Belinda J. Portley, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (S.E./S.W Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 28, 2000
01a00438 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 28, 2000)

01a00438

09-28-2000

Belinda J. Portley, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (S.E./S.W Areas), Agency.


Belinda J. Portley v. United States Postal Service

01A00438

September 28, 2000

.

Belinda J. Portley,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(S.E./S.W Areas),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A00438

Agency No. 1G-753-0070-97

Hearing No. 310-98-5483X

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges she was discriminated

against on the bases of disability (right foot and right hand/Carpel

Tunnel Syndrome), and reprisal (prior EEO activity), when: (1) on or

about April 21, 1997, she was placed in a non-duty, non-pay status;

and (2) on June 30, 1997, she was issued a Notice of Removal. For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the agency's final decision that denied complainant certain

pecuniary compensatory damages was correct.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that complainant, a Full Time Limited Duty Distribution

Clerk at the agency's Processing and Distribution Center, Dallas Texas

facility, filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on August 26, 1997,

alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as referenced

above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received

a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a

decision finding that complainant was discriminated against on the basis

of reprisal, and that she was not discriminated against on the basis of

disability.

As background, the AJ noted that complainant suffers from Carpel Tunnel

Syndrome, and as a result, she is limited to lifting no more than ten

pounds of weight. Furthermore, in January 1997, complainant fell off

a chair while she was attempting to cover an air conditioning vent.

The action that promoted the instant complaint occurred on June 30, 1997,

when complainant's supervisor issued complainant a Notice of Removal

for allegedly falsifying an Office of Worker's Compensation Program

(OWCP) form. At the request of the Labor Relations Specialist, the

postal service investigated the falsification charge against complainant.

The AJ noted that back in November of 1996, complainant had brought an

EEO complaint against the Labor Relations Specialist.

Pursuant to the grievance process, complainant was reinstated into her

position in June 1998, and awarded $20,000 in back pay, plus interest.

Since October 1998, complainant has worked in a position where she

answers phone calls for computer assistance.

In her decision, the AJ concluded that although complainant was an

individual with a disability, she failed to present a prima facie case of

disability discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that complainant

failed to demonstrate that similarly situated employees not in her

protected class were treated differently under similar circumstances.

Furthermore, the AJ noted that complainant did not dispute that she was

accommodated in her present position.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of

reprisal discrimination because she established that she engaged in

prior EEO activity in November 1996, of which the responsible officials

were aware. Further, the requisite causal connection was established

since there was only an eight month period between the prior EEO activity

and the postal service investigation and subsequent Notice of Removal.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ found that the

supervisor placed complainant in a non-pay status and subsequently issued

the Notice of Removal because she falsified items on an OWCP form in

order to make it appear that complainant's injury was work related.

The AJ found that complainant established that more likely than not,

the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful

retaliation. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that the Labor

Relations Specialist, who initiated the postal service investigation

that resulted in complainant's removal, had expressed anger over

complainant's November 1996 EEO complaint. Furthermore, the AJ found

that soon after the Labor Relations Specialist displayed contempt for

the settlement of complainant's prior EEO complaint, he initiated the

postal service inspection. As for the postal service investigation,

the AJ found insufficient evidence to support a definitive conclusion

that complainant falsified her OWCP form. The AJ also found that the

Labor Relations Specialist's actions precipitated complainant's removal

from the postal service.

Therefore, the AJ found that complainant established, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that complainant was retaliated against when she was

placed in a non-duty, non�pay status and was issued a Notice of Removal.

As relief, the AJ noted that complainant was already compensated for back

pay pursuant to the grievance procedures. As for complainant's claim of

compensatory damages, the AJ found that complainant suffered pecuniary and

non-pecuniary harm as a result of the agency's discriminatory actions.

Specifically, complainant testified that she suffered damage to her

credit standing when she was not working. She also testified that she

withdrew from her family members and broke off her engagement when she

was removed from agency employment.

The AJ recommended that complainant be reimbursed for doctor and counselor

fees and medication to the extent that she could verify that the claimed

expenses related to proven discrimination. The AJ also recommended

that complainant be reimbursed for the amount of money she lost when

her car was repossessed when she was removed from the postal service.

Specifically, the AJ determined that the agency should pay complainant the

amount of money she paid on the car note up until the car was repossessed.

Finally, the AJ recommended that the agency pay complainant's reasonable

attorney's fees and post a notice.

On May 6, 1999, the agency issued a final decision adopting the AJ's

recommended decision finding reprisal discrimination. As relief,

the agency awarded complainant $2,000 for non-pecuniary compensatory

damages, as well as her reasonable attorney's fees. Furthermore, the

agency requested that complainant submit appropriate documentation

establishing payments made for physicians, medication or counselors

due to the discrimination. The agency also requested that complainant

submit documentation establishing the amount paid on the car note until

the date the car was repossessed.

After complainant submitted her documentation, the agency issued a second

final decision on September 24, 1999. Therein, the agency noted that

it had paid complainant $2,000 for her emotional distress, and $1,248.60

for medical fees and medication related to the discrimination. However,

the agency refused to pay complainant any compensation related to the

repossession of her car since the documentation submitted by complainant

revealed that complainant was not the owner of the vehicle.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant contends that the agency misunderstood the nature

of the car ownership. She states that the car is listed in another

individual's name because she did not have a job in 1995 when she

bought the car. Complainant states that she paid the down payment,

all monthly payments, and secured insurance coverage for the car.

She also submits an affidavit from the individual whose name the car

is listed. Therein he avers that complainant paid the down payment,

monthly payments, and had sole possession of the vehicle at all times.

He averred that at no time did he provide any monetary support or act

in a manner that was in opposition to complainant's sole ownership

of the vehicle. He states that complainant continued to make monthly

payments on the vehicle until it was repossessed due to her unemployment.

Complainant submits documentation already submitted to the agency

pursuant to the AJ's order to investigate complainant's entitlement to

pecuniary damages. Therein she provides an explanation for the nature of

her ownership of the vehicle. Furthermore, she states that she phoned

an individual at the collection agency and found out that there was an

outstanding balance of $13,045.73 on the car. Therefore, subtracting

that amount from the purchase price of the car ($43,938.65) leaves a

total of $30,921 that she paid on the car until it was repossessed.

Complainant also submits proof of insurance coverage, a contract for

sale of the vehicle, a monthly bill for approximately $633.00, as well

as her credit union statements for the years 1994-1997.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Compensatory damages are recoverable in the administrative process.

See West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906(1999). Thus, if a complainant has

alleged that she is entitled to compensatory damages and the agency or

the Commission enters a finding of discrimination, the complainant must

be given an opportunity to submit evidence establishing her claim. To

receive an award of compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate

that she has been harmed as a result of the agency's discriminatory

action; the extent, nature, and severity of the harm; and the duration or

expected duration of the harm. Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Appeal No. 01934156(July 22, 1994), request for reconsideration denied,

EEOC Request No. 05940927 (December 11, 1995); Enforcement Guidance:

Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102

of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 11-12, 14

(July 14, 1992).

A complainant may recover past out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a

result of the intentional discrimination. Id. at 8. In the present

case, the AJ found that complainant established a causal connection

between the agency's discrimination and the repossession of her car.

In its final decision, however, the agency determined that complainant

was not entitled to payments on the car because the car was not in

complainant's name. After a careful review of the record, we find

complainant failed to satisfy her burden of establishing, through proper

documentation, the amount she paid on the car note. The AJ in this case

specifically requested complainant to submit proper documentation for

the car payments made on the car that complainant claimed was valued

at $17,000. The record before us, however, only contains numerous

credit union statements, one monthly car bill in the amount of $633.00,

and proof of insurance coverage. Complainant failed to provide any

cancelled checks, or otherwise explain, with supporting documentation or

affidavits, how much she paid on the car note. As such, we are unable

to determine the amount complainant paid on her car note from the time

she purchased it until the time it was repossessed.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0800)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The

Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after

the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 28, 2000

__________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.