01985637
03-01-2000
Benita F. Roland, Complainant, William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Benita F. Roland v. United States Postal Service
01985637
March 1, 2000
Benita F. Roland, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01985637
) Agency No. 1A-111-0010-98
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
On July 10, 1998, Benita F. Roland (the complainant) timely filed an
appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission)
from a final agency decision (FAD) dated June 23, 1998, concerning her
complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et
seq.<1> The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in accordance with 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37, 659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly determined that
complainant had failed to prove that the agency discriminated against
her based on sex (pregnancy) when on September 23, 1997, her light duty
assignment was interrupted and she was not permitted to work
BACKGROUND
Complainant was employed by the agency as a Mail Processor at the Queens,
New York Processing and Distribution Center Facility. She requested
light duty on May 22, 1997, due to her pregnancy. On September 17, 1997,
management informed complainant and the other 25 employees on her tour
of duty who were on light duty that from that point forward management
was going to enforce the provision in the local collective bargaining
agreement that limited the number of employees on light duty on that
tour to six. Those six light duty slots were to be filled on the basis
of seniority, with a monthly rotation. Complainant was not one of the
first six employees to be given light duty under this policy, and she
was informed she would not be working until further notice because there
were no more light duty slots open.
Complainant filed a formal complaint on October 24, 1997, alleging
discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy) when her light
duty assignment was interrupted and she was not permitted to work.
The agency accepted the complaint for investigation and processing.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency issued a copy of its
investigative report and notified complainant of her right to request an
administrative hearing. After complainant failed to request a hearing,
the agency issued its FAD on June 23, 1998.
In its FAD, the agency found that the under the regulations at 29 C.F.R. �
1604.10, (which implement the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),
42 U.S.C. � 2000e(k)), a woman affected by pregnancy, childbirth or
related conditions must be treated the same for all employment related
purposes as other persons not so affected, but similar in their ability
or inability to work. Accordingly, a person who is pregnant who seeks
light duty must be treated in a like manner to all others who are afforded
light duty and given neither greater or less consideration with respect
to their rights to light duty. The FAD found that the complainant was
treated the same as the other employees on light duty who were not
pregnant, and that the PDA did not provide for a privilege or special
consideration for women who are pregnant. Therefore, complainant had not
been discriminated against on the basis of her sex. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency
has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility
to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act amended Title VII to specify that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy constitutes sex discrimination.
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the
third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In response to complainant's claims of discrimination, the agency
explained that it was enforcing the provision in the local collective
bargaining agreement that limited the number of employees on complainant's
tour of duty to six, and that those employees would be rotated monthly
on the basis of seniority. It presented evidence that showed that
complainant was not one of the six employees with the most seniority on
the day that the policy was to go into effect and that therefore, she was
not given a light duty assignment at that time. We find that the agency
has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.
Since the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its action, the burden returns to the complainant to demonstrate that the
agency's articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination. We find
that complainant has failed to do so. Complainant failed to present
evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory
animus toward complainant's sex or pregnancy. Instead, she argued that
there should be a different category of light duty for pregnant women
and that she should not have been treated the same as the other light
duty employees who were put on rotation. The PDA requires, however,
that for all employment related purposes, pregnant employees shall be
treated the same as other employees similarly situated with respect
to their ability to work. See, e.g., Ensley-Gaines v. United States
Postal Service, 100 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1996); Robertson v. U.S. Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05980323 (October 1, 1998). Therefore,
the agency's determination that complainant failed to establish that
she was discriminated against was correct.
Accordingly, the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and
not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 1, 2000
______________ __________________________________
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that
the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_______________ __________________________
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.