above with respect to claims 27 and 28, where we addressed that
Bell ’785 teaches or suggests a “LAN.” See, e.g., Bell ’785 ¶ 56
(“Processor-based device 40 can operate in a networked environment using
physical and/or logical connections to local network 64 and/or wide area
network (WAN) 65. The connections to these networks can be wired and/or
wireless.”).
Appellant further argues Bell ’785 does not teach an “antenna for
transmitting and receiving digital data over the air,” as recited in claim 123.
Appeal Br. 89 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner relies on paragraph 56 of Bell ’785, and finds
“paragraph 0056 specifically states that the device uses physical and/or
logical connections to LAN 64 or WAN 65, including a wireless connection
which necessarily includes an antenna. Moreover, paragraph 0030 states
that the device may take the form of a wireless communication such as a
laptop, cellular phone, etc., which inherently include an antenna.” Ans. 30;
Final Act. 33.
Appellant provides several case law citations to the law regarding
inherency. However, Appellant does not provide any argument associated
with that law as to why the Examiner has not sufficiently established that an
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“antenna” is inherent in Bell ’785. See Appeal Br. 89; Reply Br. 25. Thus,
on this record, Appellant has not challenged the Examiner’s findings, and,
therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Appellant further argues Bell ’785 does not teach a “wireless
transceiver coupled to said antenna for bi-directional packet-based digital
data communication ... over the air,” as recited in claim 123. Appeal Br. 90.
The Examiner finds “Bell ‘785 specifically states that the processor-
based device is used to access the Internet to retrieve HTML data (para.
0030) and uses physical and/or logical connections to a LAN 64 or WAN
65, including a wireless connection (para. 0056), which would necessitate a
wireless transceiver to retrieve the HTML data.” Ans. 30.
Appellant provides several case law citations to the law regarding
inherency. However, Appellant does not provide any argument associated
with that law as to why the Examiner has not sufficiently established that a
“wireless transceiver” is inherent in Bell ’785. See Appeal Br. 90; Reply Br.
25–26. Therefore, on this record, Appellant has not challenged the
Examiner’s findings, and, therefore, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 123–125
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Additional Claims and Arguments
Appellant further argues that Bell ’785 does not teach “digital
address” (claims 123, 139), “WLAN” (claims 128, 138), “video display,”
(claim 133), “LCD” (claim 142), “automatic and periodic” (claim 143), and
“non-volatile memory” (claim 131, 132), “TCP” or “IP” (claims 136, 137),
and “local connecting to a ‘server’ or to [I]nternet” (claims 123–125), for the
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same reasons as have been argued above. Appeal Br. 91–92. We do not
find these argument persuasive for the reasons discussed above. Appellant
does not separately argue the remaining dependent claims. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 124–126, 128, 130–133, 136–
139, 142–152, and 155–157 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections over Bell ’785, Shneidman, and Bell ’723
Appellant argues that Bell ’785 does not teach “HDTV” (claims 153,
154) for the same reasons as have been argued above. Appeal Br. 92. We
do not find these argument persuasive for the reasons discussed above.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 153 and 154
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections over Bell ’785, Casey, and Lavaud;
Bell ’785, Lu, and Bell ’723; and
Bell ’785 and Shneidman

Appellant does not separately argue the remaining rejections. We do
not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 98 by virtue
of its dependence on claim 93. We do sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) rejection of dependent claims 100, 127, and 129, which ultimately
depend from independent claims 99 and 123.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 4–
24, 26–
30, 32–
46, 48,
112, ¶ 1 Written Description 1, 2, 4–24,
26–30, 32–
46, 48, 49,
51–76, 78–
82–84,
86, 90,
92, 99,
101–107,
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
49, 51–
76, 78–
84, 86–
121,
123–133,
136–139,
142–159
81, 87–89,
91, 93–98,
100, 108,
115, 123–
133, 136–
139, 142–
159
109–114,
116–121
1–24,
26–29,
33–46,
48, 49,
51–54,
58, 59,
62, 64–
76, 80,
158, 159
103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman, Ulrich
1, 2, 4–24,
26, 27–29,
33–46, 48,
49, 51–54,
58, 59,
158, 159
62, 64–
76, 80
30, 32,
60, 61,
78, 79
103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman, Ulrich,
Bell ’723
30, 32, 60,
61
78, 79
55–57 103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman, Ulrich,
Yamada
55–57
63 103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman, Ulrich,
Rabenko
63
82–84,
87–92,
99, 102–
104,
107–109,
115–121
103(a) Bell ’785, Lu 82–84, 87,
88, 90–92,
99, 102–
104, 107–
109, 115–
118, 120,
121
89, 101,
119
86 103(a) Bell ’785, Lu,
Wang
86
93–96 103(a) Bell ’785, Casey 93–96
97 103(a) Bell ’785, Casey,
Fong
97
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
98 103(a) Bell ’785, Casey,
Lavaud
98
100 103(a) Bell ’785, Lu, Bell
’723
100
105, 106 103(a) Bell ’785, Lu, Fong 105, 106
110–114 103(a) Bell ’785, Lu,
Masterson
110–114
123–126,
128,
130–133,
136–139,
142–152,
155–157
103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman
123–126,
128, 130–
133, 136–
139, 142–
152, 155–
157

127, 129 103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman
127, 129
153, 154 103(a) Bell ’785,
Shneidman, Bell
’723
153, 154
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–24 ,
26–30, 32–
46, 48, 49,
51–76, 78–
84, 86–
118, 120,
121, 123–
133, 136–
139, 142–
159
101, 119

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART