BellSouth Telecommunications

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 29, 2001

335 N.L.R.B. 1066 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1066
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and Gary L. Lee
and Jim Amburn

Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO and
Gary L. Lee and Jim Amburn. Cases 11–CA–
17096, 11–CA–17140, 11–CB–2699, and 11–CB–
2688
August 29, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, TRUESDALE, AND
WALSH
This case presents the novel issue of whether an em-
ployer and a union lawfully may agree to a policy requir-
ing employees to wear a company uniform that displays
both the employer and the union logos, despite the objec-
tions of certain employees to displaying the union logo.
Upon charges filed by Gary L. Lee in Cases 11–CA–
17096 and 11–CB–2688, and by Jim Amburn in Cases
11–CA–17140 and 11–CB–2699, and duly served on
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. and Communication
Workers of America, AFL–CIO (the Respondents), the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a complaint and notice of hearing on July 25,
1997, alleging that Respondent BellSouth had violated
Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and that Respondent Communications Workers
of America, AFL–CIO (CWA) had violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that Respondent BellSouth and
Respondent CWA unlawfully entered into an agreement
requiring employees to wear a CWA insignia or logo on
their uniforms, alongside a BellSouth insignia, pursuant
to a newly established mandatory uniform policy. The
complaint also alleges that Respondent BellSouth unlaw-
fully provided monetary support for employees to assist
in the procurement of uniforms displaying the CWA in-
signia. The Respondents filed answers denying the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
On January 12, 1998, the parties entered into a stipula-
tion of facts, and on January 14, 1998, the parties submit-
ted a motion to transfer proceedings to the Board. The
parties waived a hearing before an administrative law
judge and agreed to submit the case directly to the Board
for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a Decision
and Order, based on a record consisting of the charges,
the consolidated complaint, the answers to the complaint,
the stipulation of facts, and the exhibits attached thereto.
On May 11, 1998, the Board approved the stipulation
and transferred the proceeding to the Board. Thereafter,
the General Counsel, the Respondents, and the Charging
Parties filed briefs with the Board.
The Board has delegated its authority in this proceed-
ing to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the entire record stipulated
by the parties and the parties’ briefs and makes the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent BellSouth, a Georgia corporation, with a
facility located at Charlotte, North Carolina, is engaged
in telecommunication services. BellSouth annually pro-
vides interstate communication services to the general
public and derived revenues in excess of $100,000, and
provided interstate communication services valued in
excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of North
Carolina. We find that BellSouth is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act. We also find that Respondent
Communications Workers of America is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
Respondent BellSouth and Respondent CWA have a
longstanding collective-bargaining relationship which
has existed since the 1940s. Among the employees rep-
resented by the Union are technicians who work on the
Company’s telecommunications network and who might
have contact with customers and other members of the
public.
Prior to the adoption of the uniform policy described
below, BellSouth had no requirement that employees
wear uniforms while working. Rather, employees were
permitted to wear “appropriate” clothing of their own
choosing. In the 1990s, however, the Company exam-
ined the issue of uniforms and came to the conclusion
that a mandatory uniform requirement was needed in
order for the Company to be able to project a profes-
sional image and distinguish itself from other telecom-
munications providers. BellSouth thus chose to make the
creation of a mandatory uniform program one of its pri-
mary goals in negotiating the 1995 collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union.
During the 1995 negotiations, BellSouth was insistent
on adopting a mandatory uniform policy and CWA was
adamantly opposed. As a result, the issue of uniforms
was one of the last unresolved issues as a strike deadline
approached. As a concession to the Union and in order
to remove an obstacle to reaching an overall agreement,
BellSouth accepted a counterproposal from the Union:
the Union agreed to the establishment of the mandatory
uniform program on condition that a CWA logo of the
same size as the BellSouth logo be placed on uniform
335 NLRB No. 18
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1067
shirts, blouses, and outerwear on the opposite chest from
the BellSouth logo. The letters, “CWA,” measure ap-
proximately ½- by ½-inch.
The parties have stipulated that CWA’s expressed
purpose in bargaining for placement of the CWA logo
on the uniforms was to truthfully and accurately inform
the public of CWA’s status as the duly certified bar-
gaining representative of BellSouth employees and to
reflect the “full partnership relationship” between the
parties that has resulted from their lengthy and mature
collective-bargaining relationship. According to the
stipulation, BellSouth itself considers the CWA logo to
have some value to the Company in that “it conveys to
the public that the wearer is represented by a well-
known Union, receives a fair wage for a fair day’s
work, state-of-the art training, and is a member of a
bargaining unit whose parties have engaged in an
agreement that lessens or eliminates for the term of the
agreement the likelihood of telecommunications service
disruptions due to labor disputes.”
Pursuant to the agreement, BellSouth began requiring
designated bargaining unit employees to wear the uni-
forms bearing both the BellSouth and the CWA logos 1
year after execution of the bargaining agreement, and
employees who failed to do so were subject to disci-
pline.1 Uniforms bearing both logos are mandatory for
all bargaining unit employees in classifications desig-
nated in the collective-bargaining agreement irrespective
of union membership.2
Certain BellSouth supervisors and other nonbargaining
unit personnel are also required to wear uniforms, but are
prohibited from wearing clothing with the CWA logo.
According to the parties’ stipulation, the absence of the
CWA logo identifies the wearer as a supervisor or repre-
sentative of management. BellSouth and CWA logos also
appear on such items as the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, contractual grievance procedure forms, certain joint
announcements (such as United Way charitable campaigns
and collective-bargaining status reports), and on medical,
dental, and prescription drug identification cards.
Charging Parties Gary Lee and Jim Amburn are em-
ployed in the bargaining unit represented by the Union
but are not members of the Union. Lee is an outside
technician and Amburn is an electronic technician. Lee
and Amburn object to wearing the CWA logo, which
they assert demonstrates union support and interferes

1 BellSouth provides employees required to wear the uniform with
an initial vendor credit of $350 to purchase uniforms from an approved
catalog, plus an additional annual credit of $150 to allow them to re-
place a certain amount of clothing each year.
2 The parties stipulated that Respondent CWA represents union
members and nonmembers in the bargaining unit.
with their right to refrain from supporting the Union.
However, because they are required to do so pursuant to
the collectively bargained uniform program, both have
worn uniforms bearing the CWA logo.
B. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel contends that the mandatory re-
quirement that employees wear the CWA logo on their
company uniform interferes with the Section 7 right of
employees to refrain from engaging in union activity.
Although the General Counsel concedes that a general
uniform policy may promote Respondent BellSouth’s
legitimate business competitive goals and may serve to
enhance customer relations, the General Counsel con-
tends that there has been no showing that it is necessary
to place the CWA logo on a uniform to accomplish these
goals. The General Counsel contends, therefore, that
Respondent BellSouth has violated Section 8(a)(1), (2),
and (3) and that Respondent CWA has violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by entering into an agreement requir-
ing employees to wear uniforms displaying the CWA
logo. The General Counsel also asserts that Respondent
BellSouth impermissibly contributed financial support to
Respondent CWA by providing a monetary credit for the
purchase of uniforms containing the logo, in violation of
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
The Charging Parties contend that requiring the wear-
ing of union insignia impermissibly encourages member-
ship in a union, contrary to the dictates of Section 7,
which protects the rights of employees to refrain from
union activity if they so desire. The Charging Parties
further contend that forcing nonunion employees, as
here, to wear a union insignia is contrary to the policy of
voluntary unionism. They also contend that there are no
special circumstances in the present case that would war-
rant the intrusion upon the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Respondent BellSouth contends that the mandatory
uniform program does not interfere with employees’ Sec-
tion 7 rights because the union logo, in context, is not
indicative of union membership or support, but rather
only suggests that the wearer is included in a CWA-
represented bargaining unit. Respondent BellSouth notes
that unit employees wear the official company logo in
tandem with the CWA logo, and that the uniform policy
was a product of intense arms-length bargaining and
connotes a working relationship between employees and
management. Respondent BellSouth also contends that
providing credits that represented employees can apply
to the purchase of uniforms does not violate the Act.
Respondent CWA contends that the presence of the
CWA logo, in “equal billing” to that of the BellSouth
logo, is not a reflection of union membership or support.
It contends that Respondent CWA has a legitimate inter-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1068
est in advising the public, and members of the bargaining
unit, that it is the certified bargaining representative.
Respondent CWA also contends that the CWA logo, in
the context of the service industry, is the functional
equivalent of the “union label” on manufactured products
and that it is simply exercising its free speech rights un-
der Section 8(c) of the Act.
C. Discussion
1. Overview
The Board has a long history of cases pertaining to
employer prohibitions on the wearing of union buttons,
insignia, and other paraphernalia in a union electioneer-
ing context. In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793 (1945), the Supreme Court approved the
Board’s action in working out an “adjustment between
the undisputed right of self-organization assured to em-
ployees . . . and the equally undisputed right of employ-
ers to maintain discipline in their establishments.” Id. at
797–798. Both the “[o]pportunity to organize and proper
discipline,” according to the Court, are “essential ele-
ments in a balanced society.” Id. at 798. The Board has
wrestled for decades with this balance. The present case,
however, raises a new, but related, issue: the compelled
wearing on a company uniform of a union logo alongside
the company logo, pursuant to a collectively bargained
agreement between management and labor.
On one view, the present case is essentially the flip-
side of those where employers have prohibited union
buttons and insignia in the electioneering context. In
those cases, employees seek to exercise their Section 7
right affirmatively to support a union through the wear-
ing of personal apparel on the job. In the present case,
conversely, employees assert that their Section 7 right
not to support the Union is implicated by apparel rules
that require the wearing of union insignia.
On another view, however, this case can be seen as
raising different concerns than the union button prohibi-
tion cases. Here, we are faced not with a unilateral
managerial decision in a nonunion setting, but rather a
policy that is the product of arm’s–length bargaining
between an employer and a union that represents the af-
fected employees.3 And, of course, as a legal and a prac-
tical matter, the presence of a bargaining representative
in the worksite affects the degree to which represented
employees may “refrain” from activities pertaining to
that union. In a unionized workplace, an employee who
is opposed to the union’s presence is nevertheless prop-
erly subject to the union’s Section 9(a) role as the exclu-

3 Apparel rules are a mandatory subject of bargaining. See, e.g.,
Transportation Enterprises, 240 NLRB 551, 560 (1979), modified in
other respects 630 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1980).
sive bargaining representative of all unit members and its
concomitant statutory duty to represent fairly unit em-
ployees individually and as a whole. The Supreme Court
has observed that, within appropriate limits, national
labor policy is built on the principle of majority rule and
thus “extinguishes the individual employee’s power to
order his own relations with his employer.” Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organiza-
tion, 420 U.S. 50, 63 (1975), quoting NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
As explained below, we conclude that the collectively
bargained uniform policy at issue here is lawful. We so
find based on application of a balancing standard, akin to
the test applied in Republic Aviation, which calls for ex-
amination of whether “special circumstances” outweigh
the Section 7 interests of employees. In the present con-
text, of course, the “special circumstances” to be bal-
anced against Section 7 interests are derived from the
legitimate interests of both the Employer and the Union,
as expressed through the collective-bargaining process
that national labor policy endorses. For these reasons, at
least in the present context, a requirement that employees
wear union insignia cannot be analyzed as if it presented
precisely the same issues as a prohibition against wearing
such insignia.
2. The Section 7 interests
Section 7 of the Act provides, inter alia, that employ-
ees have the right “to form, join, or assist a labor organi-
zation and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”
Section 7 additionally provides that employees “shall
also have the right to refrain” from any or all activities
supporting a labor organization. In the present case, it is
stipulated that the Charging Parties desired to refrain
from the wearing of the CWA logo on their uniform but
were required to do so, as were other unit employees,
pursuant to the mandatory uniform policy contained in
the collective-bargaining agreement.
Pursuant to these protections of Section 7, it is well es-
tablished that employees have the protected right to wear
union insignia while at work, if they choose to do so.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra. An employer
can restrict employees from wearing union insignia dur-
ing working time only if it demonstrates “special circum-
stances” justifying the prohibition. Meijer, Inc., 318
NLRB 50 (1995), enfd. 130 F.3d 1209 (6th Cir. 1997).
The General Counsel and the Charging Parties contend
that the display of the CWA logo on the company uniform
constitutes an expression that the wearer of the uniform
supports the Union and, therefore, interferes with the Sec-
tion 7 right of employees to refrain from engaging in union
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1069
activity. See generally Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 318
NLRB 470 (1995), enfd. in relevant part 97 F.3d 65 (4th
Cir. 1996). In contrast, the Respondents contend that the
logo, in context, is not indicative of support for the Union
or a desire for union membership, but rather is simply an
expression that the employee is a member of a bargaining
unit represented by the Union. They contend that the
placement of the CWA logo on company uniforms is simi-
lar to the placement of the “union label” on products as an
expression that the product is produced by union repre-
sented employees who enjoy fair wages, benefits, and
working conditions through collective bargaining.
In our view, placement of the CWA logo on company
uniforms does implicate Section 7 interests, but in a fash-
ion not on all fours with either the “electioneering” context
raised by the General Counsel and the Charging Parties or
the “union label” context raised by the Respondents.
The contention that the CWA logo on company uni-
forms is an expression of union support and membership
overlooks a critical fact: that the CWA logo shares the
spotlight, as it were, with the BellSouth logo. Together,
they reasonably can be seen to convey a message that
BellSouth is a unionized employer and with the CWA
enjoys a labor-management partnership, that is, a bar-
gaining relationship characterized by cooperation, not
conflict. In this context, and worn as part of a mandatory
uniform, wearing the CWA logo does not convey the
message of “support” as does the wearing of a union (or
company) logo in an electioneering context. For exam-
ple, the uniform/logo policy at issue here is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the compelled wearing of a “vote-no”
(company) T-shirt arising in Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc.,
supra, relied on by the General Counsel. In that case, the
apparel requirement was unaccompanied by any dis-
cernible nondiscriminatory business justification, and the
compelled display occurred in the context of the em-
ployer’s commission of numerous unfair labor practices
during a union organizing campaign.
At the same time, however, we recognize that the CWA
logo worn on an individual employees’ uniform is some-
thing different than the placement of the “union label” on a
card or a product. Placement of the CWA logo on an arti-
cle of clothing, albeit a uniform, arguably implies some
form of personal connection between the symbol and the
wearer of the uniform. And, it is also arguable that the
CWA logo, as the public symbol of a labor organization,
raises at least some implication of union membership and
support when worn by an individual.
In sum, we find that the compelled wearing of the
CWA logo here does implicate Section 7, albeit to a
lesser degree than the wearing of union insignia in set-
tings where the Republic Aviation balancing test has tra-
ditionally been applied. To the extent that the CWA logo
may objectively be regarded as a personal statement of
union support and membership, this message is muted by
its placement alongside the BellSouth logo on a company
uniform.4 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to determine
whether the intrusion on the Section 7 rights of employ-
ees who object to the CWA logo is justified by “special
circumstances” that implicate competing, legitimate in-
terests under the Act.
3. Special circumstances
The Board has found special circumstances justifying
the proscription of union insignia in a variety of settings.5
In appropriate instances, for example, an employer may
restrict the wearing of union insignia not only when it
poses a compelling threat to employees’ safety or a risk
of damage to an employer’s products and equipment, but
also when it may unreasonably interfere with a public
image which the employer has established, as part of its
business plan, through appearance rules for its employ-
ees. Con-Way Central Express, 333 NLRB 1073, 1075–
1076 (2001); Meijer, Inc., supra at 50; United Parcel
Service, 195 NLRB 441 fn. 2 (1972) (conspicuous button
interfered with employer’s desired public image for its
drivers).
Here, the stipulated facts establish that the mandatory
uniform policy advances Respondent BellSouth’s public
image business objective.
In light of the stipulated record, there can be no con-
tention here that BellSouth pursued a mandatory uniform
requirement for unlawful reasons. The record, rather,
demonstrates a plausible correlation between the manda-
tory uniform requirement—which includes the wearing
of both the corporate logo and the union logo—and Re-
spondent BellSouth’s public image business objectives.
Respondent BellSouth concluded that, in light of the
highly competitive pressures in the evolving telecommu-
nications industry, it was crucial that it present to the
public an image of the Company as professional in char-
acter, totally committed to solving customers’ problems,
and ready to fulfill their telecommunications needs
through highly trained and competent employees. The
uniform policy was a “critical aspect” of that competitive
strategy.

4 Even well-known symbols and insignia, when worn on a uniform,
may not always convey expressive elements of “support.” Thus, in
Troster v. Pennsylvania State Department of Corrections, 65 F.3d 1086
(3d Cir. 1995), the court found that the required wearing on a uniform
of a patch bearing the flag of the United States was not necessarily
demonstrative of an attitude or a statement of belief or assent under the
First Amendment.
5 See American Bar Association, Section of Labor and Employment
Law, The Developing Labor Law 96 & nn. 147–150 (3d ed. 1992)
(collecting cases).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1070
As to the CWA union logo component of the uniform
policy, BellSouth concluded that it conveyed to the pub-
lic, among other things, that its employees receive state-
of-the-art training, receive a fair wage for a fair day’s
work, and are subject to an agreement that lessens or
eliminates the likelihood of telecommunications service
disruptions during the terms of the agreement. In short,
the CWA logo provided additional benefit to Respondent
BellSouth in the context of its uniform policy and overall
competitive strategy. 6
These business advantages flowing from the inclusion
of the CWA logo on company uniforms have their origin,
of course, in the collective-bargaining process. Indeed,
inclusion of the CWA logo “removed an obstacle to the
parties reaching an overall contract settlement and avoid-
ing a strike.” It is evident, therefore, that the inclusion of
the CWA logo, as a component of the general uniform
requirement, not only has business value to BellSouth,
but also served to facilitate a labor accord.

As stipulated, the uniform policy also reflects the evo-
lution of the relationship between CWA and BellSouth
from a lengthy and mature collective-bargaining relation-
ship to a full partnership. This joint uniform initiative,
designed to yield business advantage, is consistent with
and, indeed, is supported by Federal labor policy. Thus,
the Labor Management Cooperation Act of 19787 en-
courages joint labor-management initiatives. The stated
purposes of the Act are, inter alia, to expand and improve
working relationships between workers and managers in
the organized sector of the economy, to improve com-
munication between representatives of labor and man-
agement, and to enhance the involvement of workers in
workplace decisions. The underlying policy assumption
is that innovative joint approaches will enhance
organizational effectiveness and competitiveness.8 By
, BellSouth and the agreeing to the joint logo display
to the joint logo display, BellSouth and the CWA were
demonstrating to the public their commitment to working
together to enhance the Company’s competitive advan-
tage. In this respect, they were acting in accord with fed-
eral labor policy.
6 The General Counsel and the Charging Parties contend that the as-
serted labor-management partnership portrayed on the company uni-
form would not necessarily convey to customers the sentiments claimed
in the stipulation. Although we recognize that response to the uniform
may vary from customer to customer, we are satisfied that the objec-
tives sought through the uniform policy are legitimate and plausible. In
the absence of evidence suggesting that the factual premises underlying
the policy are mistaken, we are not inclined here to engage in specula-
tion.
7 29 U.S.C. § 175(a)(Pub. L. 95–524).
8 As stated in the legislative history of the Act, “there appears to be
general agreement that improved cooperation and communication be-
tween labor and management can provide the foundation for better
working relationships, more effective identification of problem areas,
regardless of the subject matter, and an improved atmosphere for arriv-
ing at mutually acceptable solutions leading to improved productivity.”
Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States,
to Senator Javits (1978). S. Rep. No. 95–891 at 51 (1978). And, Sena-
tor Javits, one of the sponsors of the Act, spoke of the need to “harmo-
nize the relationship between labor and management in the work-
9
We recognize that the Board has found unlawful, in
certain circumstances, prohibitions against the wearing
of union insignia, even when an employer has demon-
strated a legitimate attire policy and seeks to restrict un-
ion insignia on the basis of that policy. We find that
these cases are distinguishable.
In United Parcel Service, 312 NLRB 576, 597 (1993),
enf. denied 41 F.3d 1068 (6th Cir. 1994); and Meyer
Waste Systems, 322 NLRB 244 (1996), the Board held
that prohibiting the wearing of inconspicuous union pins
was not justified by any special circumstance. There, the
employers’ justification for the prohibitions was the de-
sire that its employees be “neatly attired.” United Parcel
Service, supra at 597. See also Nordstrom, Inc., 264
NLRB 698, 701–702 (1982) (policy prohibiting incon-
spicuous button held not to raise special circumstances
based, inter alia, on employer’s desire for “good taste”
and a sense of “fashion.”) Although the Board acknowl-
edged in United Parcel Service that the image of a neatly
uniformed driver was an “important” business objective
of the employer, the Board found that, as a practical mat-
ter, the employer could still advance its legitimate mana-
gerial objectives pertaining to “neat” attire without pro-
hibiting inconspicuous displays on uniforms.
This case presents fundamentally different circum-
stances. Inclusion of the CWA logo was integral to
BellSouth’s uniform policy. First, it was a prerequisite
for establishing a policy through agreement with the Un-
ion. Second, as explained, it furthered the Company’s
interest in developing a partnership with the CWA and in
symbolically displaying that relationship to the public.
Indeed, display of the CWA logo on its uniforms, along-

place—and stabilize the labor relations climate—in a particular area
and bring out new values. This in turn can help to improve employee
morale, reduce tensions in the workplace and foster local and regional
economic development.” Remarks by Senator Javits on Labor-
Management Committees during debate on the Comprehensive Em-
ployment and Training Act Amendments (1978). 124 Cong. Rec.
27239 (1978).
9 Senator Javits also stated that “we must demonstrate to both man-
agement and labor, as well as to the public that measures to improve
productivity and prevent layoffs and otherwise encourage labor-
management cooperation can mean greater efficiency, higher profits,
greater sales, expanded industrial development, and an increase in the
number of productive work opportunities.” 123 Cong. Rec. 2777
(1977). See Southern Steamship Co., 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) (Board
has not been commissioned to effectuate policies of NLRA so single-
mindedly that it may ignore other equally important congressional
objectives, but must accommodate its statutory scheme to that of other
Federal laws).
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1071
side the company logo, is likely the most direct and ef-
fective way to reach BellSouth’s customer base. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear how BellSouth could communi-
cate its lawful message to the public through its company
uniforms in a way that would be less suggestive of an
employee’s personal support for the CWA than the ½- by
½- inch logo. In short, the Company’s uniform policy—
including display of the CWA logo—advances business
aims in a manner consistent with Federal labor policy
and distinguishable from the bans on insignia present in
United Parcel Service, Meyer Waste Systems, and Nord-
strom, Inc.
The Charging Parties contend that BellSouth could
achieve its stated purposes by negotiating a bargaining
agreement that permitted employees to “opt out” of
wearing the CWA logo on their uniforms. In contrast to
the mandatory uniform policy, this approach would
likely result in individual employees being forced to re-
veal publicly their individual union sentiments depending
on whether they “opted in” or “opted out.”10 That result
implicates Section 7 concerns of its own. Moreover, this
kind of self-selection process would cut against the labor
management partnership objectives underlying the nego-
tiated uniform.
Further, any balance struck between the Section 7 right
to refrain from union activities and the “special circum-
stances” justifying the uniform policy must recognize that
the presence of a bargaining representative inevitably
touches on the Section 7 rights of some individuals who
would prefer otherwise. Even those employees desiring to
exercise their statutory right to refrain from supporting
their collective-bargaining representative are subject to
displays of their bargaining representative’s name, initials,
logos, and symbols in a variety of everyday contexts. It is
a fact of life under the Act that employees opposed to un-
ion representation remain members of the bargaining unit,
so long as the union enjoys majority support. The benefits
and, for some, the incidental burdens of union representa-
tion go hand in hand. As the Supreme Court has made
clear, “the Act placed ‘a nonconsenting minority under the
bargaining responsibility of an agency selected by a major-
ity of the workers.’” Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961).
For example, the CWA logo appears on medical, den-
tal, and prescription drug identification cards, grievance

10 As the Board has recently observed, in some circumstances, an
employer may commit an unfair labor practice when it places individ-
ual employees in the position of having to disclose their prounion or
antiunion sentiments, even when their views have been expressed be-
fore. See Allegheny Ludlum, 333 NLRB 734, 738–739 (2001).
forms, the collective-bargaining agreement itself, and on
various announcements and bulletins such as the United
Way charitable campaign. Therefore, when the Charging
Parties seek to exercise their collectively bargained right
to medical benefits, to file a grievance, to investigate
their rights and obligations under the terms of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, or to participate in charitable
causes at the worksite, they will necessarily be con-
fronted with a display of the CWA logo.
We recognize that the wearing of the CWA logo on an
item of apparel implicates the appearance of union “sup-
port” to a greater degree than do the enumerated activi-
ties. But the fact remains that the presence of the union
logo in a union organized work setting is, to some extent,
inevitably intertwined with the Union’s representation
functions and responsibilities—and legitimately so. In
the present case, CWA and BellSouth determined that
the uniform displaying the joint logos expressed to the
public that BellSouth was a unionized company that with
the CWA enjoyed a mature partnership relationship that
was of value to the Company and its employees, even if a
minority of employees opposed the relationship. Em-
ployees as a whole, then, benefited from a requirement
that had its origins in the collective-bargaining process.
In these circumstances, we find that the collectively
bargained uniform policy was a “special circumstance”
which outweighed any intrusion on Section 7 rights. We
find, therefore, that Respondent BellSouth did not violate
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Because we find that
the uniform policy was a lawful product of the collec-
tive-bargaining process, we shall also dismiss the allega-
tion that Respondent BellSouth violated Section 8(a)(2)
by furnishing monetary credits for the purchase of uni-
forms containing the CWA logo.
Contrary to the General Counsel, we do not view the
negotiated uniform policy as an impermissible “waiver”
by CWA of employees’ Section 7 rights, nor as a policy
inherently destructive of statutory rights. Even assuming
that the policy could be viewed as a waiver, we find that
the partnership objectives of the joint display of company
and union logos were in furtherance of a permissible exer-
cise of the Union’s statutory responsibilities and authority
as bargaining representative. Respondent CWA, therefore,
did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2).
Accordingly, we find that the Respondents did not vio-
late the Act, as alleged, and we shall dismiss the com-
plaint.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.