Billen Shoe Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 28, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 57 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. 57
Billen Shoe Co., Inc. and Boot and Shoe Workers
Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 1-CA-5504 and
1-CA-5642
June 28,1967
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On March 24, 1967, Trial Examiner Harry R.
Hinkes issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. He further found that Respondent had
not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices
alleged in the complaint and recommended dismis-
sal of them. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions to the Decision and a supporting brief and the
General Counsel filed a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Billen Shoe Co., Inc.,
Lewiston, Maine, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner: On April 29,
1966, Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO
(hereinafter called the Union), filed a representation peti-
tion with Region 1 of the National Labor Relations Board
seeking to represent the approximately 350 production
and maintenance employees, including shipping, receiv-
ing, and plant clerical employees, of Billen Shoe Co., Inc.
(hereinafter called the Respondent), in Case 1-RC-8958.
A stipulation for certification upon consent election
agreement was executed by the parties on May 20, 1966,
for an election to be held on June 8, 1966. By virtue of
charges filed by the Union on June 7, 1966, and sub-
sequently amended on July 6, 1966, in Case 1-CA-5504,
the scheduled election was indefinitely postponed pend-
ing disposition of the charges. A complaint issued alleging
8(a)(1) and (2) violations in Case 1-CA-5504, resulting
in a hearing scheduled for September 6, 1966, at
Lewiston, Maine. Prior to officially opening the hearing,
a settlement agreement was entered into by the parties'
subject to compliance, after which a joint motion by the
parties was to be filed requesting dismissal of the com-
plaint. During the interim, however, new charges were
duly filed by the Union on September 12, 1966, and
amended on September 28, 1966, and, following in-
vestigation of such charges, a complaint issued alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) by Respondent.
The new complaint bearing Case 1-CA-5642 included
one discriminatee, Paul Sevigny. Subsequently, by order
dated November 9, 1966, the settlement agreement in
Case 1-CA-5504 was set aside and Cases 1-CA-5504
and 1-CA-5642 were consolidated for a reopened hear-
ing which took place before Trial Examiner Harry R.
Hinkes at Lewiston, Maine, on December 7,1966.
At said hearing all the parties appeared and were af-
forded full opportunity to examine witnesses, adduce
relevant evidence, and make oral argument. Briefs have
been filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent
and have been given careful consideration.
On the basis of the record thus made, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent is and has been at all times material herein
a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue
of the laws of the State of Maine, maintaining its place of
business in the city of Lewiston, Maine, where it is and
has been engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribu-
tion of shoes and related products. In the course and con-
dua of its business, Respondent ships to and receives
from States outside the State of Maine products valued in
excess of $50,000 per annum. The complaint alleges,
Respondent's answer admits, and I find that the Re-
spondent is and has been an employer, as defined in
Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in
operations affecting commerce as defined in Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits,
and I find that the Union is and has been a labor organiza-
tion as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act.
In addition, the complaint in Case I-CA-5504 alleges
that the Department Committees are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. In its
answer Respondent has denied that allegation.
The record in this proceeding indicates that the em-
ployees of the hand sewers department at the Respond-
ent's plant formed a Department Committee around
September 1965. At first the Department Committee
consisted of about 13 employees. Later, similar Depart-
ment Committees were created for other departments in
the plant and these eventually combined into a con-
solidated Department Committee, sometimes referred to
166 NLRB No. 19
58 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
as a Shop Committee. The Respondent recognized these
Department Committees as the bargaining agents of the
employees and negotiated with them with respect to
wages, hours, and working conditions, but without con-
cluding a written contract. Members of the Department
Committees met with and negotiated with the president
of the Respondent in his office and were paid by the
Respondent for the time spent at negotiations, as well as
for the time spent by the members discussing negotiation
issues among themselves.
In the latter part of May 1966, the Department Com-
mittees disbanded. Respondent's president held a meet-
ing with the chairman of the Shop Committee, Marcel
Roy, and suggested that the Shop Committee intervene
in the representation election which was pending so as to
give the employees not only a choice between the Union
and no union but an opportunity to vote for the Shop
Committee. About the same time he suggested to the
hand sewers that the Department Committee be rein-
stated, that it was powerful, and that the employees
would not have to pay any dues. Consequently, on the
following day, the Department Committee was reinstated
by the employees. Thereafter it met with the Respondent
and negotiated with it and received pay for the time so
spent.
From the foregoing findings which are essentially un-
disputed, there can be no doubt that the Department
Committees are labor organizations as defined in Section
2(5) of the Act and I so find.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Alleged Independent Violations of Section
8(a)(1)
The Union commenced its organizational campaign at
the Respondent's plant in Lewiston, Maine, in March
1966. Paul Sevigny, one of the hand sewers, was con-
tacted by the Union to help in the campaign and con-
sequently distributed about 150 union authorization cards
to employees, obtaining from 60 to 70 signatures. He was
observed at this activity by his foreman, Fernand Simard,
as well as by Superintendent Cleveland and Stitching
Room Foreman Parnel. On the same day that Sevigny
made this distribution, he stopped during his coffee break
to talk with employee Marcel Roy. Foreman Simard
came up and told Sevigny not to bother Roy to which
Sevigny replied that he would leave for now but that he
would continue passing out union cards at noon and, if
Simard interfered, he would bring Simard before the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. On the following day,
when Sevigny was again speaking with Roy, he was again
instructed by Simard not to interfere with the help.
About the same time Simard accused Sevigny of
passing out union cards on company time and told him he
was "through." Simard then told Roy that Sevigny was
passing out union cards, whereupon Roy, who was then
chairman of the Department Committee referred to earli-
er, investigated the charge and, finding it untrue, advised
Simard, who immediately rehired Sevigny.
The above incidents were uncontradicted. Moreover,
credible testimony establishes that it was not uncommon
for employees to stop to talk to other employees while at
their benches and that such practice was not criticized by
the Respondent. In fact, the credible testimony of Marcel
Roy, who impressed me as being quite truthful,
establishes that Simard did not object to anyone talking
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with Roy except Sevigny and it was only after Roy com-
plained to Feinstein, president of Respondent, that
Simard ceased driving Sevigny from Roy's bench.
Simard, in his testimony, stated that Sevigny "got into
his hair." He was asked,
Was he getting into your hair from the time he started
this union activity, is that when it started?
Simard replied,
No, before that he used to do things, but I just let
them go.
On or about May 6, 1966, Foreman Parnel approached
employee Mary Turcotte and asked her if she had at-
tended the union meeting the night before. He also asked
her if she had signed a union card and what she thought of
the Department Committee and of the Union. She was
not told the purpose of the inquiry or given any as-
surances that her answers would not give rise to any
reprisals.
On or about May 11, 1966, Respondent posted a
notice as follows:
As PER NEGOTIATIONS WITH YOUR VARIOUS COM-
MITTEES, EFFECTIVE APRIL 18TH, THE MINIMUM
WAGE WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:
$1.25
1.28
1.33
First 12 weeks
Next 12 weeks
Thereafter
ALSO, EFFECTIVE JUNE 1, 1966, ALL HOURLY AND
PIECE WORKERS WILL BE PAID AN ADDITIONAL 3
CENTS PER HOUR.
OVERTIME WILL BE COMPUTED ON A DAILY BASIS
OVER EIGHT HOURS. IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS,
PLEASE CONTACT YOUR DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE
MEMBER.
The notice seems to speak of two different wages, one
a minimum wage and the other a wage increase. The
record is completely silent concerning the minimum
wage. As respects the wage increases, Roy testified that
Feinstein had told him that the Respondent would follow,
"penny for penny," the pattern that another local union
representing some of the shops in Lewiston, would reach
in its contract with such other chops. This intention was
not communicated, however, to other employees. When
the other union obtained a 3-cent-per-hour increase for its
members, to be effective in June, Respondent, comply-
ing with its earlier promise, announced a similar increase
for its employees. Although the record is not clear as to
the exact date when Roy was told of the Respondent's in-
tention to meet the wage increases obtained by the other
union, it appears that it was prior to the commencement
of organizational activities at the Respondent's plant
which had started barely 5 weeks before the posting of
this announcement.
B. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(A)(2)
Respondent concedes that it paid the members of the
Department Committees for the time spent in negotia-
tions and argues that this is insufficient to shcw domina-
tion of the crganization by the Respondent. The com-
plaint, however, does not allege domination but only that
the Respondent has aided, assisted, and supported the
Committees unlawfully.
BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. 59
C. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (4)
The complaint in Case 1-CA-5642 alleges that
Respondent discharged employee Sevigny in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act. Respondent admits the
discharge of Sevigny but denies the alleged illegality, ar-
guing that the discharge was for cause.
Reference has been made earlier to Respondent's ex-
periences with Sevigny in April 1966, when Foreman
Simard drove him from employee Roy's bench, as well as
to the attempted discharge of Sevigny for the unfounded
charge of distributing authorization cards on company
time. Thereafter, in June 1966, everything had been going
smoothly while Sevigny was gone and that he had "better
watch out."
On or about August 25, 1966, Sevigny was called to
the office of the president. Roy and Simard were also
present. Feinstein accused Sevigny of interfering with the
help but when Sevigny asked him to name the employees
affected, the president told him it was none of his busi-
ness. Sevigny objected to this approach, whereupon he
was asked if he wanted to quit and he replied that he did
not. Feinstein also made some mention of the Union's ac-
tivities. Finally, Sevigny called Feinstein a "damned
liar," or "God-damned liar," and walked out.
During the last week in August 1966, Simard informed
Department Committee Representative Roy that he was
going to discharge Sevigny because of poor work. De-
partment Committee representatives then looked at
Sevigny's work and told Simard that his work was not
below par and that the discharge would not be justifiable.
Simard agreed and told them to forget it and keep it quiet.
During the week of August 29, Sevigny received a sub-
pena from the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board requiring him to be present and testify at
a hearing involving Respondent and scheduled for Sep-
tember 6. On September 2, Sevigny told Simard that he
would have to attend the hearing on the 6th but that he
would come to work for 2 hours that morning and leave
at 9 a.m. Simard's only comment was "Oh, you're going
to the hearing?"
On September 6, at approximately 8:15 a.m., while
Sevigny was on his coffee break, Simard motioned for
him to come over. Simard asked Sevigny, "Have you got
a subpena to attend this hearing?" Sevigny told Simard,
according to the testimony of some of the witnesses in-
cluding Roy, that it was none of Simard's business. Other
witnesses testified that Sevigny told Simard that it was
none of his "God-damned" business. Simard then said,
"If you go to court and you haven't got a subpena, you're
all through." Sevigny punched out at 9 a.m. to attend the
hearing and returned to the plant before noon. There
Simard met him and told him "you're all through."
Shortly thereafter Roy met with Respondent's president
who told Roy that that Sevigny had been fired because he
did not have a subpena.
Other employees (Chasse, Turcotte) who informed
Simard or other foremen of their intention to attend the
September 6 bearing were not asked whether they had
received subpenas.
CONCLUSIONS
A. 8(a)(1) Allegations
1. The Turcotte incident
I have found that Foreman Parnel asked Mary Tur-
cotte on May 6 about the union meeting, and whether she
had signed a union card. Respondent argues that this was
merely a casual conversation but does not deny it was
without any indication to the employee of the purpose of
the questions nor any assurance of no reprisals regardless
of the answers given. Moreover, there was little, if any,
reason for inquiring of employee Turcotte whether she
had signed a union card in the absence of any demand for
recognition by the Union. Under such circumstances the
incident must be deemed coercive and an interference
within the rights of employees guaranteed by Section 7 of
the Act. Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591, espe-
cially in the light of the unfair labor practices found
below.
2. The Sevigny incidents
I have found above that Foreman Simard falsely ac-
cused Sevigny of distributing union cards on company
time, telling him that he was through, but countermanding
that order when the Department Committee representa-
tive advised Simard of the falsity of the charge. This ac-
tion was obviously coercive, having the necessary result
of discouraging lawful union activities. I have also found
that Simard drove Sevigny from Roy's bench although he
did not do so to others who stopped at Roy's bench to talk
to him. Since Simard knew that Sevigny was active in the
union organization, this disparity of treatment was also
coercive and discouraging to Sevigny's and other em-
ployees' union activities.
Similarly, Simard's remark to Sevigny, in June, that he
"better watch out" conveyed a similar threat as did
Simard's remark to Roy, in August, that he was going to
fire Sevigny for poor work, a charge, like the one involv-
ing alleged union solicitation on company time, which
was unfounded and tacitly admitted as such by Simard
who asked the Committee representatives to forget it and
keep it quiet.
3. The wage increases
Respondent's announcement on May 11 of a minimum
wage and a wage increase was made in the midst of the
union's organizational campaign . Ordinarily such an an-
nouncement would be presumptively invalid as
discouraging union activities by reason of benefits
promised or given by the employer at such time. As noted
earlier, the record is completely silent concerning the an-
nounced minimum wage. We do not know whether it
represents an increase or decrease , or whether it is in
compliance with statutory requirements imposed upon
the Respondent , or whether it represents any change and,
if so, whether the change is significant enough to warrant
the attention of the Board or is only the matter of a penny
or two and, therefore , de minimis . Inasmuch as counsel
have not argued the matter in their briefs , I conclude that
the issue is not the minimum wage announcement but
only the 3-cent increase which was announced simultane-
ously, to be effective June 1.
The mere existence of an organizational campaign does
not have the result of prohibiting all wage increases.
Certainly it cannot be laid down as a governing rule
that during a union campaign , management must deny to
its employees increased advantages which in the absence
of the campaign would be granted. (N.L.R.B . v. W. T.
Grant Co., 208 F.2d 710,712 (C.A. 4).)
Here the 3 -cent hourly wage increase had been both
planned and promised to the recognized Department
Committee representative before the organizational cam-
paign of the Union, contingent on the success of another
60 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
union in other shops in that area. If Respondent had
withheld the 3-cent hourly increase such action might, in-
deed, be a violation of Section 8(a)(1). American Paper &
Supply Company, Container Division, 159 NLRB 1243.
I conclude, therefore, that the 3-cent-per-hour wage in-
crease announced 'on May 11 to be effective June 1 did
not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and recom-
mend dismissal of that allegation of the complaint.
B. 8(a)(2 ) Allegation
Respondent argues that since the Department Commit-
tees were formed prior to any activity by the Union in the
shop and were formed spontaneously by the employees
themselves , the actions of the Respondent in paying com-
mittee members for time spent in negotiations constituted
mere cooperation by the Respondent . Respondent 's argu-
ment, however , overlooks certain additional facts which,
in my opinion . lead to a contrary conclusion. Thus, I have
found that in the latter part of May during the organiza-
tional campaign of the Union these Department Commit-
tees spontaneously disbanded. At this juncture Respond-
ent's president initiated a meeting with employee Roy
and asked that the Committee intervene in the pending
representation election. At the same time the president
met with the employees advising that the hand sewers'
Department Committee be reorganized , noting the power
of the Committee , and reminding the employees that they
did not have to pay any dues. But for the interference of
the Respondent 's president there is no basis to assume
that the Department Committee would have been revital-
ized. It is also significant that this revitalization sug-
gestion was made while the representation petition of the
Union was pending and management 's endorsement of
the Department Committee's status could not but have an
effect on the Union 's campaign. Under all those circum-
stances , although Respondent may not have dominated
the Department Committees nor has the General Coun-
sel alleged such behavior , it did certainly interfere with
and support them in violation of Section 8(a)(2), and in so
doing interfered with the rights of the employees guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Arduini Manufacturing Corp., 153 NLRB 887; Irving
Air Chute Company , Inc., Marathon Division , 350 F.2d
176 (C.A. 2), enfg. 149 NLRB 627.
C. 8(a)(3) and (4) Allegation
Respondent argues that Sevigny was discharged for in-
subordination and profanity towards his supervisor,
Simard, and that this episode was merely the culmination
of a long series of such incidents. The record does not
support that argument. Simard first testified that the in-
subordination giving rise to Sevigny's discharge was the
fact that Sevigny told Simard that it was none of his
"God-damned" business whether he, Sevigny, had a sub-
pena. Simard added, however, that before Sevigny started
his union activities, Sevigny used to do such things but
Simard just let them go. It appears significant to me that
his conduct became objectionable to Simard only with the
advent of Sevigny's union activities. In any event, how-
ever, if Sevigny's use of profanity was justification for the
discharge, it would have been natural for Simard to have
fired him summarily there and then just as he had at-
tempted to do when he thought Sevigny was passing out
union cards on company time. I am led, therefore, to the
conclusion that the profanity was not the cause of Sevig-
ny's discharge and this conclusion is fortified by the
testimony of employees that profanity was not uncom-
mon in the plant, by Simard's admission that there were
no plant rules regarding the use of profanity, and by the
fact that no warnings were given anyone regarding the use
of profanity.
This conclusion is further fortified by Simard's later
testimony in response to my questioning that he would
have kept Sevigny if Sevigny had not attended the NLRB
hearing.
It therefore appears from the testimony of Simard that
the motivating cause of Sevigny's discharge was Sevig-
ny's absence from work to attend the NLRB hearing on
September 6. In this connection, Respondent points to
the fact that Simard asked Sevigny if he had a subpena to
attend the hearing and that Sevigny refused to tell him.
From this, Respondent argues that it assumed Sevigny
had no subpena and was therefore justified in discharging
him for the absence. Respondent's position, however, is
undermined by the fact that it became aware that Sevigny
had a subpena shortly after the hearing. It therefore knew
that if it had discharged Sevigny for absenting himself
from work without a subpena, its action was incorrect and
Sevigny should have been reinstated. He was not, how-
ever, reinstated which leads me to the conclusion that his
dismissal was not based upon a belief that he had no sub-
pena to attend the NLRB hearing. Only one other osten-
sible reason could justify Sevigny's discharge on Sep-
tember 6 and that would have been his alleged use of
profanity towards Simard, which has already been
discussed and rejected.
Having found, therefore, that the stated reasons for
Sevigny's discharge were unfounded and merely pretex-
tual, I conclude that the real motive was one that the
Respondent desired to conceal and that such a motive
might be an illegal one. Shattuck Denn Mining Corpora-
tion v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (C.A. 9). In this instance,
I conclude that Sevigny was fired because he was known
to be active in the Union's organizational campaign and
that his dismissal came after several unsuccessful at-
tempts to discharge him. Such a discharge was in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
In addition, the discharge of Sevigny for the stated
reason of attending an NLRB hearing, despite the fact
that he had a subpena to attend that hearing, constituted
an interference with that employee's right to give
testimony under the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(4) of
the Act. Standard Packaging Corporation (Royal Lace
Paper Division), 140 NLRB 628. The Board dismissed
the complaint in the Standard Packaging case because it
found that the employer was not motivated by any desire
to interfere with the Board's processes or with such rights
the complainants may have had to attend the Board
proceeding as prospective witnesses. That conclusion
was based upon the fact that the Respondent in that case
was merely attempting to provide itself with a sufficient
work force without preventing anyone from attending the
hearing. The Respondent in this case, however, makes no
such contention or argument. Moreover, in the Standard
Packaging case the dischargees in absenting themselves
disregarded specific orders of the employer. Here the
only "order" of the Respondent, if one may call it such,
was Simard's remark to Sevigny that he had better have
a subpena if he was going to attend the hearing. Sevigny
had a subpena and he was therefore not in disregard of his
employer's orders when he absented himself for 2 or 3
hours to attend the NLRB hearing. Pacemaker Corpora-
tion, 120 NLRB 987.
THE REMEDY
BILLEN SHOE CO., INC. 61
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that
Respondent offer Paul Sevigny immediate and full rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges and make him whole for any loss of earnings
suffered by reason of the discrimination against him by
payment of a sum of money equal to that which he nor-
mally would have earned as wages from the date of
discharge to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstate-
ment, less any net earnings during said period (Crossett
Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440) and in the manner
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289,
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per
annum as set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716. In view of the variety and comprehensive-
ness of the unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that
the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner in-
fringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. Finally, upon representations that many
of the Respondent's employees are French speaking, I
shall recommend that the usual notices required to be
posted by the Respondent be written in both English and
French.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions, I recommend that the Board issue the fol-
lowing:
ORDER
Billen Shoe Co., Inc., Lewiston, Maine, its officers.
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully interrogating its employees concerning
their union activities or attitudes.
(b) Threatening its employees with loss of employ-
ment or other reprisals for engaging in union activities.
(c) Unlawfully preventing employees from commu-
nicating with each other on matters.
(d) Interfering with the administration of or contribut-
ing support to the Department Committees or any suc-
cessor thereto or any other labor organization of its em-
ployees.
(e) Recognizing or negotiating with the Department
Committees or any successor thereto for the purpose of
discussing grievances or other terms or conditions of em-
ployment.
(f) Unlawfully restricting employees from testifying at
Board proceedings or discharging or otherwise dis-
criminating against an employee because he has absented
himself to give testimony under this Act.
(g) Discouraging membership in and activity on behalf
of the Boot and Shoe Workers Union, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization by discharging or refusing to
reinstate employees or by discriminating . against em-
ployees in any other manner in regard to their hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of their
employment.
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Paul Sevigny immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and
privileges and make him whole for any loss of pay which
he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him in the manner set forth in the section of this
Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Notify Paul Sevigny, if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from the
Department Committees or any successor thereto as the
exclusive representative of its employees for the purpose
of dealing with it concerning grievances, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment unless and until such organization shall have been
certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of
such employees.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records relevant and necessary to a determination of
compliance with paragraph (a) above.
(e) Post at its plant in Lewiston, Maine, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix,"' written in both the
English and the French languages. Copies of said notice,
to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 1,
after being duly signed by Respondent's representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
should be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered. defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.2
In all other respects, the complaint herein is dismissed.
' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
2 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re
spondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
62 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate you coercively concern-
ing union activity.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of employ-
ment or other reprisals for engaging in union activity.
WE WILL NOT restrict your freedom of communi-
cation with other employees either because you sup-
port the Union or to induce you to refrain from sup-
porting the Union.
WE WILL NOT interfere with or render unlawful
support to the Department Committees or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the Boot
and Shoe Workers Union. AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization by discriminating against em-
ployees in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because he has absented himself
to give testimony under this Act or unlawfully
restrict any employee from testifying at a Board
hearing.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to
join or assist Boot and Shoe Workers Union,
AFL-CIO,, or any other labor organization, to en-
gage in any other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or any other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activi-
ties except to the extent that such rights may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified
by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
WE WILL offer Paul Sevigny immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority
or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed and
make him whole for any loss he may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against him.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recognition
from the Department Committees or any successors
thereto as the exclusive representative of our em-
ployees for the purpose of dealing with it concerning
grievances, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment unless and
until such organization shall have been certified by
the Board as the exclusive representative of such em-
ployees.
Dated By
BILLEN SHOE CO., INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
Note: We will notify Paul Sevigny if presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to
full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 20th Floor,
Federal Office Building, Cambridge and New Sudbury
Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02108, Telephone
223-3300.