Best Yet Market

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jan 14, 2003

29-CA-024995 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 14, 2003)

JD(NY)–01-03
Astoria, NY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE

A & E FOOD CO. 1, INC.,
d/b/a BEST YET MARKET

and Case No. 29-CA-24995

UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS,
LOCAL 1500, AFL-CIO

Tabitha Tyle, Esq., Brooklyn, NY,
for the General Counsel.
Patricia McConnell, Esq. (Meyer, Suozzi,
English & Klein, P.C.), New York, NY,
for the Union
Thomas V. Walsh, Esq. (Jackson Lewis, LLP),
White Plains, NY, for the Respondent.

DECISION

Statement of the Case

STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge: Based upon a charge filed on June 19,
20021 by United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1500, AFL-CIO (Union), a complaint was
issued on August 28 against A & E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a Best Yet Market (Respondent or Best
Yet), a supermarket located in a shopping center in Queens County, New York.

The complaint alleges that on June 11, the Respondent’s store manager Jim Eriksen (a)
directed Union handbillers and pickets to remove themselves from the shopping center parking
lot (b) informed the owner of the shopping center about the Union’s lawful picketing and
handbilling where an object of so informing the owner was to interfere with such activities and
(c) caused the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter seeking to cause the Union
handbillers and pickets to leave the shopping center parking lot. The complaint further alleges
that on June 12, Eriksen threatened Union handbillers and pickets that he would call the police if
they did not remove themselves from the shopping center parking lot.

The Respondent’s answer denied the material allegations of the complaint, and on
October 2, a hearing was held before me in Brooklyn, New York. Upon the evidence presented
in this proceeding, and my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and after
consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the
following:

Findings of Fact

I. Jurisdiction

1 All dates hereafter are in 2002.

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The Respondent, a domestic corporation having an office and place of business in
Astoria, New York, has been engaged in the operation of a supermarket. During the past 12
month period it has derived gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000, and has also
purchased and received at its facility, goods and materials valued in excess of $5,000 directly
from suppliers located outside New York State. The Respondent admits and I find that it is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. The Respondent also admits
and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

II. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices

A. Background

The Best Yet store involved in this matter is located in a shopping center in Queens
County, New York which comprises one square block. Best Yet leases the store from Elias
Properties Astoria, LLC (Elias). The store is situated on the north side of the shopping center,
and is one of seven stores occupying the center. The Best Yet store occupies an area which is
two-thirds that of the total area of all the stores in the shopping center. The east side of the store
is a few feet from 37th Street. That street is a roadway which has three entrances across the
sidewalk into the shopping center parking lot. Two entrances are customer entrances having
two lanes of traffic each. One of the entrances is situated only about 10 feet from the Best Yet
building. The third entrance is a commercial entrance through which vendors bring goods for the
Bet Yet store. A main parking lot is situated to the south of the Best Yet store and extends to
37th Street. The sidewalk separates the roadway from the parking lot.

B. The Picketing

The Best Yet store opened on May 23. On June 11, four Union pickets stood at each of
the two customer entrances on the sidewalk bordering 37th Street – two of the four pickets stood
on each side of each entrance with traffic passing between them to and from 37th Street into and
out of the parking lot. The picket sign stated:

SHOPPERS
This Employer DOES NOT employ
members of UFCW LOCAL 1500
PLEASE DO NOT SHOP AT
“Best Yet”
BUY UNION
SHOP AT
Stop-n-Shop
Key Food Markets
Pathmark
United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1500

A flyer distributed by the pickets advised that Best Yet is a “non-union” store; its
employees receive less benefits than other food union workers in New York City; and Best Yet
“lowers the quality of life in your community by not providing Union wages and benefits.” The
flyer asked that calls be made to the Best Yet store manager inquiring as to why the workers do
not receive the “best benefits.” The flyer also requested that shoppers not shop at Best Yet and
instead shop at other, union stores.

John Mallen, the Union organizer, did not stand on the sidewalk. Rather, he stood in an
empty parking space at the end of a row of spaces in the parking lot immediately adjacent to the

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sidewalk abutting 37th Street. The space in which he was standing was the closest parking
space to the parking lot entrance at which the pickets stood, and was two to three feet from the
sidewalk.

Mallen stood in that area during the picketing and handbilling. He testified that other
pickets also entered the lot in order to give a flyer to the occupant of a vehicle. On such
occasions, the pickets gave a flyer to a vehicle which had traveled not more than five to six feet
into the lot.

Mallen denied seeing any signs in the lot prohibiting solicitation or trespassing. Other
witnesses testified about such signs, which will be discussed below.

C. The Respondent’s Actions

Aviv Raitses, the Respondent’s president, testified that on about June 11, Jim Eriksen,
the store manager of Best Yet, called and told him that pickets were present at the shopping
center, and that picketing and handbilling were being conducted on the public sidewalk abutting
37th Street. Raitses told Eriksen to watch the picketing to see if it was being conducted in an
“orderly fashion” or if “there were unusual occurrences” such as blocking of traffic by the pickets
or harassment of customers. In the first or a subsequent conversation, Raitses was told that the
pickets had entered the parking lot. Raitses then told Eriksen to ask the pickets to leave the
property.

Mallen stood in the parking lot on June 11, and observed a man leaving the Best Yet
store carrying the Union’s flyer. The man approached Mallen, told him that he was on private
property, and asked him to step onto the sidewalk. Mallen replied that the parking lot was a
“public space” located in a “public shopping center” and refused to leave. The man repeated
that “it is private property” and said, “we do not allow solicitation.” Mallen asked him if he was
the owner of the property, and the man replied that he was not the owner but that he was the
store manager of Best Yet.2 Mallen asked if Best Yet owned the property. The manager said it
did not, but it rented the store, and again said that Mallen was on private property, and
demanded that he get on the sidewalk. Mallen replied that he could be removed only by the
property owner. The man answered that he would call the landlord. Mallen stood in the parking
space for the rest of the day until about 5:00 p.m.

After being informed by Eriksen of the picketing, Raitses called Loraine Fruhwald, the
office manager for Elias, and told her that there were pickets in the parking lot. He asked for a
letter which would “reinforce our right in case we would need to get the police involved to
remove the picketers or in case they would not accept our request [to remove them].” Raitses
testified that he did not ask for a letter specifically referring to the police, but wanted a letter
“reaffirming our rights as tenant.” He also stated that he requested the letter in the event the
police refused to evict the pickets without authorization from the landlord. Raitses mentioned to
Fruhwald that picketing had taken place at another store he owned in West Islip, New York in
1988, but that his request of the police that they be removed was refused because only the
property owner could ask that they be evicted. Raitses obtained such a letter in the West Islip
case from the landlord’s agent, which was also Elias.

Fruhwald testified that on about June 11 she received a phone call from a manager of
the Respondent who told her that there were pickets in the shopping center. He asked for a
2 I find that this man was Eriksen, the store manager.

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letter which would prevent the pickets from trespassing in the center. She prepared the following
letter dated June 11 on the letterhead of Elias:

To Whom It May Concern:
The owner, Elias Properties Astoria, LLC, forbids trespassing on
its property located at 1930-1950 37th Street, Astoria, New York
for the purpose of picketing and hereby gives permission to the
Police Department to enforce the above.

The following day, June 12, Mallen returned with the same pickets. They stood in the
same places with Mallen standing in the same empty parking space he had stood in the day
before. At 11:00 a.m. the same man who had identified himself as the Respondent’s store
manager approached Mallen and told him he must leave, and if he did not he would call the
police. Mallen then stepped onto the sidewalk. The manager gave Mallen the above letter.
Raitses testified that according to Eriksen, the pickets were obstructing traffic and the
Respondent’s business. Eriksen did not testify.

Following June 12, Mallen did not stand in any parking space in the parking lot, but
rather stood on the sidewalk abutting 37th Street. The Union continued to picket from Tuesday
through Saturday through the end of July. The police were not called to the premises at any
time during the picketing.

Fruhwald testified that Elias is not the owner of the property. Rather it is the managing
company. The lease executed by Elias and the Respondent states that Elias is the agent for the
owner. Fruhwald stated that the parking lot is part of the common area of the premises which
includes the sidewalks and the rear of the building. The lease also defines the “common areas”
as “those portions of the shopping center which are not, from time to time, covered by buildings
or structures, and are for the joint use of all tenants of the shopping center, their customers and
invitees, and for the parking of motor vehicles in the areas designated as ‘parking area.’”

The common areas are not leased, but rather are shared by all seven tenants of the
shopping center. Fruhwald stated that the Landlord is responsible for the maintenance of the
common areas - “we make sure it is clean. We repair anything that needs to be repaired.” Each
of the seven tenants is billed monthly for a “common area maintenance” (CAM) charge pursuant
to which they share the costs of the maintenance and repair of the common areas based upon
their proportionate leasehold share of the building space. Under this system, the Respondent
pays 68.02% of the total CAM, which constitutes its leasehold proportion of the entire property.
Such maintenance and repair include, according to the lease, cleaning, policing, drainage,
lighting, electric, signs and pylons, and snow, ice and debris removal. Tenants seeking services
involving the common area call Elias which then calls a contractor to perform the service. For
example, the Respondent called Elias to remove abandoned cars from the parking lot.

Fruhwald stated that the shopping center does not have a policy concerning solicitation,
and that she did not know what right Best Way had to exclude individuals from its “leased
property.” She noted that the Respondent’s lease contained no provisions restricting Best Way’s
right to exclude individuals from its leased property, nor does Elias have any rules regarding the
tenant’s ability to do so. She stated that if the Respondent, under its lease, wanted to ask an
individual to leave the parking lot, it would not be required to call Elias first. Elias erected two
signs in the parking lot in June or July, 2002. The signs state:

Warning. Private parking lot. No overnight parking. No double-
parking. Parking for customers only while you are in this

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establishment. You cannot leave the premises without your
vehicle for any reason or length of time. Violators will be towed
immediately. Rules are in effect 24 hours, 7 days. No manager or
employee can assist you.

The sign also set forth the name, address and phone number of the towing company.
Raitses stated that the signs were present in the lot when the Respondent opened its store prior
to the picketing.

Raitses testified that he believes that Best Yet has the right, as a tenant, to exclude
individuals who are not its customers or invitees from the common areas of the property. This
belief is based upon his “understanding from common sense” and from his examination of the
lease which contains no restrictions on the Respondent’s right to remove such persons.

Raitses further stated that it is the Respondent’s policy that only customers and
individuals who are shopping in its store and other stores of the shopping center and others who
are invited there by the stores are permitted in the parking lot. Raitses conceded that this policy
is not in writing and he had not asked any other tenant of the shopping center if it agreed with
this policy.

III. Analysis and Discussion

A. Legal Principles

An employer’s exclusion of union representatives from public property violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as long as the union representatives are engaged in activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 of the Act protects the Union’s peaceful area standards activity
comprising picketing and leafleting. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
District Council Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 206 fn. 42 (1978).

An employer’s exclusion of union representatives from private property as to which the
employer lacks a property right entitling it to exclude individuals also violates Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 NLRB 437, 438 (1993). The Board in Wild Oats Community
Markets, 336 NLRB No. 14, slip op. at 2 (2001) stated:

It is well established that an employer may properly prohibit
solicitation/distribution by nonemployee union representatives on
its property if reasonable efforts by the union through other
available channels of communication will enable it to convey its
message, and if the employer’s prohibition does not discriminate
against the union by permitting others to solicit/distribute. See
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 US.S. 105 (1956). This precedent, however,
presupposes that the employer at issue possesses a property
interest entitling it to exclude other individuals from that property.

Therefore, in situations involving a purported conflict between the
exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and private
property rights, an employer charged with a denial of union access
to its property must meet a threshold burden of establishing that it
had, at the time it expelled the union representatives, a property
interest that entitled it to exclude individuals from the property. If it

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fails to do so, there is no actual conflict between private property
rights and Section 7 rights, and the employer’s actions therefore
will be found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Indio
Grocery Outlet, 323 NLRB 1138, 1141-1142 (1997); Food for
Less, 318 NLRB 646, 649 (1995); Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 NLRB
437-438-439 (1993).

Accordingly, the Respondent must first establish that it had a property interest in the
parking lot which entitled it to exclude the union representatives from the lot. In determining
whether an adequate property interest has been shown, it is appropriate to examine the lease,
other evidence and the relevant state law. Bristol Farms, above, at 438-439; Johnson & Hardin
Co., 305 NLRB 690, 695 (1991).

B. The Lease

The lease provides that the Landlord “leases to the Tenant … in the building known as
1930 37th Street, Astoria, New York 11105 (approx. 32,000 s.f.) to be used and occupied by the
Tenant as a supermarket.” The lease further provided that “no vaults or space not within the
property line of the building are leased hereunder.”

As set forth above, the lease provides that the “common areas” refers to “those portions
of the shopping center which are not, from time to time, covered by buildings or structures, and
are for the joint use of all tenants of the shopping center, their customers and invitees, and for
the parking of motor vehicles in the areas designated as ‘parking area.’” The Landlord maintains
and repairs the common areas and bills each of the tenants for the costs involved in such work
based upon the tenant’s proportionate leasehold share of the property.

I cannot agree with Raitses that the Respondent has the right, as a tenant, to exclude
individuals who are not its customers or invitees from the common areas of the property. His
assertion is that inasmuch as the lease does not restrict the Respondent from removing such
persons, the Respondent possesses such right.

There is nothing in the lease which permits the Respondent to remove individuals from
the parking lot or other common areas of the property. The lease does not give the Respondent
exclusive control over the lot or the ability to possess it to the exclusion of the other tenants.
Rather, the lease expressly provides that the Respondent had the “joint use” of the lot with the
other tenants. It is clear that the Respondent is leased only a certain specified area of property
which constitutes its store. Pursuant to the lease, the landlord retains the right to maintain and
repair the parking lot. Giant Food Stores, 295 NLRB 330, 332 (1989); Polly Drummond
Thriftway, 292 NLRB 331, 333 (1989). The Respondent possessed “parking privileges on the
property but not the right to exercise dominion over strangers on it.” Polly Drummond, above, at
333, commenting on Barkus Bakery, 282 NLRB 351 (1986).

In Food for Less, above, at 649-650, the shopping center tenant’s lease had similar
provisions as the Respondent’s: it provided that the tenant had a non-exclusive easement for
parking for its “customers, employees and invitees.” That respondent also had a no-solicitation-
no trespassing and no-distribution policy. Nevertheless, the Board found that the respondent
only had a nonexclusive easement for specified business purposes, and lacked a property
interest in the parking lot which entitled it to expel the union’s handbillers. The Board held that at
best it had a nonexclusive easement interest for limited business purposes, and that such an
interest did not include the legal authority to exclude the union agents from the shopping center
property.

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The parking lot is the property of the owner, not the Respondent. The rules restricting
the use of the lot apply to the owner’s rights and not the Respondent’s. Accordingly, Raitses’
testimony that it is the Respondent’s policy that only shoppers and invitees are permitted to use
the parking lot is irrelevant, and also does not take into account the rights of the other tenants.

Accordingly, the “Respondent has shown that at best it had a nonexclusive easement
interest for limited business purposes, and it has not established that this interest carried the
legal authority to exclude.” Food for Less, above, at 650.

Notwithstanding Raitses’ hearsay testimony that Eriksen told him that the pickets were
obstructing traffic, that contention has not been proven. The record does not contain any
evidence that the handbilling or picketing interfered with the Respondent’s conduct of its
business or any person‘s ingress to or egress from the Respondent’s store.

C. New York Law

In Latrieste Restaurant and Cabaret, Inc., v. Village of Port Chester, 212 A.D. 2d 668
(1995), leave to appeal denied, 86 N.Y. 2d 837 (1995), the court held that “there is no First
Amendment right to picket or demonstrate on private property, including private driveways and
parking lots, against the wishes of the property owner and/or tenant in possession.”

I cannot find that the Respondent was a tenant in possession of the parking lot. In Turrisi
v. Ponderosa, Inc., 179 A.D. 2d 956, 957 (1992), a case involving personal injury sustained in a
parking lot, the owner of the property agreed to maintain the common area, including the
parking lot, in good repair. The plaintiff fell in the parking lot, a common area, and sued
Ponderosa restaurant, a tenant in the shopping center. The court held that “Ponderosa
exercised no control over the parking lot which is evident by its inability to exclude others from
this common area. Further, Ponderosa did not have a right of possession to the parking lot, but
only a right to use it.” See Bridgham v. Fairview Plaza, 257 A.D.2d 914 (1999).

Accordingly, I cannot find that the Respondent was a tenant in possession of the parking
lot. It did not possess the lot, occupy it, or have the exclusive right to possess it. The
Respondent merely had, according to the lease, the “joint use” of the lot which it shared with the
other tenants. Therefore, under New York law, the Respondent did not have the right to exclude
persons from picketing or demonstrating in the parking lot.

The cases cited by the Respondent are inapposite. Steltzer v. Spesaison, 161 Misc. 2d
507 (1994) and Zwerin v. Geiss, 38 Misc. 2d 306 (1963), both involved tenants residing in
residential apartment dwellings in New York City. It was held in those cases that the tenants
have exclusive possession and occupation of their dwellings and their landlords had no
authority to enter their apartments without cause. In addition, Cary v. Fisher, 149 A.D. 2D 890
(1989), In re Cole, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 275 (1947), and Brinn v. Slawson & Hobbs, 273 A.D. 1 (1947),
involved issues of possession of property by co-owners who owned the property as tenants in
common. Here, the Respondent does not own the parking lot. The cases cited by the
Respondent are far different from the instant facts where a tenant of a store seeks to exclude
persons from a shopping center parking lot. The Respondent does not have exclusive
possession of any part of the lot sufficient to exclude anyone from it, and it does not own the lot.

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D. Conclusions

Under the above principles, I cannot find that the Respondent has established that it has
any exclusory property interest in the parking lot. The lease gives the Respondent a
nonexclusive right to use that common area jointly with the other tenants. Neither the lease nor
New York law gave the Respondent the authority to attempt to remove anyone from the parking
lot or to take the actions that it did on June 11 and 12. “The lease gave the Respondent parking
privileges on the property but not the right to exercise dominion over strangers on it.” Polly
Drummond, above, at 333.

Based upon the above, I find that the Respondent interfered with the Section 7 rights of
employees by its actions. I specifically find that store manager Eriksen’s demand on June 11
that Mallen leave the parking lot property, and Eriksen’s further demand on June 12 that he
leave and if he did not Eriksen would call the police, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Food for
Less, above, at 647, 650; See Wild Oats Community Markets, 336 NLRB No. 14 (2001), slip op.
at 3,4.

I accordingly find and conclude that, as alleged in the complaint, the Respondent
unlawfully directed Union handbillers and pickets to remove themselves from the shopping
center parking lot, and threatened Union handbillers and pickets that it would call the police if
they did not remove themselves from the shopping center parking lot.

I also find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Respondent unlawfully informed the
owner of the shopping center about the Union’s lawful picketing and handbilling where an object
of so informing the owner was to interfere with such activities, and caused the owner of the
shopping center to issue a letter seeking to cause the Union handbillers and pickets to leave the
shopping center parking lot. These findings are consistent with Wild Oats, above, in which the
Board found that a shopping center tenant unlawfully “initiat[ed] a chain of events” which
culminated in the removal of union agents from the center’s parking lot. In that case, as here,
the respondent tenant contacted the shopping center manager to report the presence of pickets.
Thereafter, the manager, accompanied by the tenant’s attorney, asked the pickets to leave the
parking lot and the manager asked the police to remove them. The Board found that the
respondent unlawfully engaged in an “indirect attempt to expel the union representatives.”
Here, as in Wild Oats, by informing Elias of the picketing and requesting a letter which would
enable the police to remove the pickets, the Respondent indirectly attempted, through Elias, to
unlawfully remove the pickets. As the Board noted in Wild Oats, the Respondent could not
accomplish indirectly that which it was prohibited from doing directly.

Conclusions of Law

1. By directing Union handbillers and pickets to remove themselves from the shopping
center parking lot, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

2. By informing the owner of the shopping center about the Union’s lawful picketing and
handbilling where an object of so informing the owner was to interfere with such activities, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

3. By causing the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter seeking to cause the
Union handbillers and pickets to leave the shopping center parking lot, the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

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4. By threatening Union handbillers and pickets that it would call the police if they did not
remove themselves from the shopping center parking lot, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.

Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended3

ORDER
The Respondent, A & E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a Best Yet Market, Astoria, New York, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Directing Union handbillers and pickets to remove themselves from the shopping
center parking lot.

(b) Informing the owner of the shopping center about the Union’s lawful picketing and
handbilling where an object of so informing the owner was to interfere with such activities.

(c) Causing the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter seeking to cause the
Union handbillers and pickets to leave the shopping center parking lot.

(d) Threatening Union handbillers and pickets that it would call the police if they did not
remove themselves from the shopping center parking lot.

(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Astoria, New York,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 29, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
4 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in
the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”

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customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since June 11, 2002.

(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C.

_____________________
Steven Davis
Administrative Law Judge

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APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT direct Union handbillers and pickets to remove themselves from the shopping
center parking lot.

WE WILL NOT inform the owner of the shopping center about the Union’s lawful picketing and
handbilling where an object of so informing the owner was to interfere with such activities.

WE WILL NOT cause the owner of the shopping center to issue a letter seeking to cause the
Union handbillers and pickets to leave the shopping center parking lot.

WE WILL NOT threaten Union handbillers and pickets that we would call the police if they did
not remove themselves from the shopping center parking lot.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

A & E Food Co. 1, Inc., d/b/a Best Yet Market

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and
must not be altered, defaced, or covered with any other material. Any questions concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, One Metro Tech
Center, Jay St & Myrtle Ave,10th Floor, Brooklyn, NY 11201–4201, Tel. 718–330–2862.

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