Bell and Howell Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 28, 1975

221 N.L.R.B. 170 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Bell and Howell Company, Micro Photo Division and
International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of
America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-8587
October 28, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENELLO
On April 30, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Herzel H. E. Plaine issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record' and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions 2 and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Bell and Howell
Company, Micro Photo Division, Wooster, Ohio, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
1 The record, as corrected by the Administrative Law Judge, adequately
reflects the crucial facts and testimony presented at the hearing. Therefore,
we deny Respondent's motion to remand for purposes of compiling a
revised transcription of the testimony.
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
HERzEL H. E. PLAINE, Administrative Law Judge: In
July-August 1974, Bell and Howell Company, Micro Photo
Division, herein Respondent, disciplined employee David
Dressel with a 3-day layoff without pay; and for 1 week
moved him from his regular shift to another shift.
The complaint' alleges, and General Counsel contends,
that the disciplinary layoff and the temporary change of
1 Issued October 18, 1974, and amended on December 24 and 31, 1974,
based on a charge filed by the Charging Party (Union) September 5, 1974.
221 NLRB No. 40
shift were reprisals against employee Dressel, a mainte-
nance technician, because he supported and aided Interna-
tional Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-
CIO, herein the Union, that was campaigning to come into
Respondent's Wooster, Ohio, plant, and that both actions
were violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act), as amended.
Respondent contends that the disciplinary layoff of
employee Dressel was for infraction of its plant rules
against leaving his work station without notice or permis-
sion, and deliberately restricting production; that the
temporary change in shift was for training purposes; and
that, in any event, neither action concerning Dressel was
discriminatorily motivated.
The complaint further charges, and General Counsel
contends, that Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, in August 1974, by its production director,
Pushkin, applying the company's "no-solicitation" rule
coercively and discriminatorily to employee Hardnett, who
supported , and assisted the Union in its organizing
campaign.
Respondent replies that the supervisor was not acting
coercively in merely policing its no-solicitation rule and
that the solicitations permitted on company time for
recreational and social activities (fellowship committee
program) and a charitable solicitation (United Fund) do
not represent discriminatory applications, discriminatory
against unions, of the prohibition against employee
solicitations'on working time.
The case was heard in Wooster, Ohio, on January 14 and
15, 1975. General Counsel and Respondent have filed
briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case,2 including my
observation of the, witnesses and consideration of the
briefs, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is an Illinois corporation with its principal
office in Chicago, Illinois. Involved in this case is
Respondent's processing plant located at Wooster, Ohio,
where it is engaged in processing microfilm.
Annually, Respondent ships goods valued in excess of
$50,000 from its Wooster, Ohio, plant directly to points
outside Ohio.
Respondent is, as the parties admit, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
The Union is, as the parties also admit, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2 Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
BELL AND HOWELL CO. 171
H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Respondent's Pertinent Business Operations
According, to Respondent's second-shift supervisor,
Beverly Fiscus, of the Wooster, Ohio, plant (Wooster),
Wooster produces the completed microfilm or microfiche,
by putting printed material in much reduced size on card
film. From, Wooster, the completed microfiche is then sent
in bulk to Respondent's Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania,
office for distribution.
Wooster operates round-the-clock on three shifts per
day, currently with 300 employees, according to Personnel
Director Max Morrison, but with 260 employees at the
time of the events of this case in June-July-August 1974.
The bulk of the employees work, and worked then, on the
daytime shift. Second shift had about 20 employees, largely
women. A few of the second-shift employees started at 3:30
p.m. working until 12 midnight, but the hours of most of
the second shift, including the second-shift supervisor,
Fiscus, and the one maintenance man, David Dressel, were
4:30 p.m. to I a.m.
The immediate supervision of maintenance was separate
from production. All told there were five maintenance
technicians, supervised by Maintenance Supervisor Stanley
Stombaugh. Four of the maintenance employees worked
on the first or daytime, shift, as did Supervisor Stombaugh;
the fifth man, David Dressel, worked on the second shift.
Supervisor Stombaugh reported to, Wallace Bischof, who
was manager of quality assurance and production engi-
neering. (Currently, said Stombaugh, this reporting has
changed and he now reports to the director of production,
George Pushkin.)
Except for the brief overlap in shifts (Supervisor
Stambaugh stayed on usually to 5 p.m.; employee Dressel
started at 4:30 p.m.) when Stombaugh gave Dressel his
daily maintenance assignments, employee Dressel worked
without the presence of any supervision most of his
working time in the almost 6 years of his employment. The
second-shift production supervisor (Beverly Fiscus since
May 1974) could call on maintenance man Dressel if
equipment needed repair, as Stombaugh and Fiscus
testified; but Fiscus did not supervise the performance of
his work and he did not report to her as a supervisor, she
said. The method of obtaining Dressel's help was for the
machine operator to fill out a card order for repair, get it
approved by Production Supervisor Fiscus, and either have
the card delivered to the maintenance rack or page Dressel
on the public address system.
In this connection, both Supervisors Stombaugh and
Fiscus testified that employee Dressel had been good about
making himself available to the second-shift supervisor and
letting her know when he was going out of the building.
Dressel testified he would do this routinely when he went
outside to get parts or machinery or to work on the roof.
However, said Dressel, he did not, and was not expected
to, advise the second-shift supervisor that he was taking
either or both of his two 15-minute breaks or his lunch
period outside. For his lunch period, said Dressel, he
3 The testimony of all three-Supervisor Fiscus and employees Stull and
Dressel-contradicted the claim of Supervisor Stombaugh that the
clocked out on his timecard. Dressel and other employees
pointed out that it was a common thing in summertime for
the employees to take their breaks and lunches outside the,
building at facilities provided by Respondent.
Production Supervisor Fiscus agreed that (unlike the
production workers who had regular breaktimes) the break
policy for the maintenance technician on the second shift
was that he took his breaks, including lunch, whenever he
could, after the job he was working on was done, and that
he was not obliged to tell her when he was taking the break
and could go outside on breaks without informing her. She
noted that employee Dressel -rarely was able to take his
breaks and lunchbreak at the same time each night and
that many times he would have to take his lunchbreak as
late as 11 p.m.
Employee Kenneth Stull, a maintenance technician on
the first shift, corroborated the testimony on the break
policy for the maintenance men, testifying that they took
their breaks when they could catch them, and did not have
to check with the supervisor`in doing so or in going outside
into the parking lots or to the out-of-doors picnic tables
that Respondent provided for the employees .3
Employee Dressel's duties as the sole maintenance
technician on the second shift included not only the repair
of production equipment, but also responsibility for the
plant heating and for plant security, - which included the
locking of all doors including the cafeteria. Regarding
plant security, there had been some ambiguity in manage-
ment's assigning the responsibility, because Supervisor
Fiscus thought that she had at least part of it-security of
the cafeteria-and employee Dressel conceded that for a
time in 1974, after Fiscus became the shift supervisor, there
had been a dual responsibility placed on her as well as
himself. However, he testified, without contradiction, that
the ambiguity had been cleared up so that, at the time of
hearing, he had the sole responsibility for security and had
the only key (possessed by anyone on the second shift) to
lock the front entrance of the plant..
B. Union Activity and Employer Counteraction
Employee Dressel testified that the Union began
organizing at the Wooster plant in June 1974 and that he
became active starting at the end of June, talking to other
employees about the Union, passing out literature includ-
ing union authorization cards of the prepaid mailing type,
and seeking to arouse interest in three union meetings held
in the June-August period. He engaged in this activity, he
said, at the plant, primarily on the second shift, on
breaktimes, lunchtimes, and other opportunities.
Employee Sandy Noletti, a group leader on the second
shift, testified that she was approached by employee
Dressel with union literature and a union authorization
card when taking lunch at an outdoors bench provided by
Respondent for the employees. She said she observed
Dressel approaching other employees in a similar manner
at the same place, and specifically identified employee
Burnett Hardnett as one of them. Apparently Dressel was
successful in his approach with employee Hardnett and in
maintenance man was expected to let the supervisor know he was taking his
break outside even at the outside facilities provided for breaks and lunches.
172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
enlisting her aid, because she was later told by Production
Director Pushkin (in July) that there was no need for her to
campaign for the Union, that the Union was not necessary
to the getting of more money for the employees, and that
the company and employees could work out their own
problems without a third party; and still later (in August)
she was warned by Pushkin not to "hassle" anyone about
the Union on company time.
Employee Dressel testified that, when he began his union
activities around the end of June, he had a talk with
Second-Shift Supervisor Fiscus about his interest in the
Union. She told him, said Dressel, that the Umon would
not be good here, and expressed the fear that she would
lose her job if the Union came m4
On June 28, 1974, Respondent's president (of the Micro
Photo Division), John Marken, conducted two meetings of
the Wooster plant employees, one for the day shift and
another for the second shift, which latter was held after the
4:30 p.m. start of the second shift. As the second shift
meeting was described by employee Dressel (and not
contradicted in any essentials), President Marken was
accompanied by almost all of the plant management,
including Vice President of Operations Larry Halberg,
Director of Production George Pushkin, and Director of
Personnel Max Morrison. President Marken presided and
discussed the company benefits, past policies, insurance,
and wage increases. He used a chart to show acceleration
of the increases in past years, and pointed out that
Respondent had good environmental conditions and was a
good place to work. He then announced that the employees
would get a cost-of-living wage increase effective July 17,
1974.
President Marken called for questions, and several were
asked. Employee Dressel spoke up and asked, according to
Second-Shift Supervisor Fiscus who had attended the
meeting, "how come every time the Union knocks on the
door we get a cost of living raise?" According to Supervisor
Fiscus and employee Noletti, President Marken replied it
was just a coincidence, and that the company had been
considering the raise for some time. Employee Dressel said
it was quite a coincidence (according to Noletti), and
looked suspicious (according to Dressel), now that the
Union was organizing and in light of a previous increase
that had been given in November 1973 when the
Machinists Union had attempted to organize the plant.
Manager of Production Engineering and Quality Assur-
ance Wallace Bischof, who was in overall charge of the
maintenance men, testified he heard at "coffee table" talk
next day of the (Dressel) challenge at the Marken meeting,
characterized as an outburst by an employee, but claimed
that the employee's name was not mentioned and he didn't
know the employee was Dressel. In view of 'Manager
Bischof's evasiveness, and lack of recall on other details
affecting Dressel in which Bischof participated directly,
some of which are noted infra, I do not accept8ischof's
claim that he did not know that Dressel was the employee
4 Supervisor Fiscus denied that she was aware of employee Dressel's
support of the Union, but her own contradictory testimony, referred to
infra, indicates the contrary.
5 One other employee, Nancy O'Neil, spoke, according to employee
who suggested to President Marken the antiunion motiva-
tion of the wage increase.
Four weeks later, on July 25, 1974, Respondent called
another meeting of the second-shift employees including
Supervisor Fiscus. This meeting was conducted from about
4:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. by Donald Saballus, of Respon-
dent's Chicago office. Saballus testified that he had been
recently hired by President Marken, with the title of
communications consultant, to help improve communica-
tions between management and employees, and that the
purpose of the meeting was to present management's views
to the employees on how to improve operations.
Consultant Saballus was introduced by Supervisor
Fiscus and opened the meeting, he said, with an explana-
tion that to improve operations required more involvement
of employees at all levels. They would have to decide to
become involved, and if they did so decide, he was there to
explain how to go about becoming more involved.
According to employee Dressel, Consultant Saballus said
he recognized that there was a lack of communications
between management and employees and he invited their
views on what could be done. Dressel testified that checker
Dave Williams said that the employees needed a formal
grievance procedure and felt that the only way to achieve
this was through a Union. Saballus answered he did not
agree that a union was the way. Dressel said that he
intervened and asked Saballus what guarantee did the
employees have that the company would respond to their
requests. Saballus' answer was, the good faith of the
company. Dressel replied that he hadn't seen any good
faith for the 5 years he'd been working and stated that the
only way was to negotiate with management through a
labor union. Saballus said, again, he did not feel that a
union was the answer.
Continuing, employee Dressel told Consultant Saballus
that President Marken had said at the previous meeting
there was no need for a third party to intervene between
the company and,the employees, and that now Saballus
was acting as a third party on behalf of the company, just
as a union would act on'behalf of the employees. Saballus
replied, he was not a third party but was an employee of
the company trying to get better relations established.
Dressel commented that he'didn't see how the employees
would get cost-of-living wage increases without a union,
and Saballus reiterated that the company would in good
faith provide them.'
At this point, said employee Dressel; employee Dave
Williams (a black, who resigned shortly after the meeting)
engaged Consultant Saballus in a discussion that became
heated, over why there was not a greater percentage of
blacks in management: Williams left the meeting, there-
after, before it was over.5
Consultant Saballus and employees Noletti and Hard-
nett largely confirmed employee Dressel's participation in
the discussion, in particular on matters concerning the
union and the third party point.6 Significantly, Saballus
(corroborated by employees Noletti and Hardnett) testified
Dressel and Consultant Saballus, complaining, said Saballus, about the way
some matters were being handled in the plant.
f Hence I do not behevel Supervisor Fiscus' claim that Dressel didn't
speak at the Saballus meeting.
BELL AND HOWELL CO.
that at the point where what has been summarized so far
was said (but before employee Dave Williams left), he,
Saballus, inquired if the employees would be interested in a
team operation to improve productivity and other matters,
but if not, they were free to leave the meeting. Employee
Dave Williams suggested to, the employees, said Saballus,
not to go along with the idea-that it was not going to help
them. The first positive response, Saballus continued, came
from employee Dressel, who suggested that they stay and
listen and give it a try. Employee Williams left the meeting
but none of the employees followed him. Instead, they
agreed to collect ideas and form committees on productivi-
ty, quality, scrap, and attendance; and Dressel volunteered
for one of the committees.
Saballus testified that he had not met employees Dressel,
Williams, or O'Neil before the meeting but learned their
names in connection with their comments, after the fact,
the next morning when he met with President Marken,
Personnel Director, Morrison, and the rest of Marken's
management staff. As Saballus said, he described the
situations and comments by the employees who had
spoken, and he was told by the members of management
who these employees were: "Management knew who I was
talking about," he said.?
C. The Temporary Transfer of Employee Dressel
Out of the Second Shift
Maintenance Supervisor Stombaugh testified that Pro-
duction Supervisor Fiscus talked to him about the second-
shift meeting with Consultant Saballus on July 25, and,
according to employee Dressel, Supervisor Stombaugh let
him know next evening, Friday, July 26, that he had heard
of Dressel's participation in- the meeting, Stombaugh
saying that he had heard that Dressel had a hot meeting
the night before. Dressel answered, feelings might have
been hurt, but he didn't think any unfair questions were
raised.
Supervisor Stombaugh then told Dressel that he was
transferring him starting Monday, July 29, to the first shift.
Dressel asked why, and Stombaugh replied it was a
training program . Dressel worked on the first shift for a
week from July 29 and it turned out, as Dressel said, that
there was no training ; indeed he worked by himself for the
week doing the things he usually `did by himself on the
second shift.8
D. The Disciplinary Layoff
Employee Dressel returned to his regular post on the
second shift on August 5, 1974. He had learned that
maintenance man Stull , who had taken his place on the
second shift, in the previous week while Dressel worked the
first shift, had acquired a new motorcycle. Both were
apparently motorcycle enthusiasts , and Dressel had asked
4 Employee , Dressel's general supervisor , Manager Bischof, claimed he
only learned of the Saballus meeting of July 25 (as in the earlier case of the
Marken meeting of June 28) at "coffee table" talk the following day, and
that all he heard was that employee Williams had "tied into" Consultant
Saballus on the race issue, but hadn't heard mention of anyone else. For
reasons already given; supra, concerning his alleged lack of knowledge
about Dressel 's participation in the Marken meeting, I- do not accept
Bischofs claim that he was unaware of employee Dressel's active
173
Stull to bring the new motorcycle to the plant that night so
that Dressel might see it on his break.
At 8 p.m. that night employee Noletti handed employee
Dressel a maintenance service card at his maintenance
rack for repair of a cutter, with which she had been
working, that was chopping instead of cutting. Supervisor
Fiscus had already approved and signed the request for
repair. Employee Noletti testified that, when she gave
Dressel the card she told him there was no hurry, that she
was loaded with other work.
Nevertheless, testified Dressel, he went to see if the cutter
could be put back in service with a quick adjustment,
determined that it needed a replacement part, and came
back to his shop for the part. When Stull arrived at the
plant, he telephoned Dressel from the cafeteria saying he
had his motorcycle outside. According to employee Stull,
Dressel said he was working on something and would come
down when finished. According to Dressel, he went back to
the cutter, completed the repair with the replacement part,
then went outside into the plant parking lot, joined Stull,
and examined and rode the new motor bike in the parking
lot, during Dressel's 15-minute break. This was his first
time break that night, said Dressel. Dressel testified that,
when he came back into the building Supervisor Fiscus
asked if the cutter was fixed, and he answered yes. The
maintenance service card (G. C. Exh. 2), shows in Dressel's
handwriting that he got the card at 8 p.m. and completed
the job at 8:20 p.m. And he testified he had completed the
repairs before he took the motorcycle ride.
The next afternoon, August 6, at the start of his shift,
employee Dressel was shown two corrective action
(disciplinary) notices by Maintenance Supervisor Stom-
baugh. The first, dated July 31, 1974 (G.C. Exh. 3), signed
by Supervisor Stombaugh and Manager Bischof, accused
Dressel of having left his work without notice or permis-
sion on July 23 to work outside on a private car on
company time and failing to answer the paging calls for
him meanwhile for approximately an hour. The corrective
action or penalty assessed was a 1-day layoff without pay,
the day to be August 7, 1974.
The second corrective action or disciplinary notice
(Resp. Exh. 3), also signed by Supervisor Stombaugh and
Manager Bischof, dated August 7, 1974, though this was
only August 6, accused him of violating company work
rule 19-leaving his work station without notifying the
supervisor or anyone's permission-and company work
rule 11-deliberate restriction of production-on the
ground that on July 5, 1974 (no doubt August 5 was
meant), at 8:25 p.m., Dressel was in the company parking
lot riding a motorcycle, while at 8 p.m. a repair card was
put in his maintenance rack and at 8:35 p.m. it was still
there. Additionally, it was said in the notice, that he had
been guilty of like conduct twice before, citing July 23,
1974 (the incident in the first notice, G.C. Exh. 3 of July 31,
participation in the Saballus meeting.
8 This testimony was not contradicted by anyone for the Respondent.
Manager Bischof claimed he had approved the idea of a temporary change
of shift for employee Dressel for training purposes, but employee Dressel
and Supervisor Stombaugh were in accord that they hadn 't discussed the
idea since ' 2 months prior when there was agreement between them on the
desirability of an occasional switch for training if there was going to be
training
174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1974, simultaneously shown to Dressel) and May 1, 1973
(covered in an old notice of May 3, 1973, G.C. Exh. 5). The
corrective action or penalty assessed was a 3-day layoff
without pay, the days to be August 13, 14, and 15, 1974. In
addition the notice was marked, "THIS IS THE FINAL
WARNING."
Employee Dressel became upset and asked to see
someone higher up. Supervisor Stombaugh and he went to
Manager Bischof. Dressel said he hadn't done any of the
things charged in the two corrective action notices and
asked why they had been issued. He was told there were
witnesses and proof, including a memo by Supervisor
Fiscus. He asked for the, opportunity to be confronted by
the witnesses but was 'refused on the ground that the
witnesses didn't want to be involved and it wasn't
convenient. Though Bischof had approved both discipli-
nary notices he conceded he had not talked to the alleged
witnesses and said he would look into both matters. Next
day,, August 7, Supervisor Stombaugh told employee
Dressel (as both testified) that Respondent was dropping
the car repair matter of July 23 (G.C. Exh. 3 of July 31) but
that the notice on the motorcycle matter of August 5
(Resp. Exh. 3 of August 7) would stand and asked him to
sign it. Dressel refused. It should be noted that though
Bischof and Stombaugh claimed Respondent's Exhibit 3
was an alleged retyping of a handwritten notice it still
referred ,to the withdrawn July 23 car repair charge as an
existing prior violation of company rules.
Manager Bischof conceded that there were no witnesses
for the July 23 car repair matter, indeed that the alleged
key witness wanted to know "who was Dave Dressel?" and
that the basis for the charge against Dressel was a note
from Supervisor Fiscus to Supervisor Stombaugh claiming
that Dressel had not answered a paging call (of someone
other, than herself) and that when she, Fiscus, got up ,to
look, "Dave came around the corner so he must have just
come from outside" (Resp. Exh. 5). Fiscus had obligingly
provided the note because, as employee Noletti testified
and Supervisor Stombaugh admitted, Stambaugh had
asked Fiscus to keep an eye on Dressel, and Stombaugh
claimed it was because of his suspicion that Dressel might
be about to work on the car of a fellow employee in,the
company parking lot. The phoniness of the transaction and
supervisory testimony is heightened by the fact that though
Supervisor,Stombaugh and Manager Bischof said they had
the July 23 Fiscus note by July 24 and approved the
disciplinary notice which rests on it (G.C. Exh. 3) on July
31 for immediate issuance to Dressel, it was not issued or
shown to him until August 6 in connection with the second
disciplinary notice (Resp. Exh. 3). Neither Bischof nor
Stombaugh could explain why the July 31 notice was held
until August 6, a week after it should have issued (if it had
been a legitimate charge) .9 Neither supervisor could
explain why their alleged investigation of the matter did
not include any inquiry of or discussion with employee
Dressel, who denied ever doing noncompany repair work
on company time. Moreover, Supervisor Fiscus was
adamant, in her testimony, that she had been told by
9 Stombaugh lamely claimed that although told by Manager Bischof to
issue it, he was checking it with the personnel office, a check that was never
made.
Supervisor Stombaugh several days after writing the note
of July 23, and definitely prior to August 5, that the alleged
incident of Dressel working on a car was being dropped for
lack of a witness. If her testimony is true, then Manager
Bischof and Supervisor Stombaugh revived, on August 6, a
charge against employee Dressel they already knew was
baseless.
Manager Bischof claimed,, in his testimony, that it was he
who told employee Dressel, in the presence of Supervisor
Stombaugh on August 7, that the company was dropping
the disciplinary notice respecting the alleged car repair, but
that the notice respecting the motorcycle -riding would
issue. This claim was not true.10 Supervisor Stombaugh
and employee Dressel established that Bischof talked only
to Stombaugh, after the August 6 meeting, and that this
session on August 7 was between Stombaugh and Dressel,
where Stombaugh dramatically tore up the first notice,
which Dressel later retrieved because he had not been
given any copies of the disciplinary actions and he felt he
was being framed for his union activities.
Manager Bischof testified that in the case of the notice of
discipline for the motorcycle incident he essentially relied,
again, on a' note written by Supervisor Fiscus, allegedly on
the night of the incident, August 5 (Resp. Exh. 4). Bischof
claimed he saw the note the following morning, but when
reminded that Fiscus said she kept it until the late
afternoon of the following day, when she came to work and
delivered it to Stombaugh, Bischof changed his testimony
to say he saw it after that.
The note' (Resp. Exh. 4), addressed to Supervisor
Stombaugh in the handwriting of Supervisor Fiscus,
opened with the statement that at 8:25 p.m. this evening
(August 5) she went outside with Ernie Harvey, the
receiving clerk, to examine an alcohol drum, and saw Dave
Dressel riding Ken Stull's motorcycle around the parking
lot. Further, the 'note said, she knew Dressel had a
coffeebreak at 7 p.m. because she had been there
(cafeteria) too. Also, she checked his timecard and he
wasn't clocked out for lunch. Then concluding, the note
said, "So once again this was on company time. Also I
need 105 cut [sic] tonight and Sandy [Noletti] put a card in
for it the machine at 8:00 its now 8:35 and he's still outside
instead of fixing the cutter I need badly! Bev Fiscus."
Concerning the events of that evening and the writing of
the note, Supervisor Fiscus testified that at 8 p.m.
employee Sandy Noletti came to her with the repair card
(G.C. Exh. 2, which we have already noted in Noletti's and
Dressel's testimony) indicating that the cutter was chop-
ping. Fiscus said she signed the card, paged Dressel
without getting a response, then was interrupted by the
receiving room and immediately went outside to the shed
with Ernie Harvey, to see where a particular drum was kept.
She said it was then 8:05 p.m. and in passing to the, shed
saw Dressel riding the motorcycle .in the parking lot. When
she emerged from the shed 5 minutes later at 8:10 p.m.,
Dressel was still riding the motorcycle, she said. She then
went inside to the timecards to see if Dressel had clocked
out for lunch, taking employee Ernie Harvey, as a witness.
10 Bischof even invented a bit of alleged conversation, purporting to
indicate that Dressel adopted a resigned attitude.
BELL AND HOWELL CO. 175
She said Dressel wasn't clocked out. It was now 8:15 p.m.
She then claimed she went to employee Sandy Noletti who
was doing collating work, and asked if the cutter was fixed
and Noletti said ^t was not fixed. This was at 8:20 p.m. and
Fiscus said she observed the machine in the same position
as when Sandy had left it. Fiscus then proceeded to the
privacy of her office, she said, to write Supervisor
Stombaugh the note (Resp. Exh. 4), at 8:20 or 8:25 p.m.
While in the middle of writing the note, according to
Fiscus, employee Dressel came to her office asking did she
need him. She said yes there was a cutter down, and he
went and fixed it. She completed writing her note at 8:35
p.m. and the cutter repair was completed at 8:45 p.m.,
according to Fiscus. The repair took 20 minutes, said
Fiscus, and she clocked the time.
The account of this event on the night of August 5 by
Supervisor Fiscus was so full of holes, inconsistencies, and
damaging admissions as to be not only unbelievable but
also revealing of a purpose to set employee Dressel up for
punitive action rather than deal with performance in the
shop. Some of the glaring examples follow.
1. On direct examination, Supervisor Fiscus had read
aloud, into the record, her note of August 5 (Resp. Exh. 4),
which stated that at 8:25 p.m. she walked outside the
building and saw employee Dressel riding the motorcycle.
Nevertheless she detailed on direct, and reiterated ^ on
cross-examination , a timetable running from 8 p.m. to 8:45
p.m. of her alleged movements and actions and Dressel's.
She insisted she saw Dressel riding the motorcycle twice,
first at 8 :05 and then at 8:10 p.m. On being pressed, in
further cross-examination, to explain the -8:25 p.m. in her
note, she changed her testimony to say that the note was
right, she first saw Dressel riding the motorcycle after 8:25
p.m. It would then follow that all of the other detailed
actions, which had taken 40 minutes by her timetable, were
compressed into about 15 minutes, including the 20-minute
repair time she said she clocked.
2. Supervisor Fiscus testified that there was a delay in
production because of delay in. getting the machine
repaired, indeed employee Dressel was charged in the
disciplinary notice with deliberately restricting production.
Though Fiscus knew that the machine needed repair and
signed the repair card for employee Noletti at 8 p.m., she
testified she didn't tell employee Noletti that the pro-
duction was needed, and she didn't go over and tell Dressel
at 8:05 p.m., when she saw him outside, that she needed
the cutter fixed and needed the production badly. When
asked why- she didn't go over to Dressel and tell him these
things, she answered only: "I don't know, I should have."
She said she was planning to go out and tell Dressel that
the cutter needed fixing, after she finished the note in
which she was writing him up for not fixing it, but he came
around before she had finished the note.11 Oddly enough,
the note, which stated it was completed at 8:35 p.m., said
that Dressel wasn't working yet on the cutter, whereas
Fiscus' testimony was that he started working on it before
the note was finished.
On this matter of production, employee Noletti testified,
without contradiction and with some verification by
Supervisor Fiscus, that she was not delayed in any way
when she stopped using the cutter at 8 p.m., but turned to
her collating work and, when she was ready to resume
working with the cutter, she found it repaired.
3. Supervisor Fiscus testified that after observing
employee Dressel riding the motorcycle she went directly
to the timecards to see if Dressel was clocked out for
lunch,12 and asked employee Ernie Harvey to come with
her as a witness. Asked why she needed a witness, Fiscus
said that she was told by Supervisor Stombaugh, a few
days after the alleged July 23 car repair incident, and
before August 5, that the proposed disciplinary action was
being dropped because he couldn't get a witness concern-
ing the alleged car repair.
4. Though, Supervisor Fiscus had signed the repair
order card at her desk for employee Noletti at 8 p.m.,
without checking the machine herself, Fiscus professed not
to know that Noletti had taken the signed repair card
immediately to employee Dressel. Fiscus said she didn't
know how Dressel got the repair card, but that she left her
desk to go outdoors with employee Harvey to check on the
drum in the shed. Fiscus said that when she returned
inside, after checking Dressel's 'timecard, she went to
employee Noletti and asked if the cutter was fixed and
Noletti said no. Noletti's testimony did not confirm this,
indicating rather the absence of any conversation about the
repair. Then, at 8:20 p.m., according to Fiscus, she went to
see the cutter and observed it, as she said, still in the same
position as when Sandy Noletti left it. However, Fiscus had
not gone to see the cutter previously, she had only signed
the, repair card at her desk at 8 p.m. At 8:35 p.m. when she
said she had finished writing her note (Resp. Exh. 4),
Fiscus said she knew the cutter was not fixed by looking
through her office window to where the cutting room and
cutter are. She claimed that Dressel took 20 minutes to
repair the machine, that she clocked him, but also said she
didn't stay in her office or watch _ him, and didn't know
where she was or what she did in that time. However, she
said she knew he had finished the repair at 8:45 p.m. But,
despite the alleged need for production on that machine,
Fiscus conceded that she did not inform employee Noletti
that the cutter was repaired and to go back to work on it.
E. Section 8(a)(1) and (3) Findings Concerning
Employee Dressel
Employee Dressel has been an employee of Respondent
for almost 6 years and is regarded as a good and
cooperative employee, according to his supervisor, Stom-
baugh, and the production supervisor of his shift, Fiscus.
Indeed, notwithstanding allegations by Stombaugh of a
few work problems in earlier years, Stombaugh was clear
that since January 1974 he has had no fault to find with or
complaints about Dressel's work, and that his work was
quite satisfactory. Moreover, Dressel is a trusted employee,
who has worked mostly without any immediate supervision
11 Employee Stull said he saw Supervisor Fiscus outside the building and 12 Fiscus also claimed that she had seen Dressel taking an earlier break,
thought she called to employee Dressel, but, as she testified, she did not. at 7 p in. in the cafeteria, with employee Martin, which Dressel denied.
Also Dressel gave no testimony that he either saw Fiscus, or that she talked Respondent made no attempt to call employee Martin, and I assume his
to him, outside the building. testimony would not corroborate Fiscus.
176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for the whole period of his employment, as the sole
maintenance technician on the second shift. That trust was
reinforced even after the events of this case by putting
Dressel in sole charge of plant security for the second shift,
where formerly he shared the responsibility with the shift
production supervisor.
It is therefore surprising to ford what appears to have
been petty chicanery, resorted to' by the plant supervision,
in July-August 1974, to find a means of rebuffing employee
Dressel for nonexistent shortcomings. It is explainable only
by a desire on the part of plant management to cool him
down in his ardor for bringing a union into the plant, when
the union was at the door, organizing, against Respon-
dent's opposition, made known in the plant by President
Marken and others such as Director of Production
Pushkin. I
Dressel's advocacy of the Union was known to the plant
management from President Marken down. In addition
Dressel openly engaged in solicitation of union member-
ships and, of attendance at union meetings, and distribu-
tion of union literature, at and about the plant. Dressel
spoke up about his concept of the need for and desirability
of having the Union at the two plant meetings held by
management on June 28, and July 25, 1974, respectively,
for the second shift, in which he served. Those in
management who didn't hear him directly, such as,
Manager Bischof and Supervisor Stombaugh, heard about
it'from those in management who had been present. At the
second meeting, on July 25, Dressel spoke on the subject of
the Union with seeming moderation in contrast to the hot
advocacy of employee Williams, and in the course of and
as a result of that meeting Dressel appeared to have
emerged a leader among the employees of the second shift,
capable of influencing them.
The immediate reaction of management was to move
Dressel off the second shift, temporarily, to the first-shift,
presumably to lessen his opportunity for influencing the
employees of the second shift to greater support for the
Union. He was told the change was for training purposes,
but this was a pretense, there was no training and Dressel
worked by himself, as he normally did on the second shift.
On the second evening of his return to the second shift,
August 6, Dressel was notified he was being disciplined by
layoffs without pay for two alleged offenses, one of them
said to have occurred 2 weeks prior on July 23 even before
his temporary transfer to the -first shift, the other on the
previous night August 5. Both notices of offenses made
charges of the same order, namely, allegedly leaving the
premises without notifying the supervisor or anyone's
permission, on July 23 to repair someone's car, and on
August 5 to ride a motorcycle, hence being unavailable to
perform pending work; and in the second case, it was
added, deliberately restricting production.
Neither matter had been discussed with or even called to
employee Dressel's attention before he was notified he was
being disciplined, yet the second notice informed him it
was a final warning.
Neither matter had been investigated by the supervisors
responsible for approving and issuing the disciplinary
notices-Manager Bischof and Supervisor Stombaugh-
before they signed their -approval. Both simply acted on
unverified notes composed by second-shift Production
Supervisor Fiscus, who was obviously 'attempting to
accommodate Supervisor Stombaugh's request to keep an
eye on Dressel. Both notes, on their face, suggest, at best,
surmise, in the light of the testimony, fabrication.
'Both charges against employee Dressel were false. There
had been-no car repair or leaving the plantfor a car repair
by him on July 23, and the motorcycle ride on August 5
was taken after he completed the repair of the cutter
mentioned in Supervisor Fiscus' note and during his time
break, for which he was not obliged to ask permission or
notify' any supervisor. And, there was no curtailment of
production on the night of August 5, by anyone's account,
even if the fictional story of Supervisor Fiscus were
accepted.
Respondent's supervisors knew that the charges were not
true. They quickly withdrew the first charge on August 7
after issuing it to employee Dressel on August 6, and there
was evidence from Supervisor Fiscus that the involved
supervisors knew it would not stand up shortly after they
got her July 23 note which was the alleged basis for the
disciplinary notice. None of them could explain why the
notice, which was purportedly approved for issuance July
31, was held until August 6.
The testimony of Supervisor Fiscus,' already detailed
under heading D, was devastating evidence that the
primary interest in the second charge (incident of August
5) was to contrive an excuse for disciplining employee
Dressel. On getting the Fiscus note, on August 6,
Supervisor Stombaugh's immediate response, without any
inquiry, was: "This is it, I'm going to write him up"; and
Manager Bischof forthwith approved. The only investiga-
tion was Bischof's asking Fiscus afterward if she was sure
of her times.
Neither Manager Bischof nor Supervisor Stombaugh
knew (as they admitted) whether any production was lost
or curtailed on the night of August _5; yet they charged
employee Dressel with deliberate restriction of production
in the disciplinary notice (Resp. Exh. 3). The fact was there
was no loss of production. Moreover, Dressel was informed
on August 7, that they were withdrawing the disciplinary
notice of July 31 (G.C. Exh. 3, concerning the alleged
incident of July 23). Nevertheless, they continued it in the
August 7 disciplinary notice as a previous' violation,
maintaining the impression that Dressel was a "habitual"
violator, as Bischof put it, and kept the;, penalty at 3 days
without pay and the "final warning" notation, as originally
drawn.13
Clearly, the disciplinary layoff of employee Dressel was
an act of reprisal for Dressel's union advocacy and activity
among the employees and had nothing to do with genuine
plant discipline or actual violations of plant rules. As in the
case of the temporary change of shift, the purpose of the
disciplinary layoff was to discourage support of the Union
among the employees. Both the temporary change in shift
13 In his career with Respondent, employee Dressel had only two prior one in May 1973 for going to a baseball game without permission.
disciplinary notices, one in July 1971 for failure to wear safety goggles, and
BELL AND HOWELL CO.
and disciplinary layoff were violations of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act.14
F. Section 8(a)(1) Violation Concerning Union
Solicitation
Employee Burnett Hardnett was one of the employees on
the second shift whom employee Dressel had recruited to
aid in the organizing for the Union (B, supra ). She also had
apparently worked on an employee petition for a cost-of-
living raise.
Employee Hardnett testified, without contradiction, that
about a week after the employees received the cost-of-
living raise (of July 1974), Respondent's director of
production, George Pushkin, talked to her on the job. He
pointed out that the employees had received the cost-of-
living raise before the petition was submitted. He told her
there was no need for her to campaign for the Union
because the Union was just one way of getting more
money, and that the Union was,,-not necessary, the
Company and employees could work out their own
problems without a third party.
On August 16, 1974, the day employee Dressel returned
to work following his suspension, Director Pushkin
approached employee Hardnett again. Pushkin told her
that someone had said she had been "hassling" him about
the Union and he, Pushkin, didn't want her doing it any
more on company time because she could get into trouble.
He added that he didn't care what she did on lunchbreak
or other breaks but he didn't want her talking about the
Union during working hours on company time.,Hardnett
testified that she had not been-talking to anyone about the
Union on company time and when she asked Pushkin with
whom she was supposed to have been "hassling," he would
nit tell her. The same evening, Pushkin came back again
and repeated what he had said.
Employee Hardnett also testified that during the year she
had solicited money from employees for the United Fund,
in working hours on company time, and had solicited
funds and discussed and arranged for parties and picnics
for the Fellowship Committee, in working hours on
company time.
None of employee Hardnett's testimony was disputed.
Personnel Director Max Morrison testified that Respon-
dent's work rule 17 prohibits solicitation or distribution of
literature for any cause on work time in work areas without
permission . The rule was aimed at soliciting for personal
causes on worktime, he said. However, said Morrison,
there are two exceptions, though not so stated in the rule,
namely, the United Fund, a nationwide charity, and the
Fellowship Committee, made up largely but not entirely of
nonsupervisory people, that runs and finances by obtaining
employee contributions, social activities among the em-
ployees. The social activities include picnics, basketball,
bowling , softball; Christmas, Halloween,' and Valentine
parties ; and flowers, cards, and other remembrances in
14 The fact that the change of shift was without monetary loss to
employee Dressel did not alter its retaliatory and discriminatory purpose
and effect.
On discipline of a leading , union advocate as a classic and effective
method of undermining a union organizational drive, see NLRB. v.
Longhorn Transfer Service, inc., 346 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.A. 5, 1965). On the
177
connection with-births, deaths, or hospitalization. Respon-
dent supplements the employee contributions at $15 per
employee to the Fellowship Committee.
Work and solicitation for both the Fellowship Commit-
tee and United Fund is permitted without special permis-
sion on company time. The Respondent has refused
permission for political, religious, or commercial solicita-
tions, according to Director Morrison. He further testified
that the prohibition of the no-solicitation rule applies to
supervisory as well as nonsupervisory personnel.
General Counsel has no complaint about the propriety of
the no-solicitation rule itself. He contends, however, that
the existence of the rule cannot be used by a supervisor of
Respondent to interfere with the union activities • of
employees, who have , not been violating the rule, by
threatening them with trouble if they talk about the Union
on company time. Respondent contends that its supervisor
was, in effect, merely policing the no-solicitation rule.
In the circumstances of this case I am inclined to agree
with the General Counsel. Respondent's' director of
production, Pushkin, had himself engaged in a direct
violation of the no-solicitation rule, as the company
interpreted it, by previously-engaging in antiunion solicita-
tion of employee Hardnett. He apparently had not
succeeded in his solicitation and knew her to be prounion.
Now he was singling her out, in effect, to "read" her the
no-solicitation rule and warn her there would be trouble
for her, without identifying the time, place, or person she
was supposed to have solicited for the Union. Both these
events took place while the union organizing was ongoing;
indeed, the warning of trouble came hard upon the
discriminatory disciplining of employee Dressel. In these
circumstances, Respondent's -conduct on August 16, 1974,
through its high-ranking managerial representative, the
director of production, was coercive and, it may be
reasonably said, tended to interfere with the free exercise
of employee rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, N.LR.B. v. Illinois, Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811, 814
(C.A. 7, 1946). And see Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Incorporated, 189 NLRB 80, 82 (1971); and Harold R.
Bursten and Dr. Robert Bursten, _a Partnership, d/b/a
Shorewood Manor Nursing Home & Rehabilitation Center,
217 NLRB No. 55, (1975).
The latter case provides a useful parallel. There the
nursing home had a valid no-solicitation rule and the
administrator (Bursten) accused an employee (Vella) of
"signing up people on the floors and do you realize that
this is grounds for termination." He did not specify the
time, or place, or persons solicited, but did suggest she
reevaluate her position with the, Union. The Board held
that, "the only reasonable interpretation to be placed on
[these remarks] was that they were intended to encompass
Vella's union activities as a whole rather than merely being
directed towards the enforcement of the [no-solicitation]
rule . . . Bursten's conduct in connection with this incident
was' not directed toward policing the no-solicitation rule,
absence of a satisfactory business explanation for the discipline, and its
timing, providing support for the 'fndmg` that the motivation was to
discourage union ,activity, see NLRB. v. Tennessee Packers Inc, Frosty
Morn Division, 39Q F.2d 782, 784 (CA. 6, 1968); McGraw - Edison Co. v.
N L KB., 419 F.2d 67,75 (C.A. 8, 1969).
178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
but rather was designed to thwart Vella's union activities in
violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act." Id., 217 NLRB No. 55,
footnote 1.
Additionally, in the light of, Respondent's permissiveness
allowing open solicitation of employees by fellow employ,
ees, during , working time for a large range of social
activities, which were- not merely isolated instances 15. of,
departure from the rule against all solicitation during
working time,- the reprimand and warning of employee
Hardnett by, Director of Production Pushkin for her
supposed union activity on company time tended to inhibit
the employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Hence, such,, discriminatory conduct violated Section
8(axl), of the Act. Casey Manufacturing Company, 167
NLRB,89, 96 (1967); and see Montgomery Ward & Co., 198
NLRB 52, (1972).18' y
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By disciplining employee Dressel with a layoff for 3
days without pay and a final warning, and by temporarily
moving him for a week from his regular working shift, in
July - August 1974, because of his support and activities
on behalf of the Union, and in order to discourage such
support and activities among Respondent's employees,
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
2. By reprimanding, and warning employee Hardnett of
discipline for supposed union activity on company time,
and, by discriminatorily maintaining or enforcing its no-
solicitation rule, in a manner that restrained or impeded
her and other employees in pursuing their lawful union
activities, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. These unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It will be recommended that the Respondent:
1. Cease and desist from its unfair labor practices.
2. Rescind the disciplinary notice of August 7, 1974,
given employee Dressel, and expunge from his personnel
record any notation of it.
3. Make employee Dressel whole for-loss of the 3 days'
pay he suffered in connection'with the disciplinary action
of August 7, 1974, with interest at 6 percent per annum as
prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716
(1962).
4. Post the notices provided for herein.
15 See in contrast The Seng Company, 210 NLRB 936 (1974), holding
that isolated instances of variance do not constitute disparate treatment.
16 Respondent 's'reference to Laborers' District Council of Georgia and
South Carolina, etc: (Southern Frozen Foods, Inc), 202 NLRB 753 (1973),
affd. 501 F.2d 868; 878-879 (C A.D.C., 11974), as exculpatory of Director
Pushkin's statements to employee Hardnett, is distinguishable from the facts
of this case . In that case, the Board relied on the fact that there was evidence
that talking on the job by the employee who was reprimanded and warned
interfered with the work of fellow employees, and also relied on the fact that
there was no evidence of'discriminatory,application of the company rule
against talking at work. 'In `the case at bar, there is no evidence of
interference by employee Hardnett with the work of any fellow employee,
,nd there is clear evidence of discriminatory application of the no-
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 17
Respondent, Bell and Howell Company, Micro Photo
Division, Wooster, Ohio, its officers, agents, . successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discipline by layoff without pay, final warning,
change in regular working shift, or' other reprisal against
employees because of their union support and activities or
to intimidate them from pursuing such support and
activities.
(b) Reprimanding or warning employees for supposed
union activity on company time, and discriminatorily
maintaining or 'enforcing its - no-solicitation rule, in a
manner that restrains or impedes employees in pursuing
their lawful union activities.
(c) Discouraging employees from support of or member-
ship in the Union or any other labor organization by
disciplinary action or threat of disciplinary action, or other
discrimination affecting tenure and conditions of employ-
ment.
(d) In any like manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran-
teed under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the' following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: '
(a) Rescind' the disciplinary notice of August 7, 1974,
issued to employee David Dressel, and expunge from his
personnel record any notation of the notice.
(b) Make employee Dressel whole for the loss of 3 days'
pay suffered by him in August 1974 as a result of the
disciplinary action of August 7, 1974, with interest at. 6
percent per annum, and provide the Board with any
records necessary to compute the backpay.
(c) Post in its plant at Wooster, Ohio, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 18 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be,posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, inconspicuous places,'
including all places where notices to employees , are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
solicitation rule by Respondent , as set out above
17 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and-become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
'18 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.""
BELL AND HOWELL CO.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board Having Found, After
a hearing, that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT discipline you by layoff without pay,
final warning, change in regular working shift, or other
reprisal because of your union support and activities or
to intimidate you from pursuing such support and
activities.
WE WILL NOT reprimand or warn you for supposed
union activity on company time, and WE WILL NOT
discriminatorily maintain or enforce our no-solicitation
rule, in a manner that restrains or impedes you in
pursuing your lawful union activities.
179
WE WILL NOT discourage you from support or
membership in the International Union, Allied Indus-
trial Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the Union) or
other labor organization by disciplinary action or
threat of disciplinary action or other discrimination
affecting your tenure or conditions of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with your
rights to belong to or to be active fora labor union, or
to refrain therefrom.
Because the Board found that we unlawfully issued a
disciplinary notice to employee David Dressel on August 7,
1974, and unlawfully laid him off in August 1974 for 3 days
without pay,
WE WILL rescind the disciplinarynotice of August 7,
1974, and expunge it from employee Dressel's person-
nel record.
WE WILL give him backpay for the 3 days' layoff
with interest.
BELL AND HOWELL
COMPANY, MICRO PHOTO
DMSION