Beth Abraham Health Services

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 8, 2000

332 N.L.R.B. 1234 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1234
Beth Abraham Health Services and 1199 National
Health and Human Services Employees Union,
SEIU, AFL–CIO. Case 2–CA–31830
November 8, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND HURTGEN
On January 18, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Ste-
ven Davis issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
further discussed below, and to adopt the recommended
Order.
The Union was certified as bargaining representative
of a unit of employees at Schnurmacher Nursing Home
(Schnurmacher).1 The Union, seeking a contract for that
unit, contacted a company called Beth Israel Medical
Center (BIMC), in the belief that it owned Schnur-
macher. BIMC referred the Union to the Respondent,
stating that Schnurmacher is wholly managed by the Re-
spondent; and further that BIMC had transferred owner-
ship of Schnurmacher to Bethco Corporation, an affiliate
of the Respondent. The Union thereafter commissioned
research into that transfer, leading it to doubt whether a
bona fide transfer had occurred, and making it unsure
which entity in fact owned Schnurmacher. The Union
thus requested information from the Respondent regard-
ing the terms of the transfer transaction.2

1 Schnurmacher Nursing Home, 327 NLRB 253 (1998), enfd. in part
214 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2000).
2 The Union’s information request provided as follows:
While the agreement calls for both BIMC and Bethco to finance
certain operating expenses of the home and to bill the nursing
home for these expenses on a monthly basis, it appears that
BIMC continues to be responsible for the lion’s share of these
expenses. At the end of 1997, the balance due from BIMC to
Schnurmacher was $452,422 and the balance due to BAHS was
$425,000. If Bethco is now responsible for the day to day opera-
tions of Schnurmacher, three questions arise:
Why did BIMC Holding agree to forgive $1.7 million of
Schnurmacher’s debt as part of the transaction and what did
Bethco receive in return?
Why does BIMC continue to be the sole party responsible for
making up shortfalls in certain parts of Schnurmacher’s Medi-
caid reimbursement?
What is the nature of the consulting services provided to
Schnurmacher by Bethco/BAHS (which amounted to $475,000
in 1997)?
The judge found that the Union satisfied its burden of
establishing the relevance of the information it requested
from the Respondent. We agree. The Union and the
Respondent are parties to a collective-bargaining agree-
ment, which provides that the “contract shall apply to
any new or additional facilities of the [Respondent] and
under its principal direction and control[.]” The record
shows that the Union sought the requested information to
verify that the ownership of Schnurmacher Nursing
Home, where the Union had been certified as bargaining
representative of a unit of employees, had in fact been
transferred to the Respondent’s affiliate Bethco from
another company, Beth Israel Medical Center. This
would enable the Union to determine whether to file a
grievance against the Respondent, asserting that
Schnurmacher was an additional facility of the Respon-
dent subject to their collective-bargaining agreement. It
is well settled that an employer is obligated to provide
information which is relevant to a union’s decision to file
or process grievances. See, e.g., Bell Telephone Labora-
tories, 317 NLRB 802, 803 (1995), enfd. mem. 107 F.3d
862 (3d Cir. 1997); Barnard Engineering Co., 282
NLRB 617, 619–620 (1987).
Further, the judge found, and we agree, for the reasons
set forth by him, that the circumstances surrounding the
Union’s information request, including the fact the Re-
spondent outright ignored the request and did not seek
clarification, and the testimony at the hearing by Union
Vice President Valdez regarding the objective for seek-
ing the information, were sufficient to put the Respon-
dent on notice of the relevant purpose for which the in-
formation was sought. See, e.g., Allison Corp., 330
NLRB No. 190, slip op. at 5 fn. 23 (2000); Brazos Elec-
tric Power Cooperative, 241 NLRB 1016, 1018–1019
(1979), enfd. in relevant part 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.
1980). The Respondent’s reliance in its exceptions on
Rice Growers Assn., 312 NLRB 837, 838 (1993), is mis-
placed. The Board decision in that case that the respon-
dent was not required to furnish the requested informa-
tion was based on several factors not present here: the
relevance of the information had not been established;
the union at the hearing had not clarified its objective in
seeking the information; and the respondent did not have
a bargaining obligation to provide information because
there were no unit employees due to a lawful plant clo-
sure. Thus, we reject the Respondent’s argument that the
Union’s information request was not “sufficiently ex-
plicit so as to convey [its] objective[.]”
332 NLRB No. 113
BETH ABRAHAM HEALTH SERVICES

1235
Finally, the Respondent has not presented any other
defense to the Union’s request for relevant information.3
Absent presentation of a valid defense, an employer has
an obligation to furnish relevant information. Woodland
Clinic, 331 NLRB No. 91, slip op. at 3 (2000). The Re-
spondent’s failure to furnish the Union with the informa-
tion requested accordingly violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Beth Abraham Health Ser-
vices, Bronx, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.

Susannah Ringel, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David Diamond (Proskauer Rose LLP), of New York, New
York, for the Respondent.
Kent Hirozawa, Esq. (Gladstein, Reif & Megginniss, LLP), of
New York, New York, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Based on a
charge filed on November 16, 1998, by Local 1199 National
Health and Human Services Employees Union, SEIU, AFL–
CIO (the Union) a complaint was issued against Beth Abraham
Health Services (Respondent) on April 29, 1999.
The complaint alleges essentially that Respondent failed and
refused to supply certain requested information to the Union
which was necessary for and relevant to the Union’s perform-
ance of its collective-bargaining function. The Union asserts
that the information sought was relevant to its collective-
bargaining responsibilities toward the employees it represents
at Respondent.
Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of the
complaint, and asserted the affirmative defense that this matter
should be deferred to the grievance and arbitration provisions
of the collective-bargaining agreement between Respondent
and the Union. On October 19, 1999, a hearing was held before
me in New York, New York.
On the evidence presented in this proceeding and my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses and after consideration
of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following

3 For example, to the extent that some of the information sought may
pertain to Bethco Corporation, a holding company of which the Re-
spondent is a subsidiary, the Respondent does not argue that such in-
formation is not in its possession or unavailable to it. See Arch of West
Virginia, 304 NLRB 1089 fn. 1 (1991). Member Hurtgen additionally
observes that the Respondent does not contend that the information is
not available in document form, or that the information request was
overly broad or vague.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a New York corporation having its principal
place of business at 612 Allerton Avenue, Bronx, New York,
operates a nursing home and has been engaged in the business
of providing health care services to various disabled and elderly
individuals.
Annually, in the course of its business operations, Respon-
dent derives gross revenues from those operations in excess of
$250,000, and purchases and receives at its facility products,
goods, and materials valued in excess of $5000 directly from
points located outside New York State. Respondent admits and
I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent
also admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement
Respondent operates a nursing home in the Bronx. It is
bound to a collective-bargaining agreement between the Union
and the Association of Voluntary Nursing Homes in which it is
a member. The contract covers Respondent’s employees in the
following unit:

All full-time and regular part-time service and maintenance
employees, clerical and technical employees, licensed practi-
cal nurses, social workers, practical dieticians, occupational
therapists, and pharmacists, employed by the Employer at 612
Allerton Avenue, Bronx, New York, excluding all other em-
ployees, including professional employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.

The contract contains a clause which states that it is applica-
ble to new or additional facilities of the employer:

It is agreed that this contract shall apply and continue in full
force and effect at any location to which the Employer may
move. It is further agreed that this contract shall apply to any
new or additional facilities of the Employer and under its
principal direction and control within the five (5) boroughs of
New York City, Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester Counties.

The contract, as extended in 1995 further provides, as rele-
vant, that Respondent must give 7 days notice to the Union
following the completion of arrangements for all expansions,
acquisitions, sales, new facilities, and mergers within West-
chester County.
B. Certification of the Union at Schnurmacher and Bargaining
Following a hearing, a Board-conducted election was held
after which the Union was certified as the collective-bargaining
representative for two units of employees at Schnurmacher
Nursing Home in White Plains, Westchester County, New
York.1 The two units are essentially (1) professional employees
and (2) licensed practical nurses, coordinators, and clerks.
1 Case 34–RC–1509.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1236
A few bargaining sessions were held between Schnurmacher
and the Union but no agreement was reached. On August 7,
1998, the Union filed a charge, and on November 30, 1998, the
Board granted the General Counsel’s Motion for Summary
Judgment against Schnurmacher which directed it to bargain
with the Union. Schnurmacher Nursing Home, 327 NLRB 253
(1998).
Apparently the Union believed that Respondent and Beth Is-
rael Medical Center were affiliated with Schnurmacher or pos-
sessed some authority to bargain on behalf of Schnurmacher.
On June 30, 1998,2 the Union sent a letter to Respondent
“requesting from management . . . dates to begin the negotia-
tions at Schnurmacher Nursing Home.”
In response, Nelson Valdez, the Union’s vice president re-
ceived a call from an administrator of Schnurmacher advising
him that he should call Attorney James Frank. Valdez did so
and on July 27, Frank wrote, advising Valdez that Schnur-
macher would appeal the Board’s certifications.
C. The Union Seeks Information Concerning the Ownership
and Control of Schnurmacher
Valdez testified that he learned from public information that
Schnurmacher was owned and operated by Beth Israel Medical
Center (Beth Israel).
Accordingly, on August 5, Valdez sent a letter to Dr. Robert
Newman, the chief executive officer of Beth Israel, stating that
Beth Israel was not applying the terms of its collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union to its employees at
“Schnurmacher Nursing Home, A Division of Beth Israel—
Bethco Nursing Home, Inc.” as required by Beth Israel’s con-
tract with the Union. The letter requested that Beth Israel im-
mediately apply the terms of its collective-bargaining agree-
ment to the employees “at its Schnurmacher facility” in the
units covered by the Board election and that it meet with the
Union to discuss the implementation of the contract.
By letter dated August 11, Beth Israel official Gail Donovan
responded that Beth Israel is not the employer of the employees
at Schnurmacher, and is not involved in the day-to-day man-
agement of that facility. Donovan further stated that only 5 of
Schnurmacher’s 11 trustees are appointed by Beth Israel, and
therefore the recognition clause in the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Union and Beth Israel is not applicable.
On August 19, Dr. Matthew Fink, a Beth Israel official wrote
to Valdez, advising that his letter of August 5 was forwarded to
him by Dr. Newman. Dr. Fink advised that Schnurmacher “is
wholly managed by Beth Abraham Health Services, and is
responsible for all of the operations, including union issues and
negotiations. The Beth Israel administration has no input what-
soever in the operations or issues at the nursing home.”
By letter of August 26, Carmen Suardy, the corporate direc-
tor of labor relations for Beth Israel wrote to the Union, enclos-
ing a copy of Beth Israel’s “legal opinion” concerning the Un-
ion’s request that it apply the terms of its contract to Schnur-
macher. The legal opinion, written by Attorney Kathryn Meyer,
the senior vice president of Continuum Health Partners, Inc.,
stated:

2 All dates hereafter are in 1998 unless otherwise stated.
On March 4, 1996, Beth Israel Medical Center transferred a
controlling interest in the Schnurmacher Nursing Home … to
Bethco Corporation, an affiliate of Beth Abraham Hospital.
Under the new structure, Bethco appoints 6 of the 11 mem-
bers of the Board of Trustees of Schnurmacher and 3 of the 5
members of the Executive Committee. The agreement with
Beth Abraham specifically provides that the Board of Trus-
tees of Schnurmacher, which is controlled by Bethco, has “au-
thority over all decisions relating to the operation of Schnur-
macher, including all decisions with respect to staff.”

On August 27, Valdez responded to Dr. Fink’s letter of Au-
gust 19. Valdez requested certain information concerning the
identities of persons having an ownership interest in Schnur-
macher, the organizational structure and information concern-
ing persons holding an interest in Schnurmacher, Beth Israel
Medical Center, Beth Israel Nursing Home, and Continuum
Health Partners, Inc., and documents related to the management
of Schnurmacher by Beth Abraham Health Services.
In response, Dr. Fink wrote to Valdez on September 8, advis-
ing that the structure of Schnurmacher was “significantly”
changed in March 1996. He stated that Schnurmacher has two
corporate members: “BIMC Holding Corporation (which is
controlled by Beth Israel) but has a minority interest, and
Bethco Corporation, an affiliate of Beth Abraham.” He further
stated that Bethco elects the majority of the Board of Trustees
and the Executive Committee of Schnurmacher, and accord-
ingly “Bethco . . . controls the operations of the facility.” He
attached copies of provisions of the bylaws of Schnurmacher,
and an amendment to the certificate of incorporation which
changed the corporate name to Beth Israel-Bethco Nursing
Home, Inc.
It was stipulated that Bethco is a holding corporation, and
that Respondent is a subsidiary of Bethco.
The amended bylaws of “Beth Israel Nursing Homes, Inc.
d/b/a Schnurmacher Nursing Home of Beth Israel Medical
Center” dated March 14, 1996, states that the name of the cor-
poration is “Beth Israel-Bethco Nursing Home, Inc.” The by-
laws state that of the 11 trustees, 6 shall be elected by Bethco
and 5 by Beth Israel Medical Center Holding Corporation
(BIMCHC). The executive committee is comprised of five
members, three of whom shall be Bethco trustees, and two of
whom shall be BIMCHC trustees.
Valdez was aware that the same individual was in charge of
human resources at Respondent and at Schnurmacher. In order
to determine whether Respondent had complete control of or
ownership of Schnurmacher, and in order to verify the accuracy
of the information he had been given by Beth Israel, Valdez
requested information from the Labor Research Association.
That organization annually makes Freedom of Information
requests to the New York State Department of Health for the
cost reports filed by all hospitals and nursing homes doing
business in New York State.
The Labor Research Association prepared and sent to the
Union a memo dated September 17 which stated that Schnur-
macher’s 1997 cost report confirmed the information received
by the Union from Beth Israel concerning the 1996 restructur-
ing agreement, but also “raised some questions about what the
BETH ABRAHAM HEALTH SERVICES

1237
motivation for the deal could have been.” The memo stated that
for many years Beth Israel held the majority and controlling
interest in Schnurmacher, but in March 1996, Beth Israel en-
tered into an agreement with Beth Abraham Health Services to
provide for the restructuring of the nursing home. Under the
terms of the agreement, the bylaws of the nursing home were
amended to provide for two corporate members, BIMCHC and
Bethco.
The memo also noted that pursuant to the restructuring,
Bethco assumed responsibility for the day-to-day management
of the nursing home, and that Beth Israel and Beth Abraham
Health Services finance certain operating expenses of the home
and bill it for such expenses.
The memo stated that the transaction “appears to be a money
loser for Beth Israel, as BIMC has forgiven one of Schnur-
macher’s major debts and now BIMC owes Schnurmacher
money, while Beth Abraham appears to be making money on
the deal. The documents did not mention anything about Beth
Abraham paying BIMC for a share in Schnurmacher.”
The memo further noted that under the terms of the agree-
ment, Beth Israel is obligated to reimburse the nursing home for
any shortfall in Medicaid reimbursement related to the building
and land lease as well as for other obligations. At the end of
1997, the balance due from Beth Israel to Schnurmacher was
$452,422 and the balance due to Beth Abraham Health Services
was $425,000.
The memo stated that “with the April 1996 agreement, Beth
Israel forgave $1.7 million in debt owed to it by Schnur-
macher,” and in 1997, Schnurmacher paid Beth Abraham
Health Services $475,000 for “consulting” services.
D. The Request for Information
On October 2, Valdez drafted a letter, signed by Union
President Dennis Rivera which was sent to Respondent. It
stated that upon review of certain documentation related to the
April 1996 change in Schnurmacher’s ownership, “several
questions remain unanswered, and we would . . . appreciate
your assistance in their clarification so that we may proceed
with bargaining for a first contract for the workers at the nurs-
ing home.”
The letter states as follows:

While the agreement calls for both BIMC and Bethco to fi-
nance certain operating expenses of the home and to bill the
nursing home for these expenses on a monthly basis, it ap-
pears that BIMC continues to be responsible for the lion’s
share of these expenses. At the end of 1997, the balance due
from BIMC to Schnurmacher was $452,422 and the balance
due to BAHS was $425,000. If Bethco is now responsible for
the day to day operations of Schnurmacher, three questions
arise:
Why did BIMC Holding agree to forgive $1.7
million of Schnurmacher’s debt as part of the
transaction and what did Bethco receive in return?
Why does BIMC continue to be the sole party re-
sponsible for making up shortfalls in certain parts
of Schnurmacher’s Medicaid reimbursement?
What is the nature of the consulting services pro-
vided to Schnurmacher by Bethco/BAHS (which
amounted to $475,000 in 1997)?

Respondent admits that it did not furnish the Union with the
information requested. The complaint alleges that the informa-
tion sought in those three questions are necessary for, and rele-
vant to, the Union’s performance of its duties as the representa-
tive of Respondent’s unit employees “specifically to administer
and enforce the provisions of its collective-bargaining agree-
ment.”
The three questions relate to the information in the Labor
Research memo. At hearing, Valdez explained the relevance of
the requested information. He stated that knowing why Beth
Israel forgave a $1.7 million Schnurmacher debt is relevant in
determining whether Respondent merged, bought, or acquired
Schnurmacher. Valdez sought answers to questions he had
concerning how money provided for funding the nursing home
was spent and who made such expenditures. Valdez sought to
understand why, if Bethco or Respondent owned Schnurmacher
and is responsible for providing services to that home, it billed
Schnurmacher $475,000 for services that it was supposed to
provide.
Valdez stated that he asked the above questions because he
had no documentation regarding the change of ownership be-
tween Beth Israel and Respondent, and, for collective-
bargaining purposes, he sought to establish the financial condi-
tion of Schnurmacher.3 Thus, the information sought related,
according to Valdez, to money being transferred to other com-
panies, specifically Bethco and Respondent.
Valdez testified that the October 2 letter was an attempt to
establish whether the Union could file a grievance against Beth
Israel concerning its failure to apply the collective-bargaining
agreement to Schnurmacher and also to determine whether the
information provided—that there was a transfer of ownership
between the two entities—in fact occurred. Valdez stated that
although he was led to believe that ownership of Schnurmacher
was transferred to Respondent, he was presented with no evi-
dence that such was the case.
Valdez further stated that he did not request the information
from Beth Israel because Beth Israel claimed that Respondent
was responsible for the management of Schnurmacher. The
intent of requesting the information was to engage in collective-
bargaining with Schnurmacher.
On October 6, Geraldine Taylor, Respondent’s executive
vice president wrote to the Union in response to the October 2
letter. In the letter, Taylor spoke on behalf of Schnurmacher,
advising that Schnurmacher objects to the Union’s position that
supervisors be included in the bargaining unit. Taylor advised
that Schnurmacher intended to appeal the Board’s decision
concerning the unit.
E. Later Events
The Union requested the release from work of employees of
Schnurmacher and Beth Israel so that they may attend the nego-

3 Respondent asserts that the financial condition of Schnurmacher is
irrelevant to the Union’s concerns since in negotiations it did not raise
the issue of inability to pay.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1238
tiations between Beth Israel and the Union. Valdez stated that
he believed that the negotiations would cover all the entities
that were owned or controlled by the Beth Israel “network.”
Accordingly, the Union requested that employees be released
for negotiations in every entity owned or controlled by Beth
Israel. On October 19, the vice president for human resources at
Beth Israel denied the request, advising that Schnurmacher is
not a party to the negotiations and that Beth Israel is not the
employer of Schnurmacher’s employees.
On November 24, the president for human resources of Beth
Israel advised the Union that Beth Israel would make arrange-
ments for a meeting between Schnurmacher and the Union to
discuss outstanding issues in their labor dispute.
The Union served upon Schnurmacher and Respondent a no-
tice of an intention to engage in a strike at both facilities in late
November. A flyer issued by the Union stated that Respondent,
which controls Schnurmacher, had committed contract viola-
tions. The flyer refers to various alleged violations such as fail-
ing to schedule grievances and not responding to grievances
and hearings, and refusing to select an arbitrator. The flyer also
referred to certain safety issues. The flyer noted that the instant
charge was filed after Respondent “refused to respond to
1199’s request to meet or to provide information needed to
investigate the violations.”
F. Other Information Concerning the Ownership and Manage-
ment of Schnurmacher
Following the close of the hearing, and pursuant to a proce-
dure announced at the close of the hearing, the General Counsel
submitted certain documents to me, with copies to Respondent.
They consisted of: (a) the hearing testimony in the representa-
tion case concerning Schnurmacher of Matthew Stopler, the
vice president for human resources of Respondent; (b) the
Board’s Decision and Direction of Elections in that case; and
(c) proof of reliability or authenticity of underlying documents
to the Labor Research Associates memo dated September 17. 4
Such evidence establishes that Stopler is the vice president
for human resources at Respondent and it is his responsibility
to oversee human resources issues at Schnurmacher, including
hiring, managing, evaluating, disciplining, and terminating
employees. The administrator and manager of human resources
at Schnurmacher have corporate oversight by Respondent.
Stopler testified that Respondent has a contractual relation-
ship with Schnurmacher through Beth Israel pursuant to which
Respondent operates Schnurmacher on a day-to-day basis and
makes all operational decisions for Schnurmacher. Prior to
1996, Beth Israel managed Schnurmacher, but since March of
that year, Respondent undertook such responsibilities.
The Board’s Decision and Direction of Election found that
Schnurmacher is managed by Respondent.
For the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, the chairman of Bethco,
Edwin Stern, served simultaneously as the treasurer of Respon-
dent, and the vice chairmen of both entities, Earl Collier, were
the same. Similarly, the chairman of Respondent, Michael Po-

4 The General Counsel sent copies of all such documents to Respon-
dent. No objection was received to General Counsel’s motion to receive
them in evidence and I do so.
tack, served as treasurer-secretary of Bethco during that period
of time.
Documents filed with the New York State Health Depart-
ment by Beth Israel Nursing Homes, Inc. on December 31,
1997, state that Beth Israel Nursing Homes, Inc., d/b/a Schnur-
macher Nursing Home Beth Israel Medical Center is a not-for-
profit membership corporation having two members, BIMC
Holding Company, Inc. which is also the sole member of Beth
Israel Medical Center and Bethco Corporation, a corporate
entity related to Beth Abraham Health Services, Inc.
The documents further state that in November 1988, Beth Is-
rael Medical Center acquired the operating rights to the facility
later known as Schnurmacher. The facility began operations in
November–1988 as Beth Israel Nursing Homes, Inc., West-
chester Division–Beth Israel Medical Center and in 1992 was
renamed Schnurmacher Nursing Home Beth Israel Medical
Center.
In addition, according to the filed reports, on March 14,
1996, Beth Israel Medical Center entered into an agreement
with Beth Abraham Health Services, Inc. to provide for the
restructuring of the nursing home. Under the agreement, effec-
tive April 1, 1996, the bylaws of the nursing home were
amended to provide for two corporate members: Beth Israel
Medical Center Holding Company, Inc., and Bethco. The nurs-
ing home’s board of trustees consists of 11 trustees, 6 of whom
are elected by Bethco and 5 of whom are elected by Beth Israel
Medical Center. Bethco assumed responsibility for the day-to-
day management of the nursing home.
G. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent’s answer asserted as an affirmative defense that
this matter should be deferred to the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent and the Union. It is well settled that issues involv-
ing requests for information are not appropriate for deferral and
the Board has refused to defer such cases. American National
Can Co., 293 NLRB 901, 904 (1989).
Respondent argues that the Union has not proven that it
needed the information requested in its October 2 letter because
the information sought was made without any reference to any
grievance or potential grievance, or to any other of the union’s
collective-bargaining functions. However, the Board has held
that it is irrelevant that there was no pending grievance when
the request was made. Barnard Engineering, supra, at 620.
Respondent also argues that the October 2 letter only asked
Respondent for “assistance” in helping it answer certain ques-
tions concerning the relationship between Beth Israel and
Schnurmacher. The argument is that since the request did not
contain any reference to a legitimate purpose for the informa-
tion, Respondent was not advised that it had a duty to furnish
the information. I do not agree. Although the Union phrased its
request in a polite form, the letter clearly asked for the informa-
tion sought. No particular terminology is required to make a
demand for information, and Respondent could not doubt that it
was being asked for information.
Respondent further contends that the information is irrele-
vant to the Union’s function as the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of Respondent’s employees. It asserts that the Union
BETH ABRAHAM HEALTH SERVICES

1239
is not entitled to, and does not need to know, the specifics of
the interrelationship between Beth Israel, Respondent and
Schnurmacher in order to fulfill its duties as the bargaining
representative of Respondent’s employees. It argues that Re-
spondent has never denied that it had day-to-day operational
responsibility for Schnurmacher, and therefore the information
sought was irrelevant.
Analysis and Discussion
An employer has a statutory obligation to provide a union,
on request, with relevant information the union needs for the
proper performance of its duties as a collective-bargaining rep-
resentative. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–
436 (1967). In determining whether an employer is obligated to
supply particular information, the question is only whether
there is a “probability that the desired information [is] relevant,
and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statu-
tory duties and responsibilities.” Acme, supra at 437.
When the union’s request relates to information pertaining to
employees in the unit which goes to the core of the employer-
employee relationship, such information is presumptively rele-
vant. The General Counsel argues that the information sought
here is presumptively relevant inasmuch as the Union claims
that if Respondent’s collective-bargaining agreement is applied
to Schnurmacher’s employees, those employees may become
part of the unit in Respondent’s contract.
I reject that argument. The information sought must clearly
refer to employees “in the unit,” not those who may become
members of the unit following additional proceedings. In addi-
tion, the data sought does not encompass such information
which goes to the “core” of the employer-employee relation-
ship such as wages, hours, and working conditions. The infor-
mation sought relates to data sufficient to enable the Union to
discover which entity owns or has a controlling interest in
Schnurmacher. Accordingly, the information sought relates to
matters occurring outside the unit.
As to such information, the union must establish the rele-
vancy and necessity of its request for information. “A union has
satisfied its burden when it demonstrates a reasonable belief
supported by objective evidence for requesting the informa-
tion.” Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258 (1994). The
Supreme Court has characterized the standard to be applied in
determining the union’s right to information as a “broad dis-
covery type standard” permitting the union access to a broad
scope of information potentially useful for the purpose of effec-
tuating the bargaining process. Acme, supra at 437 and fn. 6.
The Board has adopted that discovery standard in “determining
relevance in information requests, including those for which a
special demonstration of relevance is needed, and potential or
probable relevance is sufficient to give rise to an employer’s
obligation to provide information.” Shoppers Food, supra, at
259. The burden of showing the relevance of nonunit informa-
tion “is not an exceptionally heavy one.” Bently-Jost Electric
Corp., 282 NLRB 564, 567 (1987); Pence Construction Corp.,
281 NLRB 322, 324 (1986).
A union satisfies its burden by demonstrating that when it
made its request, it had a “reasonable belief supported by objec-
tive evidence for requesting the information.” E. J. Alrich Elec-
trical Contractors, 325 NLRB 1036, 1039 (1998); Kranz Heat-
ing & Cooling, 328 NLRB 401, 403 (1999).
The facts known to the Union at the time of its request for in-
formation were as follows:

Valdez at first believed that Beth Israel owned Schnurmacher
and demanded that it apply the terms of its contract to
Schnurmacher. Then Valdez was informed that Schnur-
macher was managed by Respondent which was responsible
for its operations, and that Beth Israel was not involved at all
in Schnurmacher’s operations. Thereafter, Valdez was ad-
vised that Beth Israel transferred a controlling interest in
Schnurmacher to Bethco, an affiliate of Respondent.

At that point, Valdez was apparently sufficiently concerned
about the relationship of the companies involving Schnur-
macher to inquire of Beth Israel the organizational structure and
identities of individuals having an ownership interest in
Schnurmacher, Beth Israel Medical Center, Beth Israel Nursing
Home and Continuum Health Partners, and documents related
to the management of Schnurmacher by Respondent.
Valdez was then advised that Bethco, an affiliate of Respon-
dent, is the majority owner of Schnurmacher and controls the
operation of the facility. He was further advised that BIMC
Holding Corporation has a minority interest in Schnurmacher.
Valdez was then furnished a report by the Labor Research
Association which raised certain questions which formed the
basis of the Union’s request for information at issue here.
Thus, the Association’s report noted that when ownership of
the nursing home was transferred in 1996 to Beth Israel Medi-
cal Center Holding Corporation and Bethco, Beth Israel Medi-
cal Center forgave a $1.7 million debt of Schnurmacher. Never-
theless, at the time of the 1997 report filed with the Department
of Health, Beth Israel Medical Center was obligated to reim-
burse Schnurmacher for any shortfall in Medicaid reimburse-
ment, and the Medical Center owes $452,422 to Schnurmacher,
whereas Beth Abraham Health Services is due $425,000.
These facts caused the Union to ask why Beth Israel Medical
Center forgave the $1.7 million debt and what Bethco received
in return, and also why Beth Israel continued to be the sole
party responsible to make up shortfalls in Schnurmacher’s
Medicaid reimbursement. Valdez sought to probe whether,
notwithstanding that Beth Israel Medical Center purportedly
gave up ownership and control of Schnurmacher, it neverthe-
less retained an interest or ownership in it by virtue of having
received something of value in return for its forgiveness of a
substantial debt.
Such retention of control or ownership might justify a griev-
ance against Beth Israel seeking the application of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement’s after-acquired clause to Schnur-
macher upon the theory that Schnurmacher was an additional
facility of Beth Israel and under its principal direction and con-
trol. Such an approach had already been undertaken by the
Union in its letter of August 5 to Beth Israel, demanding that it
apply the contract to Schnurmacher. The Union was then re-
buffed with the answer that Beth Israel did not own or control
Schnurmacher.
The answers to the Union’s inquiry might also justify a
grievance against Respondent if the Union determined that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1240
Schnurmacher was an additional facility of Respondent and
under its principal direction and control.
Valdez also sought to learn why Beth Israel, which sold
Schnurmacher, and purportedly having a minority interest in
the nursing home, would agree to reimburse it for shortfalls in
Medicaid reimbursement. Kranz Heating & Cooling, 328
NLRB 401, 402 (1998), where a union properly requested in-
formation concerning the relationship between joint employers
or alter egos. The Union’s last question asked for the nature of
the consulting services provided to Schnurmacher by
Bethco/BAHS of $475,000. That question raised the issue of
why the purported owner of Schnurmacher billed it for services
provided to it. According to Valdez, he believed that it was
unusual for an owner of a facility to charge itself for consulting
services. These inquiries call into question the issue of whether
Respondent was, in fact, the owner of the facility.
Notwithstanding that at the time of the Union’s October 2
letter, public documents confirmed that Bethco and Respondent
owned the facility, each of the three questions asked by the
Union was directed to a fuller understanding of the nature of
the ownership and clearly related to the issue of whether
Schnurmacher was a new or additional facility, and which en-
tity had principal direction and control of Schnurmacher. The
answers to that inquiry would enable the Union to properly
consider whether and against which entity to file a grievance
under the after-acquired facility clause of the two contracts.
The Union made clear its intent to have some entity with
which it had a collective-bargaining agreement apply that con-
tract to Schnurmacher. First, the Union through its August 5
letter demanded that Beth Israel do so. Then when the Union
was informed that Beth Israel was no longer the owner of
Schnurmacher, it was given information that Respondent was
the owner and then sought to make the same demand of Re-
spondent.
Contrary to Respondent, I find that the Union’s October 2
letter set forth the basis for its request for the information. The
Union stated that it had several questions relating to the 1996
change in Schnurmacher’s ownership, and requested answers
so that it “may proceed with bargaining for a first contract for
the workers at the nursing home.”
Thus, following the Union’s certification as the collective-
bargaining representative of certain Schnurmacher’s employ-
ees, the Union obtained information from the Labor Research
Association’s review of Schnurmacher’s public reports. The
information raised certain questions concerning whether Beth
Israel retained ownership or control of Schnurmacher. The
Union thus had a reasonable belief supported by objective evi-
dence for requesting explanations and answers to its inquiry.
The Union’s October 2 request sought information concern-
ing the retention of control of Schnurmacher by Respondent or
Beth Israel following its sale. The request specifically raised
the issue of the continued responsibility of Beth Israel for
Schnurmacher’s expenses and its forgiveness of a substantial
loan notwithstanding its sale of the facility. Accordingly, the
Union sought to explore and obtain answers to the question of
the continued relationship of Beth Israel to Schnurmacher. “The
Union was entitled to the requested information to determine
the nature of the relationship between the companies.” Brisco
Sheet Metal, 307 NLRB 361 (1992). In National Broadcasting
Co., 318 1166, 1168–1169 (1995), the Board found that the
union was entitled to information concerning the extent to
which the General Electric Company controlled the operations
of the respondent, and the arrangements between it, respondent
and other companies.
The guiding consideration in determining the validity of the
Union’s request is whether there is a “probability” that the de-
sired information is relevant and that it would be of use to the
Union in carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities.
Acme, supra. The information sought need not be determinative
of the issue of which entity owns, or has principal direction or
control of Schnurmacher. The information sought here is
clearly potentially useful and has probable relevance in the
Union’s attempt to discover, for itself, the nature of the rela-
tionship between Beth Israel and Respondent as it relates to
Schnurmacher. Such an inquiry is clearly related to the Union’s
duties and responsibilities toward the unit employees of Beth
Israel, Respondent and Schnurmacher inasmuch as the facts
revealed by the answers to the questions may indicate that a
grievance should be filed under the after-acquired clause of the
contract with Beth Israel or Respondent.
I accordingly find that the Union requested relevant informa-
tion to aid it in its determination as to whether to file a griev-
ance under the after-acquired clause of its collective-bargaining
agreement with either Beth Israel or Respondent.
Although there is no evidence to support a finding that the
Union’s October 2 request could have reasonably alerted Re-
spondent to the fact that the Union sought this information to
assert a claim that the after-acquired clause of their contract
would be applied to Schnurmacher, nevertheless the letter spe-
cifically stated that the information related to a contract for the
Schnurmacher employees. In addition, “the adequacy of the
requests to apprise the Respondent of the relevancy of the in-
formation must be judged in the light of the entire pattern of
facts available to the Respondent” including the Union’s hear-
ing testimony as to the reasons for the requests inasmuch as the
Union’s requests for the information is still outstanding. Re-
spondent’s continuing failure to respond cannot be attributed to
inadequacy of the communications. Ohio Power Co., 216
NLRB 987, 991 fn. 9 (1975); Barnard Engineering Co., 282
NLRB 617, 620 (1987). Moreover, Respondent’s failure to
respond to the request had nothing to do with the alleged inade-
quacy of the request. Respondent simply ignored the request.
The record does not support a finding that Respondent would
have complied with the request had it been given the specific
reasons for the information sought. Westwood Import Co., 251
NLRB 1213, 1227 (1980). Furthermore, “an employer may not
simply refuse to comply with an ambiguous and/or overbroad
information request, but must request clarification and/or com-
ply with the request to the extent it encompasses necessary and
relevant information.” National Electrical Contractors Assn.,
313 NLRB 770, 771 (1994).
Respondent argues that there is no dispute that it has com-
plete control over Schnurmacher’s operations, the Union was so
informed at the representation hearing and even by its own
research, and therefore the information requested is irrelevant
and unnecessary. However, the Union was not required to ac-
BETH ABRAHAM HEALTH SERVICES

1241
cept Respondent’s assertion that it had complete control over
the management of Schnurmacher. It was “entitled to make its
own investigation and evaluation of the merits of the claim.”
Barnard, supra at 621. The Union was entitled to “verify
whether its belief was accurate.” E. J. Alrich, supra at 1036.
Respondent contends that the Union is not entitled to finan-
cial information in the absence of a claim that it is unable to
pay requested wages or benefits. However, “the Union is not
seeking Respondent’s records—merely answers.” Bentley-Jost,
supra at 569.
Contrary to Respondent, I do not believe that the statements
in Valdez’ November 1998 affidavit defeats the Union’s claim
for the information. The affidavit was submitted in opposition
to Respondent’s application for an injunction prohibiting the
sympathy strike against Respondent, and accordingly his state-
ments related to that lawsuit only. The affidavit stated that the
Union did not claim that Respondent has a contractual obliga-
tion to force Schnurmacher to negotiate a contract with the
Union, and that “there is no provision in the 1199-BAHS col-
lective-bargaining agreement relating to the dispute at”
Schnurmacher. As set forth in the affidavit, Valdez’ statement
was in response to Respondent’s argument that the strike was
not a sympathy strike because of the Union’s claim that Re-
spondent has a contractual obligation to require Schnurmacher
to bargain with the Union. The affidavit related to the issue of
whether the Union was properly engaged in a sympathy strike,
and not which entity has principal direction and control of
Schnurmacher as is involved here.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Beth Abraham Health Services, is an em-
ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. Local 1199 National Health and Human Services Employ-
ees Union, SEIU, AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material, the Union has been and continues to
be the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Re-
spondent’s employees in the following unit:

All full-time and regular part-time service and maintenance
employees, clerical and technical employees, licensed practi-
cal nurses, social workers, practical dieticians, occupational
therapists, and pharmacists, employed by the Employer at 612
Allerton Avenue, Bronx, New York, excluding all other em-
ployees, including professional employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.

4. By failing and refusing to respond to and furnish the Un-
ion with the information requested in its letter of October 2,
1998, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent
be ordered to provide the Union with the information that it
requested by letter dated October 2, 1998.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Beth Abraham Health Services, Bronx,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with Local 1199 Na-
tional Health and Human Services Employees Union, SEIU,
AFL–CIO, by failing and refusing to furnish it with information
that was requested by letter dated October 2, 1998, which in-
formation is relevant and necessary to administer the collective-
bargaining agreement between Respondent and the Union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Furnish to the Union the information it requested by letter
dated October 2, 1998.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in the Bronx, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since October 6, 1998.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1242
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with 1199
National Health and Human Services Employees Union, SEIU,
AFL–CIO, by failing and refusing to furnish it with information
that was requested by letter dated October 2, 1998, which in-
formation is relevant and necessary to administer the collective-
bargaining agreement between us and the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish to the Union the information it requested
by letter dated October 2, 1998.
BETH ABRAHAM HEALTH SERVICES