Benjamin Fletcher | Martin Gale | Jose Garza | Gareth JonesDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 29, 201911835679 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 11/835,679 08/08/2007 Benjamin Joseph Fletcher 73109 7590 12/02/2019 Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC 20283 State Road 7 Ste. 300 Boca Raton, FL 33498 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. GB920060098US 1 8152-0020 CONFIRMATION NO. 1863 EXAMINER NGUYEN, THUY-VI THI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3664 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ibmptomail@iplawpro.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BENJAMIN JOSEPH FLETCHER, MAR TIN J. GALE, JOSE EMIR GARZA, and GARETH EDWARD JONES Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 Technology Center 3600 Before ANTON W. PETTING, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-6, 8, 9, and 11-18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant describes that the present invention "relates to communications within a data processing network, and in particular to apparatus, methods and computer programs implementing the publish/subscribe communications paradigm" (Spec. ,r 1 ). Claims 1, 8, 11, and 12 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for subscription matching in a publish/subscribe data processing system, wherein the subscription matching comprises comparing topic identifiers within received publications with topic identifiers within subscribers' stored subscriptions to determine whether the received publications should be forwarded to the subscribers, comprising the steps of: [ (a)] determining from a subscription whether a respective subscriber wishes subscription matching to implement a first topic classification scheme or a second topic classification scheme; and 1 We use the term "Appellant" to refer to "applicant" as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1. 4 2. Our decision references Appellant's Appeal Brief (" Appeal Br.," filed April 1, 2016) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed January 17, 2017), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed November 17, 2016) and Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed October 30, 2015). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as IBM Corporation. Appeal Br. 1. 2 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 [ (b)] in response to the determining step, invoking a subscription matching component to perform a subscription matching process that implements the respective one of the first and second topic classification schemes. REJECTIONS Claims 1---6, 8, 9, and 11-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1---6, 8, 9, and 11-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(b) as anticipated by Ravin et al. (US 2006/0047615 Al, published Mar. 2, 2006) ("Ravin"). ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Appellant argues the pending claims as a group (see Appeal Br. 9). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims, thus, stand or fall with claim 1, see 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv), except to the extent that the patent eligibility of dependent claims 2-6, 9, and 13-18 is affected by Appellant's additional, separate arguments with respect to these dependent claims. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted§ 101 to include an implicit exception: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim 3 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered "individually and 'as an ordered combination'" to determine whether there are additional elements that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is "a search for an 'inventive concept' - i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id. at 217-18 ( alteration in original). In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that claim 1 is directed to "the abstract idea of organizing human activities and/or fundamental economics[,] e.g.[,] comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify option[s], [and] using categories to organize[,] store, and transmit information" and that the claim does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (Final Act. 2-3). The Examiner determined that the remaining claims are patent ineligible for substantially the same reasons (id. at 3--4). After Appellant's briefs were filed, and the Examiner's Answer mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the "USPTO") published revised guidance on January 7, 2019 for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED 4 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the "2019 Revised Guidance"). That guidance revised the US PTO' s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) "[p ]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea"; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not "directed to" a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id. 2 Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to determine whether the claims at issue are "directed to" a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test; in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 2 The 2019 Revised Guidance supersedes MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ("MPEP") § 2106. 04(II) and also supersedes all versions of the USPTO's "Eligibility Quick Reference Sheet Identifying Abstract Ideas." See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 ("Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R-08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon."). Accordingly, Appellant's arguments challenging the sufficiency of the Examiner's rejection will not be addressed to the extent those arguments are based on currently superseded USPTO guidance. 5 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that "integrate the uudicial] exception into a practical application," i.e., that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception ("Step 2A, Prong Two"). Id. at 54--55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is "directed to" the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea ( Appeal Br. 10-18). The Federal Circuit has explained that "the 'directed to' inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether 'their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter."' Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an "abstract idea" for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335-36. Here, the Specification (including the claim language) makes clear that the claims focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to computer technology and/or functionality. The Specification is entitled "FLEXIBLE TOPIC IDENTIFICATION IN A PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE SYSTEMS," and describes, in the Background section, that within a messaging network, messages may be delivered from one data processing system to another via one or more 6 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 "message brokers" (Spec. ,r 2). The Specification describes that many of these message brokers support the so-called "publish/subscribe communication paradigm," which involves publishers forwarding communications for receipt by subscribers, who have registered their interest in receiving communications of that type; publish/subscribe, thus, allows subscribers to receive information in an area of interest without having to proactively and repeatedly request that information from each publisher (id. ,r 3). As described in the Specification, a typical publish/subscribe environment has a number of publisher applications sending messages, via a broker, to a potentially large number of subscriber applications located on remote computers across the network; subscribers register with the broker and identify the categories of information, e.g., one or more topic names, they wish to receive (id. ,r 4). Publishers assign topic names to messages that they send to the publish/subscribe broker, and the broker uses a matching engine to compare the topics of received messages with stored subscription information to identify the subscribers to whom the messages should be sent (id.). The Specification describes that topics are often specified hierarchically; this allows publishers and subscribers to precisely specify topics within published messages and within subscription requests, and allows the topic strings within received messages to be compared with subscriptions using a matching algorithm that iteratively steps through the topic hierarchy (id. ,r,r 9, 10). Yet, a problem with conventional hierarchical topic names and the corresponding matching algorithms is that the publishers, subscribers, and publish/subscribe brokers must all have knowledge of the topic hierarchy, and must all use consistent expressions for 7 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 the hierarchical topic names (id. ,III). The Specification describes that an alternative approach has been proposed in which publishers classify their publications, and subscribers specify their interests, using a simple keyword scheme that uses Boolean matching (id. ,r 14). But, the Specification explains that "[ e ]ven with a good understanding of the keyword matching algorithm, a subscriber that defines its subscription sufficiently generally to capture all desired publications is likely to receive a lot of unwanted publications as well" (id.). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to address these issues by providing a system and method for flexible topic identification in a publish/subscribe communications network (id. ,II 6). In accordance with the invention, publishers and subscribers are allowed to specify the type of topic classification scheme, e.g., a hierarchical topic classification scheme or a non-hierarchical keyword classification scheme, to be used by the publish/subscribe broker during subscription matching, and the broker is responsive to the specified intentions of either one or both of the publisher and the subscriber, to invoke a respective subscription matching component (id.). Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1, thus, recites a method comprising: (1) "determining from a subscription whether a respective subscriber wishes subscription matching to implement a first topic classification scheme or a second topic classification scheme" (step (a)); and (2) "in response to the determining step, invoking a subscription matching component to perform a subscription matching process that implements the respective one of the first and second topic classification schemes" (step (b)). These limitations, when given their broadest reasonable 8 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 interpretation, recite forwarding publications, of the type a subscriber wishes to receive, by comparing/matching new information ( e.g., topic identifiers within the publications) with stored information (e.g., topic identifiers within the subscriber's stored subscriptions) in accordance with a subscriber- specified comparison/matching scheme - a concept that, in the context of Appellant's Specification, can reasonably be characterized as a commercial interaction, e.g., among and between publishers, message brokers, and consumer subscribers, which is a method of organizing human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. See also, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ( concluding that parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is 'limited to particular content' or a particular 'source,' that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.") (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353, 1355 (citing cases)); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options is an abstract idea). Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two). The only additional element recited in claim 1, beyond the abstract idea, is the claimed "publish/subscribe data processing system" - an element described in the Specification at a high level of generality, i.e., as 9 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 comprising generic computer components (see, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 36-40). We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, invoke any assertedly inventive programming, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible."). We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an improvement in technology and/or a technical field to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a "practical application," as that phrase is used in the 2019 Revised Guidance. 3 Appellant argues that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea because the claims are tied to a particular machine, i.e., a publish/subscriber data processing system (Appeal Br. 11 ). That argument is unavailing. 3 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c) and (e) in describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the claim is not "directed to" the judicial exception. 10 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 The Federal Circuit has recognized that the machine-or- transformation test, 4 although not the only test, "can provide a 'useful clue'" to patent eligibility under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 594). As such, satisfying either prong of that test may integrate an abstract idea into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 nn.27-28 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(b), (c)). At the same time, however, it is well settled that "whether a [recited] device is 'a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a 'machine')' is not dispositive." ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at224). Fora machine to impose a meaningful limit on the claimed invention, it must play a significant part in permitting a claimed method to be performed, rather than merely providing the generic environment in which to implement the recited abstract idea. Cf Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ( explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must "play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly"); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b)(II) (citing Versata). Here, the publish/subscriber data processing system performs the latter role. We find no specific claim limitations directed to a particular 4 Under the machine-or-transformation test, a claimed process is patent eligible if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), ajf'd sub nom. Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 11 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 machine nor, for that matter, does Appellant direct our attention to any such specific elements, whether in the claim or elsewhere in the Specification. Rather than being tied to a particular machine, claim 1 merely implements an abstract idea using generic computer components, which is not enough for patent eligibility. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223 ("[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("An abstract idea on 'an Internet computer network' or on a generic computer is still an abstract idea") ( citation omitted). It also is insufficient, without more, for patent eligibility, even accepting Appellant's contention, that the claimed method steps cannot be performed "by the human mind" (see Appeal Br. 15 ( charging that the Examiner's reliance on SmartGene is misplaced because the claimed invention is "performed within a publish-subscribe data processing system," not by the human mind)). Although "a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under§ 101," CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 13 73 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ), it does not automatically follow that methods requiring physical components - i.e., methods that arguably cannot be performed entirely in the human mind- are, therefore, not directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry."); Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[T]he 12 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 inability for the human mind to perform each claim step does not alone confer patentability."). We also are not persuaded that there is any parallel between claim 1 and the claims held patent eligible in DDR Holdings. There, the claims were directed to retaining website visitors, and in particular to a system that modified the conventional web browsing experience by directing a user of a host website, on clicking an advertisement, to a "store within a store" on the host website, rather than to the advertiser's third-party website. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257-58. The court determined that "the claims address a business challenge (retaining website visitors) [that] is a challenge particular to the Internet." Id. at 1257. The court also determined that the invention was "necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks," and that the claimed invention did not simply use computers to serve a conventional business purpose. Id. Rather, there was a change to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol. Id. Appellant asserts that, like the claims in DDR Holdings, "the claims of the present application are necessarily rooted in computer technology and used to overcome problems specifically arising in the realm of computer networks and e-commerce" (Appeal Br. 17 ( directing us to "see discussion on pages 1-6 of Appellants' specification")). But Appellant does not identify the "problems specifically arising in the realm of computer networks and e-commerce" that the claimed invention purportedly overcomes. And the only problem, which we discern from our review of the discussion on pages 1---6 of the Specification, relates to the difficulties that subscribers encounter in suitably defining their subscriptions so that they 13 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 receive all relevant publications without being burdened with a large number of irrelevant publications. We are not persuaded that determining how to suitably formulate a hierarchical topic string or a string of independent keywords is a challenge particular to computer networks or one necessarily rooted in computer technology. Appellant's further argument that the present claims pose no risk of preemption is likewise unpersuasive of Examiner error (Appeal Br. 17-18; see also Reply Br. 4--5). Although the Supreme Court has described "the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption," Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. "The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability" and "[ fJor this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the§ 101 analysis." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). "[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Id. Responding to the Examiner's Answer, and referencing paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Specification, Appellant notes in the Reply Brief that, at the time the present invention was made, a problem existed with then current publish/subscriber systems, involving the consistent expression of hierarchical topic names (Reply Br. 4). Appellant asserts that the claimed invention addressed this problem by implementing flexible topic classification schemes whereby subscribers can choose between multiple 14 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 topic classification schemes (id.). Therefore, according to Appellant, the claimed invention, like the claimed invention in Enfzsh, represents an improvement in computer functionality, i.e., "an improvement to the functionality of publish/subscribe data processing systems, which is not an abstract idea" (id. at 3--4). The difficulty with Appellant's argument is that there is a fundamental difference between computer functionality improvements, on the one hand, and the uses of existing computers as tools to perform a particular task, on the other. Indeed, the Federal Circuit applied this distinction in Enfish in rejecting a§ 101 challenge at the step one stage in the Mayo/Alice analysis because the claims at issue focused on a specific type of data structure, i.e., a self-referential table, designed to improve the way a computer carries out its basic functions of storing and retrieving data, and not on asserted advances in the uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put. Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. Allowing subscribers to choose between multiple topic classification schemes, and performing a subscription matching process that implements the selected classification scheme, do not concern an improvement to computer capabilities but instead relate to the implementation of a task for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional element recited in the claim, i.e., the publish/subscribe data processing system, is no more than a generic component used as a tool to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, it does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223-24 15 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 ("[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of 'additional featur[ e]' that provides any 'practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract idea] itself."' (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not "well-understood, routine, conventional activity" in the field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only claim element beyond the abstract idea is the "publish/subscribe data processing system," i.e., a collection of generic computer components used to perform generic computer functions (Final Act. 15; see also Ans. 16)- a determination amply supported by, and fully consistent with the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 36-40). 5 Appellant cannot reasonably 5 The Office's April 19, 2018 Memorandum to the Examining Corps from Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, Robert W. Bahr, entitled, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.), available at https ://www. uspto. gov/ sites/ default/files/ documents/ memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF, expressly directs that an examiner may support the position that an additional element ( or combination of elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional with "[a] citation to an 16 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 contend, nor does Appellant, that the operation of the publish/subscribe data processing system is not well-understood, routine, and/or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer components, invoke any assertedly inventive software, or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer components to perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving and processing information. We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1, and independent claims 8, 11, and 12, which fall with claim 1. Appellant's Separate Arguments Regarding Dependent Claims 2-6, 9, and 13-18 Addressing dependent claims 2-6, 9, and 13-18 separately, Appellant ostensibly maintains that the rejection of these dependent claims under § 101 cannot be sustained because the Examiner did not specifically address the additional elements recited in the dependent claims (Appeal Br. 20). We disagree. There is no dispute that examiners are instructed to evaluate the patent eligibility of each claim individually. But, consideration of each claim individually does not require a separate written analysis of each individual claim. express statement in the specification ... that demonstrates the well- understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s)" (id. at 3). 17 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 Moreover, the Examiner explicitly addressed dependent claims 2---6, explaining that the claims "merely add further details of the abstract steps/elements recited in claim 1 without including an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment" (Final Act. 3--4). The Examiner provided a similar explanation with respect to dependent claims 9 and 13-18 (id. at 4 ). It also is telling here that aside from charging that the Examiner's analysis "fails to explain why the additional elements recited in the dependent claims do not add significantly more to the alleged exception" (Appeal Br. 20), Appellant offers no substantive arguments in support of the separate patent eligibility of the dependent claims. In view of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth above with respect to independent claim 1, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claims 2---6, 9, and 13-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Anticipation We are persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 8, 11, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because Ravin does not disclose "determining ... whether a respective subscriber wishes subscription matching to implement a first topic classification scheme or a second topic classification scheme" where subscription matching comprises "comparing topic identifiers within received publications with topic identifiers within subscribers' stored subscriptions to determine whether the received publications should be 18 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 forwarded to the subscribers," as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 8, 11, and 12 (Appeal Br. 20-22). Ravin is directed to a knowledge management system for allocating expert resources (Ravin, Abstract), and discloses that data on experts are stored in an expert database and data on requesters stored in a requestor database (id. ,r 12). Information requests are provided over networked devices, e.g., over voice and data networks, and a pairing unit identifies an appropriate expert matched to each request and requestor (id.). The pairing unit includes a request/requestor characterization unit collecting request/requestor attributes, a matching unit matching request/requestor attributes with an expert, and a routing unit routing each incoming request to a selected matching expert (id.). Ravin, thus, discloses, with reference to Figure 1, that the system provides access to an expert of an appropriate skill level matched to the needs of each user (id. ,r 20). For example, Ravin discloses that the expert identification system can be employed in the context of a call center in which an incoming call is routed to a matching expert (id. ,r,r 23-24). We have carefully reviewed the cited portions of Ravin, on which the Examiner relies (see Final Act. 5-7 (citing Ravin ,r,r12, 29, 30, 36, 37, 40, and 41, Figs. 2-5); see also id. at 8-11)). And we agree with Appellant that there is nothing in the cited portions of Ravin that discloses subscription matching, as called for the independent claims. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claims 1, 8, 11, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). For the same reasons, we also sustain the Examiner's rejection of dependent claims 2-6, 9, and 13-18. 19 Appeal2017-004338 Application 11/835,679 In summary: 1---6, 8, 9, 101 11-18 1---6, 8, 9, 102(b) 11-18 Overall Outcome CONCLUSION Eligibility 1---6, 8, 9, 11-18 Ravin 1---6, 8, 9, 11-18 1---6, 8, 9, 11-18 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 20 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation