Belron Hungary Kft. – Zug Branch

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 19, 2015

No. 86047553 (T.T.A.B. May. 19, 2015)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Hearing: Mailed:
April 21, 20151 May 19, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Belron Hungary Kft. – Zug Branch
_____

Serial No. 86047553
_____

Thomas A. Walsh of Ice Miller LLP for Belron Hungary Kft. – Zug Branch.

Hai-Ly Lam, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 112 (Angela B. Wilson,
Managing Attorney).
_____

Before Bucher, Kuczma, and Masiello, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Masiello, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Belron Hungary Kft. – Zug Branch (“Applicant”) has filed an application to
register on the Principal Register the mark shown below for “Automobile dent,
scratch and chip repair”:2

1 The Board heard Applicant’s oral argument at the hearing. No one appeared on behalf of
Law Office 112 of the USPTO.
2 Application Serial No. 86047553, filed August 26, 2013 under Trademark Act Section 1(b),
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
Serial No. 86047553
2
Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. The application includes the following
description of the mark:
The mark consists of the word “autorestore” along with
two arcs.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration under § 2(d) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, as used
in connection with Applicant’s services, so resembles the registered mark AUTO
RESTORER (in standard characters) as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive. The cited mark is registered on the Principal Register under
the provisions of § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), for “Providing online information and
news in the field of vehicle repair, maintenance, rebuilding, customization, detailing
and cleaning.”3
The Examining Attorney also refused registration because of Applicant’s refusal
to comply with the Examining Attorney’s requirement under Trademark Act § 6(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), that Applicant disclaim the exclusive right to use AUTO
RESTORE apart from the mark as shown, on the ground that it is an unregistrable
component of Applicant’s mark because it is merely descriptive of Applicant’s
services within the meaning of Trademark Act § 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1).
When the refusal was made final, Applicant filed a notice of appeal. The case is
fully briefed.

3 Reg. No. 3623001 issued May 19, 2009.
Serial No. 86047553
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A. Refusal under Section 2(d).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of
likelihood of confusion as set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods and services at issue. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard
Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). In this case, Applicant
and the Examining Attorney have also submitted arguments regarding trade
channels and customers for the services, the degree of care used by customers in
selecting the services, and the number of similar marks in the marketplace.
1. The marks.
We will consider first the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks at issue in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. See
Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396
F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005). While we consider each mark in its
entirety, there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided that our ultimate
conclusion rests upon a comparison of the marks in their entireties. In re National
Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
The literal components of the marks at issue are, respectively, AUTORESTORE
and AUTO RESTORER. In the case of marks consisting of words and a design, the
words are normally given greater weight because they would be used by customers
Serial No. 86047553
4
to request the goods or services. In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593,
1596 (TTAB 1999); In re Appetito Provisions Co., 2 USPQ2d 1553, 1554 (TTAB
1987). See also Sweats Fashions Inc. v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560,
4 USPQ2d 1793, 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Food Service,
Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 218 USPQ 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The word components of the
marks differ by virtue of the fact that Registrant’s mark is rendered as two words
and includes an additional final letter R. These differences affect the appearance of
the two marks. Applicant’s mark also differs in appearance from Registrant’s mark
because its wording is presented in stylized lettering and it includes a design of two
arcs positioned over the wording. However, we must consider that Registrant’s
standard character mark may be displayed in lettering styles that are similar to
those of Applicant. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909-10
(Fed. Cir. 2012). As a general matter, the specific style of a mark cannot, alone,
distinguish it from another mark that is registered in standard character form. Id.;
In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
We find that the similarities in appearance outweigh the visual differences noted
above. The final letter R in Registrant’s mark is, visually, a very subtle distinction,
as it falls at the end of the mark; and the average customer may well fail to
remember whether Applicant’s mark is rendered as one word or two. The test is not
whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side
comparison. The proper focus is on the recollection of the average customer, who
retains a general rather than specific impression of the marks. Winnebago
Serial No. 86047553
5
Industries, Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 USPQ 335, 344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed
Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975).
With respect to sound, Applicant points out that the final letter R adds an extra
syllable to the registered mark.4 In this case, where the extra syllable, which is
unstressed, ends in R and follows a syllable that also ends in R, we agree with the
Examining Attorney that the phonetic difference between the marks is very slight.
With respect to meaning and connotation, Applicant emphasizes that “restore” is
a verb and “restorer” is a noun.5 Dictionary definitions of record6 indicate that the
most relevant meaning of the word “restore” in the context of the services of
Applicant and Registrant is “to return (something) to an earlier or original condition
by repairing it, cleaning it, etc.”7 The most relevant definition of “restorer” is “a
person whose job is to repair old buildings, works of art, etc. so that they look as
they did when new.”8 These are, obviously, different meanings. However, in the
context of the commercial services at issue, the impressions created by the two
words are similar: the service provided by a “restorer” is to “restore.” Both words

4 Applicant’s brief at 4, 4 TTABVUE 5.
5 Id. at 5, 4 TTABVUE 6.
6 Applicant submitted a number of dictionary definitions as attachments to its brief.
Although evidence submitted for the first time with a brief is untimely, we have considered
the dictionary evidence. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ.
of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff'd,
703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in
printed format or have regular fixed editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377
(TTAB 2006). We have not considered the other forms of evidence submitted with
Applicant’s brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d).
7 , Applicant’s brief, Exhibit A, 4 TTABVUE 29.
8 , Applicant’s brief, Exhibit B, 4 TTABVUE 34.
Serial No. 86047553
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apply to Applicant’s repair services with equal aptness, and customers would
experience no cognitive dissonance if they saw either word applied to Applicant and
its repair services.
Applicant also argues that, because its mark AUTORESTORE is rendered as a
single word, the term AUTO- should be understood as a prefix, and contends that
“The term ‘auto-’ as a prefix in combination with ‘restore’ may have several different
connotations.”9 In arguing this point in its brief, Applicant does not propose any
single meaning of its mark AUTORESTORE. However, the dictionary definitions of
record indicate that “auto-” may mean “automatic” or “self-caused,” such that the
mark might perhaps suggest do-it-yourself repair services.10 At hearing, Applicant
argued that one way in which customers might understand the mark would be to
suggest automotive repair services that are in some way automatic. By contrast,
Applicant appears to argue that Registrant’s mark, because it consists of two
separate words, would be understood to mean a person whose job is to repair
automobiles so that they look as they did when new. See Applicant’s brief at 6, 4
TTABVUE 7 (“The two words ‘auto’ and ‘restorer’ in the Cited Mark give only the
impression that ‘auto’ and ‘restorer’ retain their well-understood meanings as
individual, standalone terms.”).
Section 2(d) requires us to consider the effect of Applicant’s mark “when used on
or in connection with the [services] of the applicant.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). When the

9 Applicant’s brief at 6, 4 TTABVUE 7.
10 See definitions of “auto-” from and ,
Applicant’s brief, Exhibit C, 4 TTABVUE 36-42.
Serial No. 86047553
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mark is viewed in the context of “Automobile dent, scratch and chip repair” services,
it is highly likely that customers will perceive the AUTO- portion of the mark as
meaning “automobile.” There is nothing in the recitation of services, nor is there
any evidence, to suggest that there is any kind of automatic feature of Applicant’s
services or that there is any do-it-yourself aspect to the services. In this regard, the
AUTO- prefix of Applicant’s mark will be perceived to have the same meaning as
the word AUTO in Registrant’s mark.
While we acknowledge the literal distinction in meaning between “restore” and
“restorer,” we find that, in meaning, Applicant’s mark AUTORESTORE and
Registrant’s mark AUTO RESTORER are closely similar. Considering together the
similarities in appearance, sound, and meaning of the two marks, as a whole, we
find that overall they create similar commercial impressions. Accordingly, the
du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks weighs in favor of a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
2. The services.
We next consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the services at issue, as
identified in the application and the cited registration. Stone Lion Capital Partners,
LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1161-1162 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Octocom Syst. Inc. v. Houston Computers Svcs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16
USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Applicant’s services are “Automobile dent,
scratch and chip repair” services. Registrant’s service is “Providing online
information and news in the field of vehicle repair, maintenance, rebuilding,
customization, detailing and cleaning.”
Serial No. 86047553
8
Applicant argues that the services at issue are different in nature: Applicant’s
repair service is a physical service that must be performed in person; Registrant’s
service is provided only online; and repair services cannot be provided over the
Internet. Applicant argues that its services and those of Registrant address
“entirely different markets” and “exist for distinct purposes.”11
At hearing, Applicant argued that the information provided by Registrant relates
to restoration of classic cars, whereas Applicant’s services relate to ordinary dent,
scratch and chip repair. However, we must presume that the respective recitations
of services encompass all of the services of the nature and type described therein.
In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006). Registrant’s service
offers information about “vehicle repair,” and Applicant’s recitation includes
“automobile … repair.” Accordingly, we must consider that Registrant provides
information about services similar to those of Applicant.
In order to demonstrate that the services of Applicant and Registrant are related,
the Examining Attorney has submitted at least nine use-based, third-party
registrations that cover both automotive repair services and provision of online
information regarding automotive repair or maintenance.12 Such registrations may
have some probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the listed
services are of a type which may emanate from the same source. In re Albert Trostel

11 Applicant’s brief at 10-11, 4 TTABVUE 11-12.
12 Office Action of November 27, 2013 at 9-25; Office Action of April 25, 2014 at 27-49. We
have not counted registrations covering information services that are not identified as being
provided online.
Serial No. 86047553
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& Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-1786; In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co. Inc., 6
USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988).
More importantly, the Examining Attorney has submitted evidence from the
Internet showing nine businesses that offer automotive repair services and also
operate online blogs featuring articles and other information on the subject of
automotive repair and maintenance.13 Among these are the website of Dan R’s
Automotive, which advertises repair services and features “Dan R’s Blog,” offering
information and advice about car maintenance; the website of Jiffy Lube, which
offers repair services and features “Jiffy Lube Knowledge Center”; the website of
Pep Boys, offering repair services and featuring a “Do It Yourself” section with
advice about car repair; and the website of Affordable Auto Repair Services, which
offers repair services and features a section of “News/Articles.”
The evidence of record is sufficient to persuade us that customers having an
interest in automobiles and automotive repair would readily believe that repair
services and an online information service relating to automotive repair may
emanate from a single source. Accordingly, the du Pont factor relating to the
similarity or dissimilarity of the services at issue weighs in favor of a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
3. Trade Channels.
Applicant has described a number of its arguments as relating to “trade channels”
but, in fact, the arguments relate to the customers for the services. The Examining

13 Office Action of April 25, 2014 at 50-69, 73-89. We have not counted the website shown at
70-72.
Serial No. 86047553
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Attorney too has referred to trade channels but has presented no evidence or
persuasive arguments on this point. Accordingly, the du Pont factor of trade
channels is, on this record, neutral.
4. Customers; Conditions of sale.
Applicant argues that the target customers of Applicant and Registrant are
different, stating that its own customers are “owners of dented, scratched, and
chipped automobiles,” whereas the customers of Registrant would be “consumers
interested in reading and learning information and news about vehicle repair,
maintenance, rebuilding, customization, detailing and cleaning.”14 The Examining
Attorney argues, in so many words, that these groups are likely to consist of the
same people.
As automobiles are ubiquitous and are owned by a very broad range of adult
individuals in virtually all segments of our society, the customers for the service of
repairing dents, scratches and chips in them would include a very wide range of
ordinary consumers. Moreover, we agree with the Examining Attorney that
ordinary consumers who have an interest in having their cars repaired would also
be interested in learning information relevant to that process. Thus, the customer
classes for the two services overlap substantially.
Applicant argues that its customers and those of Registrant are “careful
consumers.” It argues that automobiles are expensive, that consumers rely heavily
on their cars, and that certain automobile repairs are very expensive. We agree with

14 Applicant’s brief at 12, 4 TTABVUE 13.
Serial No. 86047553
11
Applicant that customers are likely to apply a somewhat elevated degree of care to
selecting Applicant’s services, although there is no actual evidence on this point.
There is also no evidence to suggest that readers of online information use more
than an ordinary degree of care, especially since much of such information is
available without charge. Overall, we find that this factor weighs slightly against a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
5. Similar marks in use.
Applicant argues that the cited registered mark should be entitled to only a narrow
scope of protection because there are “thousands of trademark registrations that
include the term ‘auto’ and hundreds of trademark registrations that include
variations of the term ‘restore,’” which “demonstrate[ ] that the public is capable of
distinguishing between marks that use either or both of these terms.”15 Applicant’s
argument is without support. Applicant’s evidence on this point was submitted for
the first time with its appeal brief; it is untimely and we have not considered it. See
37 C.F.R. § 2.142(d) (“The record in the application should be complete prior to the
filing of an appeal. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board will ordinarily not
consider additional evidence filed with the Board by the appellant or by the
examiner after the appeal is filed.”) Moreover, the submission of a list of TESS
search results is not effective to make the listed registrations of record. Even if they
were of record, third-party registrations are not evidence that the registered marks
have been used, let alone used so extensively that consumers have become

15 Applicant’s brief at 16, 4 TTABVUE 17. Applicant points out in its brief only three
registered marks that include both AUTO and some form of the word RESTORE.
Serial No. 86047553
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sufficiently conditioned by their usage that they can distinguish between such marks
on the bases of minute differences. See Olde Tyme Foods Inc. v. Roundy’s Inc., 961
F.2d 200, 22 USPQ2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Smith Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Stone Mfg.
Co., 476 F.2d 1004, 177 USPQ 462, 463 (CCPA 1973); Lilly Pulitzer, Inc. v. Lilli Ann
Corp., 376 F.2d 324, 153 USPQ 406, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1967). Accordingly, this du Pont
factor is neutral.
6. Balancing the factors.
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record, including those
not specifically discussed herein, and all relevant du Pont factors. The marks are
closely similar, and the services at issue are related. The relevant customers
overlap substantially. It seems likely that, in selecting Applicant’s services,
customers may exercise a somewhat elevated degree of care, although there is no
actual evidence to demonstrate such care. In sum, we find that Applicant’s mark, as
used in connection with Applicant’s services, so closely resembles the registered
mark as to be likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to the source of
Applicant’s services. We AFFIRM the Examining Attorney’s refusal under Section
2(d).
B. Disclaimer.
Although we have found that Applicant’s mark must be refused registration, for
the sake of completeness we will address the Examining Attorney’s requirement
that Applicant disclaim the exclusive right to use AUTO RESTORE apart from the
mark as a shown.
Serial No. 86047553
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The Director of the USPTO “may require the applicant to disclaim an
unregistrable component of a mark otherwise registrable.” Trademark Act § 6(a), 15
U.S.C. § 1056(a). The USPTO may require a disclaimer as a condition of
registration if the term at issue is merely descriptive of any of the identified goods
or services. In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F3d 1039, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
A term is merely descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1) if it forthwith
conveys an immediate idea of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, feature,
function, purpose or use of the goods or services. In re Chamber of Commerce of the
U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also In re Gyulay,
820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987). A term need not immediately
convey an idea of each and every specific feature of the goods or services in order to
be considered merely descriptive; it is enough if it describes one significant
attribute, function or property of them. See In re Gyulay, 3 USPQ2d at 1010; In re
H.U.D.D.L.E., 216 USPQ 358 (TTAB 1982); In re MBAssociates, 180 USPQ 338
(TTAB 1973). In cases where a mark includes merely descriptive wording that is
misspelled, it is appropriate for the USPTO to require a disclaimer of the wording in
its proper spelling. See In re Omaha Nat’l Corp., 819 F.2d 1117, 1119, 2 USPQ2d
1859, 1861 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Applicant contends that its mark is suggestive and that “even if an average
purchaser imagined, speculated, or stretched the meaning of the Mark, it is unlikely
that such purchaser would deduce the quality or characteristics of Applicant’s
Serial No. 86047553
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specific dent, scratch and chip services.” Applicant argues that this is so because
AUTO and RESTORE have several different possible meanings and because AUTO-
used as a prefix combined with the suffix RESTORE “can have several meanings.”16
Whether a mark or a component of a mark is merely descriptive is determined in
relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought and the context in
which the term is used, not in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork. In re Abcor
Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978); In re Remacle,
66 USPQ2d 1222, 1224 (TTAB 2002). In the context of automobile repair services,
customers will most readily understand AUTO- to mean “automobile” or view it to
be “a combining form representing automobile,” as is shown by Applicant’s
dictionary evidence.17 As we discussed above when we addressed the connotation of
Applicant’s mark, we find it unlikely that customers would view the term AUTO- as
a prefix meaning “self-caused,” “automatic,” or “do-it-yourself.” There is nothing in
the recitation of services, nor is there any evidence, to suggest that there is any kind
of automatic feature of Applicant’s services or that there is any do-it-yourself aspect
to the services.
Similarly, even though RESTORE may, in other contexts, be defined to mean
“reestablish,” “bring back into existence or use,” “make restitution,” or “put
(someone) back in a former position,” these meanings are quite alien to the field of
automobile repair. In the context of Applicant’s services, the most relevant meaning

16 Applicant’s brief at 20, 4 TTABVUE 21.
17 See definitions of “auto-” from and ,
Applicant’s brief, Exhibit C, 4 TTABVUE 36-42.
Serial No. 86047553
15
of the word is “to return (something) to an earlier or original condition by repairing
it, cleaning it, etc.”18 In an analysis of mere descriptiveness, the fact that a term
may have other meanings in different contexts is not controlling. In re Bright-Crest,
Ltd., 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979). “The question is not whether someone presented
with only the mark could guess what the goods or services are. Rather, the question
is whether someone who knows what the goods or services are will understand the
mark to convey information about them.” In re Tower Tech Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314,
1316-17 (TTAB 2002).
It is clear that AUTO- describes the fact that Applicant’s service is to repair
automobiles; and that RESTORE describes the repair aspect of Applicant’s services.
We must now determine whether the composite AUTORESTORE is merely
descriptive within the meaning of Section 2(e)(1). If two or more merely descriptive
terms are combined and each component retains its merely descriptive significance
in relation to the services, the resulting composite is itself merely descriptive. See
e.g., In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 71 USPQ2d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2004); In re Petroglyph Games, Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1332 (TTAB 2009).
The absence of a space between the components AUTO and RESTORE is
immaterial. In re Greenliant Systems Ltd, 97 USPQ2d 1078, 1084 (TTAB 2010)
(NANDRIVE); In re 3Com Corp., 56 USPQ2d 1060, 1062 (TTAB 2000) (ATMLINK);
Micro Motion Inc. v. Danfoss A/S, 49 USPQ2d 1628, 1631 (TTAB 1998)
(MASSFLO). In this case, the lack of a space between the words is essentially the

18 , Applicant’s brief, Exhibit A, 4 TTABVUE 29.
Serial No. 86047553
16
same as a minor misspelling of the words. See In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198
(TTAB 2009) (URBANHOUZING merely descriptive of real estate brokerage, real
estate consultation and real estate listing services).
Moreover, the combination of the terms AUTO and RESTORE does not give rise
to any new or nondescriptive meaning. Indeed, the evidence shows use of these
terms together for the purpose of describing car repair services. We note in
particular the following examples:
“AUTO RESTORE SERVICES used as a heading alongside the
heading CUSTOMIZATION SERVICES.19

“It truly is generally an emergency if you need to have an automobile
restore shop. … Do not let auto restore be your worst nightmare!”20

Everett Auto Restore
Auto Concepts Northwest
Everett, WA – Auto Restore
Do you need your vehicle restored? Come to Auto Concepts Northwest
where we offer an array of restoration services for your vehicle….21

iDesigns – Auto restore and accessories.22

WELCOME TO LAST CHANCE AUTO RESTORE
…
Is your car in pieces? Are you stuck? Do you need critical welding? Last
Chance can get you moving again.23

Our automotive fix team are several of the very best mechanics within
your area and provides a degree of customer support rivaled by your
regional auto restore store. When you are in require of car restore, first
we are going to provide you with an car fix estimate of what

19 , Office Action of April 25, 2014 at 90.
20 , id. at 93.
21 , id. at 95.
22 Facebook page of iDesigns, id. at 96.
23 , id. at 98.
Serial No. 86047553
17
requirements to be performed to your motor vehicle in order to bring it
to satisfactory ranges.24

These advertisements are clear examples of the use of “auto restore” with the
intention of immediately conveying the idea of automobile repair services.
We find that AUTORESTORE is merely descriptive within the meaning of Section
2(e)(1) and is an unregistrable component of Applicant’s mark within the meaning
of Section 6(a). We therefore AFFIRM the Examining Attorney’s refusal to register
Applicant’s mark, absent a disclaimer of the exclusive right to use AUTO RESTORE
apart from the mark as shown.25
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed on both grounds of refusal.

24 , id. at 99.
25 If the entry of a disclaimer were the only impediment to registration of Applicant’s mark,
we would allow Applicant time to enter the disclaimer. 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g). However,
inasmuch as we have also found that registration must be refused under Trademark Act
Section 2(d), entry of the disclaimer would be futile at this time.