Beverly A. Baker, Complainant,v.Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 18, 2002
01A14745 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 18, 2002)

01A14745

12-18-2002

Beverly A. Baker, Complainant, v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Beverly A. Baker v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A14745

December 18, 2002

.

Beverly A. Baker,

Complainant,

v.

Anthony J. Principi,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A14745

Agency No. 99-0206

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated this appeal from the final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. At all times

relevant to the agency action at issue, complainant was employed at

the agency's Coatesville Medical Center in Coatesville, Pennsylvania.

Complainant alleges in her complaint that she was subjected to unlawful

discrimination on the bases of her race (African-American), color (black),

and disability (back, neck, and shoulder injury) when, on February 14,

1999, she was reassigned from her position as a Housekeeper to that

of a Health Aide in the agency's �Silver Spoon Program� (SSP).<1>

At the conclusion of the agency's investigation into her complaint,

complainant was informed of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge or, alternatively, to receive a final decision by

the agency. When complainant failed to respond within the time period

specified in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a FAD.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant had failed to establish

that she had been subjected to unlawful discrimination as alleged.

The agency found that complainant had established a prima facie case

as to her claims, as she had been assigned to the SSP at its outset in

1999, and at that time only African-Americans were in the program,<2>

and because she had established that, at the relevant time, she had

been regarded by the agency as a qualified individual with a disability.

The agency further found, however, that it had articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for placing complainant in the program.

The agency found that the evidence established that the SSP had been

initiated to ensure that employees would be available to feed certain

patients at the medical center who were incapable of feeding themselves,

and in an attempt to reduce workers' compensation costs by providing

work for employees on light duty assignments; that the program was

applied uniformly to all employees; and that while the first employees

selected for the program were African-Americans, they were also the only

employees who were on light duty status at that time, and therefore the

only employees eligible for inclusion in the program. The agency further

found that complainant failed to present any evidence that its articulated

reasons were mere pretext for unlawful discrimination, and concluded that

she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she had been

unlawfully discriminated against as claimed. This appeal followed.

In a claim such as that presented by complainant, which alleges disparate

treatment based upon race, color, and/or disability, and where there

is an absence of direct evidence of such discrimination, the allocation

of burdens and order of presentation of proof is a three-step process.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); Presley

v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05980656 (Sept. 20,

2001) (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to disability claims).

First, complainant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination

by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination; i.e., that a prohibited consideration was

a factor in the adverse employment action. Kimble v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01983020 (Aug. 22, 2001). Next, the agency

must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

If the agency is successful in meeting its burden, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason

proffered by the agency was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.

However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the

agency intentionally discriminated against complainant remains at all

times with complainant. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).

Applying this analysis to the instant matter, we find that the agency

properly concluded that complainant failed to establish that she had

been subjected to unlawful discrimination as alleged. Even assuming

for the sake of this appeal that she established a prima facie case

as to her race, color, and disability discrimination allegations,

the agency correctly found in its FAD that it articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, as described above. The record

also shows that complaint failed to present any evidence in support

of her allegations or which indicated that the agency's articulated

reasons were unworthy of credence. We note that our review of the

record on appeal failed to reveal any indication that the agency's

decision to place complainant in the SSP was the result of an unlawful

discriminatory animus it held against her based upon her race, color,

or disability status. Accordingly, we conclude that complainant failed

to meet her ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence

that she was subjected to unlawful discrimination as claimed.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, it is the decision

of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. �Agency� or �department� means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (�Right

to File A Civil Action�).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 18, 2002

Date

1 In her complaint, complainant also included sex as a discriminatory

basis for the alleged unlawful activity, as well as the additional

allegation that her duty hours were unlawfully changed because of her

race, color, sex, and disability. Complainant subsequently withdrew

her allegations pertaining to the basis of sex and the additional claim

relating to her duty hours.

2 The record shows that of the six employees initially designated by

agency management as eligible for the SSP in February, 1999, and of the

three (including complainant) who were then assigned to the program,

all six were African-Americans. No non-African-American employee

was identified as eligible for the SSP until April, 1999, and no

non-African-American employee was assigned to the program until May, 1999.