Bendix Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 8, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 62 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DI)F('ISIONS OF: NATIIONAL ABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Automation & Measurement Division The Bendix
Corporation and International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFI.-CIO-CI,C and
its IAocal 759. Case 9 CA 8762
May 8. 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CGAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS,
MuRPIIY, AND TRUESI)AI.E
On May 20, 1975, Administrative Law Judge Hen-
ry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the Charging
Party filed exceptions, supporting briefs, and answer-
ing briefs.'
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of' the exceptions, briefs, and
amicur curiae brief', and has decided to affirm the rul-
ings, findings. and conclusions of the Administrative
Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith.
1. The Administrative Law Judge found that Re-
spondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
refusing to furnish the Union with a copy of the
agreements between Respondent and the insurance
carriers providing health, life, and sickness and acci-
dent insurance benefits to unit employees under the
terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. We dis-
agree.
The Board has long held that group insurance is
encompassed within the concept of "wages" 2 and it is
equally well settled that:
... "wage and related information pertaining to
employees in the bargaining unit should, upon
request, he made available to the bargaining
agent without regard to its immediate relation-
ship to the negotiation or administration of the
collective-bargaining agreement." As such infor-
mation concerns the core of the employer-em-
ployee relationship. it is presumptively relevant
and "a union is not required to show the precise
relevance of it, unless effective employer rebuttal
comes forth .... "
In the instant case, no effective employer testimony
was offered to rebut the presumption of relevancy of
On December 22. 1975, the Board granted Firestone lire and Rubber
('ompan's request to file an armnius uriae brief in the abosve-captioned case
and in White Farm Equipment (otnpantr .4 Suhvidian ,o Whilte Motor (Corpo-
ration. Case 9 (CA 8835. and The East Dayton Tool and Die Co., Case 9
('A 8887. On January 12. 1976. Firestone filed an amicur brief. On January
12, 1976, Firestione moved for oral argument and requested participation in
oral argument its aniu. rcuriae in the three above-mentioned cases. The
motion is denied with respect to the case at hand inasmuch as the record. the
exceptions aid the briefs adequately present the issues and the psitions ot
the parties.
2Stoi,e- Wiodard. In. 123 NLRB 287. 288 (1959).
(;'iles (omlmunioation. Inc . 172 NL RB 1909 (19681
the requested information. Therefore, we conclude
that the Union is entitled to a copy of the master
insurance agreements to enable it to police and ad-
minister the existing contract and that Respondent's
refusal to furnish this information was violative of
Section 8(a)(5). 4
2. The complaint was amended at the hearing to
allege that Respondent unlawfully refused to provide
the Union with the results of a survey, conducted by
Respondent during July and August 1974, concerning
whether or not race and/or sex discrimination existed
at its Dayton, Ohio, plant. The Administrative Law
Judge recommended dismissal of this allegation of the
complaint on the ground that Respondent took no
action in reliance upon the survey. Although we agree
with the Administrative aw Judge's recommenda-
tion, we find it unnecessary to pass on his underlying
rationale because there is insufficient evidence in the
record to establish the existence of such a survey.
The Administrative Law Judge recognized that
"[the] record evidence with regard to the survey is
sparse" and noted that "[wjhat the investigation con-
sisted of does not appear in the record." Nevertheless,
the Administrative Law Judge found that such a sur-
vey was made, relying, not on record evidence, but on
his contention that "Respondent has not contested
the use of the word survey and implicitly acknowl-
edges the existence of a work product which one can
call a survey." We find merit in Respondent's excep-
tion to this finding. he Union's international repre-
sentative, Wiley Stamper, testified that he was told by
Respondent that someone was going to make a com-
plete inspection of the plant and was going to take a
look at some of the problems raised by the Union.
Stamper testified that he requested the outcome of the
tour and investigation. The record does not indicate
whether the investigation was in fact undertaken,
who conducted it, its nature, or whether the results
have been recorded. Under these circumstances, we
find that the evidence is insufficient to establish the
existence of the "survey" and we shall dismiss the
complaint insofar as it alleges an unlawful refusal to
furnish the Union with a copy.
3. The Administrative Law Judge further recom-
mended that Respondent be ordered to furnish the
Union with a copy of its affirmative action plan, with
deletions of certain financial data. Respondent ex-
cepted to this portion of the recommended Order. We
find merit to this exception. As a government contrac-
tor, Respondent is required, under Executive Order
1 1246 and the rules of the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance, to develop and file affirmative action
4 he East Diton 7 I and Die Co. 239 NLRB 141 (1978): see Film
Editing Equipment ('orp d/hla HJllvvId Filmn Compan,). 213 NI.RB 584.
591 592 (1974)
242 NLRB No. 8
62
THE BENDIX (CORPORATION
programs which set forth, inter alia, the employer's
goals and timetable to correct deficiencies in the utili-
zation of minority groups and women. In Westing-
house Electric Corporation,5 the Board found that the
information contained in such affirmative action
plans, i.e., projections, goals, and timetables, is not
reasonably necessary to enable a union to administer
its contract intelligently and effectively and, thus, is
not presumptively relevant. The Union herein has not
demonstrated the relevance of the requested informa-
tion. We will not, therefore, require Respondent to
produce the affirmative action plan. While the plan
may contain statistical information regarding race
and sex of employees to which the Union, upon re-
quest, would be entitled, as discussed below, we will
not attempt to sift through Respondent's affirmative
action plans to discern the data to which the Union is
entitled. In this respect, the Union failed to indicate
with appropriate specificity the relevant information
sought.
4. The Administrative Law Judge recommended
that Respondent be ordered to supply the following
information requested by the Union:
(a) The total number of individuals who sought
employment with Respondent in the certified unit. in-
cluding their race and sex.
(b) The number actually hired, including their race
and sex and the department and classification in
which they were placed.
(c) Job posting data, including the names of em-
ployees who bid on jobs, their race and sex, and the
name, race, and sex of the employees awarded the
unit jobs.
(d) Copies of requisition forms used to requisition
employees for unit positions.
We agree with the recommendation of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge for the reasons stated in his Deci-
sion and for the reasons set forth below.
With respect to the information requested concern-
ing unit employees, it is now settled law that such
information must be provided to the collective-bar-
gaining agent. The Union has a duty of fair represen-
tation requiring it to represent fairly the interests of
all unit employees, including those who are women or
who belong to minority groups. Inasmuch as the
Union has a right to protect unit employees from dis-
criminatory treatment by Respondent, it has the need
for information related to race and sex in order to
carry out this function. 6 Furthermore, the antidiscri-
mination clause in the collective-bargaining agree-
5239 NLRB 106 (1978)
6 Westinghouse Electric Corporation, supra at 108-109. Member Jenkins
considers that the Union has, in addition to and because of its duty of fair
representation, an obligation to endeavor to prevent the establishment of
discriminatory practices, and thus has also the correlative right to informa-
tion relating to such discrimination.
ment7 entitles the Union to this information to enable
the Union to implement contractual policy and moni-
tor the terms of the agreement.R Thus, we find that the
above information relating to bargaining unit em-
ployees is presumptively relevant and must be sup-
plied by Respondent.
Certain information requested by the Union relates
solely to job applicants. Job applicants are employ ees
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act. Fur-
thermore the Board stated in lTlnner Motor l.iert,
Ltd., that "an employer's hiring policies and practices
are of vital concern to employees inasmuch as such
policies and practices inherently affect terms and con-
ditions of employment. "9 Thus, we find that the appli-
cant data sought by the Union is presumptively rel-
evant because the data is integral to the Union's
fulfillment of its functions as statutory bargaining
representative of unit employees. °0
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing. we
agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the
above-listed information is necessary and relevant to
the Union's pertfrmance of its bargaining obligation
and we will order Respondent to produce the current
requested data and materials."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Lahor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
lions Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Au-
tomation & Measurement ivision The Bendix Cor-
poration, Dayton. Ohio, its officers, agents.
successors, and assigns. shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
Art VII. 23!. provides, "Neither the Company nor the Union shall dis-
criminate against any employee because of race. religion. color, sex. age or
national origin."
W 1estinghou.se Electric (orporation, supra at 108.
148 NLRB 1402. 1404 1964), enforcement denied on other grounds 419
F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
' See The East Dayton Tool and Die Co.. supra at 142. 149.
" Our dissenting colleague repeats the contentions she made in her dissent
in Westinghouse Electric Corporation and The East Davron Ttaxl and Die (o.
supra. Her characterizations and inferences herein are no more persuasive
now than they were in the earlier cases. Furthermore. her reliance on the
recent Supreme Court decision in Derrioit Edison Co. v, L. R 440 l .S
301 (1979}. Is totally misplaced. There, the Court refused to enforce a Board
Order requiring the employer to furnish to the union aptitude tests and
answer sheets. as well as scores of individual examinees. without first obtain-
tng their consent. With respect to the tests, the Court found that secrecy was
necessary to preserve the valihdty of the tests As to the individual scores, the
Court noted that a promise of confidentiahlity as made to the examrelles,.
and took judicial notice of the sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of
information that may hbe taken to bear on his uor her basic cimpetence he
Court therefore concluded that "[Uinder these circumstances, any possible
impairment of the function of the Uinion in processing the grlevances of
employees is more than justified by conditioning the disclosure of the test
scores upon consent of the ery employees whose grievance is being pro-
cessed." We fail to see how the considerations of secrecy and confidentiality
apply to the information we are rdering the Emploer to furnish to the
Union herein: i.e.. information respecting its master insurance agreements.
job postings and requisition forms, and the race and sex of applicants for
employ menl
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(a) Refusing to bargain with International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-
CIO-CLC and its Local 759, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the employees in the unit de-
scribed below, by refusing upon request to furnish
information respecting its master insurance agree-
ments, job postings and requisition forms, and the
race and sex of applicants for employment. The unit
is:
All production and maintenance employees
employed by the Employer at its Dayton, Ohio
plant, including plant clerical employees, truck
drivers, expediters and schedulers, but excluding
all office clerical employees, technical employees
with diverse interests, co-op students, field ser-
vice employees, the secretary and stenographer
in the service department, managerial employees
and all professional employees guards and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, furnish the above-named Union
with a copy of its master insurance agreements, cur-
rent job-posting data and requisition forms, and cur-
rent data respecting the race and sex of applicants for
employment as requested in the Union's letter of July
25, 1974.
(b) Post at its Dayton, Ohio, facility copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."' 2 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and
it hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations
not found herein.
MEMBER MURPHY, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
This case presents the Board with an excellent op-
portunity to reverse its erroneous decisions in Wes-
tinghouse Electric Corporation,3 and The East Dayton
Tool and Die Co. 14 In those cases the Board-turning
itself into a mini-EEOC-sanctioned a union's use of
the National Labor Relations Act and the National
Labor Relations Board's processes to obtain informa-
tion relating to issues properly cognizable under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'5 Instead of avail-
ing itself of this opportunity to make good law, the
Board majority here again extends union liability un-
der title VII, heedless of the consequences under ei-
ther that statute or the National Labor Relations Act.
This case-like Westinghouse and East Dayton-
arose in the context of the International Union's
adoptions in 1972 of a program to eliminate race and
sex discrimination in bargaining units represented by
it and/or its locals, a goal with which I agree. But in
furtherance of this laudable internal union goal, the
International Union by letter of June 22, 1973, re-
quested certain information from Respondent Com-
pany, which request Respondent denied by letter of
July 12, 1973. After more than a year had elapsed, on
July 25, 1974, the International Union wrote to the
Company asking for, inter alia, the following informa-
tion:
1. Copies of master plans for health and life insur-
ance and sickness and accident benefits for unit em-
ployees. 6
2. A breakdown by race and sex of all applicants
for employment during 1973 and 1974 to date of the
letter, and, as to those applicants hired, a breakdown
by race and sex of the classification and department
into which they were placed.
3. A copy of Respondent's affirmative action
plans.
4. A sample copy of job requisition forms used to
requisition employees for unit jobs and five such
forms completed within a recent period prior to the
letter.
5. A listing of all 1974 job postings, the names of
all persons who bid for jobs posted, broken down by
race and sex, and a designation indicating which per-
son was awarded the job.
On September 19, 1974, the Company refused to
supply the information. Subsequently, on or about
September 30, 1974, the International Union re-
quested the Company supply it with the results of a
survey allegedly conducted in July and August 1974
'3 239 NLRB 106 (1978).
' 239 NLRB 141 (1978).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
,' The letter requested "[t]he complete agreement setting forth the terms
under which unit employees [sic] benefits are secured. .. ' I assumL, as the
majonty apparently does, that the Union sought only those portions of the
plans which pertain to unit employees.
64
THE BENDIX CORPORATION
concerning the existence of race and/or sex discrimi-
nation at Respondent's Dayton, Ohio, facility, the
only plant here at issue. Respondent also refused this
request.
During the relevant times the Company had a col-
lective-bargaining agreement with the International
and its Local 759 (herein the Union) containing a
nondiscrimination clause providing that "[n]either the
Company nor the Union shall discriminate against
any employees because of race, religion, color, sex,
age or national origin." There is no evidence that,
during the relevant times, any grievance was filed al-
leging a violation of the nondiscrimination clause, or
that the Union filed any charges against the Com-
pany with either the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission or the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, or
that the Union even suspected that the Company was
engaging in conduct which violated title VII.
My colleagues in the majority here order the Com-
pany to supply the Union with virtually all of the
information requested-except the affirmative action
plans (AAP's) and alleged survey-on grounds that
such information is "presumptively" relevant. Except
with respect to the insurance plans insofar as they
pertain to benefit coverage for unit employees,'7 I
cannot agree with the majority that any of the infor-
mation requested is properly obtainable in this pro-
ceeding. In fact, I vigorously assert the contrary.
The information sought in item 2, above, i.e., the
race and sex of applicants for employment and of
those applicants actually hired, is similar to that re-
quested by the union in The East Dayton Tool and Die
Co., supra. As in East Dayton, the majority in this
case orders the Company to provide the requested
information. By this action the majority expands li-
ability for employer discrimination under title VII
and imposes on unions the duty to represent appli-
cants for employment despite the fact that the Union
has no say whatsoever-and is entitled to none-with
regard to Respondent's hiring decisions." (See East
Dayton.)
i I agree with the majority's conclusion that "group insurance is encom-
passed within the concept of 'wages,'" information as to which is in turn
presumptively relevant; that Respondent has not rebutted the presumption:
and that therefore Respondent's refusal to furnish the insurance information
violated Sec. 8(aX5) of the Act. In support of this conclusion the majority
cites, inter alia, The East Days on Tool and Die Co., upra, in which I dissented
from the majority's determination that the union was entitled to similar
information. As stated in fn. 16 of the decision, however. my dissent on that
issue was based solely on the fact that the request for the information was
not made by the local union, which was the exclusive representative of the
unit employees, but by an agent of the international union, to which the
employer had no obligation to furnish the information. In the instant case
the request was made by the recognized collective-bargaining representative
and I therefore find that the Union was entitled to the insurance informa-
tion.
'8 Of course, where a union is in part responsible for an employer's dis-
crinminatory scheme or pattern of conduct, employees adversely affected by
such discrimination have a course of action against the union as well as
against the employer. See Laffev v. Northwest Airlines, Inc, 13 FEP Cases
1068 (D.C Cir. 1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1086 (1978t.
Indeed, the facts here present an even more persua-
sive case for the conclusion that the Company has no
obligation to provide the applicant information, for in
East Dayton the union and the employer were parties
to a collective-bargaining agreement containing a
nondiscrimination clause which specifically applied,
inter alia, to hiring. Although, as I stated in the dis-
sent in that case, I do not consider the mere existence
of such a clause involving a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining to justify a finding that a union is entitled
to information about applicants for employment, the
majority relied on the hiring provision in finding that
information as to applicants was necessary and rel-
evant to the union's performance of its bargaining
function. Indeed, having found that the union had
demonstrated the relevance of this information, the
majority in East Dayton specifically found it "unnec-
essary to determine whether such information is pre-
sumptively relevant." (Emphasis supplied.)' 9
In the instant case, however, the nondiscrimination
clause in the collective-bargaining agreement between
the Company and the Union is silent as to its applica-
bility to hiring and, thus, much of the underpinning
for the majority decision in East Dayton-as weak as
it was-is conspicuous by its absence here. Notwith-
standing this fact, the majority, citing Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd. (as it did in East Dayton), for the propo-
sition that "an employer's hiring policies and prac-
tices are of vital concern to employees inasmuch as
such policies and practices inherently affect terms and
conditions of employment," 2 0 finds the information
"presumptively relevant because the data is integral
to the Union's fulfillment of its functions as statutory
bargaining representative of unit employees." Thus,
once again the majority merely makes the bald asser-
tion that the requested information is "presumptively
relevant because it is presumptively relevant," and
thereby in one sentence tries to annihilate volumes of
established precedent concerning an employer's duty
to furnish information. To summarize the basic
ground rules in this area, the standard for determin-
ing whether requested information is "presumptively
relevant" has been succinctly articulated by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
[W]age and related information pertaining to em-
ployees in the bargaining unit is presumptively
relevant ... as such data concerns the core of the
empoyer-employee relationship . .. as to other
requested data, however . . . a union must, by
reference to the circumstances of the case, as an
5' East Dayton, supra, fn. 6.
20 148 NLRB 1402, 1404 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds 419
F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
65
I) ('ISI()NS OF NATIONAI. IAB()R RIlATI()NS BOARDI
initial matter demonstrate more precisel the rel-
evance of the data it desires.21
Clearly, the inf'ornlation as to applicants requested
by the Union here does not fall within the category of
"wage and related intormation" and does not concern
the core of' the employer-employee relationship. The
majority thus errs in concluding that it is presump-
tively relevant. Equally clearly, the Union has also
failed to demonstrate the relevance of' that informa-
tion because there is in fact no relevancy to estab-
lish! Accordingly, fbr all the reasons discussed in full
in my dissenting opinion in lEa'l Dalvon, supra, and
the additional reasons set forth above, I find that the
Union is not entitled to any of' the information it
seeks concerning applicants for employment.
Additionally, to the extent the Union requested in-
formation as to unit employees (item 2, supra), i.e.,
the race and sex of employees hired into various de-
partments and classifications, as I did in iWesting-
house. supra, that the information was not sought for
any purpose of collective bargaining and I therefore
would not require Respondent to supply such intor-
mation. Although in the instant case, unlike P'.esling-
house, it does not appear that the Union had filed suit
against the Company and was seeking information as
"part of its litigation strategy," it is abundantly clear
here, as it was in Westinghouse and Ea.vt Davton, that
the Union wanted the data in furtherance of its own
purposes and not for collective bargaining.22
In item 3, as noted above, the Union requested the
Company's affirmative action plans. The issue of
whether a collective-hargaining representative is enti-
tled to copies of an employer's AAP's was discussed
at length in Westinghouse Electric Corporation. supra,
in both the majority and dissenting opinions. As I
stated in my dissent in that case:
The whole purpose of AAPs is to enable employ-
ers to monitor their own fair employment pro-
gram and to provide equality of employment op-
portunity without regard to artificial barriers....
* * * * *
If employers must ... hand over under Section
8(a)(5) their race and sex statistics and certain
information contained in their AAP ... and run
the risk of a union lawsuit, I think experienced
21 Curltss /right ( 'orporation, Wright A4 ronauliitl Divi ,on S N L R Pr.
347 F.2d 61, 69 (1965).
2 The conclusion that collective bargaining and protectumn f' employee
nghts were a long way from being the Union's primary concern in requesting
the information is amply supported by internatilnal representative Wilt
Stamper's testimony that he w ould i.ithdra the unfair lahuor practice charge
if Respondent swould furnish the [nion lith ia "hold harmless" agreement
Such a comment is hard]: consistent with a burning desire on the part olt Ithe
Union to unearth and eliminate any polssible emplo)ment discrimination
Respondent.
counsel will make sure that employers will be
less than candid in preparing the data in the fu-
ture.
I adhere to this position and, consequently agree
with the majority's conclusion- but not their ratio-
nale therefor that the Company here is not obli-
gated to supply the Union with copies of' its affirma-
tive action plans.
With regard to item 4, as noted by the Administra-
tive Law Judge, it is not clear whether job requisition
forms are used in hiring new employees and/or in
connection with job postings of unit positions. To the
extent the forms are used as part of the hiring process,
I finu that inasmuch as the Union is not entitled to
information about hiring clearly a management pre-
rogative it is also not entitled to copies of docu-
ments utilized by management in the hiring process.
Further, inasmuch as it is not established on this rec-
ord that the requisition forms had any connection
with rights of unit employees under the collective-
bargaining agreement, it is obvious that the Union
has not demonstrated the relevancy of the requested
information. 23 Accordingly, my colleagues err in re-
quiring Respondent to supply the Union with any job
requisition forms.
With respect to item 5, in which the information
requested was about job postings and about employ-
ees who bid for jobs and those who were awarded
posted jobs, the Union might be entitled to such in-
formation if it were requested for a purpose related to
collective bargaining. However, there is no indication
here that the information was requested for such a
purpose. As discussed above, there is no evidence that
the Union filed charges or grievances relating to al-
leged discrimination by the Company here, but there
is abundant evidence that the Union sought the infor-
mation at issue tfor its own purposes. In these circum-
stances, it is clear that the Union is seeking the
Board's assistance in a mere fishing expedition. I
therefore would not require Respondent to supply the
job posting information.
Finally, with regard to the survey allegedly under-
taken by the Company to determine whether race or
sex discrimination existed at its Dayton plant, I agree
with the majority that the General Counsel has failed
to establish that such a survey was conducted. How-
ever. even if the existence of such a survey were
shown, I would not require the Company to provide
the results thereof to the Union. For, as I emphasized
21 As I emphalilsed in my dissent n East Dnavi,n. pra, quoting the United
Sla tes ('lurt )I1 Appeals for the Ninth ('ircut. "''the showing iof relevancel by
the union must be more than a mere concoction ol'some general theor . "
.Sin Diegoe Ne paper Guild,. .oc(L No t5 / the .Ncwspaper Guild. AFFL
(/0 ((' I( 'niun Tribune Publishing ( / v N R B, 548 F.2d 863. 868
11977). affg I nn -rihiune Publishing (,* 220 N lRH 1226 (1975) 1 did not
partlcipale in the Board decision in I rinn 7rihlun
66
IE BENtI)IX ('ORP()RAIlON
in feI.stingh/ulvse "Ithe spirit and motive behind Title
V11 itself was to encourage voluntar, colmpliance.'
Obviously, ordering Respondent to produce the re-
sults of a survey conducted on Respondent's on ini-
tiative results which could conceivably be used
against Respondent in some future proceedings is
far from conducive to the goal of voluntary compli-
ance with this country's equal employment opportu-
nity laws and programs. Furthermore, as with most of
the other data requested by the Union in this pro-
ceeding, it is clear that the information is not re-
quested for purposes of collective bargaining.
Finally, ev-n if the data had been requested for
collective-bargaining purposes, the United States Su-
preme Court has recently held that a union's interest
in "arguably relevant" information does not always
predominate over all other interests. In Derroit Edivon
Cornpal' v. N.L. RB., 440 U.S. 301 (1979). the ('ourt
concluded that a union is not necessarily entitled to
all information it requests?2 a position which I em-
phasized in lf,'stinghouse and East Daton, lsu/ra, and
reiterate here. Although Detroit Eison involved types
of information other than those involved in this case.
the general principle is relevant here. Obviously, the
fact that my colleagues of the majority do not accept
my dissent does not make it less valid.
In summary. I agree with the majority that Re-
spondent is obligated to furnish the nion with the
information requested regarding insurance coverage
of unit employees, and violated Section 8(a)(5) and ( I)
of the Act by failing to do so. However, for all the
reasons stated above. I would not find the Union en-
titled to any of the other information sought in this
proceeding. and to the extent the majority orders Re-
spondent to provide such information, I dissent.
The illoing observatlions ol the Supreme (Court are pertinent
A unton's ha re assertion halt it needs ntlormation to process a griev-
ance dves not autormaticalls oblige the employer tI suIppls all he ntor-
mation n the manner requested 144(1 U.S at 314.1
rhe Board's positiin appealrs to rest oIn the propositllon that unilon
Interests n arguabl) relealnt intormation must .IalwaS predoiinate
over all other interests, h cver legitima.te ut such ani absolute rule
has never been etahlished. and xe decline to adopl such .I rule here
[440 U.S. at 318.1
APPENI)IX
Noii(t To EtI ONYilis
POSIID BY ORDI)ER O() 1111
NAIONAI. L.ABO()R RELATIONS BOARI
An Agency of the United States Government
Wi; WII.I. N refuse to bargain with Interna-
tional Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers. AFIt CIO CI.C and its Local 759, as
the exclusive hbargaining representative of the
emplo,ees in the unit described below. b refus-
ing to furnish information, upon request. respect-
ing our master insurance agreements, job post-
ings and requisition fbrms. and the race and sex
of applicants liOr emplo,, ment. Tlhe unit is:
All production and maintenance employees
employed at our Dayton, Ohio plant. includ-
ing plant clerical employees, truck drivers, ex-
pediters and schedulers, but excluding all o:
fice clerical employees, technical emplobees
with diverse interests, co-op students, field ser-
vice employees, the secretary and stenogra-
pher in the service department. managerial
emploNes and all profssional employees.
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Wi xliil is ol in an3 like or related manner
interfere with. restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed them h Sec-
tion 7 of the Actl.
\\i: \ 11.,. upon request. f'urnish the abo e-
named Union with a cop ol'f our m;aster insur-
alce agreements, current job posting data atnd
requisition forms, and current data respecting
the race and sex of applicants for employ mient as
requested in the .:lnion's letter of July 25. 1974.
At i()M\tiiiN & IIASI RI:MI:NI I)i\ ISI()N\
I ii BN)IX ()R'RP()RA I I()N
DI)E('I SI()N
IIiR ' 1.. .1 \1 I I I . Adllnlt istratixe .Iac Jutd ge: -1his case
presents the qtlestiin i t hargaMinig rcprcsent li \e's ritht
to inftormation f1roImn tllt pio\er re]ating to matters ot mi-
nority groups anid S ollle as thex nii affect [the tlnion's
dut's of tair represenrtation Ihe proceedItcltg xas niti;aed h
a charge tiled b International tInion otf lectrical. Radio
and Malchine Workers..\l . ('10 ((' and its Local 7591
on September 6. 1974, pursuant to which complaint issued
on I)ecemher 12. 1974. On Jnuar' 20. 1975, the hearintg
was held in ()akwood. ()hio.
U pon the entire record. ncldingclui' obsera;ltion of the
witnesses. and atter due consitderation of the bhrets iled hs
the (jeneral Counsel and Auiomaition & Mellsurermcent [)i-
vision he Bendix ('orporation, herein called Respondent I
make the tollowing:
INIl)IN(is () :t
1. 1111 Al 1I (1-i) RI SXl I() IBAR(Ai\
A. t-fi( tlr Serlin
Respondent is engaged in the mantinitacture of precision
mcasuring g equipment at a plant in Da!ton. Ohio. eniplo, -
ing aboutl 45) unit emIpilt cs ; nd 400 nolnunlit emnplosees.2
he ilnternahll j ll ll ,1 1 I .1 7i9. re reerred 't o lleciltl I .a t I l rllo
Jt rli di ion is not in isue t he ill l li e .ileg the rls .er 1drilIll . ind
I find Illt Respondent meets thle ioair'1 $5*iilIi dreCt Lil tss .ial Md s1olli
si.indAlrds ,r the i.ssertiol oI' jutrldlitll
67
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Since November 21, 1969, the Union has been the certified
representative in a unit of all production and maintenance
employees of Respondent at the plant, and since that date
the Union and Respondent have been parties to two collec-
tive-bargaining agreements, the most recent agreement
being effective from March 2, 1973, through March 1, 1976.
On July 25, 1974, the Union requested that Respondent
supply it with certain information. The complaint alleges,
and it is not disputed, that Respondent refused to supply
the Union with the following information:
I. The master plans containing the agreements between
Respondent and the insurance carriers who provide medi-
cal insurance coverage, sickness and accident (S & A) insur-
ance coverage and life insurance coverage for unit employ-
ees.
2. The total number of individuals who sought employ-
ment with Respondent in the certified unit, including their
sex and race, and the number actually hired, including their
race and sex and the department and classification in which
they were placed from January 1, 1973, to the date of the
issuance of complaint.
3. Respondent's affirmative action plan to eliminate race
and sex discrimination in its employment practices at the
Dayton, Ohio, plant, and the requisition form used to requi-
sition employees for unit positions.
4. The job postings for 1974, the names of the employees
who bid on each unit job posted, including their race and
sex, and the name, race, and sex of the employee awarded
the unit job.
5. Results of a survey conducted by Respondent during
July and August 1974, concerning whether or not race and/
or sex discrimination existed at its Dayton facility.)
In requesting the foregoing information, the Union ad-
verted to a program it maintains to eliminate race and sex
discrimination in plants represented by it and gave as its
reason for the request "in order to do a thorough and cor-
rect analysis in reference to possible race and sex discrimi-
nation at Bendix .. ." and "in furtherance of its efforts and
duty to represent all unit employees in an impartial nondis-
criminatory manner."
In replying to the Union's request, Respondent, in a let-
ter dated September 19, commended the Union's adoption
of a program to eliminate race and sex discrimination
within its own organization (which was not what the Union
referred to in its request) but added "we do not believe [the
Union] has an obligation to monitor or supervise similar
programs adopted by the Bendix Corporation. Although we
are willing to cooperate with the Union in assuring compli-
ance with the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 by both organizations, we are unwilling to furnish
information or data under any claim by the union that it
has a right or obligation to review the nondiscrimination
programs adopted by the company."
The letter did not address itself to the specific requests of
the Union, but a letter of the same date to the Board agent
investigating the instant charge gave reasons why Respon-
dent was refusing to furnish specific items. These reasons
will be adverted to below.
3 This information was requested on or about September 30, 1974.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
The ultimate issue in this case is whether or not the infor-
mation which the Union requested is relevant and neces-
sary for the Union in order to perform its obligations under
the Act as the exclusive representative of Respondent's em-
ployees. As a threshold matter, it is settled law that the
union owes a duty of fair representation to all unit employ-
ees. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Comnmunit, Organization,
420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975), "we have held. by the very nature of
the exclusive bargaining representative's status as repre-
sentative of all unit employees, Congress implicitly imposed
upon it a duty fairly and in good faith to represent the
interests of minorities within the unit. Vaca v. Sipes, supra;
Wallace Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 323 U.S. 248 (1944); cf.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944)." A union which violates its duty of affording fair
representation to all unit employees is guilty of an unfair
labor practice. Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No.
1, 147 NLRB 1573 (1964); Locals 1367 and 1368, Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association, etc., 148 NLRB 897
(1966), enfd. 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 389
U.S. 837 (1967). To fulfill that duty and remedy its unfair
labor practices, a union may be ordered by the Board to
propose specific contractual provisions to the employer to
prohibit racial discrimination. Local Union No. 12, United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, etc., 150 NLRB 312 (1964), enfd.
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 389 U.S. 837
(1967).
Respondent does not question these principles. Its posi-
tion is that the information requested is not relevant and
necessary to the Union for the purpose of fulfilling its duty
of fair representation.4
It is settled law that the duty to bargain extends beyond
the period of contract negotiations and applies to labor
management relations during the term of an agreement.
N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corporation, 385 U.S. 421
(1967). It is also settled law that an employer has the obli-
gation to furnish a union, upon request, with information,
which will allow it to decide whether to process pending
4 Respondent also asserts as a defense that the evidence supports a finding
that the International Union sought the information not for the purpose of
representing the interests of unit employees, but for the purpose of insulating
itself from financial liability for any unfair employment practices under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This contention is predicated on the
assertions that the International Union's program against race or sex dis-
cnmination had its genesis in an adverse EEOC determination; that the local
unions were uncooperative in furnishing data and, thus, forced the Interna-
tional Union to request data from the employers, and, when they refused,
unfair labor practice charges were filed: and upon the testimony of interna-
tional representative Wiley Stamper that he would withdraw the instant
charge if Respondent furnished the Union with a hold harmless agreement.
While Stamper's offer to withdraw the charge in return for a hold harmless
agreement suggests a greater concern on the part of the Union about possible
financial liability for violating title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 than
concern over affording fair representation to all unit employees, I am not
persuaded that his offer warrants the finding urged by Respondent. The
record does not support the assertion that the International's program was
adopted because of an adverse EEOC determination, rather than a genuine
concern for the protection of the rights of minority groups and women. In
any event, a concern about possible financial liability is not inconsistent with
a purpose of fulfilling the duty of fair representation. Accordingly, I find no
merit to Respondent's defense.
68
THE BENDIX CORPORATION
grievances. .'.L.R.B v. Acme Industrial Co.. 385 U.S. 432
(1967). Again, I do not understand Respondent to be dis-
puting these settled principles. Its contention is that the
Union did not request the information in question either for
the purpose of negotiating a new contract or to administer
an existing contract.
I find no merit to this contention. True, the Union did
not express a need for the requested information in terms of
administering the existing contract or negotiating a new
one. However, the contract does contain a no-discrimina-
tion clause5 to the enforcement of which the requested in-
formation could be relevant and necessary and the Union
did state as its purpose "in furtherance of its efforts and
duty to represent all unit employees in an impartial nondis-
criminatory manner," a purpose which subsumes both the
administration of the existing contract and preparation for
a contract in the future.
On the matter of relevance for the administration of the
existing contract, Respondent's position essentially is that
in order to be relevant under that principle it must appear
that the requested information relates to a grievance or a
claimed breach of contract. But the principle is broader
than that. A somewhat similar contention was rejected in
J. 1. Case Company v. N.L.R.B., 253 F.2d 149, 153 (7th Cir.
1958), wherein the court stated:
These contentions stem from a basic disagreement
between petitioner and the Board as to the proper con-
ception of the Union's role as representative of the em-
ployees and of the very nature of the collective bar-
gaining process. The contention that the Union's right
to data is limited to pending wage negotiations over-
looks the fact that collective bargaining is a continuing
process which, "[a]mong things, * * * involves day to
day adjustments in the contract and other working
rules, resolution of new problems not covered by exist-
ing agreements, and the protection of employee rights
already secured by contract."
In General Electric Co. v. N.L.R.B., 466 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir.
1972), in the Seattle case, the parties were neither engaged
in negotiations, nor processing grievances, at the time the
Union requested wage survey information, yet the court
upheld the Board's finding that the survey was relevant and
necessary to the union's proper performance of its statutory
responsibility.
In short, while the absence of pending grievances may be
a factor in determining the relevancy and necessity of re-
quested information, it is not a dispositive factor. Rele-
vancy and necessity may be predicated on other factors.
With these principles in mind, I turn to the specific infor-
mation here requested.
I. The survey
The record evidence with regard to the survey is sparse.
All that appears is that on July 30, 1974, at a meeting to
discuss the Union's requests for information, Respondent
indicated that it intended to conduct "a complete inspec-
tion of the plant and was going to take a look at some of the
Art. VII (23) provides "Neither the Company nor the Union shall dis-
criminate against any employees because of race, religion, color, sex, age or
national origin."
problems [the Union] had brought up...." On September
30, the Union requested the outcome of this investigation
and Respondent refused its request.
What the investigation consisted of does not appear in
the record. The Union has referred to it as a survey and the
complaint alleges a refusal to furnish the Union with a copy
of the survey. Respondent has not contested the use of the
word survey and implicitly acknowledges the existence of a
work product which one can call a survey.
In contending that the survey is relevant and necessary to
the Union for the proper performance of its duties as bar-
gaining representative, the General Counsel has cited sev-
eral cases which recite general principles. not disputed
herein, and resolve factual situations different from the situ-
ation here presented. He has not, however. indicated how
or why the survey is relevant and necessary for the Union
to perform its statutory function as bargaining representa-
tive.
It was not relevant to a grievance as none was pending.'
Nor was its relevance shown by other circumstances as in
LTniversal Atlas Cement of United States Steel Corporation,
178 NLRB 444 (1969), and The Fafnir Bearing Company, v.
N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966), cited by the General
Counsel. In Universal Atlas Cement, a grievance had been
resolved and the circumstances gave the union reason to
believe that other employees might be entitled to relief in
Fafnir Bearing, there was a price rate dispute to which the
union's timestudy request specifically related. In this case.
the Union has made no claim of discrimination, or breach
of contract. to which the survey can be said to relate.
The General Counsel asserts "such a survey must, of ne-
cessity, have dealt with the wages, hours and working con-
ditions of Respondent's employees, as well as Respondent's
hiring policies . . ." and the Union was entitled to the survey
"to see whether Respondent's employment policies were
discriminatory...." I do not agree that this is sufficient
basis to require Respondent to furnish the survey to the
Union. In General Electric Company, 192 NLRB 68, 69
(1971), wherein the Board held that the company was re-
quired to furnish the union with the results of an area wage
survey, the Board stated "we do not hold that any informa-
tion which could have relevance to determining a party's
decision with respect to any matter under negotiation or to
be negotiated must upon request be revealed to the other
party. Our decision is bottomed on our conclusion that
there was inherent reliance by the Company upon the wage
surveys .... " There was no such showing here. There was
no overt act, no management decision, flowing from the
survey which the Union could point to as the basis for its
request. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal of this
allegation of the complaint.
2. Requisition forms and job postings
The Union's specific request for information under this
heading was for "a sample copy of the job requisition forms
6 Union representative Wiley Stamper testified that in his meeting with
representatives of Respondent on July 30 he referred to the case of one
Catherine Dietrich as a problem case and he implied that Respondent re-
ceived the information as source material for its survey Be that as it may no
gnevance was filed at any time with regard to Dietrich and in requesting the
survey the Union did not advert to any problem involving Dietnch.
69
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
used to requisition employees for unit positions and five
recently completed forms for any bargaining unit employ-
ees" and "a listing of all job postings for 1974 identitfying
for each job posting the person(s) who bid for that job and
their race and sex. Please also indicate by some appropriate
designation, such as an asterisk, the person or employee
awarded the job."
Respondent's reasons for refusing to submit the infbrma-
tion, as stated in its letter to the investigator for the Re-
gional Office, were that "requisition forms constitute a part
of the selection and hiring processes carried on by the em-
ployer as one of' the specific rights reserved to it by the
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement and as
such cannot reasonably be considered as information neces-
sary to the union for purposes of meaningful collective bar-
gaining ... " and "the employer and the union have negoti-
ated a bidding system to be utilized in the filling of
vacancies within the bargaining unit. The Union has had
throughout the period of time requested, and still has at the
present time, full knowledge as to the jobs posted and the
identity of' the persons bidding for such jobs. If at any time
the union feels this negotiating procedure has been violated,
contractual remedies are available and have been utilized
by the union on previous occasions. There is no contractual
requirement for the employer to compile or arrange this
available data into any periodic reports for submission to
the union."
In its brief, Respondent has not addressed itself specifi-
cally to the items here under discussion, but at the hearing
testimony was adduced from representatives of Respondent
to the effect that the information requesting job postings
was voluminous and it would be cumbersome and time con-
suming for Respondent to accumulate the data fbr submis-
sion to the Union.
As was true in the case of the survey discussed above, the
information here in question was not requested because of
any pending or past grievances. The reason for the request
was spelled out by the Union's attorney who testified that
the Union has found that some employers requisition em-
ployees for various jobs according to sex. Attorney Janetzke
gave an example where a supervisor with heavy work in his
department wants all males in his department. The requisi-
tion forms used by Respondent do not carry a male or fe-
male designation. but to discover whether or not supervi-
sors were inserting sex designations along with their
requisition the Union requested five recently completed
forms.
In the matter of' job posting, the record indicates that
when vacancies occur in departments the vacancies will be
posted on bulletin boards and employees interested in being
considered for the vacancy can bid by filling out a bidding
form. Under the contract. Respondent has the sole discre-
tion in deciding to which employee bidding for the vacancy
it will award the vacant job. According to Janetzke. in his
discussions with the local union, the local union had indi-
cated to him that there might exist a problem in the move-
ment of females in the plant into certain jobs and in females
not moving up in the job plant structure. The information
requested by the Union would permit the Union to deter-
mine whether or not there was any sex discrimination in the
operation of the bidding procedure.
In my judgment. the job posting information requested
by the Union was relevant and necessary to its performance
of its obligations as the collective-bargaining representative
of Respondent's employees. As previously noted, the con-
tract between the Union and Respondent contains a no-
discrimination clause. The information requested by the
Union with regard to job postings was relevant and neces-
sary for the Union to determine whether or not Respondent
was complying with that provision. At first blush, it may
appear that such a conclusion is inconsistent with the con-
clusion above respecting the survey. In my judgment, there
is no inconsistency. The data requested is different. Insofar
as the survey was concerned, as I stated above, there was no
showing that the survey was utilized by Respondent in any
way either in its dealings with the Union or in its manage-
ment of the plant. Insofar as the job postings are concerned,
however, they are the very means by which unit employees
are selected for various job. In view of Respondent's con-
tractual obligation not to discriminate against employees on
any basis prohibited by law the Union was entitled to the
requested information in order to determine whether or not
Respondent was complying with its contractual obligation.
Apart from considerations of discrimination, an addi-
tional reason for concluding that the information requesting
job postings was relevant and necessary to the Union's per-
formance of its obligations as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of employees is the fact that the bidding proce-
dure vested discretion in selecting applicants for vacancies
solely in Respondent. With access to the job posting data
the Union could determine how this descretion was being
exercised and whether it was necessary or desirable to pro-
pose limitations on that discretion in future negotiations.
As noted earlier. Respondent adverted at the hearing to
the voluminous nature of the job posting data and implied
that it would be unduly burdensome to compile it. The
record does not support such a holding. Respondent al-
ready compiles a arietl of data concerning its operations
and there is no showing that production of the job posting
data would require any substantial additional effort. It is
noteworthy that Respondent did not base its refusal on
such a ground. "I it had. some arrangement could possibly
have been made to lessen such 'burden.' " J. I. Case Co. v.
N.L.R.B. .supra at 156.
At the hearing. Respondent adverted to information sup-
plied to the Union every month setting forth the name.
classification, and labor grade of all unit employees and it
implied that this information was sufficient for the Union's
purpose. It clearly is not sufficient.
As to the requisition forms, the record is not entirely
clear what they consist of or what use is made of them other
than as part of the selection and hiring process. In particu-
lar, it is not clear whether requisition frms relate to job
vacancies and the job postings just discussed above. or
whether they relate to new hires. If they are part of the
process by which job postings are made, they are relevant
and necessary for the Union's performance of its obliga-
tions as bargaining agent under the rationale above. If,
however, they are only part of the process of hiring new
employees, additional rationale is required. This additional
rationale will be found below in the discussion of the
Union's right to information concerning Respondent's poli-
cies.
70
THE BENDIX CORPORATION
3. The master insurance agreements
In its July 25 request, the Union requested a copy of the
agreements between Respondent and the insurance carriers
relative to health and life insurance and sickness and acci-
dent benefits provided to employees under the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement.
Article XXXVI of the collective-bargaining agreement
provides for pension and insurance benefits as follows:
(143) The Parties have provided for a Pension Plan
and an Insurance Program by Supplemental Agree-
ments signed by the Parties simultaneously with the
execution of this Agreement. (Which Supplemental
Agreements are set forth in Exhibits A and B, respec-
tively, and made a part of this Agreement as if set out
in full herein, subject to all the provisions of this
Agreement.)'
(149) No matter respecting the provisions of the
Pension Plan or the Insurance Program shall be subject
to the grievance procedure as established in this Agree-
ment.
The insurance benefits which Respondent is contractu-
ally obligated to the Union to provide is contracted for by
Respondent with Travellers Insurance Company. The bene-
fits provided to employees are set forth in a group insurance
plan handbook available to the Union and all employees.
The handbook sets forth the benefits to which employees
are entitled.
According to Janetzke, the Union requested a copy of the
master insurance agreements to examine them in detail to
see whether they contained provisions which discriminated
against employees on the basis of race or sex. Although
Janetzke spoke in terms of possible race or sex discrimina-
tion, it seems that possible sex discrimination was the pro-
posed object of search.
It appears that in certain respects insurance plans may
discriminate against women in certain particulars such as
disability benefits. For example Equal Opportunity Com-
mission guidelines require employers to treat disability due
to pregnancy the way they do other temporary disabilities
for all job-related purposes. In 'etzel v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 9 FEP Cases 227, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit upheld this view. If the respondent main-
tains an insurance program with provisions discriminatory
in this particular, and the union has failed to protest and to
seek modification of the insurance program, it may be held
liable itself by the EEOC. More importantly, for our pur-
poses, under the principles discussed earlier regarding the
union's duty of fair representation, it is evident that the
union's duty of fair representation under the NLRA re-
quires it to seek to eliminate any vestages of discrimination
against unit employees because of race or sex. The only real
question is whether master insurance plans are necessary to
that purpose I am not persuaded that they are on the facts
of this case.
7 The supplemental insurance agreement is not in fact set forth as an ex-
hibit, nor is it in evidence. It appears from the testimony o James Schaefer.
Respondent's director of industrial relations, that a supplemental agreement
was discussed by the parties and after revision was put into effect without
being executed by the Union. but without objection from it.
The insurance benefits for all employees are set forth in
the group insurance plan handbook. That handbook defines
and describes the benefits to which employees are entitled,
including disability benefits, hospital and surgical benefits,
pregnancy benefits, and the like. According to Janetzke
these benefits are described only in general terms in the
handbook, and only by a study of the master insurance
policy can the Union determine whether or not there are
discriminatory provisions. I do not agree. In my judgment,
general though they may be, the descriptions of the benefits
in the handbook are sufficient for the Union to determine
whether discrimination exists. At least the handbook is suf-
ficient to justify rejection of a broad request such as was
made here. The type of discrimination which the Union
seeks to ferret out is somewhat specific (it has, at least, been
identified by EEOC) and it appears to me that a determina-
tion of the existence or nonexistence of such discrimination
can be made by a study of the handbook. If, after study of
the handbook, the Union believes the information therein is
insufficient it can particularize its demand for further infor-
mation and necessity may then become apparent. On this
record, a finding that the master insurance plans are rel-
evant and necessary to the Union for the fulfillment of its
duty of fair representation is unwarranted.
4. The affirmative action plan
Under Executive Order 11246 and rules of the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance, contractors engaged in the
performance of government contracts are required to de-
velop and file affirmative action programs setting forth spe-
cific procedures to establish equal employment opportuni-
ties for minorities and women. Respondent is a government
contractor and it has developed and filed an affirmative
action program. Respondent has refused to furnish the
Union with a copy of its affirmative action plan for the
reason that the Union had no right to review nondiscrimi-
nation programs adopted by it and, for the further reason,
that a copy of the program was a matter of public record.
The fact that the affirmative action program is a matter
of public record is no defense to Respondent's refusal to
furnish a copy to the Union if it is relevant and necessary.
As bargaining representative the Union has the right to
look to Respondent as the source of information relating to
wages, hours, or other conditions of employment of its em-
ployees and may not be required to go to other sources It
is noted in this connection that while Title 41. Ch. 60, part
60-40, of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations provides for
public disclosure of affirmative action plans. upon request,
the plans may be inspected and copied only "if it is deter-
mined that the requested inspection or copying furthers the
public interest and does not impede any of the functions of
the OFCC or the Compliance Agencies ... " (Sec. 60-40.2)
Accordingly. I reject Respondent's defense that its plan s a
matter of public record. As a matter of fact, in light of the
provisions for public disclosure, Respondent's refusal to
furnish a copy to the Union is incomprehensible.
Cf. V. LRB v. Norrhxestern Publishing Compwai. 343 F 2d 521. 525 (7th
Cir. 1965): V L R B. v The Item Compani. 220 F.2d 956. 959 (5h Cr 1955).
cert. denied 350 US. 905.
71
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It seems unnecessary to spell out the relevance of an affir-
mative action program to the Union's performance of' its
obligations as a statutory bargaining representative. Such a
program is required to set forth, inter alia, an employer's
goals and timetables to correct deficiencies in the utilization
of minority groups and women. By its very nature, an affir-
mative action plan looks not only to the need for changes
in, for example, transfer, promotion, assignment, or classifi-
cation policies as they may affect minorities and women,
but also it sets forth the method to be used to correct defi-
ciencies.
But where there is a bargaining representative any meth-
ods adopted by an employer respecting transfer of employ-
ees, promotions, assignment, classifications, and the like are
subject to the requirements of Section 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of
the Act. The employer may not ignore the provisions of the
contract, nor may he act unilaterally. Even where there is a
management-rights clause, the union has a right to know
what he contemplates doing in order to evaluate whether
the particular proposed action falls within its provisions.
The validity of these observations is buttressed by Section
60-2.21 (6) of the rules issued by OFCC which call for
dissemination of an employer's plan in several ways, includ-
ing meeting with union officials to inform them of policy
and request their cooperation. A specific example of the
problems created by nondisclosure can also be noted in Co-
polymer Rubber, 64 LA 310, wherein a grievance over a
breach of seniority provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement was dismissed and the employer excused from its
contractual duty to adhere to departmental seniority by vir-
tue of its affirmative action plan. In short, it is evident, and
I find, that an affirmative action program is relevant and
necessary to a union in the performance of its duties as
statutory bargaining representative and Respondent's re-
fusal to furnish a copy to the Union was violative of Section
8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act.
At the hearing, Respondent took the position that por-
tions of its affirmative action plan contained confidential
material. The confidential material was described as "data
relating to future plans" and financial data such as the sala-
ries of members of management. The General Counsel as-
serts that this is not ground for refusing to furnish the
Union with a copy of the plan because it was not the
ground for refusal given to the Union and because confi-
dentiality has been held by the Board as no defense. I do
not agree. If the information were in fact confidential and
not relevant. Respondent could not, in my judgment, be
estopped from asserting such a defense at the hearing as
was done here. In the cases cited by the General Counsel
the information sought was relevant and for this reason
confidentiality was no defense. In the instant case, the mat-
ters described as confidential (e.g., management salaries)
are not relevant to the Union's performance of its obliga-
tions as statutory bargaining representative. Accordingly, I
shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to furnish a
copy of its affirmative action plan to the Union with leave
to delete therefrom financial data not related to unit em-
ployees or to Respondent's plans for correcting deficiencies
in its utilization of minority groups or women in unit posi-
tions.
5. Information respecting the sex and race of applicants
for employment
As noted, the Union requested that Respondent furnish it
with the total number of individuals who sought employ-
ment in the certified unit, indicating their race and sex, the
number actually hired according to race and sex, and the
department and classification for which hired, for the pe-
riod 1973 and 1974.
The predicate asserted for the Union's right to this infor-
mation is the same as the predicate for the other informa-
tion discussed earlier: namely, that the Union owes a duty
of fair representation to all employees, and this information
is relevant and necessary for the Union to fulfill that duty.
The statement that a union owes a duty of fair representa-
tion to all employees is only accurate if we add "in the
bargaining unit." Applicants for employment, albeit held to
be employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act,
are not in the bargaining unit until hired, and, where the
union plays no part in the hiring process, the union has no
duty of representation to applicants for employment until
they are in fact hired. For example, in the no-discrimina-
tion provision in the contract herein, Respondent and the
Union have agreed not to discriminate against employees
by reason of race or sex. Certainly, it is not contended that
an applicant for employment could invoke this provision
and request the Union to process a grievance on her behalf
by reason of Respondent's refusal to hire her. How then is
the data about applicants for employment here requested
relevant to the Union's performance of its duty of fair rep-
resentation?
The principal thrust of the General Counsel's argument
that information here in question is relevant and necessary
is that title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and decisions
of the EEOC and the courts impose responsibility for race
or sex discrimination in hiring not only on employers, but
also on unions in contractual relation with them who may
be found in violation of title VII in case of discrimination in
hiring. This is simply not the law. A union may not be held
liable for an employer's discriminatory hiring practices
where hiring is solely in the control of the employer. Mead-
ows v. Ford Motor Co., 6 FEP cases 795 (W.D.Ky. 1973).
But, assuming, arguendo, that it could, it is not the function
of the Board to enforce title VII. Emporium Capwell Co.,
420 U.S. 50; Benkins Moving & Storage Co. of Florida, Inc.,
211 NLRB 138, 143-144(1974).
Despite the foregoing disagreement with the General
Counsel's arguments, I conclude the fact the information
here in issue related to applicants for employment is no bar
to requiring its production. The Board has expressly held
that "an employer's hiring policies and practices are of vital
concern to employees inasmuch as such policies and prac-
tices inherently affect terms and conditions of employ-
ment." Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 NLRB 1402, 1404
(1964), enforcement denied on other grounds 349 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1965), and 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969). From this,
it can readily be seen that while the Union may owe no
duty of representation to applicants for employment it is
nevertheless entitled to information respecting an employ-
er's hiring practices in order to fulfill its duty of fir repre-
sentation to unit employees. Accordingly, I find that by
72
THE BENDIX CORPORATION
refusing to furnish the information requested by the Union
respecting its hiring practices Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
[I. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth above, occurring in
connection with its operations described above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several states and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
III. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices in violation of Section 8(aX)l) and (5) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take appropriate and affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, specif-
ically, that Respondent be ordered to furnish to the Union
the information which I have found herein was unlawfully
denied to it.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Automation & Measurement Division The Bendix
Corporation Is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 759 are, each of
them, labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees employed
by Respondent at its Dayton, Ohio plant, including plant
clerical employees, truckdrivers, expediters and schedulers,
but excluding all office clerical employees, technical em-
ployees with diverse interests, co-op students, field service
employees, the secretary and stenographer in the service
department, managerial employees and all professional em-
ployees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, and its Local 759 are, and at all
times herein have been, the exclusive representative of the
employees in the unit described above within the meaning
of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to furnish the above-named Union, upon
request, with copies of its affirmative action program, the
information regarding job postings in 1974 and requisition
forms, and the information requested with regard to the
race and sex of applicants for employment during the years
1973 and 1974, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging
in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union with a copy
of its survey and the master insurance agreements requested
by it was not violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (I ) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
73