Big John Super Stores, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 19, 1977

232 N.L.R.B. 134 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Big John Super Stores, Inc. and District Union Local
227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO. Cases 9-
CA-10672 and 9-CA-10906
September 19, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND MURPHY
On June 20, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Michael O. Miller issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Big John Super
Stores, Inc., Fulton, Kentucky, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and
it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations
of the Act not herein found.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard on March 2 and 3, 1977, in Mayfield,
Kentucky, based on charges filed on September 28 and
December 15, 1976, and complaints which issued on
December 2, 1976, and January 31, 1977. The complaints,
which were consolidated for hearing, alleged that Big John
Super Stores, Inc.,' herein Respondent, violated Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein the
Act, by interrogating and polling its employees concerning
their union activities and desires, by threatening its
employees with discipline, discharge, more onerous work-
ing conditions, or the closing of the store because of their
The name of Respondent appears as amended at hearing.
2 General Counsel's posthearing motion that official notice be taken of
232 NLRB No. 41
union activities, and by granting a wage increase in order
to discourage union membership or support. Respondent's
timely filed answers denied the substantive allegations of
the complaints.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally.
General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs which have
been carefully considered. Based on the entire record,2
including my observation of the witnesses and their
demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE UNION'S
LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS-PRELIMINARY
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent is an Illinois corporation operating retail
grocery stores in various States of the United States,
including a store in Fulton, Kentucky, the only store
directly involved herein. The complaints alleged, Respon-
dent's answers admitted, and I find and conclude that
Respondent satisfies the Board's standards for the asser-
tion of jurisdiction over retail enterprises and is an
employer, engaged in commerce and in operations affect-
ing commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
The complaints alleged, Respondent admitted, and I find
and conclude that District Union Local 227, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL-CIO, herein the Union, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1l. BACKGROUND
Respondent's Fulton store is part of its southern division,
which consists of seven stores in Kentucky and Tennessee.
Five of these stores, including Fulton, were acquired from
their prior owners around September 1975. None of the
southern division stores were covered by collective-bar-
gaining agreements. Respondent also operates nine stores
in its northern division, some of which have collective-
bargaining agreements.
The Union commenced an organizing campaign among
the employees of the Fulton store around June 1976. (All
dates hereinafter are in 1976 unless otherwise specified.)
Respondent learned of this campaign in late June, when it
was served with the unfair labor practice charge in Case 9-
CA-10423 (subsequently withdrawn or dismissed). A
representation election petition was filed in late July, and a
Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election was
approved on September 3, setting an election among
Respondent's Fulton store employees for October 1. That
election was canceled on September 28, when the Union
filed the charge in Case 9-CA-10672. No new election date
has been scheduled.
the "Order Cancelling Election and Notice of Cancellation of Election" in
Case 9-RC-11623 is granted.
134
BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Conduct of James L. Menees', Polling of
Employees
About October 18, Meat Market Manager James L.
Menees circulated a petition among Respondent's Fulton
store employees which stated, in essence, that the employ-
ees did not wish to be represented by the Union. He
secured approximately 50 signatures. Denver Perkins, who
was store manager at that time, was aware of Menees'
activity. Menees' testimony appears to indicate that
Perkins suggested it:
Q. (By Counsel for General Counsel) Okay. Now,
what were your discussions with Mr. Perkins about this
petition?
A. Well, it was really-our discussion really-I
just-I talked to some of the employees there, and it
was kind of a big mess there, and so I co, : in one
morning ... and he mentioned the fact of the petition.
It was just mentioned . . . when I came in in the
morning. And so I talked to Ruth Phipps, she's the
office lady, and I talked to Ron Tanus ... in produce,
and we decided . . . [w]e'll just see how the people feel
about it.
Menees' position as meat market manager had been
included within the stipulated unit for the election.
Respondent contended that it was not responsible for
Menees' conduct as he was not a supervisor or, if he were
found to be a supervisor, his conduct v"- noncoercive.
General Counsel contended that Menees was a statutory
supervisor, that the conduct was coercive, and that
Respondent was responsible for that conduct and charged
with such knowledge of union sympathies as Menees may
have acquired.
Respondent's stores have a store manager, admittedly
possessed of supervisory authority, an assistant store
manager, and managers in the produce, bakery-delicates-
sen, and meat departments. The handbook of company
policies refers to these positions as "managerial." Each of
these departments has a supervisor who functions through-
out one or both of Respondent's divisions. The meat
department supervisor is Gene Woods, who visits the
Fulton store two or three times per week and is in daily
telephonic communication with the meat market manager.
The meat supervisor originates and gives to the meat
market managers a weekly merchandising letter, telling
them what will be advertised and informing them how to
merchandise and display the meats. The weekly advertise-
ment is available to the managers when they make up their
meat orders. Based on the needs of his inventory, Menees
purchases meats for the store from wholesalers of his
choice. His purchases average $10,000 per week.
There are seven employees in the meat market at Fulton,
including Menees and two part-time employees. All are
hourly paid. At $5.25 per hour, Menees receives about 65
cents per hour more than the next highest paid individual.
He also receives a quarterly bonus, based on the profitabili-
ty of the department, which accounts for 4 or 5 percent of
his annual income. Employees below the level of manager
do not share in that bonus. Menees is paid premium pay
for the overtime that he works. He schedules the work of
the other employees, including the number of hours they
will work, and, when overtime is required, asks them to
work it. He generally secures approval for departmental
overtime from the store manager. He may permit an
employee to leave work early or take a day off for personal
reasons. The employees generally know what work has to
be performed; to the extent that an assignment of duties is
required, Menees makes it. He may also train, or ask other
experienced meatcutters to train, an employee. He has no
independent authority to discharge or otherwise discipline
an employee; when such action has been necessary,
Menees has reported the problem to the store manager.
Neither does he hire employees, although he does talk to
applicants to determine their experience and has been
asked for his opinion of them and his recommendation. All
meat department employees are interviewed and hired by
the meat supervisor. Menees has not been consulted when
meat department employees have been granted wage
increases.
Menees is held out to the public and employees as the
meat market manager. According to their testimony, some
employees view Menees as a "boss" or supervisor; others
do not. He has access to the employees' personnel records,
access which is denied employees below the level of
department manager. He also meets with the meat
supervisor and the store manager to discuss the meat
department's displays and advertising and occasionally
meets with the employees to listen to their problems.
In view of all of the foregoing, and particularly noting
Menees' authority to make recommendations on new hires,
his authority to affect an employee's earnings by sched-
uling and the assignment of overtime, and the fact that,
unless he is deemed to be a supervisor, the seven
individuals in the meat department operate essentially
without any direct supervision, I conclude that Menees is a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Stephens Produce
Co., Inc., 214 NLRB 131 (1974); Bedford Discounters, Inc.,
204 NLRB 509 (1972). The inclusion of the meat market
manager in the unit as stipulated to by Respondent and the
Union does not estop General Counsel from contending
that Menees is a supervisor. See Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Inc., 115 NLRB 645 (1956), enfd. 242 F.2d 497 (C.A. 2,
1957).
I further find and conclude that Respondent was
responsible for Menees' actions in polling the employees
both by reason of his supervisory authority and Perkins'
authorization or instigation of that poll.
Respondent contended, on the authority of Montgomery
Ward & Co., Inc., supra, that as Menees was to be included
in the unit by agreement of the Union and the Employer,
employees would not deem his antiunion conduct to be the
representation of management. Under such a circumstance
his conduct would lack the tendency to coerce employees.
However, in that case, the Board stated (115 NLRB at
647):
For that reason, the Board has generally refused to
hold an employer responsible for the antiunion conduct
of a supervisor included in the unit, in the absence of
evidence that the employer encouraged authorized, or
135
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ratified the supervisor's activities .... lEmphasis
supplied.]
As noted, Menees' conduct was "encouraged, authorized,
or ratified" by Perkins. Accordingly, I find and conclude
that Menees' conduct would tend to interfere with
employee free choice, that Respondent is chargeable with
that conduct, and that, by such conduct, Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Sabine Towing &
Transportation Co., Inc., 205 NLRB 423 (1973).
B. Conduct Directed at Mary Woodruff
Mary Woodruff was employed in Respondent's delica-
tessen department in October 1975. In June 1976, she was
made aware of the Union's organizational campaign by
another employee and signed a union authorization card.
Thereafter, she distributed some cards to other employees,
discussed the Union with them, and attended union
meetings. She also attended the hearing on the Union's
representation petition. On October 18, according to her
undenied testimony, Woodruff was approached by Me-
nees, who asked her to sign his antiunion petition. She
refused, telling him that he knew how she felt about the
Union.
On the morning of December 5, Bakery Supervisor
Geraldine Knight called Woodruff into the office after
observing that Woodruff appeared upset. Knight asked
Woodruff what the problem was. She informed Knight that
she had had a run-in with Perkins, the store manager, in
which Perkins had admonished and cursed at her for
allegedly walking on a freshly washed floor. Woodruff
complained that she was being mistreated and picked on
because of her union activities. She pointed to the union
button she was wearing. Knight asked her why she wanted
the Union and Woodruff told her that it was because of
mistreatment such as she had been receiving.3 At this
point, according to Woodruff, Knight told her: "Mary, let's
keep this a secret, but . . . if the union comes in Mr.
Martin has already said he will close the store." She also
assured Woodruff that higher management would take a
greater interest in the store in the future. Knight denied
making any reference to a secret, a threat to close the store,
or management's attention to improve conditions in the
store.
Around this same period of time, Respondent eliminated
most of the delicatessen products, laid off the part-time
employees, and generally altered the operation of the
bakery-delicatessen department in an effort to make it
profitable. Woodruff's duties changed; she was assigned to
fry doughnuts and chickens. She performed this duty for
several days but objected to having to do all the frying.
Another employee was brought in to cook the chickens;
Woodruff continued to fry doughnuts. In addition, she
testified, her other duties increased and she was assigned
more arduous cleaning work than she had done before or
than other employees were required to do.4
On December 17, Woodruff was summoned to a meeting
with Knight and the bakery-delicatessen manager, Jerry
I To this point. the testimony of Woodruff and Knight are in substantial
agreement.
4 The complaint did not allege, and the evidence would not support, a
Tipps. According to her testimony on direct examination,
Woodruff was told that her work was not satisfactory, that
she was working too slow, that if she did not improve they
would have to put her on the night shift (which Knight and
Tipps knew was not practical for her), and that, if that did
not work out, they would have to let her go. On cross-
examination, Woodruff readily acknowledged that she told
Knight and Tipps that she was working as fast as she
intended to, that she couldn't do any more than she was
doing, and that, although she had to work, she really did
not like the work she was doing. Knight responded by
telling her that the only alternative to the work she was
doing would be a position on the night shift. She further
recalled that Knight told her all of the employees were
going to have to work harder in order to make the bakery a
success, that the bakery was being run on a trial basis, and
that this was its last chance. Woodruff told Knight and
Tipps that she believed that they were doing this to her
because she was in favor of the Union. Knight denied that
the Union made any difference to her. Woodruff's cross-
examination testimony concerning this interview is in
substantial agreement with testimony of Knight and Tipps,
which I credit.
On December 26, Tipps gave Woodruff a "correction
slip" in regard to the quality of some doughnuts which she
had made. This was the first time such a slip had been
issued. There was no mention of the Union.
In the 2 weeks prior to January 11, 1977, Woodruff was
late for work several times. She testified that there were
about three such times, occasioned by adverse weather.
Tipps said that there were about six incidents. Twice,
Woodruff had called Tipps to report that she could not
secure transportation to the store and he picked her up. On
January 11, Tipps and the new store manager, Ken
Jungers, told Woodruff that her tardiness was not accept-
able. Woodruff complained that they were trying to
"crucify" her because of her union activities and were
trying to make her quit. Tipps and Jungers denied any such
intention. Tipps then left and Jungers continued to talk
with Woodruff. He asked her why she was so bitter toward
the Company. According to Woodruff, he also asked her
why she wanted the Union. She repeated her assertions
that she had been badly treated by the employer and that
her mistreatment was the result of her union activities.
Jungers denied asking Woodruff why she favored the
Union and asserted that it was Woodruff who mentioned
the Union in their conversation.
Geraldine Knight impressed me as a forceful and
credible witness; her candid admission that she asked
Woodruff why she wanted the Union bolsters the credibili-
ty of the denials of other statements attributed to her. I
similarly found both Tipps and Jungers to be credible
witnesses. I was less favorably impressed with Woodruff's
testimony and demeanor. As previously noted, her testimo-
ny varied substantially from direct to cross-examination.
Additionally, she displayed hostility toward Respondent
and a propensity to view all actions taken by the employer
as retaliation for union activities, even when those actions
contention that Respondent discriminatorily assigned Woodruff more
onerous or arduous work because of her union activities.
136
BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC.
were attempts to work out accommodations with her work
preferences. In this regard, I observe that Respondent did
extend itself to Woodruff, bringing in another employee to
relieve her of the task of frying chickens, offering her a shift
with less arduous work, and picking her up on mornings
when she refused to drive because of the weather.
Accordingly, to the extent that there are differences in the
testimony of Woodruff and her supervisors, I credit those
supervisors.
In each instance wherein the Union was mentioned
between Woodruff and her supervisors, it was Woodruff
who raised the subject. When Knight asked her why she
wanted the Union, Woodruff was wearing a union button
and had brought it to Knight's attention. In these
circumstances, I conclude that Knight's casual and isolated
question lacked the tendency to interfere with the exercise
of employee rights under the Act. In so concluding, I note
that the inquiry was not directed at determining Wood-
ruff's union sympathies; those were openly proclaimed.
Neither was it directed at determining the extent of her
union activities or the sympathies or activities of other
employees. The question was asked once and was not
pursued. See Hobart Corporation, 228 NLRB 907, fn. 3
(1977). This case is thus distinguishable from such cases as
Florida Steel Corporation, 224 NLRB 45 (1976), Bushnell's
Kitchens, Inc., 222 NLRB 110 (1976), and Hanes Hosiery,
Inc., 219 NLRB 338 (1975). I shall, therefore, recommend
that this allegation be dismissed. Additionally, as I have
found that Knight did not threaten Woodruff with either
the closing of the store or with assignment to more onerous
working conditions, and that Jungers did not coercively
interrogate Woodruff concerning her union activities, I
shall recommend that those complaint allegations be
dismissed.
C. Conduct Directed at Linda Wade
Linda Wade is a high school student who began working
for Respondent during the summer of 1976, in the bakery.
She was laid off around the end of November and was
recalled about a week later. On her first or second day
back, Store Manager Perkins called her into his office and
began to admonish her for the way work had been
performed in the bakery. Wade told him, "[Y]ou haven't
liked me since you started work here." At this point,
Perkins got "nasty," called her a "bitch" and "fussed" at
her for work that had not been done. In this conversation,
as Wade testified, "he said something about the union, that
slipped, and then he said he'd like to see me gone because
my job wasn't good anymore because I was behind Mary
[Woodruff]." Wade further testified that Perkins had
observed Woodruff talking with her and several other
employees, about the Union, around the beginning of
November.5
General Counsel alleged that the foregoing statement to
Wade constituted a threat to discharge Wade because of
her union activities. The evidence reflects that Mary
I Respondent did not call Perkins as a witness. Geraldine Knight,
however, was present when Perkins spoke to Wade. To the extent that
Knight recalled the substance of the conversation, she corroborated Wade.
She did not recall Perkins making reference to Wade "being behind Mary."
6 The complaint alleged the "granting of a wage increase to discourage
Woodruff's union activities were known to Respondent
and it stands uncontradicted that Perkins observed Wade
and others discussing the Union with Woodruff. That
incident, however, occurred more than a month prior to
Wade's confrontation with Perkins, a period of dormancy
in union activity. The record does not establish that
Woodruff was known to be a leading union proponent or
that Wade was, or was suspected to be, a supporter of
Woodruff in her union activities.
It is not entirely clear from Wade's version of the
conversation whether Perkins specifically mentioned the
Union or whether Wade merely surmised that Perkins was
referring to the Union when he alluded to Wade's being
"behind Mary." While Perkins may have been referring to
Woodruff in her role as a proponent of the Union, it is
quite as likely that he was referring to problems he was
having with Woodruff's work performance. In light of this
ambiguity, and the other circumstances set forth above, I
am constrained to conclude that General Counsel has
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Perkins threatened Wade with discharge because of her
union activity. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this
allegation be dismissed.
D. The Wage Increases
In late November, Respondent's Fulton store employees
received substantial wage increases: 60 cents or more per
hour for the full-time employees and 25 cents per hour or
more for the part-time employees, retroactive to September
1. Checks were given them for the retroactively earned
wages. General Counsel contends that Respondent granted
"an unusually large and unexpected wage increase, in order
to unlawfully influence employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights." 6 Respondent contends that the wage
increase was the same as had been granted throughout its
southern division effective September I but withheld from
the Fulton store employees in order to avoid creating the
appearance that it was seeking to improperly influence the
election. After the election was indefinitely postponed,
Respondent claimed, it determined to give the increase to
those employees so that they would not be penalized by the
pendency of the election petition.
The record reflects that when Respondent acquired the
Fulton store, along with about four others, in September
1975, the employees' wage rates were near the minimum
wage. The employees were told that wage rates would be
reviewed and that there would be periodic increases. While
corporate vice president and general supervisor, Paul York,
could not recall that employees were told of any specific
dates on which to expect wage increases, employee Don
Elliot recalled being told that wages were reviewed twice a
year, in April and September. Employee Brad Coley
recalled being told that there would be raises around
September. Their recollections essentially corroborate the
testimony of William Harper, executive vice president who
was responsible for formulation and implementation of
the union activities of [Respondent's] employees." The complaint is broad
enough to support the issue as framed in General Counsel's brief. Moreover.
that issue was fully litigated. See Sheboygan Sausage Company, Inc.. 156
NLRB 1490. fn. 1(1966).
137
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wage policies. Harper testified that it was Respondent's
policy for all stores not covered by collective-bargaining
agreements to review wages and grant increases at 6-month
intervals, in April and October.
In April 1976, the Fulton store employees received wage
increases of approximately 5 or 6 percent, 10 cents to 15
cents per hour. In May, Harper began to formulate the
policy for the wage increases to be given in the fall. That
policy, he testified, was made final by the end of July or
mid-August, admittedly after Respondent acquired knowl-
edge of the organizational campaign in Fulton. Under that
policy, the employees of all of the southern division stores
would receive identical wages, $3.10 per hour after 6
months experience with higher wages paid in the meat
department. This wage scale was based on a study of the
rates paid by Respondent's competition, and was compara-
ble thereto.
When the employees in Respondent's other stores
received their September increases, no mention was made
of the union activity at Fulton. The Fulton employees were
not told about those raises; nothing was said to them to
indicate that their union activity prevented their receipt of
raises. Again, when Respondent gave them the wage
increases, there was no mention of the Union. No evidence
was adduced to contradict Harper's credible testimony that
the wage increases at Fulton were the same as those at the
other southern division stores.
General Counsel contended that, in speaking to its
employees, Respondent had conditioned wage increases
upon store profitability. As the evidence reflected that the
staff of the Fulton store had decreased from approximately
64 in September of the high 40's in November, it was
submitted that the store's profits could not have justified
such substantial wage increases. Harper denied that the
Fulton store was not profitable. He acknowledged that the
bakery department therein was not showing a profit.
Layoffs in the bakery, previously discussed, accounted for
some of the reduction in the work force. So too, apparently,
did a storewide reduction in hours. He further explained
that, although the employees were told that wage increases
depended upon individual store performance, this had
been said to motivate the employees. It was not, however,
the basis upon which he formulated wage policy.
The Board, in Newport Division of Wintex Knitting Mills,
Inc., 216 NLRB 1058 (1975), concisely summarized the
state of the law regarding the announcement or grant of
wage increases during the pendency of an election
campaign:
It is well established that the announcement of a
wage increase during the pendency of a representation
petition for the purpose of stifling an organizational
campaign constitutes unlawful interference and coer-
cion ...
An employer's legal duty in deciding whether to
grant benefits while a representation petition is pending
is to determine that question precisely as if a union
were not in the picture. An employer's granting a wage
I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
increase during a union campaign "raises a strong
presumption" of illegality. In the absence of evidence
demonstrating that the timing of the announcement of
changes in benefits was governed by factors other than
the pendency of the election, the Board will regard
interference with employee freedom of choice as the
motivating factor. The burden of establishing a justifi-
able motive remains with the Employer.
The question is thus one of motivation. On the record
before me, I am persuaded that Respondent has satisfied
its burden of establishing a justifiable motive and has
overcome the presumption of illegality. Thus, I find
significant that the timing of the raises followed the pattern
previously announced to employees at the time of Respon-
dent's acquisition, that formulation of the raises began
prior to the advent of the Union, that consistent raises were
given throughout the entire division, that those raises
brought Respondent's wages in line with those paid by its
competition, and that Respondent did not attempt to
capitalize upon its planned raises by granting them prior to
the scheduled election or by making reference to the Union
either when it decided to withhold those raises or when it
reversed that decision and granted them. See Allis Chal-
mers Corporation, 224 NLRB 1199 (1976) (particularly at
1205-06); California Pellet Mill Company, 219 NLRB 435
(1975). Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation
be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By coercively polling its employees concerning their
union activities and desires, Respondent has engaged in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l)
of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. Respondent has not violated the Act in any manner
not specifically found herein.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, in order to effectuate the policies of
the Act, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER 7
The Respondent, Big John Super Stores, Inc., Fulton,
Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively polling its employees concerning their
union activities and desires.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
138
BIG JOHN SUPER STORES, INC.
(a) Post at its Fulton, Kentucky, store, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by its representative, shall
be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has
taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found herein.
I In the event this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing
To engage in activities together for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection
To refrain from the exercise of any such
activities.
In recognition of these rights, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT coercively poll our employees concern-
ing their union activities or desires.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
BIG JOHN SUPER STORES,
INC.
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The act gives the employees the following rights:
139