Benjamin Hill

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 10, 2021

2020003857 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/015,154 08/30/2013 Benjamin R. Hill HILL-101 9652
116025 7590 02/10/2021
Robert Klinger, Esq.
C/o Culhane Meadows PLLC
2591 Dallas Parkway Suite 300
Frisco, TX 75034
EXAMINER
WHITAKER, JONATHAN J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3622
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/10/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
eOfficeAction@AppColl.com
patentdocket@cm.law
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BENJAMIN R. HILL
___________

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
ERIC B. CHEN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4–13, and 16–25. (Appeal Br. 3.)
Claims 2, 3, 14, and 15 have been cancelled. (Id. at 43, 45.) We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter is directed to advertising on an Internet
capable device, in which advertising content is generated during the time
between when a program or web page is requested and when it actually
loads. (Abstract.)
Claim 1, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter,
with minor formatting and disputed limitations in italics:
1. A method for providing announcements during a
setup time of a mobile device, the method comprising:
receiving data associated with one or more
announcements in the mobile device through a communication
network;
detecting, using a scheduler component in an
announcement application, initiation of a function operable on
the mobile device, said function being associated with a setup
time of the mobile device;
the scheduler component receiving data from said
function and an operating system;

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest is the
inventor, Benjamin R. Hill. (Appeal Br. 3.)
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

3
the setup time being selected from a time associated with
an unlock function of the mobile device, and a time associated
with either powering-on, or sleeping/hibernating functions of
the mobile device;
the setup time being a time period between a time point
(a first instant) when a function of the mobile device is initiated
and another time point (a second instant) when the initiated
function is operational;
an application generating said function being different
from the announcement application;
wherein the detecting initiation of the function operable
on the mobile device occurs before providing an announcement
to a user and before rendering the announcement;
upon detection, in the mobile device, of the initiation,
providing, using rendering components in the mobile device,
the announcement to the user of the mobile device during the
setup time;
the announcement being rendered for a predetermined
duration, the predetermined duration being less than at most
equal to the set up time;
wherein an interaction with the announcement is not
required for resumption of the function; and
rendering the announcement in a display at a time
between the beginning and the end of the set up time.

REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Gupta US 2012/0005017 A1 Jan. 05, 2012
Kosashvili US 2012/0054022 A1 Mar. 01, 2012
Ricasata US 2014/0019253 A1 Jan. 16, 2014
Grundfast US 2014/0081765 A1 Mar. 20, 2014

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

4
REJECTIONS2
Claims 1, 4–8, 10–13, and 16–25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast.
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ricasata, Kosashvili, Grundfast, and Gupta.

OPINION
Grundfast as Prior Art
In rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the
Examiner cited to paragraph 26 of Grundfast for teaching the limitations
“the announcement being rendered for a predetermined duration, the
predetermined duration being less than at most equal to the set up time” and
“wherein an interaction with the announcement is not required for
resumption of the function.” (Final Act. 15; see also Ans. 7, 15–16.) In
particular, the Examiner cited to “step 110”, “step 130”, and “step 160”, as
described in paragraph 26 of Grundfast. (Ans. 7, 15–16.)
The Examiner concluded that Grundfast is available as prior art
because “the Grundfast reference application is a Continuation-In-Part
Application of and claims priority to parent U.S. Patent Application Ser. No.
12/828,830, filed July 1, 2010, which claims priority to and the benefit of
parent U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 61/309,690, filed Mar. 2,
2010” (Ans. 5) and “cited portions of the 2014 Grundfast reference have
priority based on being supported by the provisional application 61/309,690

2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1, 4–13, and 16–25
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Ans. 3.)

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

5
filed on March 2, 2010 . . . and the 2011 Grundfast publication [Application
No. 12/828,830] incorporation by reference of this provisional” (id. at 6).
Appellant argues “Fig. 8 and paragraphs 23, 33–36 can only claim
priority of the filing date of US patent application No. 14/059,313, which is
October 21, 2013 and that date is after the priority date of the appellant’s
application.” (Reply Br. 15; see also Appeal Br. 26.) However, even if
Appellant is correct with respect to the priority date for the subject matter of
Figure 8 and paragraphs 23 and 33–36 of Grundfast, the Examiner also cited
to paragraph 26 of Grundfast. Appellant has not presented any arguments or
evidence as to why paragraph 26 of Grundfast should not qualify as prior art.
Furthermore, paragraph 26 of Grundfast does possess reasonable support, as
discussed below.

Effective Filing Dates
Appellant’s present application was filed on August 30, 2013. This
application claims the benefit of provisional Application No. 61/695,014,
filed on August 30, 2012. (Spec. ¶ 1.)
Grundfast, based upon Application No. 14/059,313, was filed on
October 21, 2013, which is a continuation-in-part (CIP) of Application No.
12/828,830 (now US 8,566,817 B2), filed July 1, 2010, which claims
priority to provisional Application No. 61/309,690, filed on March 2, 2010.
Thus, Grundfast was filed after the filing date of the present
application. However, the earliest effective filing date of Grundfast is before
the filing date of the present application, as well as the filing date of the
present application’s underlying provisional application.

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

6
Written Description Support for Claimed Subject Matter
The Federal Circuit has held, “[a] reference patent is only entitled to
claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application if the
disclosure of the provisional application provides support for the claims in
the reference patent in compliance with § 112, [first paragraph].” Dynamic
Drinkware, LLC, v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2015). Moreover, the Federal Circuit has held that such requirement for a
provisional application to be in compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, first
paragraph, also applies to published PCT applications. See Amgen Inc. v.
Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
With respect to continuation-in-part applications, the Federal Circuit
had held the following:
Claims containing any matter introduced in the CIP are
accorded the filing date of the CIP application. However,
matter disclosed in the parent application is entitled to the
benefit of the filing date of the parent application.
Waldemar Link, GmbH & Co. v. Osteonics Corp., 32 F.3d 556, 558 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).

Grundfast
Independent claim 1 of Grundfast recites the following:
1. A method for displaying advertisement content on
an internet capable device, comprising the steps of:
providing an option to a user to initiate a process on the
internet capable device;
receiving input from the user to initiate the process on the
internet capable device;
loading the process on the internet capable device,
wherein the loading includes a loading time delay;
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

7
displaying a quantity of advertisement content on a
screen of the internet capable device during the loading time
delay;
determining that the loading time delay has concluded;
and
redirecting the user to the process upon completion of the
loading time delay.
(Claim 1.)
Paragraph 26 of Grundfast discloses the following:
FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a preferred
embodiment of the instant invention 10 for a system and
method of advertising for use on internet and/or digital
networking capable devices. In this embodiment, a method for
receiving multimedia/advertisement on an internet and/or
digital networking capable device (“IDNCD”) is shown,
wherein a selection and/or flagging of displayed multimedia
and/or advertisement by either the system or an individual user
is recorded. At step 100 an individual user of the system
initiates the process by interacting with an IDNCD. At
step 110, the user initiates a process on the IDNCD, wherein
the process includes a loading or scheduled time delay. . . . In
conjunction with the user initiating the loading process at
step 110 and the background being displayed at step 120, a
quantity of multimedia/advertisement content is disposed to
load on the IDNCD at step 130 during a predetermined time
period for the loading of the application. . . . Conversely, if the
user of the IDNCD makes a decision not to select and/or flag
any of the multimedia/advertisement content, then the user is
ultimately redirected to the completed process which was
previously initiated by the user at step 160.
(¶ 26 (emphases added).)
Thus, because paragraph 26 of Grundfast discloses (i) at step 100, “an
individual user of the system initiates the process by interacting with an
IDNCD,” Grundfast provides written description support for the limitations
“providing an option to a user to initiate a process on the internet capable
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

8
device” and “receiving input from the user to initiate the process on the
internet capable device.” Because Grundfast discloses (ii) at step 110, “the
user initiates a process on the IDNCD, wherein the process includes a
loading or scheduled time delay,” Grundfast provides written description
support for the limitation “loading the process on the internet capable
device, wherein the loading includes a loading time delay.” Because
Grundfast discloses (iii) at step 130, “a quantity of multimedia/
advertisement content is disposed to load on the IDNCD . . . during a
predetermined time period for the loading of the application,” Grundfast
provides written description support for the limitations “loading the process
on the internet capable device, wherein the loading includes a loading time
delay” and “determining that the loading time delay has concluded.” Last,
because Grundfast discloses (iv) at step 160, “if the user of the IDNCD
makes a decision not to select and/or flag any of the
multimedia/advertisement content, then the user is ultimately redirected to
the completed process,” paragraph 26 of Grundfast provides adequate
written description support for the subject matter recited in independent
claim 1.
Accordingly, paragraph 26 of Grundfast describes a claimed
embodiment and fully supports independent claim 1, in compliance with
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

Parent Application of Grundfast
Page 12, line 5 to page 13, line 21 of Application No. 12/828,830, the
parent application of Grundfast, discloses nearly identical language as
paragraph 26 of Grundfast. Accordingly, independent claim 1 of Grundfast
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

9
is fully supported by the parent application of Grundfast, in compliance with
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Moreover, because independent claim 1 of
Grundfast, a CIP application, is fully supported by the parent application, the
subject matter of claim 1 is entitled to the filing date of the parent
application.

Provisional Application for the Parent Application of Grundfast
Application No. 61/309,690, the provisional for the parent application
of Grundfast, discloses the following:
In the step of providing 4, the device or program
responds to the user’s input by taking any necessary actions to
fulfill the request. This may include initiating a loading
sequence that transfers data from one source to another. For
example, on a web or internet capable mobile device, the user
may choose or be required to load a program, function, or
website that requires a transfer of data to that device from any
other digital medium such as a remote server.
(¶ 7 (emphasis added).)
The next step of loading 5 describes the transfer of data,
information, images, or any other digital language to the mobile
device or program. This transfer of data occurs in response to
the actions requested by the user, device, or program. The
requested action may also require the device or program to
access information contained on another digital medium with
rate of transfer that causes a delay in completing the action.
(¶ 8 (emphasis added).)
In the advertising/posting 7 step, a form of audible,
visual, and/or digital media or transmittal occupies the loading
space. Instead of a simple message such as “loading,” or a
blank screen, the mobile device or program will display or
transmit information such as advertisements, through any
means available to that device or its agents. The information or
advertisement will display or transmit during the loading
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

10
process and is meant to stop transmitting or displaying when
the loading process has completed.
(¶ 10 (emphasis added).)
The mobile devices operating system needs to be
modified so that when an end-user launches a program or
process with a loading sequence, the program loads in the
background while an advertisement from the cache is displayed.
The end-user has the option to click on, indicate interest or
select the advertisement. When the end-user selects an
advertisement, the advertisement is saved on the web or internet
capable mobile device and the program initially launched by the
end-user is displayed. If the end-user does not select the
advertisement after it has been displayed for a preset amount of
time, the web or internet capable mobile device displays the
program initial launched by the end-user.
(¶ 34 (emphasis added).)
Thus, because the provisional application discloses, (i) “on a web or
internet capable mobile device, the user may choose or be required to load a
program, function, or website that requires a transfer of data to that device
from any other digital medium such as a remote server” (¶ 7), the
provisional application provides written description support for the
limitations “providing an option to a user to initiate a process on the internet
capable device” and “receiving input from the user to initiate the process on
the internet capable device.” Because the provisional application discloses,
(ii) “[t]he requested action may also require the device or program to access
information contained on another digital medium with rate of transfer that
causes a delay in completing the action” (¶ 8), the provisional application
provides written description support for the limitation “loading the process
on the internet capable device, wherein the loading includes a loading time
delay.” Because the provisional application discloses, (iii) “[t]he . . .
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

11
advertisement will display or transmit during the loading process and is
meant to stop transmitting or displaying when the loading process has
completed,” the provisional application provides adequate written
description support for the limitations “displaying a quantity of
advertisement content on a screen of the internet capable device during the
loading time delay,” and “determining that the loading time delay has
concluded.” Last, because the provisional application discloses, (iv) “[i]f the
end-user does not select the advertisement after it has been displayed for a
preset amount of time, the web or internet capable mobile device displays
the program initial launched by the end-user,” the provisional application
provides adequate written description support for the limitation “redirecting
the user to the process upon completion of the loading time delay,” as
recited in independent claim 1 of Grundfast, the CIP application.
Because the disclosures of parent Application No. 12/828,830 and its
underlying provisional Application No. 61/309,690 support independent
claim 1 of Grundfast under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, the effective
filing date of the subject matter of claim 1 is the filing date provisional
Application No. 61/309,690, March 2, 2010. As such, paragraph 26 of
Grundfast qualifies as prior art under because its effective filing date,
March 2, 2010 is before the filing date of the present application, August 30,
2013, and the filing date of its underlying provisional application,
August 30, 2012.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that Grundfast
qualifies as prior art.

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

12
§ 103 Rejection— Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast
First, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 33)
that the combination of Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast would not have
rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation
“detecting, using a scheduler component in an announcement application.”
The Examiner found that scheduler 206 of Kosashvili, which is for
timing the commercial information, corresponds to the limitation “detecting,
using a scheduler component in an announcement application.” (Final
Act. 15; see also Ans. 9.) We agree with the Examiner’s findings.
Kosashvili relates to “an application residing on a mobile device for
providing and presenting information.” (Abstract.) Figure 2 of Kosashvili
illustrates a block diagram of client application, including “scheduler 206 for
timing the commercial information according to the business rules.” (¶ 40.)
Because Kosashvili explains that scheduler 206 provides timing for
commercial information, Kosashvili teaches the limitation “detecting, using
a scheduler component in an announcement application.”
Appellant argues the following:
Ricasata does not teach or suggest detection of the initiation of
the function associated with a setup time, . . . . If a program
that performs a function associated with a setup time also uses a
splash screen, the program initiates the function and then
provides the splash screen. Ricasata teaches providing an
announcement once the splash screen is present.
(Appeal Br. 33.) However, the Examiner cited to scheduler 206 of
Kosashvili, rather than Ricasata, for teaching the limitation “detecting, using
a scheduler component in an announcement application.” (Final Act. 15.)
The rejection of claim 1 is based on the combination of Ricasata, Kosashvili,
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

13
and Grundfast, and Appellant cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ricasata,
Kosashvili, and Grundfast would have rendered obvious independent
claim 1, which includes the limitation “detecting, using a scheduler
component in an announcement application.”
Second, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments
(Appeal Br. 33) that the combination of Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast
would not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the
limitation “an application generating said function being different from the
announcement application.”
The Examiner found that client application of Kosashvili, which is for
activating the presentation platform and managing the commercial
information objects, corresponds to the limitation “an application generating
said function being different from the announcement application.” (Final
Act. 15; see also Ans. 9.) We agree with the Examiner’s findings.
Figure 1 of Kosashvili illustrates mobile device 102 in communication
with central server 104. (¶ 39.) In particular, Kosashvili explains,
[t]he mobile device [102] includes a client application for
activating the presentation platform and managing the
commercial information objects, the application is operatively
working in association with a server application which provides
campaign management platform enabling the distribution of the
commercial information to plurality of mobile device through
the wireless network.
(Id.) Because Kosashvili explains mobile device 102, having a client
application, works with a separate server application, which provides
distribution of commercial information, Kosashvili teaches the limitation “an
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

14
application generating said function being different from the announcement
application.”
Appellant argues the following:
Ricasata does not teach or suggest . . . an application generating
said function being different from the announcement
application. If a program that performs a function associated
with a setup time also uses a splash screen, the program
initiates the function and then provides the splash screen.
Ricasata teaches providing an announcement once the splash
screen is present.
(Appeal Br. 33.)
However, the Examiner cited to the client application of Kosashvili,
rather than Ricasata, for teaching the limitation “an application generating
said function being different from the announcement application.” (Final
Act. 15.) Again, the rejection of claim 1 is based on the combination of
Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast, and Appellant cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually. See Keller, 642 F.2d at
426.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ricasata,
Kosashvili, and Grundfast would have rendered obvious independent
claim 1, which includes the limitation “an application generating said
function being different from the announcement application.”
Third, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Reply Br. 7)
that the combination of Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast would not have
rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation, “the
announcement being rendered for a predetermined duration, the
predetermined duration being less than at most equal to the set up time.”
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

15
The Examiner found that the multimedia or advertising loading
process of Grundfast, which loads multimedia or advertising while a
program or web page loads, corresponds to the limitation “the announcement
being rendered for a predetermined duration, the predetermined duration
being less than at most equal to the set up time.” (Final Act. 15.) We agree
with the Examiner’s findings.
Grundfast relates to advertising on an internet and/or digital
networking capable devices (“IDNCD”). (¶ 2.) In particular, Grundfast
explains that “[a]dvertisers will be able to display content and/or media on
the screen of the device during the time between when a program or web
page is requested and when it actually loads.” (¶ 9.) Figure 1 of Grundfast
illustrates a block diagram of “a system and method of advertising for use on
internet and/or digital networking capable devices.” (¶ 26.) In reference to
Figure 1, Grundfast explains that “[i]n conjunction with the user initiating
the loading process at step 110 and the background being displayed at
step 120, a quantity of multimedia/advertisement content is disposed to load
on the IDNCD at step 130 during a predetermined time period for the
loading of the application.” (Id.) Because Grundfast explains that at
step 130, multimedia/advertisement content loads on the IDNCD during a
predetermined time period for the loading of the application, Grundfast
teaches the limitation “the announcement being rendered for a
predetermined duration, the predetermined duration being less than at most
equal to the set up time.”
Appellant argues that “the fact that Kosashvili teaches detecting the
functions at a time that is outside of the setup time is consistent with what
Kosashvili once the deal with his invention” and “Kosashvili’s invention
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

16
displays the announcement at the same time the function is displaying the
functions output.” (Reply Br. 7.) However, the Examiner cited to
Grundfast, rather than Kosashvili, for teaching the limitation “the
announcement being rendered for a predetermined duration, the
predetermined duration being less than at most equal to the set up time.”
(Final Act. 15.) Again, the rejection of claim 1 is based on the combination
of Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast, and Appellant cannot show non-
obviousness by attacking references individually. See Keller, 642 F.2d at
426.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ricasata,
Kosashvili, and Grundfast would have rendered obvious independent
claim 1, which includes the limitation “the announcement being rendered for
a predetermined duration, the predetermined duration being less than at most
equal to the set up time.”
Fourth, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 39;
see also Reply Br. 8) that the combination of Ricasata, Kosashvili, and
Grundfast would not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which
includes the limitation “the scheduler component receiving data from said
function and an operating system.”
The Examiner found that Figure 2 of Kosashvili, which illustrates
scheduler 206 and detection module 202 communicating with mobile
device 102, corresponds to the limitation “the scheduler component
receiving data from said function and an operating system.” (Final Act. 15;
see also Ans. 9.) In particular, the Examiner found that detection
module 202 and Figure 2 of Kosashvili as “disclosing a client application
with scheduler component that receives data from the operating system of a
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

17
mobile device through the interception of all device activities of new
activated actions/functions of the mobile device.” (Ans. 9.) We agree with
the Examiner’s findings.
Figure 2 of Kosashvili illustrates a block diagram of client
application, including:
detection module 202 [that] intercepts all device activities for
identifying new activated actions/function of the mobile device
such as new phone call, sending a new message (SMS or mails)
incoming/outgoing calls, during reading or writing SMS
messages, navigating through menu, during editing, adding or
searching for a contact, displaying pictures, playing games,
running third side applications, etc.
(¶ 40.) Moreover, Kosashvili explains that mobile device 102 can be a
cellular phone, PDA or tablet computer.” (¶ 39.)
Because detection module 202 intercepts all device activities for
mobile device 102, Kosashvili teaches the limitation “the scheduler
component receiving data from said function and an operating system.” In
particular, because mobile device 102 can be a tablet computer, one of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize such mobile device 102 as having
an “operating system.”3
Appellant argues that “neither Ricasata nor Kosashvil nor Grundfast
teach or suggest a scheduler component receiving data from said function
and an operating system.” (Appeal Br. 39; see also Reply Br. 8.) However,

3 One technical dictionary defines “operating system” as “[t]he software that
controls the allocation and usage of hardware resources such as memory,
central processing unit (CPU) time, disk space, and peripheral devices” and
“is the foundation software on which applications depend.” MICROSOFT®
COMPUTER DICTIONARY 378 (5th ed. 2002). Moreover, in the “Related Art”
section, Ricasata explains that smart phones include operating systems.
(¶ 5.)
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

18
other than merely providing a conclusory statement that Kosashvili does not
teach the limitation “the scheduler component receiving data from said
function and an operating system,” Appellant does not provide any
persuasive arguments or evidence as to why the Examiner’s findings with
respect to paragraph 40 of Kosashvili, are erroneous.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ricasata,
Kosashvili, and Grundfast would have rendered obvious independent
claim 1, which includes the limitation “the scheduler component receiving
data from said function and an operating system.”
Last, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 39)
that the combination of Ricasata, Kosashvili, and Grundfast would not have
rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation
“wherein an interaction with the announcement is not required for
resumption of the function.”
The Examiner found that the internet and/or digital networking
capable device (IDNCD) of Grundfast, in which the user does not select an
advertisement after being displayed on such device, corresponds to the
limitation, “wherein an interaction with the announcement is not required for
resumption of the function.” (Ans. 15–16.) We agree with the Examiner’s
findings.
Grundfast explains, “[a]dvertisers will be able to display content
and/or media on the screen of the device during the time between when a
program or web page is requested and when it actually loads.” (¶ 9.) As
illustrated in Figure 1 of Grundfast, “[a]t step 110, the user initiates a
process on the IDNCD, wherein the process includes a loading or scheduled
time delay.” (¶ 26.) Moreover, Grundfast explains that at step 160 “if the
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

19
user of the IDNCD makes a decision not to select and/or flag any of the
multimedia/advertisement content, then the user is ultimately returned to the
completed process.” (Id.) Because Grundfast explains that if the user does
not select the multimedia/advertisement, the user is ultimately returned to
the content program or web page, Grundfast teaches the limitation, “wherein
an interaction with the announcement is not required for resumption of the
function.”
Appellant argues that “neither Ricasata nor Kosashvil nor Grundfast
teach or suggest ‘wherein an interaction with the announcement is not
required for resumption of the function.’” (Appeal Br. 39.) However, other
than providing a conclusory statement that Grundfast does not teach the
limitation “wherein an interaction with the announcement is not required for
resumption of the function,” Appellant does not provide any persuasive
arguments or evidence as to why the Examiner’s findings with respect to
paragraph 26 of Grundfast are erroneous.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ricasata,
Kosashvili, and Grundfast would have rendered obvious independent
claim 1, which includes the limitation “wherein an interaction with the
announcement is not required for resumption of the function.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 4–8 and 10–12 depend from claim 1, and Appellant
has not presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to these
claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 4–8 and 10–12 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), for the same reasons discussed with respect to
independent claim 1.
Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

20
Independent claims 13 and 25 recites limitations similar to those
discussed with respect to independent claim 1, and Appellant has not
presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to these claims.
We sustain the rejection of claims 13 and 25, as well as dependent claims
16–24 for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 1.

§ 103 Rejection—Ricasata, Kosashvili, Grundfast, and Gupta
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of dependent
claim 9 separately (Appeal Br. 40), the arguments presented do not explain
why the limitations of this dependent claims are separately patentable.
Instead, Appellant argues that “Gupta also does not teach or suggest those
limitations that are not taught or suggested by Ricasata or Kosashvil or
Grundfast.” (Id.) We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons
discussed with respect to independent claim 1, from which claim 9 depends.
Accordingly, we sustain this rejection.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4–13, and 16–25 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.

Appeal 2020-003857
Application 14/015,154

21
DECISION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 4–8, 10–
13, 16–25
103(a) Ricasata,
Kosashvili,
Grundfast
1, 4–8, 10–
13, 16–25

9 103(a) Ricasata,
Kosashvili,
Grundfast, Gupta
9
Overall
Outcome
1, 4–13, 16–
25

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED