Benita F. Roland, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 1, 2000
01985637 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 1, 2000)

01985637

03-01-2000

Benita F. Roland, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Benita F. Roland v. United States Postal Service

01985637

March 1, 2000

Benita F. Roland, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01985637

) Agency No. 1A-111-0010-98

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

On July 10, 1998, Benita F. Roland (the complainant) timely filed an

appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)

from a final agency decision (FAD) dated June 23, 1998, concerning her

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq.<1> The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37, 659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly determined that

complainant had failed to prove that the agency discriminated against

her based on sex (pregnancy) when on September 23, 1997, her light duty

assignment was interrupted and she was not permitted to work

BACKGROUND

Complainant was employed by the agency as a Mail Processor at the Queens,

New York Processing and Distribution Center Facility. She requested

light duty on May 22, 1997, due to her pregnancy. On September 17, 1997,

management informed complainant and the other 25 employees on her tour

of duty who were on light duty that from that point forward management

was going to enforce the provision in the local collective bargaining

agreement that limited the number of employees on light duty on that

tour to six. Those six light duty slots were to be filled on the basis

of seniority, with a monthly rotation. Complainant was not one of the

first six employees to be given light duty under this policy, and she

was informed she would not be working until further notice because there

were no more light duty slots open.

Complainant filed a formal complaint on October 24, 1997, alleging

discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy) when her light

duty assignment was interrupted and she was not permitted to work.

The agency accepted the complaint for investigation and processing.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency issued a copy of its

investigative report and notified complainant of her right to request an

administrative hearing. After complainant failed to request a hearing,

the agency issued its FAD on June 23, 1998.

In its FAD, the agency found that the under the regulations at 29 C.F.R. �

1604.10, (which implement the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),

42 U.S.C. � 2000e(k)), a woman affected by pregnancy, childbirth or

related conditions must be treated the same for all employment related

purposes as other persons not so affected, but similar in their ability

or inability to work. Accordingly, a person who is pregnant who seeks

light duty must be treated in a like manner to all others who are afforded

light duty and given neither greater or less consideration with respect

to their rights to light duty. The FAD found that the complainant was

treated the same as the other employees on light duty who were not

pregnant, and that the PDA did not provide for a privilege or special

consideration for women who are pregnant. Therefore, complainant had not

been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The Pregnancy Discrimination

Act amended Title VII to specify that discrimination on the basis of

pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination.

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the

third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of

whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency

explained that it was enforcing the provision in the local collective

bargaining agreement that limited the number of employees on complainant's

tour of duty to six, and that those employees would be rotated monthly

on the basis of seniority. It presented evidence that showed that

complainant was not one of the six employees with the most seniority on

the day that the policy was to go into effect and that therefore, she was

not given a light duty assignment at that time. We find that the agency

has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.

Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate that the

agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination. We find

that complainant has failed to do so. Complainant failed to present

evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory

animus toward complainant's sex or pregnancy. Instead, she argued that

there should be a different category of light duty for pregnant women

and that she should not have been treated the same as the other light

duty employees who were put on rotation. The PDA requires, however,

that for all employment related purposes, pregnant employees shall be

treated the same as other employees similarly situated with respect

to their ability to work. See, e.g., Ensley-Gaines v. United States

Postal Service, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996); Robertson v. U.S. Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05980323 (October 1, 1998). Therefore,

the agency's determination that complainant failed to establish that

she was discriminated against was correct.

Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1199)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS

OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be

submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the

absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed

timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration

of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the

other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 1, 2000

______________ __________________________________

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_______________ __________________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.