Benjamin Tingle, Complainant,v.Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 5, 2002
01A15161 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 5, 2002)

01A15161

11-05-2002

Benjamin Tingle, Complainant, v. Dr. James G. Roche, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Benjamin Tingle v. Department of the Air Force

01A15161

November 5, 2002

.

Benjamin Tingle,

Complainant,

v.

Dr. James G. Roche,

Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A15161

Agency Nos. AR000010366 and AR000010367

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from two (2) final agency decisions

(FAD) concerning his complaints of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title

VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's FADs.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Supply Technician at the agency's Tinker Air Force Base,

Oklahoma facility (�facility�). Complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on October 27, 2000, (Case Number

AR000010366), alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis

of race (Black) and disability (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (�PTSD�)

when it proposed on June 20, 2000 to suspend him without pay for five

(5) days. Complainant also alleged he was discriminated against in

reprisal for prior EEO activity when the agency suspended him without

pay from August 21, 2000, through August 25, 2000.

Complainant also filed another formal complaint on January 22, 2001 (Case

Number AR000010367), alleging that he was retaliated against due to prior

EEO activity when his first-level supervisor (S1) did not schedule him

for training scheduled for December 5-12, 2000.

Regarding complainant's first complaint, the record indicates that

S1 notified him on June 20, 2000 that he would be suspended from duty

without pay for five (5) days for failure to comply with a direct order.

The record further indicates that on June 7, 2000, complainant walked out

of a meeting with S1 and disobeyed S1's order to some back to his office.

S1 had called complainant into his office to discuss an argument involving

complainant and a co-worker that occurred at work on June 6, 2000.<2>

Following a facility investigation, complainant's second-level supervisor

(S2) informed complainant that after considering all the evidence,

the altercations involving complainant did occur, and thus complainant

was suspended without pay from August 21, 2000 through August 25, 2000.

Regarding complainant's first complaint, the record indicates that the

failure to schedule complainant for training was an oversight

At the conclusion of the investigations in both complaints, complainant

was informed of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by

the agency. Complainant requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its first FAD issued on August 3, 2001, the agency initially found

that complainant established a prima facie case of race discrimination.

In so finding, the FAD noted that complainant is a member of a protected

group, got into an argument with a co-worker (White male) and his

supervisor proposed a harsher punishment than the co-worker received.

The FAD found that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, namely, that complainant received more discipline

than did the White co-worker as he had two incidents at issue (i.e., both

the altercation with the co-worker on June 6, 2000, and his failure to

respond to the direct order of S1 on June 7, 2000). The FAD found that

S1 provided evidence that management's response to complainant's actions

on June 6-7, 2000, was well-researched and based upon agency guidelines.

The FAD then found that complainant failed to demonstrate that the

agency's articulated reason were a pretext for race discrimination.

Addressing complainant's claim of disability discrimination, the FAD found

that there was insufficient evidence that complainant is an individual

with a disability to qualify for coverage under the Rehabilitation Act.

In so finding, the FAD noted that while complainant has a veterans

preference, there was no medical diagnosis or other recognition of PTSD

in the record. The FAD noted that there is insufficient evidence of

the severity of complainant's PTSD or that it substantially impairs

any major life activities. Further, the FAD found that complainant

established a prima facie case of reprisal, as S1 and S2 became aware of

complainant's prior EEO activity and suspended him shortly thereafter.

The FAD found that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions, namely, that complainant's five-day suspension

was determined after consideration of agency written guidelines and

analysis of complainant's rebuttal. The FAD then found that complainant

failed to establish that the agency's articulated reasons were not a

pretext for retaliation.

In its second FAD, also issued on August 3, 2001, the agency found that

complainant established a prima facie case of retaliation, as S2 knew

that complainant engaged in prior EEO activity and complainant was

denied training shortly after complainant's protected activity such

that a retaliatory motive can be inferred. The FAD further found that

complainant did not establish a prima facie case of reprisal through a

hostile work environment. The FAD then found that the agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that

the failure to schedule complainant for training was an oversight.

In addition, the FAD found that complainant failed to establish that the

agency's articulated reasons for omitting complainant from the training

at issue were a pretext for discrimination.

On appeal, complainant again contends that the agency discriminated and

retaliated against him when it gave him the five (5) day suspension at

issue and failed to schedule him for training. The agency requests that

we affirm its FAD.

Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973), and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental

Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222

(1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal cases), the

Commission initially considers the agency's FAD on complainant's first

claim and agrees with the agency that while complainant established a

prima facie case of race discrimination, complainant failed to demonstrate

that the agency's articulated reasons for issuing him the suspension

were pretextual in nature. In reaching this conclusion, we note that

the agency stated that complainant received a five (5) day suspension

while the co-worker at issue received a lesser punishment was due to

the altercation on June 6, 2000, and also due to complainant's failure

to respond to the direct order of S1 on June 7, 2000.

Addressing complainant's claim of disability discrimination, the

Commission finds that assuming, arguendo, that complainant is an

individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, we find

that there is no evidence in the record that the agency issued the

suspension to complainant due to any impairment he may have had.<3>

Further, there is no evidence in the record that the agency violated

the Rehabilitation Act in any way by suspending complainant for five

(5) days. In addition, the Commission agrees with the FAD's finding

that while complainant established a prima facie case of retaliation,

he failed to demonstrate that the agency's articulated reasons for its

actions were more likely than not a pretext for retaliation. While there

is evidence in the record that S1 and S2 were aware of complainant's prior

EEO activity when the proposed suspension was issued, we find that the

evidence establishes that complainant was issued the suspension due to

his altercation with the co-worker at issue and his failure to respond

to the direct order of S1 as detailed above.

Considering the agency's FAD which addressed complainant's second formal

complaint, the Commission initially agrees that complainant established

a prima facie case of retaliation. In addition, we agree with the FAD's

finding that complainant failed to proffer evidence which demonstrates

that the agency's articulated reasons for omitting complainant from the

training at issue were pretextual in nature. We note that complainant

alleged that S2 admitted to retaliating against complainant by denying

him training. Investigative File (IF), at pages 3, 150. However, the

evidence establishes that the agency's failure to schedule complainant

for the training at issue was a mere oversight. Initially, we note that

the record establishes that after S2 realized he had omitted complainant

from the training, he notified S1 that he forgot to include complainant.

IF, at page 120. The record further indicates that on December 6, 2000,

S2 scheduled complainant for the training at issue. IF, at page 155.

Regarding complainant's allegation that S2 conceded retaliating against

complainant, we note that S2 stated that complainant's prior EEO activity

did not influence his actions against complainant. Further, we note

that one of complainant's co-workers stated that he had never witnessed

S2 making inappropriate remarks against complainant or anything that

would indicate that he would discriminate against complainant. IF, at

page 167. While the record does establish that complainant and S2 had an

antagonistic relationship, we find that there is insufficient evidence

to demonstrate that the agency's articulated reasons for temporarily

omitting complainant from a training session were more likely than not

pretexts for retaliation.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's FADs.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 5, 2002

__________________

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 Complainant is a military veteran who received counseling for PTSD,

and anger management is an integral part of his PTSD therapy.

3 Further, we note that while the record contains evidence that

complainant has a veterans preference due to his PTSD, but there is

no evidence regarding the severity of the PTSD or evidence that his

impairment substantially limits any of his major life activities.