Bell Atlantic Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 2001

336 N.L.R.B. 1076 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1076
Bell Atlantic Corporation and Communications
Workers of America, AFL–CIO. Case 2–CA–
32010
November 30, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On April 5, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Michael
A. Marcionese issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and
supporting briefs and the Respondent filed an answering
brief. The General Counsel and the Charging Party filed
reply briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.

Olga C. Torres, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles P. O’Connor, Esq., and Gregory R. Talbot, Esq. (Vic-
toria E. Houck, Esq. (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP), on
brief; and Ronald G. Burden, Esq., for the Respondent.
Gabrielle Semel, Esq. (Semel, Young & Norum), for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. MARCIONESE, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was tried in New York, New York, on October 6, 7,
8, and 29, 1999. The Communications Workers of America,
AFL–CIO (the Union) filed the charge on February 23, 1999,
and the complaint issued on June 28, 1999. The complaint al-
leges that the Respondent, Bell Atlantic Corporation, violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 8(d) of the Act by closing,
and permanently transferring bargaining unit work, from facili-
ties in Manhattan and Brooklyn, New York, to locations in
Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, and Braintree, Massachusetts,
respectively, without affording the Union sufficient notice and
an opportunity to bargain regarding this decision. The Respon-
dent filed its answer to the complaint on July 14, 1999, denying
the commission of any unfair labor practice and asserting, as an
affirmative defense, that the Union waived its bargaining rights
by inaction and by contract. The Respondent asserted, alterna-
tively, that it had satisfied whatever duty it had to bargain with
respect to this decision.1

1 The General Counsel and the Charging Party have excepted to
some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established pol-
icy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolu-
tions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have care-
fully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
On the entire record,2 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the Respon-
dent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Telesector Resources Group, Inc., doing business as Bell At-
lantic Network Services, is a Delaware corporation, with a
principal place of business in New York, New York, engaged
in the business of providing management services to New York
Telephone Company and other Bell Atlantic Operating Tele-
phone Companies. New York Telephone Company, doing
business as Bell Atlantic-New York, is a New York corpora-
tion, with a principal place of business in New York, New
York, engaged in the business of providing telecommunications
products and services. Telesector Resources Group, Inc. and
New York Telephone Company are indirectly wholly owned
subsidiaries of the Respondent and shall be collectively referred
to as the Respondent.
The Respondent annually derives gross revenues in excess of
$500,000 and purchases and receives at its New York facilities
equipment and other goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of
New York. The Respondent admits and I find that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent is the successor, through various mergers
and acquisitions, of the New York Telephone Company whose
employees have been represented by the Union for many years.
The most recent change in corporate identity occurred in Au-
gust 1997, when Bell Atlantic merged with NYNEX. The Un-
ion represents the Respondent’s employees in a number of
separate bargaining units represented by different local unions.
Collective bargaining for contracts covering the different units
is coordinated regionally by the International Union with com-
mon issues such as wages and benefits negotiated at one table
and local issues, such as job upgrades, work assignments, etc.,
negotiated at another. Each local union has its own contract
incorporating terms and conditions of employment negotiated
at the regional and local bargaining tables. The unit involved in
this proceeding consists of all accounting financial clerks and
accounting operations clerks employed in the New York met-
ropolitan area. Local 1100 of the Union is the designated col-
lective-bargaining representative of this unit. The current col-
1 The Respondent’s affirmative defense premised on Sec. 10(b) of
the Act was withdrawn at the hearing.
2 The transcript of the hearing contains numerous misspellings and
typographical errors and often misidentifies the speaker. No party has
requested any corrections to the record. To the extent there are signifi-
cant discrepancies, I will note corrections in this decision.
336 NLRB No. 113
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1077
lective-bargaining agreement covering this unit is effective for
the period August 9, 1998, through August 5, 2000.
The background to the current dispute begins in 1994 when
the Respondent’s predecessor, NYNEX, negotiated the previ-
ous collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. The Re-
spondent began negotiations with the Union at that time by
announcing that, as a result of a plan called “Process Re-
engineering” it anticipated a reduction in the work force of
16,000 employees. The parties then proceeded to negotiate a
retirement incentive plan to facilitate the Respondent’s efforts
to downsize while avoiding as much as possible the involuntary
termination of unit employees. The incentive plan negotiated in
1994 became known as the “6 and 6,” a reference to the provi-
sion adding 6 years to an employee’s age to make him or her
eligible to retire and 6 years to length of service to increase the
employee’s pension benefit as an inducement for employees to
leave voluntarily. This retirement incentive would be offered to
employees in classifications and work areas declared to be sur-
plus under the Respondent’s process reengineering. Under the
terms of the 6 and 6 negotiated by the parties in 1994, all em-
ployees who would be eligible to retire with these enhance-
ments who had not been offered the opportunity to do so by the
end of the contract would receive an offer at that time, i.e., in
August 1998. The 6 and 6 Retirement Incentive plan was incor-
porated in the 1994–1998 collective-bargaining agreement at
article 36.3
All witnesses agreed that the Respondent’s “Process Re-
engineering” was a failure and that, instead of downsizing, the
Respondent was required to add employees to meet the rising
demand for telecommunications services. As a result, by Au-
gust 1998, a large number of employees would be entitled to
receive retirement incentive offers under the 6 and 6. Those
accepting this offer would then have to leave the Respondent’s
payroll within 30 days under the terms of the 1994 collective-
bargaining agreement. In the fall of 1997, after the merger of
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX was complete, the Respondent be-
came concerned about the prospect of a mass exodus of experi-
enced employees needed to conduct its business upon expira-
tion of the agreement. The Respondent’s representatives ap-
proached union representatives with the idea of early negotia-
tions for a new agreement with the goal of obtaining relief from
the impact of the 6 and 6 plan. The Union agreed and contract
negotiations commenced in early January 1998,4 a full 7
months before expiration of the contract.
Contrary to the Respondent’s hope for quick resolution of
the 6 and 6 issue, the negotiations became protracted. Final
agreement on the collective-bargaining agreement, including
revisions to the 6 and 6 intended to encourage employees to
stay and to delay the departure of those accepting the offer, was
not reached until August 11, after a 2-day strike.5 In pertinent
part, the parties agreed to extend the offer to all eligible em-

3 The actual terms of the 6 and 6 were set forth in an April 3, 1994
Memorandum of Understanding which is not in evidence. There is no
dispute however regarding the substance of the agreement.
4 All dates hereafter are in 1998, unless otherwise indicated.
5 It is undisputed that the strike was not caused by any disagreement
over the 6 and 6 offer.
ployees, as envisioned by the 1994 agreement, upon the effec-
tive date of the new agreement and that employees would have
30 days to elect to take the offer. The parties agreed further that
employees electing to take the offer could choose one of six
alternative retirement dates (ARDs), at the end of each calendar
quarter between September 30 and December 31, 1999. The
parties agreed to a quota of employees who could leave on each
ARD. If the number of employees choosing to leave on a par-
ticular ARD exceeded the quota, the ARD would be assigned
by seniority. In addition, to encourage people to stay, the par-
ties agreed that employees who did not elect to take the 6 and 6
would have another opportunity to retire with at least the same
benefits in calendar year 2001. In addition, the parties negoti-
ated wage increases, pension band increases, job upgrades,
training pay, and other incentives to encourage employees to
stay.
It is undisputed that, during the 1998 negotiations, union rep-
resentatives advised the Respondent that a majority of employ-
ees, including those in the unit involved in this proceeding,
wanted to take the 6 and 6 and leave the Respondent’s employ.
Gail Murcott, president of Local 1100 of the Union and a par-
ticipant in the regional bargaining, testified that she anticipated
even before bargaining commenced that 60 percent of the em-
ployees in her unit would take the 6 and 6 as it existed under
the 1994 agreement. The record reveals that all but a handful of
employees in the Manhattan payroll office and more than half
of those in the Brooklyn Revenue Accounting Office (RAO),
the two offices at issue here, were eligible to receive a 6 and 6
offer in August 1998.
It is undisputed that at no time during the 1998 negotiations
did any representative of the Respondent advise the Union that
a transfer of work out of the unit was under consideration.
B. The Respondent’s Decision
Dennis Jacobs is the Respondent’s vice president of finance
operations with responsibility for the Respondent’s billing,
revenue accounting, payroll, and related functions for its core
business in the 13 northeastern States from Maine to Virginia.
He has not been a participant in contract negotiations with the
Union, although he has occasionally been consulted by indi-
viduals in labor relations and human resources regarding issues
pending in negotiations. In 1998, he reported to Ellen Wolf, the
Respondent’s vice president and treasurer. Reporting to him
were Thomas Daley, the Respondent’s executive director of
billing operations, and Sherry Hessenthaler, the Respondent’s
executive director of payroll operations. Daley had responsibil-
ity for the Revenue Accounting offices in Brooklyn and Brain-
tree, Massachusetts, and Hessenthaler was responsible for the
payroll offices in Manhattan and Upper Darby, Pennsylvania.
Jacobs testified that Wolf approached him in early February
and asked him to look for ways to take advantage of the 6 and 6
incentive plan to save the Respondent money. According to
Jacobs, extension of the 6 and 6 offer to all remaining eligible
employees at the expiration of the 1994 agreement would cost
the Respondent billions of dollars and leave it with fewer em-
ployees to do the work. Jacobs was assigned to find ways to
take advantage of the anticipated exodus of employees to re-
duce the Respondent’s costs of operations. With input from
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1078
Daley, Hessenthaler, and David White, the Respondent’s direc-
tor of remittance processing, Jacobs prepared a memo to Wolf
outlining two alternative scenarios.6 The memo is dated Febru-
ary 17. Under the first scenario, the Respondent would achieve
approximately $2.6 million in annual savings by not replacing
all employees who left with the 6 and 6 offer. This scenario did
not involve the movement of any work and could be effectuated
unilaterally. In his memo, Jacobs advised Wolf that he could
immediately commit to implementing this plan.
In the February 17 memo, Jacobs described his second sce-
nario as “higher risk” because it involved closing the Brooklyn
revenue accounting office and moving the work performed
there to other offices, including the revenue accounting office
in Braintree, Massachusetts. The employees at Braintree are
represented by a different union, the IBEW. As part of this
scenario, Jacobs also proposed moving some bill print opera-
tions from Braintree to Massapequa, Long Island, a facility
within the bargaining unit represented by Local 1100. Jacobs
projected that the savings from this scenario would exceed $5
million a year, including reductions in management personnel
associated with the closure of the Brooklyn office. When com-
bined with the savings projected from the first scenario, the
total savings to the Respondent would be almost $8 million a
year. All of the savings in Jacobs’ memo are based on the
wages and benefits saved by reducing headcount. Jacobs pro-
jected that the unit represented by Local 1100 would be re-
duced from 308 to 197 employees while the IBEW-represented
unit would increase by 15 employees.
In his memo, Jacobs advised Wolf that his second scenario
could not be pursued unilaterally. “It would require substantial
support at the officer level because it has major labor relations
impact at a critical time.” In pertinent part, he detailed the sup-
port requirements as follows:

1. The plan to move work would have to be communi-
cated at the time of the CWA 6/6 offer.
2. The labor relations risks would have to be recog-
nized. Labor Relations must commit to bargain with both
the CWA or IBEW any requirement needed to effect
movement of work.
3. The option to extend employees who have accepted
the 6/6 would have to be available.

Jacobs testified that a movement of work from the Manhat-
tan payroll office was not under consideration at the time be-
cause the Respondent was already in the process of moving the
payroll office to a new location in Manhattan. Instead, Jacobs’
second scenario envisioned using vacancies created by the de-
parture of payroll employees accepting the 6 and 6 offer to
accommodate employees from Brooklyn whose jobs were
moved to Braintree. He described this scenario as follows:

6 Daley testified that he came up with the two scenarios after Jacobs
called him and said that Wolf wanted to know whether there was any
way the Respondent could take savings out of the 6 and 6 program.
Daley worked with his staff manager, Joe Osburne, to come up with the
numbers used in the memo. Daley was a member of the Respondent’s
negotiating committee at the local table in 1998.
Of great importance, we do believe we could care for most of
our associates and management employees who are displaced
in Brooklyn. If the 6 and 6 and the closing of the Brooklyn
RAO were announced simultaneously, the acceptance would
probably be greater than the estimates shown on the attached.
In addition, some employees could fill vacancies that will oc-
cur in Massapequa and also in the New York payroll office.
Vacancies will be substantial in both of these locations as well
as other work locations in Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and
Manhattan.

Jacobs testified that he met with Wolf to discuss his memo
and that they committed to the first scenario unequivocally. She
expressed interest in the second scenario but had reservations
whether it was doable. According to Jacobs, he and Wolf then
held an impromptu meeting with Don Sacco, the Respondent’s
senior vice president of human resources responsible for ad-
ministering the 6 and 6 plan. Daley was also present for this
meeting. After reviewing the two scenarios for Sacco, Sacco
agreed that the second scenario was something the Respondent
should pursue in connection with the 6 and 6 but that imple-
mentation would depend on the outcome of the 6 and 6 negotia-
tions taking place simultaneously with these discussions. Daley
corroborated Jacobs regarding these meetings. Sacco and Wolf
did not testify.7 According to Jacobs and Daley, there was no
further discussion of the second scenario until after agreement
was reached on the new collective-bargaining agreement.
Jacobs acknowledged being asked during the negotiations by
company negotiators, whom he did not identify, whether there
was “anything in the pipeline like this under consideration.”
According to Jacobs, he advised the negotiators that there were
“concepts” being considered. Daley did have more regular con-
tact with the Respondent’s human resources department, field-
ing “what if” questions regarding different proposals for im-
plementing the 6 and 6, such as questions regarding the number
of accounting department employees who could be allowed to
leave the payroll in 1998 and 1999. Daley recalled that the
numbers being discussed kept changing over the course of the
negotiations. Whenever he asked about the status of negotia-
tions on the 6 and 6, he was told nothing was firm, not even
with respect to staggering off-payroll dates. Daley admitted that
he never apprised any of the negotiators about the second sce-
nario he discussed with Wolf and Jacobs in February.
According to Jacobs and Hessenthaler, consideration of clos-
ing the New York payroll office did not come up until June. As
previously noted, in 1998, the Respondent was in the process of
planning for the relocation of the payroll office from 1166
Avenue of the Americas to East 30th Street in New York as a
result of the Respondent’s decision to sell 1166. Christopher
Kelly, the Respondent’s executive director of real estate portfo-
lio management, testified that the Respondent did not begin
preparation of the new office space on 30th Street until August
1998. According to Kelly, it cost the Respondent $1.6 million
to renovate the space on 30th Street to accommodate the New
York payroll office. Hessenthaler testified that, in addition to
this move within New York, the Respondent was in the process
7 Wolf is no longer employed by the Respondent.
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1079
of combining the formerly separate Bell Atlantic and NYNEX
payroll systems and converting to new software in 1998.
In early June, Wolf asked Hessenthaler a question similar to
the one she posed to Jacobs in February. In the course of dis-
cussing the status of the payroll system conversion and the
impact of the 6 and 6, Wolf asked Hessenthaler to look at proc-
ess improvements and efficiencies that could be achieved
through the 6 and 6. In response, Hessenthaler drafted a memo,
which is undated, laying out a proposal to consolidate the Re-
spondent’s payroll offices in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania.8 In
her memo, Hessenthaler suggested that the Respondent take
advantage of the upcoming 6 and 6 offers to close the New
York payroll office and consolidate all payroll operations in
Upper Darby. She reasoned that, because 95.5 percent of the
unit employees in New York were eligible for a 6 and 6 offer,
there would be minimal employee displacement. In addition,
conversion to a common payroll computer system and new
software would reduce the number of employees needed to
process payroll. Hessenthaler projected annual savings in ex-
cess of $1.6 million from closing the New York office. These
savings would result from fewer employees and lower wage
and benefit costs in Upper Darby.9 Hessenthaler did not calcu-
late nonwage related savings associated with the move, such as
lower real estate and utility costs. According to Hessenthaler,
there were no meetings or any other discussions regarding her
memo before negotiations concluded. The only followup she
had was to talk to Daley about it because Jacobs told her that he
was considering a similar plan for the revenue accounting op-
erations. Hessenthaler had no involvement in contract negotia-
tions.
On July 31, Hessenthaler sent Jacobs an e-mail in response
to an inquiry from him regarding the impact of the 6 and 6 on
payroll operations. Her e-mail assumes the continued presence
of the New York payroll office. Hessenthaler reported to Jacobs
that she anticipated that all 60 employees eligible to receive a 6
and 6 offer would accept it and that 57 of these would be re-
placed in the New York office. She anticipated further that the
employees’ departures would be equitably spread out over the
next five quarters, through calendar year 1999. Hessenthaler
indicated that these projections were “arbitrary” and depended
on resolution of the 6 and 6 negotiations, the timing of the of-
fers, and the relative seniority of payroll employees compared
to other accounting department employees accepting the 6 and
6 offer.
Jacobs, Daley, and Hessenthaler denied being aware of the
terms of the parties’ agreement to extend the 6 and 6 until after
the contract was settled on August 11. However, a memo to the
Respondent’s managers dated July 9, 1998, updates the status
of negotiations, including the negotiations over the 6 and 6. The
memo’s description of the Respondent’s 6 and 6 proposal on
the table at that time is identical to the agreement ultimately

8 The Respondent had three payroll offices at the time. Upper Darby
and Princeton, New Jersey, handled the payroll for the premerger Bell
Atlantic offices south of New York. Hessenthaler’s memo indicates that
there was already a plan to consolidate these offices into the Upper
Darby office by late 1999–early 2000.
9 The record indicates that the employees in Upper Darby are repre-
sented by a different local of the Union.
reached on August 11. The only open question was the number
of employees in the various bargaining units who would be
permitted to leave on any given ARD. This is consistent with
the testimony of the witnesses who were present at the regional
bargaining table where the 6 and 6 issue was discussed, i.e.,
that the 6 and 6 had been substantially resolved by July 1998.
Jacobs, Daley, and Hessenthaler would presumably have re-
ceived this memo because they occupied positions at and above
the director level. Hessenthaler’s July 31 e-mail to Jacobs indi-
cates that she was at least aware of the staggered ARDs being
negotiated in order to spread out the departure of employees
accepting the 6 and 6. In his direct testimony, Daley conceded
that the 6 and 6 extension with staggered ARDs was not a “total
surprise.” According to Daley, the only aspect of the agreement
that was a surprise was the 30-day time period for employees to
elect to take the offer. In any event, all three witnesses testified
that, upon learning the details of the agreement after August 11,
they discussed among themselves whether the Respondent
should go forward with the proposed relocations and decided to
convene a meeting with representatives from labor relations
and human resources.
On August 18, Jacobs, Daley, and Hessenthaler met with
John Hann from labor relations, and John Abeles and Anna
Shuster from human resources. Osburn, Daley’s staff manager,
was also present. Jacobs testified that this “meeting” was via
conference call. Daley recalled that it was a face-to-face meet-
ing. Neither Hessenthaler nor Hann testified one way or another
regarding the type of meeting. No other participant testified.
The minutes of this meeting prepared by Jacobs are in evi-
dence. Two “initiatives” were discussed at this meeting. The
first was a modification of Jacobs’ and Daley’s second scenario
laid out in the February 17 memo. Instead of retaining some of
the Brooklyn office’s revenue work in New York, the plan was
to move all of it to Braintree. This initiative still included
movement of bill print work from Braintree to Massapequa.
The second initiative was Hessenthaler’s proposal to consoli-
date payroll operations in Upper Darby. At the meeting, the
participants discussed a number of “issues/concerns” related to
the proposal. Daley asked about rumors that Larry Mancino, a
vice president of the Union, had said after negotiations were
concluded that, “there will be no geographical movement of
work.” Hann reported that, “nothing happened in bargaining
that would support” Mancino’s comment. The participant’s
then discussed the terms of the merger agreement between Bell
Atlantic and NYNEX limiting the amount of work that could be
moved between the two formerly separate companies. Hann
was assigned to determine whether the payroll move would
exceed the limit. There was also discussion of the impact of
announcement of these moves on contract ratification, which
had not yet occurred. Hann advised that he did not think it
would affect ratification. The minutes of the meeting and the
testimony reflect that the participants at the meeting also dis-
cussed contractual requirements of 6-months notice to the Un-
ion of such moves and the requirement for collective bargaining
over the decision. Daley also expressed concerns about “exter-
nal intervenors.” From past experience with the Union, he an-
ticipated that the Union would enlist public figures to intervene
in an attempt to stop the movement of work. It was decided that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1080
the Respondent’s officers should be prepared to respond to such
overtures. Jacobs’ minutes also reflect that someone raised the
possibility that the Union might ask for an extension of the
deadline for employees to respond to the 6 and 6 offer so em-
ployees could think about the new initiatives. Hann is reported
to have advised against this, indicating that an extension of the
deadline could make the 6 and 6 process “unmanageable.
After discussing these issues/concerns, the participants at the
meeting were assigned various individuals in upper manage-
ment to brief. A timeline for making a decision and announcing
it was prepared, which anticipates that the various approvals
would be obtained by August 24, and that Daley and Hessen-
thaler would inform the executive board of Local 1100 and the
affected unit employees on August 25. Jacobs’ minutes also
include savings and cost figures. According to the minutes, the
movement of work from Brooklyn and Manhattan to Braintree
and Upper Darby, respectively, would cost the Respondent
approximately $4.4 million in 1998 and 1999. This includes the
cost of training employees, site preparation, equipment and
personnel relocation costs and capital expenditures. By calen-
dar year 2000, after the move was completed, the Respondent
would save in excess of $7 million a year in wages and benefits
alone.
Following the August 18 meeting, according to the Respon-
dent’s witnesses, the meeting participants carried out their re-
spective assignments to investigate and close down the open
issues and concerns related to the proposed move. For example,
Hann testified that he checked with Jim Dowdall, the Respon-
dent’s vice president of labor relations, regarding the applica-
tion of the merger agreement to this move.10 According to
Hann, Dowdall told him that the 0.5-percent figure was a per-
centage of all work done by CWA-represented employees, not
individual bargaining units. Hann testified that Dowdall did not
see any reason not to proceed with the move. Daley testified
that there were two significant open issues after the August 18
meeting, EEO concerns because the employees whose work
was being moved were disproportionately female and minority
class members, and regulatory concerns. These issues were
discussed with the Respondent’s EEO counsel and with Paul
Crotty, the Respondent’s group president, external affairs, who
is in charge of regulatory matters, and Pat Mulhearn, the Re-
spondent’s vice president, corporate communications, who was
responsible for the public relations aspects of the move. The
managers who met on August 18 had further discussions among
themselves, via conference calls, during the period August 18
through 24, as issues and concerns were resolved. After the
final briefing with Crotty and Mulhearn on August 24, Jacobs,
Daley, and Hessenthaler met briefly with Wolf and made the
decision to go forward with the two moves. Daley and Hessen-
thaler were assigned to meet with the executive board of Local
1100 and the affected employees in Brooklyn and Manhattan,
respectively, to inform them of the decision.11 Daley and Hes-

10 Under the terms of a premerger agreement with the Union, the Re-
spondent could not move more than 0.5 percent of bargaining unit work
from north (NYNEX) to south (Bell Atlantic) and vice versa.
11 The minutes of the August 18 meeting indicate that Daley was
also assigned to meet with the IBEW regarding the aspects of the move
senthaler prepared “talking points” to use in their meetings with
the employees. These “talking points” are in evidence.
C. Respondent Announces its Decision
The Respondent first notified the Union of its decision by a
telephone call from Daley to Murcott at approximately 4 p.m.
on August 24. Hessenthaler was also on the line. According to
the undisputed testimony of Murcott, Daley told her he was
going to give her some information and asked if she could keep
it confidential until the Respondent was ready to divulge it.
When Murcott agreed, Daley told her that the Respondent was
going to close the Manhattan payroll office and move the work
to Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, and that the Respondent was
going to close the Brooklyn office and move the work to Brain-
tree, Massachusetts. Daley also informed Murcott that some
work was being moved from Braintree to the Massapequa of-
fice represented by her Union. In response to this news, Mur-
cott, who was admittedly angry, said that they had just negoti-
ated a contract with job upgrades that had gone to the member-
ship without one word from the Respondent about any move-
ment of work. Daley asked her to set up a meeting with the
executive board for the following morning, which she agreed to
do,
The following day, at 8 a.m., Daley and Hessenthaler met
with Murcott and most, if not all, members of the Union’s ex-
ecutive board at the Union’s office. Murcott and Gloria Gadz-
inski, Local 1100’s secretary, testified for the General Counsel
about this meeting. Gadzinski’s minutes of the meeting are also
in evidence. Daley testified for the Respondent. Hessenthaler
merely testified that she agreed with Daley’s testimony regard-
ing this meeting. There is not much dispute regarding what
happened at the meeting.
Murcott testified that Daley did most of the talking and re-
peated his announcement about the two moves. Gadzinski, in
her testimony and in the minutes of the meeting, indicates that
Daley and Hessenthaler referred to the 6 and 6 and the high
number of employees eligible to retire under this offer as a key
factor in the decision. Murcott and the members of the Board
expressed anger at the announcement and its timing so soon
after negotiations had concluded. They expressed disbelief that
the Respondent did not know about this move during the nego-
tiations. Murcott expressed her feeling that the Union and the
members had been deceived by the Respondent. Murcott also
told Daley and Hessenthaler that she believed the movement of
work from New York to Upper Darby violated the merger
agreement. Daley told the Union that he and Hessenthaler had
scheduled a meeting with the affected employees for 11 a.m.
that morning to announce the decision. Murcott requested a
caucus to try to reach the Union’s vice president, Mancino.
However, Murcott was unable to reach Mancino. Murcott and
Gadzinski testified that, after the caucus, Murcott asked Daley
and Hessenthaler to hold off announcing the decision until she
had time to reach Mancino. Daley refused, telling the Union
that the employees had a right to know about this while they

affecting the Braintree office. Hann testified that he and Daley met with
the IBEW in Braintree to announce the decision. According to Hann,
the Respondent then engaged in collective bargaining with the IBEW
over the move there.
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1081
were considering the 6 and 6 offer.12 Daley’s testimony was in
agreement with that of Murcott and Gadzinski in all but two
respects. Although Daley recalled Murcott asking him to delay
the announcement to the employees, he did not recall her pro-
viding any reason for this request. He admitted refusing to
postpone the announcement because of the 6 and 6 deadline.
Daley also testified that he asked Murcott and the Union’s ex-
ecutive board if they were going to attend his meeting with the
employees. He could not recall any response, but testified that
it was clear to him they were not. According to Daley, it is not
uncommon for union representatives to attend such meetings
with employees and to hold their own meeting with the em-
ployees on company premises after the Respondent is finished
meeting with the employees. Murcott and Gadzinski denied
being asked by Daley to attend the Respondent’s meeting with
the employees. Murcott acknowledged that it was not uncom-
mon for the Union to meet with employees immediately after
the Respondent held meetings with them.
There is no dispute that after meeting with the executive
board Daley went to Brooklyn and Hessenthaler to Manhattan
to make the announcement to the affected employees, as
planned at the August 18 meeting, of Respondent’s decision
makers. Daley and Hessenthaler testified about their respective
meetings. Cora Batties, a personnel staff director who had re-
tired and was working as a consultant for the Respondent at the
time, also testified about the Brooklyn meeting. The Respon-
dent also placed in evidence the written “talking points” they
prepared for use at this meeting. Daley and Hessenthaler ac-
knowledged that they did not read from the talking points, us-
ing them instead as a guide. The General Counsel offered the
testimony of Venice Booker and Louise Thomas regarding the
meeting in Brooklyn and Evelin Mendoza and Peggy Corley
regarding the meeting in Manhattan. All are long-term employ-
ees who were eligible for the 6 and 6 offer. Booker and Men-
doza were also union representatives in their respective offices.
Booker and Thomas testified that Daley told the employees
in Brooklyn that the building would be closing and their work
was being moved to Braintree, Massachusetts. Daley also told
the employees that any employees who did not take the 6 and 6
would be placed in other jobs. Both witnesses recalled that
there was a lot of grumbling after the announcement and that
employees asked many questions, including why the Respon-
dent didn’t tell the employees before the new contract was ne-
gotiated. Booker recalled that someone asked when the work
would be moved and Daley responded that he didn’t know yet,
that he would have to get back to them. According to Booker,
Daley also told the employees that he expected that the Union
would be getting in touch with them. Both employees testified
that their impression of the announcement was that the decision
was final. Thomas explained that she reached this conclusion
because Daley told them that he had already met with the Un-
ion. Daley and Batties disputed the testimony that the meeting
was “chaotic”. According to Daley, he gave the employees a lot
of information about the decision, including the reason for the
move. He also testified that he told the employees that he had

12 The deadline for employees to accept the 6 and 6 offer, according
to the terms of the written offer, was September 6.
just met with the Union’s executive board and that the Union
was going to fight the move. Daley and Batties testified that
employees actually applauded at the end of the meeting.
Mendoza and Corley testified that Hessenthaler told the em-
ployees in Manhattan that the office would be closed and the
work moved to Upper Darby. They both recalled that one em-
ployee asked if the employees would be moving with the work
and that Hessenthaler responded no, only the work was moving.
They also recalled that Hessenthaler advised the employees to
take the 6 and 6 offer because, if they didn’t, they would have
to find a another job. Hessenthaler disputed this testimony.
According to her, she did not recommend that any employee
take the 6 and 6 although she acknowledged that there were
many questions about the 6 and 6 offer and job placement for
employees who chose not to or were ineligible to retire. Hes-
senthaler testified that she responded to these questions by tell-
ing the employees that she did not know the answers but that
she would schedule another meeting with experts who did.
Such a meeting was held, according to Hessenthaler, on Sep-
tember 1.
The four employee witnesses all testified that they had not
made any decision regarding the 6 and 6 offer before this meet-
ing, but all decided to accept it after the announcement. They
acknowledged that, under income protection and job security
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, they could
have continued working by filling jobs in other offices, with no
change in their pay or benefits. However, the “green circle”
around their rates was only guaranteed through the end of the
current contract. Booker testified that, after the announcement,
she was concerned about what would happen to the green circle
after the contract expired. Murcott testified that the Union has
surveyed the employees in the unit and determined that 28 of
60 eligible employees in Manhattan and 19 of 75 eligible em-
ployees in Brooklyn would not have accepted the 6 and 6 offer
if the offices remained open. The Respondent placed in evi-
dence a summary of its records showing that, of the total num-
ber of employees in these two offices accepting the 6 and 6
offer, 32 percent in Manhattan and 46 percent in Brooklyn did
so before the decision was announced.
D. The Union’s Response to the Respondent’s
Announcement
As noted above, Murcott had been unable to reach Mancino
during the Union’s meeting with Daley and Hessenthaler. Ac-
cording to Murcott, she finally reached Mancino in the after-
noon and informed him of the Respondent’s decision that had
been announced to the Union that day. Mancino told Murcott
that he would contact the Respondent’s vice president of labor
relations, Jim Dowdall, about it. Murcott heard nothing further
from Mancino thereafter. Nor did she attempt to contact him.
According to Murcott, Mancino had open-heart surgery shortly
thereafter and he was out of work for several months. Murcott
did talk to Dowdall herself, about a week later during the Inter-
national Union’s convention. Dowdall was also at the conven-
tion and Murcott asked him why the Respondent was moving
work when the unit employees were doing such a good job.
According to Murcott, Dowdall told her that he didn’t know
much about what was going on, but that he either was having,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1082
or would be having, discussions with someone about it. Murcott
testified that she was not “encouraged” by his response. She
admittedly did not follow up with anyone else after these con-
versations with Mancino and Dowdall.
Mancino testified that he received a call from Murcott to-
ward the end of August about the Respondent’s planned moves.
According to Mancino, he then contacted Dowdall and “vented
his frustrations,” reiterating the objections that Murcott had
expressed about the Respondent’s failure to notify the Union
about the proposed move during contract negotiations. Mancino
testified that Dowdall told him that he would look into it and
get back to Mancino. Dowdall did not indicate to Mancino that
he knew about the Respondent’s decision. Shortly after these
calls, the Union had its convention in Chicago. Because of his
heart condition, he was unable to travel to the convention.
Shortly after the convention, he went into the hospital for sur-
gery and was out of work until November 8. Mancino did not
hear back from Dowdall before he left work. He did not dele-
gate to anyone else the task of following up on his phone call
with Dowdall because he believed it would be demeaning to
Dowdall to have a lesser official in the Union contact him.
Mancino admitted that, even after his return to work, he had no
further contact with Dowdall about this issue.
The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that the
Union took no other action in response to the Respondent’s
announcement until it filed two grievances at the end of Octo-
ber alleging that the movement of work violated the premerger
agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement. It is spe-
cifically admitted by the Union’s witnesses that the Union
made no request to bargain over the decision between August
25 and December 15.
E. The Common Committee
On August 25, after the meeting with Daley and Hessen-
thaler, the Union received by fax a letter from Hann, the Re-
spondent’s labor relations director, dated August 24 formally
advising the Union of the Respondent’s decision. The letter
indicates that the movement of work from the two offices
would begin in March 1999, and be completed by December
1999. According to the letter, the early announcement of the
move was necessitated by the September 8 deadline for em-
ployees to accept the 6 and 6 offer.13 Hann closed his letter as
follows:

At the next Common Committee meeting we will re-
view the details of these consolidations. In the meantime,
the Company plans to meet with you to discuss the impact
of these consolidations and the schedule of announcements
to the work force.
Please call me if you have any questions.

Murcott did not call Hann regarding this letter.
The “Common Committee” referred to in Hann’s letter is the
successor to several joint labor-management committees, in-
cluding a “technology change committee,” that existed prior to

13 The offer sent to employees was dated August 8, and had a dead-
line of September 6, to accept. The later date in Hann’s letter is the
result of the 2-day delay in mailing the offers to the employees because
of the strike.
the 1994–1998 collective-bargaining agreement.14 In 1994, the
parties merged all of the joint committees into one “Common
Committee.” Article 33 of the 1994 and 1998 collective-
bargaining agreements, which are identical, embodies the par-
ties’ agreement on the Common Committee. The committee
consists of an equal number of union and management repre-
sentatives and is cochaired by the Respondent’s managing di-
rector of labor relations and the Union’s vice president, District
One, or their designees. The committee has a staff of two, one
selected by each of the parties, and its operations are funded by
the Respondent. Under article 33:

The Company will notify the Union at least six months in ad-
vance of planned major technological changes (including
changes in equipment, organization, or methods of operation),
which may affect employees represented by the Union, unless
it has done so prior to the date of this agreement. Meetings
about the planned changes will be held as soon thereafter as
can be mutually arranged. At such meetings, the Company
will advise the Union of its plans with respect to the introduc-
tion of such changes and will familiarize the Union with the
progress being made. Although the company is required to
notify the Union at least six months in advance of the intro-
duction of any planned major technological change, it will
make a good faith effort to advise the Union as soon as it de-
cides to introduce such changes in order to give the Union the
opportunity to discuss the impact of these changes upon the
various bargaining units and the Company’s customers.
The Common Committee will serve as a clearinghouse
for the exchange of information between the Company and
the Union regarding those and other significant planned
actions or changes and their effects on represented em-
ployees, and as a forum to seek mutually acceptable ways
to minimize any significant negative impact on repre-
sented employees, while enhancing the Company’s ability
to grow, improve customer service, and improve its com-
petitiveness.
The Committee’s staff will, at the direction of the
Committee, evaluate planned Company actions or changes
referred to in the preceding paragraph, and provide input
to the Committee regarding alternatives to mitigate em-
ployee impact.
After consideration of any staff input, the Committee
may make recommendations to the Company regarding al-
ternatives to the planned major technological changes, and
the Company members of the Committee will work to fa-
cilitate these recommendations as appropriate. Nothing in
this Common Committee process, however, will prevent
the Company, after the end of the six-month period, from
implementing proposed major technological changes that
do not otherwise violate the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.

Murcott testified that the Union’s representatives on the
Common Committee were the members of its executive board.
14 The evidence in the record indicates that the technological change
committee was initially created under a letter of understanding dated
August 10, 1980.
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1083
She acknowledged that the purpose of the committee was to
give the Respondent and the Union a 6-month period to discuss
any changes in the Respondent’s methods of operation that
would affect the unit. According to Murcott, the Common
Committee in practice functions as nothing more than a forum
for the Respondent to notify the Union of changes it plans to
make without any real discussion taking place. There is no
evidence that the Common Committee discussed the work relo-
cation plan at issue here until June 1999. Daley testified with-
out contradiction that he and Hessenthaler attended a meeting
of the Common Committee at that time at which the move was
supposed to be discussed. However, after taking a caucus, the
Union’s representative told the Committee that it had no desire
to discuss it in that forum, that the Union was taking the issue
to a different forum.
F. Meetings After the Respondent’s Announcement
On or about October 28, the Union and the Respondent met
at union headquarters for a step 1 and 2 meeting on the Union’s
grievances. Daley represented the Respondent and Murcott
represented the Union. Murcott could not recall who else was
there.15 According to Murcott, this is the first time the parties
discussed “people issues” related to the move, such as training
and placement of employees in other jobs. The Union also
asked to extend the ARDs selected by those employees who
had taken the 6 and 6. No resolution to these issues was reached
at that meeting. Murcott did not describe in any detail the dis-
cussion regarding the grievances themselves but she acknowl-
edged that Daley gave an explanation of the reasons for the
Respondent’s decision. The grievances were denied at this step
and the Union pursued them to step 3.
The parties held three more meetings on November 16 and
23 and December 8 at which the “people issues” were dis-
cussed. Murcott was the only witness to testify regarding these
meetings. Her testimony was not very detailed regarding what
happened at each of these meetings. She admitted however that
bargaining about the Respondent’s decision was not discussed.
From her testimony, it appears that the “people issues” were in
actuality effects of bargaining issues. By the last meeting in
December, according to Murcott, the parties had agreed to al-
low employees to extend their ARDs until April 1999. This was
later extended further so that no employee who had taken the 6
and 6 offer would have to leave the payroll before December
1999.
The most significant meeting between the parties after the
decision was announced was the third-step grievance meeting
on December 15. Murcott, Gadzinski, and Donna Dolan, the
Union’s International staff representative were present for the
Union while Daley, Hessenthaler, and Hann represented the
Respondent. Several witnesses testified regarding this meeting.
Also in evidence are Dolan’s and Gadzinski’s notes taken at the
meeting. There is essentially no dispute regarding what tran-
spired at the meeting. The notes are consistent with the testi-
mony of the witnesses, but are much more detailed.
As established by the testimony and the notes, the meeting
opened with the Union stating its position with respect to each

15 Murcott was the only witness to testify about this meeting.
grievance. Specifically, the Union contended that the move-
ment of work from Manhattan to Upper Darby violated the pre-
merger agreement’s limitations on the amount of work that
could be moved from the former NYNEX units to the former
Bell Atlantic units and that the movement of work from Brook-
lyn to Braintree violated the Recognition clause of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Hann, speaking for the Company,
disagreed with the Union’s interpretation of the contract. Gadz-
inski’s notes reflect that he said: “If we have a good business
reason [to transfer unit work to the IBEW] we would discuss
with you–we must do this.” (Emphasis added.) Gadzinski’s
notes show that Murcott claimed that the Respondent made no
attempt to sit and bargain with the Union over the movement of
work. Hann responded by referring to the August 25 meeting at
which Daley and Hessenthaler informed the Union of the deci-
sion. Hann also referred to the 6 and 6 deadline as forcing the
Respondent to announce the decision when it did, so that em-
ployees would have this information when they were making
their decisions whether to accept the 6 and 6 offer. When the
Union objected to the timing of the announcement and the fail-
ure to raise this issue during contract negotiations, Hann and
Daley responded that the decision was not made until after a
meeting with Crotty and Mulhearn, after negotiations were
concluded. They told the Union that the Respondent wanted to
await the outcome of negotiations before deciding on the
movement of work. Murcott and other union representatives
then challenged the Respondent’s claims, arguing that the is-
sues related to the 6 and 6 were resolved in July and were
known to the Respondent’s management. Hann and Daley re-
sponded that nothing was final until the strike was settled.
The testimony and notes reflect that the parties then dis-
cussed the number of jobs being relocated, with disagreement
between the parties over this. There was further discussion
regarding the timing of the decision and the reason for the
move. After Murcott and Dolan questioned why the Respon-
dent didn’t discuss its “ideas” with the Union sooner, Hann
asked if the Union had any alternatives. Murcott replied that the
Union was “not prepared to do that today.” Hann then asked if
the Union wanted to bargain and Murcott said, “we need to
bargain on the movement of the work.” Hann again explained
the timing of the decision and announcement and the Union
complained that the Respondent should have notified them
sooner. After Murcott suggested that the Respondent bring back
“In Touch Center work,” work that had been removed from the
unit previously, Hann told the Union it was his job to see that
the work can be done cheaper. Murcott replied, “[W]e can give
you job cheaper–give us figures.” Hann replied that he was
there to do the grievance and then asked if the Union wanted to
make an economic proposal. Murcott responded that she didn’t
believe Hann. Gadzinski’s notes show that Daley and Hessen-
thaler told the Union that they didn’t have a definitive plan in
place yet for the move. Daley told the Union that he didn’t
think that the Respondent would begin moving any work before
March or April 1999. Gadzinski’s notes show that Hessenthaler
then said that the Respondent “would listen to you if you have a
plan.” (Emphasis added.) The notes reflect that, rather than
respond to this invitation, the Union sidetracked the discussion
by asking questions about the lease in Brooklyn, the number of
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1084
jobs affected and other issues. At one point during this discus-
sion, Daley told the Union that the move would take place in
stages and would take 11 months to 1-1/2 years to complete.
Before taking a caucus, Dolan told the Respondent that the
Union wanted to request information regarding the movement
of work.
The testimony and notes reflect that when the Union returned
from the caucus Dolan told the Respondent that in order to
make an economic proposal it needed information on the cost
of operations in the New York offices compared to the facilities
where the work was being moved. She and Murcott then de-
scribed specifically the type of information they wanted, such
as wage rates and EEO data for the other offices. Daley and
Hessenthaler each agreed to provide this information. Towards
the end of the meeting, the Union again questioned the Respon-
dent why it had selected the Brooklyn and New York offices to
close. Daley explained that they selected the offices based on
the expected vacancies created by the number of people who
would take the 6 and 6, resulting in fewer employees who
would be displaced as a result of the closing. The meeting
ended with Hann asking the Union if it wanted to schedule
another meeting to bargain over the decision. Murcott replied
that the Union would get back to him after it received and re-
viewed the information. By letters dated December 30, 1998,
signed by Hann, the Respondent denied the Union’s two griev-
ances.16
On December 22, Dolan wrote to Hann as a follow-up to the
meeting. After reiterating the Union’s objections to the move
and reminding the Respondent of her request for information,
Dolan wrote as follows:

You emphatically stated that the Company would be
willing to reconsider the transfer of work if the Union pre-
sented a convincing proposal for keeping this work in New
York.
Based on the following information, which CWA
learned subsequent to the December 15th meeting, it is
impossible for us to take your offer seriously.
On August 25 at 8:00 a.m., Tom Daley and Sherry
Hessenthaler arrived at Local 1100’s office to inform the
Executive Board of their intention to transfer their work.
At that time Local 1100 asked Management to delay in-
forming the employees in Brooklyn and Manhattan of the
Company’s intention to transfer their work out-of-state un-
til they could discuss this matter with their CWA District
leadership. Management flatly refused and went to the
Brooklyn and Manhattan offices at 10:00 a.m. that morn-
ing to make the announcement.
If, however, the Company is willing to rescind the de-
cision to transfer work out of state until such time as you
have received and studied the Union’s proposal, then we
will know that your offer was a serious one.
The Union is not willing to commit the tremendous
amount of effort required to develop a comprehensive

16 Dolan testified that the Union filed for arbitration but that the arbi-
tration is being held in abeyance pending the outcome of these proceed-
ings. The Respondent has not requested deferral to arbitration in this
case.
proposal unless we believe there is a possibility that the
Company will reverse the decision.

Hann responded to Dolan by letter dated December 31. At-
tached to the letter was information in response to Dolan’s
request at the December 15 meeting. The information provided
to the Union indicates that the Respondent projected savings
from the consolidation of work to total $6.2 million a year, a
figure slightly less than that forecast in August when the deci-
sion was made. In response to the other issues raised by Do-
lan’s letter, Hann wrote the following:

As you are aware, the Company’s plans to consolidate
the CBO/CBS and Payroll functions were primarily driven
by cost reductions and the anticipated retirements that will
result in these groups from the recently negotiated 6 and 6
retirement offer. Since the 6 and 6 retirement offer only
impacts the New York work force, it makes business sense
for the Company to consolidate these job functions in this
manner. However, the Company in presenting its plan to
the CWA has consistently indicated a willingness to dis-
cuss with the CWA the Company’s plans and to consider
any alternative proposal made by the CWA.
Regarding your surprise that the Company notified
employees in the Brooklyn RAO and Manhattan Payroll
office of the Company’s plans to consolidate work func-
tions and close those facilities, you should know that prior
to announcing the Company’s plans to employees, the
Company advised the CWA Local 1100 Executive Board
that the Company would be informing employees of the
Company’s plans. As I discussed with you, the decision to
inform employees of the Company’s plans was to enable
employees to make an informed decision when they con-
sidered the 6 and 6 retirement offer. Even though CWA
represented employees have job security protection under
the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, an em-
ployee’s decision on whether to accept or reject the 6 and
6 retirement offer could be impacted by a change in job
function and job location.

After an explanation of the information attached to his letter,
Hann ended his letter with the following paragraph:

If the CWA has a proposal, which equals the benefits to the
business of consolidating work functions, the Company will
reconsider its plans to consolidate work. However, in the ab-
sence of such a proposal and in consideration of the time nec-
essary to properly plan and implement this work consolida-
tion, the Company at this time must continue its plan to con-
solidate work. The Company is available to meet to discuss
further any aspects of this planned consolidation of Account-
ing work. Please call me if you have any questions or if you
want to schedule additional meetings to discuss the plan itself
or the effects of the plan on the work force or any CWA alter-
natives.

It is undisputed that the Union did not submit any proposals
to the Respondent after receiving Hann’s letter. It is also undis-
puted that there was no further contact between the parties be-
fore the Union filed the instant unfair labor practice charge on
February 23, 1999. Although Dolan testified that she was not
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1085
satisfied with the information supplied by the Respondent on
December 31, she admitted that she did not contact Hann to
advise him that the information was inadequate or incomplete.17
In fact, the Union did not communicate with the Respondent
regarding the information request until August 12, 1999, when
Dolan made another request for information.
G. Implementation of the Move
The General Counsel placed in evidence a variety of docu-
ments obtained from the Respondent pursuant to subpoena in
an attempt to show when the Respondent began implementing
the movement of work. The earliest document is a computer-
generated document entitled “Contract Purchase Order Infor-
mation” with an entry date of November 5, for a vendor identi-
fied as Atlantic Design Alliance involving the Upper Darby
Accounting Center. The work to be done is described as:
“Renovations and space planning to expand Payroll on the 2nd
floor. Requires moving Sourcing group on the 2nd floor to the
1st floor and rearrange 1st floor to accept Sourcing.” Other
documents indicate that bids for various portions of the work
were solicited on November 24, and that a contractor received
an “Authorization to Proceed” with the expansion of the Upper
Darby payroll office on December 23. This authorization indi-
cates that the work was to start on December 14, and be com-
pleted by March 31, 1999. Kelly, the Respondent’s real estate
portfolio manager, testified that it cost the Respondent ap-
proximately $100,000 to renovate the space in Upper Darby to
accommodate the payroll office consolidation.
A “Payroll Services Associate Job Requisition” form for the
Upper Darby office shows that the Respondent first sought to
hire additional employees for that office on December 10. Hes-
senthaler testified that these new hires were to be used initially
to replace employees in Upper Darby who were working on the
software conversion and then would take over the work being
moved from the Manhattan office. The document shows that
the first employees hired pursuant to the job requisition started
in January 1999. According to Hessenthaler, it ordinarily takes
30–60 days to fill a position after it is requisitioned and another
6–8 weeks to train a new employee. Hessenthaler testified that
the Upper Darby office did not begin performing the work pre-
viously done in Manhattan until April 5, 1999.
Kelly testified that he first learned of the move to Braintree
in December. According to Kelly, a planner from his depart-
ment had been working with individuals in the Braintree office
who wanted additional space there for expansion. The space
they wanted to occupy had been reserved for another depart-
ment. Kelly got involved in order to resolve these competing
claims for the same space. Documents placed in evidence by
the General Counsel show that on October 27, there was a
meeting in Braintree at which managers from the Braintree
office discussed with a representative from the Respondent’s
real estate office their plans to expand that office to accommo-
date the work consolidation. According to the minutes, the
Braintree managers advised the real estate representative that
they planned to have the building ready for occupancy by

17 There is no allegation in the complaint that the Respondent failed
or refused to furnish any information requested by the Union.
March or April 1999, and that the entire transition would take
10–14 months. The minutes reflect that no final decision on the
expansion plans was made at that meeting. A document entitled
“Client Agreement Form, A Real Estate Project Planning Docu-
ment” dated October 30, shows agreement being reached to go
forward with the expansion of the Braintree office to ac-
commodate the movement of work from Brooklyn. The desired
start date for the move is March 1999, with completion by De-
cember 1999. Daley signed the document indicating his concur-
rence on October 30. On January 6, 1999, there was another
meeting involving representatives from the Respondent’s real
estate portfolio management group and the accounting depart-
ment at which the physical consolidation of the accounting
functions from Brooklyn into the Braintree office was dis-
cussed. The minutes of this meeting indicate that, despite the
October 30 client agreement, nothing had been done to imple-
ment the proposed move. The minutes of the January 6 meeting
indicate that space plans were yet to be developed and no draw-
ings were done or bids solicited. Another document in evidence
reveals that on January 13, 1999, the construction manager was
authorized to proceed with the work. The construction schedule
shows that the work was to start on April 1, 1999, and be com-
pleted by July 1, 1999. These documents are consistent with the
testimony of Daley that the movement of work from Brooklyn
to Braintree did not commence until April 1999, and that prepa-
rations of the office in Braintree to receive the work occurred
around February–March 1999. Kelly testified that the real es-
tate cost for the movement of work from Brooklyn to Braintree
was $325,000.
H. The Respondent’s History of Consolidations
and Work Transfers
Daley, who has been employed by the Respondent and its
predecessors in New York for 34 years, testified about the his-
tory of consolidation of accounting functions. According to
Daley, the Respondent employed more than 4000 people in 15
offices when he started with New York Telephone in 1965. As
of the date of the hearing, there were 630 employees doing the
same work for an expanded company. Daley testified that he
dealt with the Union with respect to some of the consolidations
of offices. The Respondent introduced a chart showing consoli-
dations of offices and work functions affecting the unit in-
volved here going back to 1973. Daley testified specifically
regarding two of these moves.
In 1990, the Respondent decided to close an office located at
5030 Broadway in Manhattan.18 The work being performed
there was moved to Brooklyn and Massapequa, within the same
bargaining unit. Daley testified that the Respondent notified the
Union of this decision under the predecessor to the Common
Committee clause in the collective-bargaining agreement and
met with Local 1100 to discuss it. As a result of these discus-
sions, the Respondent agreed to delay the move for the conven-
ience of the employees who would have to report to a new
work location and to provide transportation for employees who
had to travel further to get to work. Daley testified that the Re-
18 The location of this office is reported incorrectly throughout the
transcript as “1530 Broadway.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1086
spondent notified the employees of the move after it completed
its discussions with the Union.
In 1995, the Respondent closed an office in Syracuse, New
York, represented by a different local of the Union, and moved
the work performed there to Massapequa and Brooklyn offices
represented by Local 1100. In addition, some functions per-
formed in Massapequa were relocated to an office in Menands,
New York, represented by the other local union. Daley testified
that the Respondent notified both Local 1100 and the Union
representing the employees in the upstate New York offices and
negotiated with the two unions regarding the decision. A letter
dated May 4, 1994, to Murcott indicates that these changes
were part of the Respondent’s process reengineering plan and
that notice of these changes was being given to the Union pur-
suant to the “technological change” language in the contract.19
Attached to this notice was detailed information regarding the
planned moves and the numbers of employees affected. The
date of this notification is approximately 1 month after the
agreement was reached on the 1994–1998 collective-bargaining
agreement. According to Daley, after giving the Union notice,
the parties met and formed a committee to look for alternatives
that would produce equivalent savings for the Respondent
without moving the work. The committee developed a financial
plan to keep the work in the Brooklyn office. That plan was
presented to the Union’s members who rejected it. Daley testi-
fied that, had the members accepted the plan, the work would
have remained in Brooklyn.
I. Analysis and Conclusions
There appears to be no dispute that the Respondent’s deci-
sion at issue here was subject to mandatory bargaining under
the Board’s decision in Dubuque Packing Co., 303 NLRB 386
(1991), enfd. 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In fact, the Respon-
dent made no contrary argument in its posthearing brief. As-
suming arguendo that the Respondent nevertheless contests this
issue, I find that the evidence in the record satisfies the Board’s
Dubuque test. The parties stipulated at the hearing to facts es-
tablishing that the Respondent’s decision involved a relocation
of unit work unaccompanied by any basic change in the nature
of the Respondent’s operations, thereby satisfying the General
Counsel’s prima facie burden. Respondent offered no evidence
at the hearing to rebut this prima facie case under either alterna-
tive recognized by the Board. Thus, the Respondent did not
attempt to prove that the work now being performed in Brain-
tree and Upper Darby varies significantly from the work per-
formed at Brooklyn and Manhattan, or that the work previously
performed by Unit employees was to be discontinued, or that
the Respondent’s decision involved a change in the scope and
direction of the enterprise. As to the alternative defense recog-
nized by the Board in Dubuque, the Respondent failed to show
by a preponderance of the evidence either that labor costs were
not a factor in its decision or that the savings anticipated by the
move were so substantial that the Union could not offer conces-
sions that could have changed the Respondent’s mind. The

19 There is no dispute that the referenced “technological change”
provision in the collective-bargaining agreement was the precursor to
the “Common Committee” in the current contract.
testimony of Jacobs, Daley, and Hessenthaler proves conclu-
sively that labor costs were indeed a significant factor in the
Respondent’s decision. All of the savings identified in the
memos and meetings at which the decision was discussed by
the Respondent’s managers came from a reduction in the num-
ber of employees performing the work and the lower wage and
benefit structure in the offices where the work was relocated.
Although Hann may have told the Union at the December 15
grievance meeting that the Union could not come up with sav-
ings that would equal what the Respondent expected to achieve
by relocating the work, as Murcott claimed, the Respondent did
not seek to prove that this was true. Moreover, the fact that the
Respondent invited the Union to make a proposal on December
15 amounts to a concession that it was possible to meet the
savings through bargaining. See Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 327
NLRB 835, 858 (1999).
Having concluded that the Respondent’s decision was a
mandatory subject of bargaining, it must next be determined
whether the Respondent satisfied it’s statutory duty to afford
the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain regarding the
decision. In determining this issue, the Respondent’s waiver
defense must also be considered. It has long been settled law
that an employer that desires to make material changes in the
terms and conditions of employment of its union-represented
employees has a duty under the Act to give timely notice to the
union and afford the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain
before implementing the changes. Defiance Hospital, 330
NLRB 492 (2000), and cases cited therein. It is also well settled
that, upon receipt of such notice from an employer, a union
must act with due diligence to request bargaining, otherwise it
may be found to have waived its right to bargain over the mat-
ter. Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital, 221 NLRB 670, 678–679
(1975), and cases cited therein. Accord: Haddon Craftsmen,
Inc., 300 NLRB 789 (1990); Clarkwood Corp., 233 NLRB
1172 (1977). The Board has held, however, that where notice is
given too short a time before implementation, or under circum-
stances where it is clear that the employer has no intention of
bargaining about the subject, then a violation will be found
even if the Union has failed to request bargaining. In such
cases, the Board has found that the notice is nothing more than
informing the Union of a “fait accompli.” Ciba-Geigy Pharma-
ceuticals Division, 264 NLRB 1013, 1017 (1982), enfd. 722
F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983). Accord: Mercy Hospital, 311 NLRB
869, 873 (1993). In determining whether an employer has pre-
sented the Union with a “fait accompli,” the Board looks for
objective evidence. Mercy Hospital, supra; Haddon Craftsmen,
Inc., supra. See also W-I Forest Products Corp., 304 NLRB
957 (1991). A union representative’s subjective impressions of
the employer’s state of mind and the employer’s use of positive
language in its notice announcing the changes have been de-
termined by the Board to be insufficient evidence of a “fait
accompli.” Id.
The General Counsel and the Charging Party argue that the
Respondent’s notice to the Union on August 24 was nothing
more than a “fait accompli,” thereby excusing the Union’s fail-
ure to act to preserve its rights. The General Counsel and the
Charging Party rely on the positive tone in which the plans
were announced, the Respondent’s almost simultaneous an-
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1087
nouncement to the employees, and the Respondent’s denial of
the Union’s request that it postpone the scheduled announce-
ment to the employees as proof of a “fait accompli.” Alterna-
tively, they argue that even if the notice was not a fait accom-
pli, the Respondent did not afford the Union sufficient time to
bargain over the movement of work. According to the General
Counsel and the Charging Party, bargaining would have to have
occurred before the September 6 or 8 deadline for employees to
accept the 6 and 6 retirement offer because, after that date, the
Union would have no leverage with which to bargain. The Re-
spondent argues that its notification to the Union was timely
because implementation of the plan was not scheduled to com-
mence for at least 6 months. The Respondent contends that the
Union’s inaction, even when invited at the December 15 griev-
ance meeting to submit a proposal and commence bargaining,
is clear evidence of a waiver of its statutory rights. The Re-
spondent argues further that the Union had already waived its
statutory bargaining rights by agreeing to the contractual
“Common Committee” procedures for addressing changes such
as those at issue here.
Although there are some minor disagreements among the
witnesses regarding what was said a various meetings, the criti-
cal facts are not in dispute. It is undisputed that the Respondent
notified the Union of its plans to close the Brooklyn RAO and
the Manhattan payroll office and to relocate unit work on Au-
gust 24. The Respondent’s witnesses concede that the subject
of relocating at least some of this work had been discussed as
early as February. There is no dispute that the Union was never
informed during contract negotiations, from February through
August 11, that a relocation of unit work was under considera-
tion. It is also undisputed that the Respondent announced its
decision to the affected employees almost immediately after
informing the Local 1100 executive board and that the Respon-
dent denied a request from the Union to postpone this an-
nouncement.20 The Union’s witnesses concede that they did not
request bargaining over the Respondent’s decision after receiv-
ing notice of the Respondent’s plans. The record establishes
conclusively that the Union essentially did nothing until it filed
grievances more than 2 months later claiming that the reloca-
tion of work violated collective-bargaining agreements with the
Respondent. The earliest the Union even broached the possibil-
ity of bargaining over the decision was December 15, at the
third-step grievance meeting. Even then, although the Union
initially indicated that it desired to bargain about the decision
and even requested information related to the subject, which
was promptly furnished by the Respondent, it quickly aban-
doned any effort at bargaining after the meeting. Finally, the
uncontradicted evidence establishes that the Respondent did not
begin relocating any unit work before April 1999.21 In fact, the
earliest evidence of any action being taken to implement the

20 Although the Respondent informed the executive board of its deci-
sion on August 25, the Union had actual notice since 4 p.m. on August
24, when Daley and Hessenthaler told Murcott about the Respondent’s
plans.
21 Both offices were still open as of the close of the hearing. In addi-
tion, by agreement of the parties, no unit employees affected by the
work relocation were required to leave the Respondent’s payroll under
their 6 and 6 elections before December 1999.
move was in November, when planning and design work for
expansion of the Upper Darby office began. Actual construc-
tion work did not begin in either of the offices to which the
work was being moved before early 1999.
On these facts and the record as a whole, I find that the Gen-
eral Counsel has not proved that the Respondent’s decision was
a fait accompli. As noted above, the positive language used by
Daley in announcing the Respondent’s decision and the subjec-
tive impression of Murcott, Gadzinski, and the unit employees
who testified regarding the finality of the Respondent’s deci-
sion is insufficient to establish that the August 24 and 25 notifi-
cation was a “fait accompli.” Haddon Craftsmen, Inc., supra.
Although the Board has generally found that announcement of
changes to employees before notification to the Union is suffi-
cient to establish that an employer’s decision is a fait accompli,
that did not occur here. Cf. AT&T Corp., 325 NLRB 150
(1997); Roll & Hold Warehouse & Distribution Corp., 325
NLRB 41 (1997). Moreover, the facts in those cases contain
other evidence, such as contemporaneous statements by man-
agement officials and testimony at the hearing, establishing that
the employer’s decision was irrevocable even before notice was
given to the Union. See also Dorsey Trailers, supra. In the in-
stant case, Daley and Hessenthaler made no statements at the
time of the announcement that would lead a reasonable person
to conclude that the decision was irrevocable. On the contrary,
they informed the Union that the move would not take place for
at least 6 months. By letter the same date, Hann advised the
Union that the issue was being referred to the “Common Com-
mittee.” Murcott conceded that the purpose of this contractual
procedure was to afford a forum for the Respondent and the
Union to develop alternatives to changes such as those an-
nounced here. Murcott even acknowledged being aware that,
under the contract, the Respondent could not implement any
changes for 6 months. The record establishes that, in the past,
the Union had engaged in bargaining over similar decisions
with varying degrees of success. Under these circumstances, it
cannot be found that the Respondent’s decision was irrevocable
before the announcement was made.
The Board’s recent decision in Defiance Hospital, supra,
where the Board found a “fait accompli” based on, inter alia,
the fact that the employer informed the union and the employ-
ees simultaneously of a change in their wages, is distinguish-
able. In that case, there was testimony from the employer’s
administrator indicating that the decision to grant a wage in-
crease was final even before he met with the union. Moreover,
the employer’s announcement of the change occurred in the
context of the employer’s general refusal to recognize and bar-
gain with the union following its merger and affiliation with
another union. Under such circumstances, it was clear that the
employer had no intention of bargaining over the subject at
issue. In the instant case, the evidence establishes that after
making the announcement to the Union and the employees the
Respondent indicated a willingness to bargain over the subject,
even inviting the Union to make a proposal at the December 15
grievance meeting. I note that the Respondent bargained with
the IBEW, the Union whose work was relocated from Braintree
to Massapequa, regarding this same matter. Finally, I credit the
testimony of the Respondent’s witnesses that they were cogni-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1088
zant of their obligation to bargain over this decision and dis-
cussed it during the meetings at which the decision was made.
These facts do not evidence an employer that has no intention
of bargaining with its employees’ representative regarding its
decision.
The strongest evidence in support of the “fait accompli” ar-
gument is the fact that the Respondent admittedly denied the
Union’s request that it postpone the announcement to the em-
ployees. Although under ordinary circumstances, this might
indicate that an employer’s decision was irrevocable, the cir-
cumstances here negate such a finding. The Respondent ex-
plained to the Union that it was obligated to go forward with its
plans to announce the decision because the employees were in
the midst of considering whether to accept the Respondent’s 6
and 6 retirement offer. The possibility that their jobs would be
eliminated and they would have to transfer to other jobs could
be a material factor in the employees’ decision whether to ac-
cept the offer. Under these circumstances, the Respondent’s
denial of the Union’s request was reasonable. I note that, even
after denying this request, the Respondent indicated its willing-
ness to discuss the decision with the Union. I also credit
Daley’s testimony that he informed the employees that their
Union was “fighting the decision.”22 Finally, the Union, while
asking that the employer delay its announcement to the em-
ployees, never requested bargaining over the decision and did
not even meet with the employees after the announcement was
made. Because the Union never perfected its rights, I am not
inclined to find that this denial by the Respondent proved it had
no intention to bargain with the Union.
In determining whether the Respondent’s announcement of
its decision was a “fait accompli,” I have also considered the
fact that the Respondent did not inform the Union during con-
tract negotiations that it was considering such a move. This was
the Union’s main objection when it first learned of the decision.
I find, based on the testimony of Jacobs, Daley, and Hessen-
thaler, that the Respondent did not make any decision to close
the offices and relocate bargaining unit work until after negotia-
tions were complete. Although the movement of some work
from Brooklyn may have been considered in February, and the
possibility of a consolidation of payroll operations discussed in
June, it is clear that these were just “concepts” until the August
18 meeting. I note that as late as July 31 Hessenthaler was pro-
jecting in her e-mail report to Jacobs that the New York payroll
office would remain open. I also note that the decision finalized
at the August 18 meeting and announced to the Union was not
identical to the plan under consideration in February. It also
makes sense that the Respondent would not want to make such
a decision until the final agreement on the 6 and 6 issue was
known. Although Daley and Hessenthaler may have been aware
of the tentative agreement resolving the 6 and 6 issues as early
as July, it is undisputed that a total agreement, including resolu-
tion of the 6 and 6, was not final until August 11. I find it
credible that the Respondent’s management would await a final

22 Although Venice Booker testified that she did not recall Daley
making such a statement, she did recall that he told the employees that
their union would be getting in touch with the employees.
collective-bargaining agreement before making any final deci-
sion on a matter of this nature.
The Board has held that it is not unlawful for an employer to
present a proposed change in employees’ terms and conditions
of employment as a fully developed plan. Board law requires
only that, after reaching a decision concerning a mandatory
subject, that the employer delay implementation of the decision
until it has consulted with the employees’ bargaining represen-
tative. The Act does not require the employer to delay the deci-
sion-making process itself. Haddon Craftsmen, Inc., 300 NLRB
supra at 790 fn. 8; Lange Co., 222 NLRB 558, 563 (1976).
Here, the Respondent satisfied its obligations under the Act by
informing the Union as soon as a final decision was made and
by delaying implementation of that decision for 6 months, more
than ample time to bargain about it had the Union shown any
interest in doing so. Moreover, the Respondent waited more
than 2 months, in the face of total silence from the Union, be-
fore it even began planning for the physical changes required to
implement its decision. Clearly, the Respondent’s decision here
was not a “fait accompli.”
The General Counsel and the Charging Party make a strong
argument that, even if the notice did not amount to a fait ac-
compli, the Respondent did not give the Union a meaningful
opportunity to bargain over this decision, focusing on the Sep-
tember 8 deadline under the Respondent’s 6 and 6 offer.23 Such
an argument would have been more persuasive, however, if the
Union had acted with due diligence to request bargaining,
thereby testing the Respondent’s good faith. The Union had
notice of the decision 2 weeks before the deadline. This was
ample opportunity to request bargaining and start the process,
even if agreement could not be reached before the deadline.
The parties, as part of bargaining over the decision might well
have discussed extending the deadline, or allowing employees’
election to take the 6 and 6 be subject to the outcome of bar-
gaining, or with the right to rescind if the parties agreed to keep
the two offices open. We will never know if the employer
would have agreed to such proposals because the Union waited
until it was too late. I do note in this regard that the Respondent
did agree, in the course of bargaining over “people issues” after
the deadline had passed, to allow employees to extend their
selected ARDs through December 1999. This tends to show
that meaningful bargaining was not futile even with the 6 and 6
deadline.
Finally, the Union’s December 22 letter to the Respondent,
in which it indicated an interest in bargaining over the decision
under certain conditions, must be addressed. This letter was a
follow up to the December 15 grievance meeting at which the
Union, for the first time, expressed any interest in bargaining
and requested information as a preliminary step to formulating
a proposal. In her letter, the Union’s representative, Dolan,
conditions the making of a proposal on the Respondent “re-
scind[ing] the decision to transfer the work out of state until
23 Although the terms of the written offer mailed to the employees
indicated that the deadline to accept was September 6, it is clear from
the summary of the Respondent’s records prepared for the hearing that
the Respondent accepted election forms submitted through September
8.
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. 1089
such time as you have received and studied the Union’s pro-
posal.” Dolan asserts in her letter that only by doing so would
the Union know that the Respondent was serious about bargain-
ing. I find that this letter was nothing more than posturing on
the part of the Union. In particular, Dolan makes a false claim
that her position in the letter was based on information obtained
after the December 15 meeting. The only information she cites
is nothing new and was known to the Union since the August
25 announcement of the Respondent’s decision. The Respon-
dent’s reply, that it was unwilling to “rescind” its decision to
satisfy the Union’s bargaining demand made 4 months after it
was announced, is not a sign of bad faith. Had the Union
wanted to test the “seriousness” of the Respondent’s bargaining
intentions, it could easily have done so in August.24
Based on the above and the record as a whole, I find that the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
failing to notify and bargain with the Union regarding its Au-
gust 24 decision to close the Brooklyn and Manhattan offices
and to permanently transfer bargaining unit work from those
offices to non unit facilities. I find further that the Union
waived any right it had under the statute to bargain about these

24 I note that because very little had been done to implement the de-
cision by December 15 there was no need for the Respondent to “re-
scind” its decision to facilitate bargaining. The Union had at least 3
months before any work was to be removed and any employees dis-
placed if it truly wanted to bargain about this decision.
decisions by its inaction. In light of this finding, it is unneces-
sary for me to address the Respondent’s argument that the
“Common Committee” provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement amounts to a contractual waiver of the Union’s bar-
gaining rights as to this decision.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Bell Atlantic Corporation, did not refuse
to bargain collectively, within the meaning of Section 8(d) of
the Act, with the Communications Workers of America, AFL–
CIO, and its Local 1100 regarding the August 24, 1998 deci-
sion to relocate bargaining unit work.
2. The Respondent did not violate Sections 8(a)(1) and (5)
and 8(d) of the Act in any manner encompassed by the com-
plaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended25
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.