Bentley Motors Limitedv.Aucera SA

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 29, 2016

No. 92060353 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2016)

Baxley Mailed: November 29, 2016

Cancellation No. 92060353
Bentley Motors Limited
v.
Aucera SA

Before Cataldo, Kuczma, and Larkin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

By the Board:

Aucera SA (“Respondent”) owns three registrations on the Supplemental Register
for the mark BENTLEY in standard characters for (1) “watches, watch bands, watch
chains and watchcases” in International Class 14 (“the watch registration”),1 (2)
“jewelry bracelets, bracelets of precious metal, diamonds, earrings, jewelry, jewelry
pins, pearls, jewelry boxes of precious metal, and jewelry cases of precious metal,” in
International Class 14 (“the jewelry registration”),2 and (3) “ball-point pens, fountain

1 Registration No. 2007286, issued October 8, 1996, renewed, and alleging February 12, 1948
as the date of first use anywhere and May 15, 1995 as the date of first use in commerce. The
underlying application for such registration was filed on April 14, 1995, based on an assertion
of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15
U.S.C. § 1051(b). After Respondent filed an amendment to allege use on February 28, 1996,
Respondent amended the application to the Supplemental Register on July 16, 1996.

2 Registration No. 2096184, issued September 9, 1997, renewed, and alleging February 1,
1996 as the date of first use anywhere and March 1, 1996 as the date of first use in commerce.
The underlying application for such registration was filed on October 18, 1996, based on an
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
This decision is not a
precedent of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board.
Cancellation No. 92060353

2
pens, pen clips, pens, pen cases and writing ink” in International Class 16 (“the pen
registration”).3 In the original petition to cancel, Bentley Motors Limited
(“Petitioner”) seeks cancellation of Respondent’s registrations on the ground of
abandonment.4 Respondent, in its answer, denied the salient allegations of the
petition to cancel.5

assertion of use in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
Respondent amended the application to the Supplemental Register on July 1, 1997.

3 Registration No. 2096186, issued October 18, 1996, renewed, and alleging February 1, 1996
as the date of first use anywhere and March 1, 1996 as the date of first use in commerce. The
underlying application for such registration was filed on October 18, 1996, based on an
assertion of use in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a).
Respondent amended the application to the Supplemental Register on July 1, 1997.

4 The abandonment claim set forth in the original petition to cancel is insufficiently pleaded.
An abandonment claim requires an allegation of ultimate facts pertaining to the alleged
abandonment, i.e., a pleading of at least three consecutive years of nonuse or of facts that
show a period of nonuse less than three years coupled with an intent not to resume use. See
Otto Int’l Inc. v. Otto Kern GmbH, 83 USPQ2d 1861, 1863 (TTAB 2007). In the original
petition, Petitioner merely alleges that, upon information and belief, Respondent
discontinued use in the United States of its involved mark with no intent to resume said use.

5 In its answer, Respondent set forth affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim and
unclean hands. However, Respondent did not file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) prior to or concurrently with its answer.
See TBMP § 503.
In addition, the defense of unclean hands is unavailable against a claim of abandonment
and, in any event, is insufficiently pleaded because Respondent alleges no conduct related to
Petitioner’s claim that provides a basis therefor. See American Vitamin Products Inc. v.
DowBrands Inc., 22 USPQ2d 1313 (TTAB 1992) (equitable defenses, such as unclean hands,
unavailable against abandonment claims); Midwest Plastic Fabricators Inc. v. Underwriters
Laboratories Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1067, 1069 (TTAB 1987) (defense of unclean hands found
insufficient where it included no specific allegations of conduct that, if proven, would prevent
plaintiff from prevailing on its claims); Tony Lama Co., Inc. v. Di Stefano, 206 USPQ 176,
179 (TTAB 1980) (the concept of unclean hands must be related to a plaintiff's claim;
misconduct unrelated to the claim against which it is asserted as a defense does not constitute
unclean hands).

Cancellation No. 92060353

3
The following motions are pending in this case: Petitioner’s motion (filed April 19,
2016) for leave to file an amended petition to cancel; (2) Petitioner’s motion (filed
April 19, 2016) for summary judgment; and (3) Respondent’s cross-motion (filed May
24, 2016) for summary judgment.
Turning first to Petitioner’s motion for leave to file an amended petition to cancel,
that motion is granted as conceded in view of Respondent’s failure to file a brief in
response thereto. See Trademark Rule 2.127(a). The amended petition to cancel is
accepted as the operative complaint herein.
A review of the amended petition to cancel indicates that Petitioner seeks
cancellation of Respondent’s aforementioned registrations on the Supplemental
Register on grounds of nonuse (paragraphs 1 and 2), fraud (paragraph 3), and
abandonment based on nonuse of the BENTLEY mark “for all of the registered goods
for one or more periods of three years or more” with intent not to resume use of that
mark (paragraph 4). 29 TTABVUE 5-7. Petitioner has adequately pleaded its
standing (paragraph 5) and claims of nonuse and abandonment.6 See Trademark Act
Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Barbara's Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, 82
USPQ2d 1283, 1289-90 (TTAB 2007); Otto Int’l Inc., 83 USPQ2d at 1863.

6 Although Respondent’s involved registrations were issued more than five years prior to the
commencement of this proceeding, Trademark Act Section 14(3), 15 U.S.C. 1064(3), is
inapplicable because those registrations are on the Supplemental Register. See Trademark
Act Section 26, 15 U.S.C. § 1094.

Cancellation No. 92060353

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Regarding the proposed fraud claim, that claim is set forth in the amended
petition to cancel as follows:
3. On information and belief, including based on materials produced
in discovery, Respondent procured each of the Registrations through
fraud on the Trademark Office:
a. In discovery, Respondent produced no evidence of any
use of the mark BENTLEY prior to September 2001,
between September 2001 and January 2008, or between
April 2008 and June 2013.
b. Respondent submitted declarations to the Trademark
Office in connection with the Registrations affirming its
use of the mark BENTLEY in 1996, 2002, 2003, 2006, and
2007.
c. On information and belief, including based on
materials produced in discovery, Respondent’s declarations
of use were false, and Respondent knew or should have
known that the declarations were false.
d. On information and belief, including based on
materials produced in discovery, in making the false
declarations, Respondent intended to induce the
Trademark Office to issue the Registrations.
e. Respondent’s declarations of use were material, and
were relied on by the Trademark Office in issuing each of
the Registrations.

A pleading of fraud requires an allegation that an applicant or registrant
knowingly made specific false, material representations of fact in connection with an
application to register or in a post-registration filing with the intent of obtaining or
maintaining a registration to which it is otherwise not entitled. See In re Bose Corp.,
580 F.3d 1240, 91 USPQ2d 1938, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “Materiality” of any false
application statement is determined in the context of whether the false statement is
critical to the Trademark Examining Attorney's decision to approve a mark for
publication. See Standard Knitting, Ltd. v. Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, 77
USPQ2d 1917, 1926 (TTAB 2006). Because intent is a required element to be pleaded
Cancellation No. 92060353

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for a claim of fraud, allegations that a party made material representations of fact
that it “knew or should have known” were false or misleading are insufficient. See In
re Bose Corp., 91 USPQ2d at 1940-41. Further, pleadings of fraud made “on
information and belief,” when there is no allegation of “specific facts upon which the
belief is reasonably based,” are also insufficient. Asian and Western Classics B.V. v.
Selkow, 92 USPQ2d 1478, 1479 (TTAB 2009). Although knowledge and intent, as
conditions of mind of a person, may be averred generally, pleadings of fraud must
contain allegations of sufficient underlying facts from which the Board may
reasonably infer that a party acted with the requisite state of mind. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b); id.
Petitioner’s fraud claim is legally insufficient because it is improperly based on an
allegation that Respondent “knew or should have known” that the declarations at
issue were false. Moreover, Petitioner’s allegations regarding intent to deceive are
made upon information and belief without reciting any specific facts from which we
may infer that Respondent acted with requisite intent to deceive. In view thereof, we
sua sponte strike paragraph 3 and all of its subparts from the amended petition to
cancel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); TBMP § 506.01. The amended petition to cancel will
go forward on the nonuse and abandonment claims only.
Turning to the cross-motions for summary judgment, Petitioner, in its motion,
seeks entry of judgment on the grounds of (1) nonuse of the BENTLEY mark prior to
the issuance of any of Respondent’s involved registrations; (2) failure to make bona
fide commercial use of such mark for any of the identified goods in its involved
Cancellation No. 92060353

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registrations; and (3) abandonment based on nonuse of the BENTLEY mark for
separate periods of more than three years commencing (a) in 1995, (b) on September
9, 2001, and (c) on April 20, 2008.7 Respondent in its cross-motion, seeks entry of
judgment on the grounds that (1) its registrations are not void ab initio in view of its
use of the mark on the goods at issue either prior to the filing of the amendment to
allege use in support of the watch registration or prior to the filing of the use-based
applications for the jewelry and pen registrations;8 and (2) it has not abandoned use
of the BENTLEY mark on the goods identified in the registrations at issue.
Following the completion of briefing of the cross-motions, Petitioner, on June 30,
2016, filed objections to evidence that Respondent submitted with its reply brief in
support of the cross-motion for summary judgment, and Respondent, on July 8, 2016,
filed a response thereto. Because those evidentiary submissions are expressly
prohibited by Trademark Rule 2.127(a), they have received no consideration.
However, we note that, with its reply brief, Respondent submitted a supplemental
declaration of Respondent’s president Chia-Hsiang Cheng (“the Cheng supplemental
declaration”) and a declaration of Chao-Chung (Kris) Chen, president of Respondent’s
licensee, Pyxis Enterprise Co. (“the Chen declaration”), regarding its activities in

7 Petitioner further contends that its claims are not barred by laches. However, Respondent
never pleaded an affirmative defense of laches and therefore could not rely thereon in defense
of Petitioner’s motion. See TBMP §§ 314 and 528.07(a). Moreover, such defense is unavailable
against claims of abandonment and nonuse. See Saint-Gobain Abrasives Inc. v. Unova
Industrial Automation Systems Inc., 66 USPQ2d 1355, 1359 (TTAB 2003).

8 Respondent alleges throughout its brief in response to Petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment and in support of its motion that it had a bona fide intent to use the BENTLEY
mark in connection with the goods identified in the registrations. However, Petitioner did not
plead a claim of no bona fide intent to use in the amended petition to cancel. See TBMP § 314.
Cancellation No. 92060353

7
connection with Respondent’s involved mark since it became Respondent’s licensee
in 2012. The Cheng supplemental declaration merely updates an earlier declaration
and has therefore been accorded appropriate probative weight.
Regarding the Chen declaration, Petitioner did not have the opportunity to
address this evidence in its response to Respondent’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. Fairness dictates that Respondent should have submitted it with
Respondent’s combined brief in response to Petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment and cross-motion for summary judgment. Based on the foregoing, the Chen
declaration is untimely submitted and has been given no consideration. See Omega
SA (Omega AG) (Omega Ltd.) v. Alpha Phi Omega, 118 USPQ2d 1289, 1300 n.18
(TTAB 2016).
Many invoices submitted in connection with the cross-motions for summary
judgment appear to be in Chinese. Because the Board conducts its proceedings in
English, any submitted documents that are in another language must be
accompanied by a translation. See Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. de C.V. v.
Paleteria La Michoacana Inc., 98 USPQ2d 1921, 1928 (TTAB 2011). Because such
invoices are not accompanied by the requisite translations, they are entitled to no
probative weight.9 See id.
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
are no genuine disputes as to material facts, thus leaving the case to be resolved as a
matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding motions for summary judgment,

9 We hasten to add that the vast majority of those invoices are for transactions that take
place outside of the time period upon which this decision turns.
Cancellation No. 92060353

8
the Board must follow the well-established principles that, in considering the
propriety of summary judgment, all evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable
to the non-movant, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s
favor. The Board may not resolve disputes of material fact; it may only ascertain
whether such disputes are present. See Lloyd's Food Prods. Inc. v. Eli's Inc., 987 F.2d
766, 25 USPQ2d 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Opryland USA Inc. v. Great Am. Music Show
Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 23 USPQ2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Olde Tyme Foods Inc. v.
Roundy's Inc., 961 F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
As a plaintiff moving for summary judgment, Petitioner must establish that there
is no genuine dispute of material fact as to both its standing and any of the claims at
issue. See Fram Trak Industries Inc. v. WireTracks LLC, 77 USPQ2d 2000, 2004
(TTAB 2006). Regarding Petitioner’s standing, Petitioner submitted status and title
copies obtained from the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) of
(1) its pleaded Registration No. 3998345 for the mark BENTLEY for various goods
and services in International Classes 14, 16, 18, 25, 36, and 3710 (31 TTABVUE 26-
27) and (2) its pleaded Registration No. 4881745 for the mark B BENTLEY and

10 The goods and services identified in Registration No. 3998345 include “Jewelry, watches
and clocks, all of the foregoing sold exclusively by authorized dealers” in International Class
14 and “Texts, periodicals, magazines, brochures, pamphlets, information sheets pertaining
to automobiles, their parts, fittings, and accessories; posters, stationery, diaries, calendars,
paper coasters, paper flags, photographs, autograph cards, postcards, photograph and picture
albums, greeting cards, decalcomanias, printed signage for application to windows and
vehicles and user manuals pertaining to automobiles, their parts, fittings, and accessories;
passport holders and checkbook holders made of leather and imitations of leather, all of the
foregoing sold exclusively by authorized dealers” in International Class 16 (emphasis added).

Cancellation No. 92060353

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design for goods in International Classes 11, 14, 16, 20, 2411 (31 TTABVUE 29-30).
These registrations for the identified goods in International Classes 14 and 16 suffice
to establish that there is no genuine dispute that Petitioner has a direct commercial
interest in the outcome of this proceeding and therefore has standing to petition for
cancellation of Respondent’s involved registrations. See Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Turning to the abandonment claim, under Trademark Act Section 45, 15 U.S.C. §
1127,
The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use
in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or
the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed
thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement
impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or
their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce.
So long as the goods are “transported” in commerce, sale of those goods is not required
to satisfy the Section 45 “use in commerce” requirement. See id. “Use in commerce”

11 The goods identified in Registration No. 4881745 include “Precious metals and their alloys;
jewellery, watches and clocks; table clocks; desk clocks; cufflinks; jewellery boxes; cuff
link boxes; key rings of precious metal; key trays of precious metal” in International Class 14
and “Money clips; desk sets; stationery; writing implements; pens; pencils; letter openers;
desktop business card holders; stands for pens and pencils; holders for pens and pencils; desk
file trays; letter trays; letter racks; document folders in the form of wallets; desk pads;
photograph albums; printed photobooks; diaries; paper coasters; calendars; paper clip
holders; paperweights; desk blotters” in International Class 16 (emphasis added).

Cancellation No. 92060353

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should be interpreted with flexibility to account for different industry practices. See
Automedx Inc. v. Artivent Corp., 95 USPQ2d 1976, 1981 (TTAB 2010).
A mark is abandoned “[w]hen its use has been discontinued with intent not to
resume such use. … Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie
evidence of abandonment. ‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark
made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark.” Trademark Act Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added). Section 45
“thus provides that ‘use’ of a trademark defeats an allegation of abandonment when:
the use includes placement on goods sold or transported in commerce; is bona fide; is
made in the ordinary course of trade; and is not made merely to reserve a right in a
mark.” Electro Source LLC v. Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Group Inc., 458 F.3d 931, 80
USPQ2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2006).
The prima facie case “eliminates the challenger's burden to establish the intent
element of abandonment as an initial part of [his] case,” and creates a rebuttable
presumption that the registrant abandoned the mark without intent to resume or
commence use under the statute. See Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris Inc., 899
F.2d 1575, 14 USPQ2d 1390, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 1990). This presumption shifts the
burden to the registrant to produce evidence that, during the relevant statutory
period, it either used the mark or intended to resume or commence use. See id., 14
USPQ2d 1390, 1394-95; Cerveceria Centroamericana S.A. v. Cerveceria India, Inc.,
892 F.2d 1021, 13 USPQ2d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1989). To prove excusable nonuse,
the registrant must produce evidence showing that, under its particular
Cancellation No. 92060353

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circumstances, its activities during that period are those that a reasonable business,
that had a bona fide intent to use the mark in United States commerce, would have
undertaken. See Imperial Tobacco Ltd., 14 USPQ2d at 1394-95 (requiring evidence
“with respect to what activities it engaged in during the nonuse period or what
outside events occurred from which an intent to resume use during the nonuse period
may reasonably be inferred”). Abandonment cannot be cured by subsequent
readoption of a mark. See Linville v. Rivard, 26 USPQ2d 1508, 1513 (TTAB 1993),
rev’d on other grounds, Rivard v. Linville, 31 USPQ2d 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(unpublished); First National Bank of Omaha v. Autoteller Systems Service Corp., 9
USPQ2d 1740, 1743 (TTAB 1988).
Regarding the abandonment claim based on nonuse of the mark for at least three
years commencing September 9, 2001, such claim is based on alleged nonuse for more
than three years following a September 8, 2001 shipment of watches to Helen Wu
(“Wu”) in New Jersey.12 Petitioner contends that Respondent “has not produced any
documents from which one could reasonably infer that, during the three year period
between September 9, 2001 and September 8, 2004, [Respondent] had an intent to
resume bona fide commercial use of the BENTLEY mark” and that, if Respondent

12 To the extent that Petitioner seeks to rely on a three-year period of nonuse commencing
in 1995 in support of its abandonment claim, Petitioner cannot assert a three-year period of
nonuse that began prior to Respondent's filing on February 28, 1996 of the amendment to
allege use in support of the watch registration and of the use-based applications on October
18, 1996 for the jewelry and pen registrations. See Noble House Home Furnishings, LLC v.
Floorco Enters., LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1413, 1418 (TTAB 2016); Consolidated Cigar Corp v.
Rodriguez, 65 USPQ2d 1153, 1155 (TTAB 2002); Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Brothers Inc.,
47 USPQ2d 1281, 1283 (TTAB 1998).

Cancellation No. 92060353

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“did establish rights in the BENTLEY mark, it abandoned those rights through non-
use from September 9, 2001 and September 8, 2004.” Petitioner’s evidence in support
of its motion includes the declaration of its attorney, Jessica Bromall Sparkman, who
notes that Respondent’s “document production includes no purchase orders, no
requests or inquiries from any U.S. customer, no images showing BENTLEY products
for sale in any U.S. retail establishment, no communications with any U.S. retailer,
no sales records reflecting any U.S. sales, and no profit and loss statements or other
financial documents reflecting any U.S. sales,” that Respondent “has not produced
any business plans, advertising plans, marketing plans, or any other plans relating
to the actual or intended past, present, or future transportation or sale, actual or
intended, of any product bearing the BENTLEY mark;” and that Respondent’s only
evidence of sale or transportation of goods under the BENTLEY mark that may be
relevant to this time period is a FedEx receipt for a September 8, 2001 shipment of
watches from Respondent’s address in Taiwan to Wu in Georgia (30 TTABVUE 32),
and FedEx receipts for January 30, 2008 and April 19, 2008 shipments of watches
from Respondent’s addresses in Switzerland and Taiwan to Mag Ma (“Ma”) in New
Jersey (30 TTABVUE 33-34).13 We note, in addition, that Respondent has not
provided summaries of annual sales or advertising figures for goods sold under the
BENTLEY mark in the United States.

13 Petitioner filed these invoices under seal. However, because Respondent filed copies of
these invoices as exhibits to the declaration of Chia-Hsiang Cheng with its brief in response
to Petitioner’s motion and in support of its cross-motion (33 TTABVUE 39, 48-49) in the
public record of this case, we have referred to them in this decision.

Cancellation No. 92060353

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In response, Respondent submitted, among other things, the declaration of Chia-
Hsiang Cheng, Respondent’s president, who avers, among other things, that (1) in
May 1995, he shipped five watches and five pieces of jewelry bearing the BENTLEY
mark to Paul Huang (“Huang”) in Queens, New York for use in identifying potential
purchasers and distributors of Respondent’s goods (33 TTABVUE 31); (2) in March
1996, he shipped five pens bearing the BENTLEY mark to Huang (33 TTABVUE 31);
(3) between 1996 and 2001, he shipped approximately 12 watches bearing
Respondent’s BENTLEY Mark to World of Wonder, Inc., Little Bug, Inc., Jack Tsai
(“Tsai”) and Wu, in Illinois and Georgia, including shipments on November 5, 1996,
November 27, 1996, and September 8, 2001 (33 TTABVUE 31); (4) he sold Mr. Tsai
at least two watches and four pens bearing the BENTLEY mark on August 27, 1996
(33 TTABVUE 31); (5) Tsai then sold approximately eight watches to U.S. consumers
in late 1996 and early 1997; (6) “[i]n approximately 2006, [he] provided additional
inventory of watches bearing” the BENTLEY mark to Yenchi Chen (“Chen”) “with
connections to several jewelry stores in the U.S., where the watches were displayed
for sale;” and (7) between January 30, 2008 and April 19, 2008, he “shipped
approximately 10 watches bearing” the BENTLEY mark to Mag Ma (“Ma”) in New
Jersey.
In view of Petitioner’s showing that Respondent made no sales or transportation
of any of the identified goods in any of its involved registrations in the three-year
period commencing September 9, 2001, we find that Petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of abandonment. In response, Respondent refers in its brief to its
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“shipments and sales of watches, jewelry, and pens bearing [the] BENTLEY Mark
from 1995 to the present, sales of products bearing [the] BENTLEY Mark to U.S.
consumers, advertisements and promotions of BENTLEY-branded products, and
[Respondent’s] continued efforts to establish purchasers and distribution channels in
the U.S. for watches, jewelry, and pens bearing [the] BENTLEY Mark” (33 TTABVUE
25-26). However, in view of Respondent’s failure to identify any specific activities that
it undertook in the time period between September 9, 2001 and September 8, 2004 in
connection with the use or intent to resume use of the BENTLEY mark for any of the
goods identified in its involved registrations, we find that there is no genuine dispute
that Respondent abandoned the BENTLEY mark during that time period. Even if we
assume that Respondent readopted the BENTLEY mark in 2006 and is currently
using that mark, the abandonment is a terminal event which cannot be cured by such
readoption. See Linville, 26 USPQ2d at 1513. Therefore, we find that Petitioner is
entitled to entry of summary judgment on its abandonment claim based solely on
Respondent’s nonuse during the three-year period commencing September 9, 2001
and the absence of any countervailing evidence of Respondent’s intent to use resume
use of the mark during that time period. In view thereof, Petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment on the abandonment claim is granted, and Respondent’s cross-
motion on that claim is denied.
The foregoing entitles Petitioner to the relief sought in its amended petition to
cancel, namely, cancellation of the involved registrations. Therefore, in the interest
Cancellation No. 92060353

15
of judicial economy and in exercising our inherent authority to control the conduct of
proceedings on our docket, we decline to reach the remaining issues herein.
Respondent’s involved Registration Nos. 2007286, 2096184, and 2096186 will be
cancelled in due course.