Beaumier, Francois et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 23, 2020

13346600 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/346,600 01/09/2012 Francois Beaumier JSP-2302-158 6408
23117 7590 03/23/2020
NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
NEUBIG, MARGARET M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte FRANCOIS BEAUMIER and MICHAEL TOOKER
____________

Appeal 2019-001506
Application 13/346,600
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–36, which are all the claims pending and rejected in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42.
Appellant identifies TouchTunes Music Corporation as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The present invention relates to “monitoring audio inputs to jukebox
devices to determine whether the jukebox devices are being used to play
unlicensed media.” Spec. ¶ 2.
In certain exemplary embodiments, a digital jukebox
device is provided. At least one processor is provided. A media
catalog stores a plurality of instances of media available for
playback via the jukebox device. A user interface is configured
to enable a user to cause an instance of media to be played by
the jukebox device upon receipt of a fee. An output is
connectable to at least one speaker system. An input is
connectable to an external source of audio. A monitor
subsystem is configured to detect whether unlicensed music is
being played on the jukebox device.
Spec. ¶ 24. Claims 1 and 25 are exemplary:
1. A method for detecting unlicensed music being played
on a digital jukebox device, the method comprising:
starting the digital jukebox device in an internal audio
mode in which internal jukebox media is reproduced by the
jukebox device;
determining whether there is queued internal audio in the
digital jukebox device;
determining whether an auxiliary override feature is
enabled, wherein, when the auxiliary override feature is
enabled, the digital jukebox device is configured to receive an
audio stream from an external source and reproduce the audio
stream;
in response to the determination that there is queued
internal audio and the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is not enabled, operating the jukebox device in the
internal audio mode;
in response to the determination that there is no queued
internal audio or the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is enabled, changing the jukebox to operate in an
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auxiliary audio mode in which the audio stream from an
external source is being provided to the digital jukebox device
for reproduction via a speaker system connected to the digital
jukebox device;
in response to the changing the digital jukebox device to
operate in the auxiliary audio mode:
capturing at least a portion of the audio stream after
determining that the audio stream is being provided to the
digital jukebox device from the external source for reproduction
via the digital jukebox device;
acquiring a digital fingerprint or watermark
corresponding to the captured portion;
detecting whether the captured portion corresponds to
audio content that should be licensed based on the acquired
digital fingerprint or watermark;
updating a log of possible license violations when the
detecting indicates that the captured portion corresponds to
audio content that should be licensed; and
generating a notification concerning the log of possible
violations when a number of possible violations meets or
exceeds a predetermined threshold in a predetermined time
period.

25. A digital jukebox device for detecting unlicensed
music being played on the digital jukebox device, comprising:
at least one processor;
a non-transitory storage medium storing a plurality of
instances of media available for playback via the digital
jukebox device;
a user interface, the user interface accepting a selection
of an instance of media;
an audio output connectable to at least one speaker
system; and
an audio input, an audio stream from an external source
being provided through the audio input;
wherein the digital jukebox device is configured to at
least:
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start the digital jukebox device in an internal audio mode, in
which internal jukebox media is being reproduced by the digital
jukebox device;
determine whether there is queued internal audio in the
digital jukebox device;
determine whether an auxiliary override feature is
enabled, wherein, when the auxiliary override feature is
enabled, the digital jukebox device is configured to receive an
audio stream from an external source and reproduce the audio
stream;
in response to the determination that there is queued
internal audio and the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is not enabled, operate the digital jukebox device in the
internal audio mode;
in response to the determination that there is no queued
internal audio or the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is enabled, change the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary
audio mode, in which the audio stream from an external source
being provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction
via a speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device;
in response to the changing the digital jukebox device to
operate in the auxiliary audio mode:
capture at least a portion of the audio stream after
determining that the audio stream is being provided to the
digital jukebox device from the external source for reproduction
via the digital jukebox device,
acquire a digital fingerprint or watermark corresponding
to the captured portion;
detect whether the captured portion corresponds to audio
content that should be licensed based on the acquired digital
fingerprint or watermark,
update a log of possible license violations when the
detecting indicates that the captured portion of the audio stream
corresponds to audio content that should be licensed, and
generate a notification concerning the log of possible
violations when a number of possible violations meets or
exceeds a predetermined threshold in a predetermined time
period, in detecting whether unlicensed music is being played
on the digital jukebox device.
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References and Rejections2
Claims 1–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 12–26.
Claims 1–36 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph for failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Final Act. 26–32.
Claims 1–7, 9–19, 21–31, and 33–36 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the collective teachings of Martin
(US 2002/0002079 Al; Jan. 3, 2002), Grabar (WO 02/25610 A1; Mar. 28,
2002), Itskov (US 2011/0160885 A1; June 30, 2011), Schmelzer (US
2003/0037010 A1; Feb. 20, 2003), and Logan (US 2010/0131558 A1; May
27, 2010). Final Act. 33–41.
Claims 8, 20, and 32 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over the collective teachings of Martin, Grabar, Itskov,
Schmelzer, Logan, and Lim (US 2010/0306179 Al; Dec. 2, 2010). Final
Act. 41–42.

ANALYSIS
Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph

The Examiner determines claims 1–36 fail to comply with the written
description requirement with respect to various claim limitations discussed
below. See Final Act. 26–32.

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated Jan.
12, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated June 29, 2018 (“Appeal
Br.”); (3) Examiner’s Answer dated Oct. 10, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (4) Reply
Brief dated Dec. 10, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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I

The Examiner determines:
With regard to claims 1, 13, and 25, the claims recite, “. . .
starting the digital jukebox device in an internal audio mode . .
. determining whether an auxiliary override feature is enabled,
wherein, when the auxiliary override feature is enabled, the
digital jukebox device is configured to receive an audio stream
from an external source and reproduce the audio stream . . .”
The claim appears to be reciting the device to be in internal
audio mode and that an auxiliary override feature is also
enabled. Applicant’s PGPub ¶ [0042] does not provide a clear
teaching of how the device occupies both internal and auxiliary
override mode. The claim is therefore rejected for failing to
comply with the written description requirement. Dependent
claims 2-12, 14-24, and 26-36 inherit the same deficiency and
are rejected for the same reason.

Final Act. 26–27; see also Ans. 16–17.
We disagree with the Examiner. It is well established that during
examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification and should be read in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art, but
without importing limitations from the specification. See In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted);
SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
2004). Contrary to the Examiner’s interpretation, the claims do not require
“the device occupies both internal and auxiliary override mode” (Final Act.
27). Therefore, the Specification does not need to disclose such
simultaneous modes.
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Because the Examiner has not provided sufficient basis for the
rejection, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

II

With regard to claims 1, 13, and 25, the claims recite, “. . .
changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio mode . . .
.” Applicant’s specification does not disclose a ‘changing’
operation. Applicant’s PGPub ¶ [0042], recites, “. . . the
jukebox starts in the internal audio mode . . . If, however, the
there is no queued internal audio, or there is queued internal
audio but the auxiliary override feature is enabled, then the
system may be in the auxiliary audio mode (306) . . .”
Applicant’s specification therefore discloses considering
conditions to determine the device’s mode, but does not
disclose changing the device’s mode. The claim is therefore
rejected for failing to comply with the written description
requirement. Dependent claims 2-12, 14-24, and 26-36 inherit
the same deficiency and are rejected for the same reason.

Final Act. 27; see also Ans. 17.
To satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure must
reasonably convey to skilled artisans that Appellant possessed the claimed
invention as of the filing date. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Specifically, the
description must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to
recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed” and
the test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the
specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill
in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must
describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and
show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Appellant cites Figure 3 and paragraph 42 of the Specification for
supporting the disputed claim limitation. See Appeal Br. 23; Reply Br. 11–
12. We agree with Appellant because Figure 3 illustrates the changing
operation, and paragraph 42 explains “for example, that the jukebox starts in
the internal audio mode (302). A check is performed to determine whether
there is queued internal audio (304). If there is queued internal audio, a
second check is made to determine whether the auxiliary override feature is
enabled (308),” and “[i]f, however, . . . there is no queued internal audio, or
there is queued internal audio by the auxiliary override feature is enabled,
then the system may be in the auxiliary audio mode (306).” Spec. ¶ 42.
Therefore, the “specification . . . describe[s] an invention understandable to
that skilled artisan and show[s] that the inventor actually invented the
invention claimed.” Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351.
Because the Examiner has not provided sufficient basis for the
rejection, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

III

With regard to claim 1, 13 and 25, the claims recite, “. . .
changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio mode . . .
.” Applicant’s specification does not specifically disclose the
structure responsible for this ‘changing’ step. Specification
discloses only, (¶ [0033]), “. . . The switch 210 may be at least
partially controlled by a processor . . . .” The claim is therefore
rejected as containing subject matter which was not described
in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey the
inventor, at the time the application was filed, had possession of
the claimed invention. Dependent claims 2-12, 14-24, and 26-
36 inherit the same deficiency and are rejected for the same
reason.
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Final Act. 27; see also Ans. 17–18.
We disagree with the Examiner. The Examiner adds the requirement
of a switch structure, but does not cited any statute or case setting forth that
requirement. In any event, Appellant cites Figure 2 and paragraph 33 of the
Specification for supporting the disputed claim limitation. See Appeal Br.
24–25; Reply Br. 13. In particular, Figure 2 of the Specification illustrates
the switch for the changing operation, and paragraph 33 describes the
changing operation. See Spec. ¶ 33. Therefore, with respect to the
limitation “changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio mode,” the
“specification . . . describe[s] an invention understandable to that skilled
artisan and show[s] that the inventor actually invented the invention
claimed.” Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351.
Because the Examiner has not provided sufficient basis for the
rejection, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

IV

With regard to claims 1, 13, and 25, the claims recite, “. . .
determining whether an auxiliary override feature is enabled,
wherein, when the . . .feature is enabled, the digital jukebox
device is configured to receive an audio stream . . . ,” and “. . .
changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio mode in
which the audio stream from an external source is being
provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction via a
speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device . . . .”
However, the specific functions of each component, the
processor, the user interface and the switch, as well as the inter-
relationship among the three have not been sufficiently taught
within the disclosure. Applicant’s specification does not
provide clear teaching as to whether the switch functions only
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to switch the internal and auxiliary audio signals, or if the
switch instead provides a way for the user to inform the
processor that the user wishes to have the jukebox play audio
from an external source such that the processor would utilize an
algorithm for determining whether to comply with the user’s
wishes. As a result of the description of the switch functions
being unclear, the role of the processor and the interactions
among the processor, the user interface and the switch are also
unclear. Consequently, the recitations “. . . determine whether
an auxiliary override feature is enabled . . . ,” and “. . . changing
the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio mode . . .” lacks
clear support from the written disclosure. No clear teaching has
been provided as to any inter-relationship among the three
elements. The written disclosure recites no algorithm for
performing the interaction, and in particular for changing the
jukebox mode such that those skilled in the art would clearly
recognize that the inventor had possession of the claimed
subject matter. Furthermore . . . without reciting any algorithm
being performed by the processor for actually performing
control of the switch, those skilled in the art would not
recognize that the Applicant had in their possession at the time
of the invention the necessary programming for the processor to
control the switch. The claims are therefore rejected as
containing subject matter which was not described in the
specification in such a way as to reasonably convey the
inventor, at the time the application was filed, had possession of
the claimed invention. Similarly, the limitation, “. . . in
response to the changing the digital jukebox device to operate
in the auxiliary audio mode . . . ,” does not satisfy the written
description requirement. Dependent claims 2-12, 14-24 and 26-
36 inherit the same deficiency and are rejected for the same
reason.

Final Act. 28–29; see also Ans. 18.
We disagree with the Examiner. The Examiner has not cited any
statue or case setting forth the additional requirement of “the specific
functions of each component, the processor, the user interface and the
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switch, as well as the inter-relationship among the three” (Final Act. 28).
Nor does the Examiner cite any basis for the additional requirement of
clear teaching as to whether the switch functions only to switch
the internal and auxiliary audio signals, or if the switch instead
provides a way for the user to inform the processor that the user
wishes to have the jukebox play audio from an external source
such that the processor would utilize an algorithm for
determining whether to comply with the user’s wishes

(Final Act. 28). To the extent the Examiner does not understand how to
interpret the claim limitations, such interpretation issue is associated with
indefiniteness—not the written description requirement.
As to the Examiner’s requirements of an “algorithm for performing
the interaction, and in particular for changing the jukebox mode” and
“algorithm being performed by the processor for actually performing control
of the switch” (Final Act. 28–29), the Examiner has not cited any statute or
case setting forth such requirements. To the extent the Examiner has
determined such algorithms are required because the claim limitations
constitute means-plus-function claim limitations under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, sixth paragraph, the Examiner has not provided any analysis or
explanation for such determination.
Further, the Examiner’s determination that “[s]imilarly, the
limitation[] ‘. . . in response to the changing the digital jukebox device to
operate in the auxiliary audio mode . . . []’ does not satisfy the written
description requirement” (Final Act. 29) is unclear, as the statement does not
adequately explain the basis for the rejection.
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Because the Examiner has not provided sufficient basis for the
rejection, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

V

With regard to claims 1, 13, and 25, the claims recite, “. . .
determining whether there is queued internal audio . . . .”
However, Applicant’s specification does not specifically
disclose an algorithm for this determination. Applicant’s
PGPub, ¶ [0042] discloses only, “. . . A check is performed to
determine whether there is queued internal audio (304) . . . .”
No algorithm is disclosed for performing the function;
moreover, the function is not specifically disclosed as being
performed by the jukebox device but could instead be
performed by an operator. The claim is therefore rejected as
failing to comply with the written description requirement. . . .
Dependent claims 2-12, 14-24 and 26-36 inherit the same
deficiency and are rejected for the same reason.

Final Act. 29–30; see also Ans. 18.
The Examiner acknowledges paragraph 42 of the Specification
discloses the disputed limitation. Final Act. 29. Therefore, with respect to
the limitation “determining whether there is queued internal audio in the
digital jukebox device,” the “specification . . . describe[s] an invention
understandable to that skilled artisan and show[s] that the inventor actually
invented the invention claimed.” Ariad Pharms., 598 F.3d at 1351.
As to the Examiner’s requirement of an algorithm for the disputed
limitation, the Examiner has not cited any statute or case setting forth such a
requirement. To the extent the Examiner has determined such an algorithm
is required because the claim limitation constitutes a means-plus-function
claim limitation under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, the
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Examiner has not provided any analysis or explanation for such
determination.
Because the Examiner has not provided sufficient basis for the
rejection, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

VI

With regard to claims 1, 13, and 25, the claims recite, “. . .
acquiring a digital fingerprint or watermark corresponding to
the captured portion; detecting whether the captured portion
corresponds to audio content that should be licensed based on
the determined acquired digital fingerprint or watermark . . . .”
Acquiring a digital fingerprint or watermark is a broad
limitation and lacks full support by Applicant’s specification,
which discloses finding an embedded mark or sending captured
content to a service. The term can reasonably be interpreted to
read on generating a fingerprint or watermark, but this is not
disclosed by Applicant’s specification. Moreover, the acquiring
and subsequent matching require an algorithm (See PGPub ¶
[0019], “. . . capturing segments of the audio stream(s) and
matching the audio stream(s) against music files by means of a
music fingerprint or watermarking algorithm . . .”), but no
algorithm is disclosed in Applicant’s specification. The claims
are therefore rejected as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. . . . Claims 2, 3, 14, 15, 26 and 27 are
similarly rejected for reciting similar language, “. . . acquiring .
. . digital fingerprint . . . comparing the digital fingerprint . . .”
and “. . . acquiring the digital fingerprint . . . comprises
searching for a digital fingerprint . . .” Dependent claims 2-12,
14-24 and 26-36 inherit the same deficiency and are rejected for
the same reason.
Final Act. 30–31; see also Ans. 18–19.
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Appellant cites paragraph 35 of the Specification for supporting the
disputed claim limitation “acquiring a digital fingerprint or watermark
corresponding to the captured portion.” See Appeal Br. 32; Reply Br. 15.
We agree with Appellant because paragraph 35 describes the acquiring
limitation below:
For example, the portions of the captured stream may simply be
scanned to determine whether they already include a digital
watermark, encrypted or other tag, etc. As another example, the
captured portion may be forwarded to a service configured to
run a fingerprint or watermark algorithm on the captured data,
with the service being stored and/or executed locally or at a
remote location. The fingerprint or watermark may be
compared to a database of songs to identify likely matches.

Spec. ¶ 35.
Cumulatively, the original claim 2, which is a part of the
Specification, also describes the capturing limitation. See original claim 2.
Therefore, with respect to the limitation “acquiring a digital fingerprint or
watermark corresponding to the captured portion,” the “specification . . .
describe[s] an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show[s]
that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Ariad Pharms.,
598 F.3d at 1351.
As to the Examiner’s requirement of algorithms for the limitations
“acquiring a digital fingerprint or watermark corresponding to the captured
portion” and “detecting whether the captured portion corresponds to audio
content that should be licensed based on the acquired digital fingerprint or
watermark,” the Examiner has not cited any statute or case setting forth such
a requirement. To the extent the Examiner has determined such algorithms
are required because the claim limitations constitute means-plus-function
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claim limitations under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, the
Examiner has not provided any analysis or explanation for such
determination.
Because the Examiner has not provided sufficient basis for the
rejection, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.

35 U.S.C. § 101

We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
contentions and the evidence of record. For the reasons set forth below, we
concur with Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner erred regarding the
35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
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U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
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environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 REVISED PATENT
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance”).3 Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining

3 The Guidance was updated in October 2019.

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18
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th ed. rev.
08.2017 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.)
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance, claim 25 (with
emphases) recites:
25. A digital jukebox device for detecting unlicensed
music being played on the digital jukebox device, comprising:
at least one processor;
a non-transitory storage medium storing a plurality of
instances of media available for playback via the digital
jukebox device;
a user interface, the user interface accepting a selection
of an instance of media;
an audio output connectable to at least one speaker
system; and
an audio input, an audio stream from an external source
being provided through the audio input:
wherein the digital jukebox device is configured to at
least:
start the digital jukebox device in an internal audio
mode, in which internal jukebox media is being reproduced by
the digital jukebox device;
determine whether there is queued internal audio in the
digital jukebox device;
determine whether an auxiliary override feature is
enabled, wherein, when the auxiliary override feature is
enabled, the digital jukebox device is configured to receive an
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audio stream from an external source and reproduce the audio
stream;
in response to the determination that there is queued
internal audio and the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is not enabled, operate the digital jukebox device in the
internal audio mode;
in response to the determination that there is no queued
internal audio or the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is enabled, change the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary
audio mode, in which the audio stream from an external source
being provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction
via a speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device;
in response to the changing the digital jukebox device to
operate in the auxiliary audio mode:
capture at least a portion of the audio stream after
determining that the audio stream is being provided to the
digital jukebox device from the external source for reproduction
via the digital jukebox device,
acquire a digital fingerprint or watermark corresponding
to the captured portion;
detect whether the captured portion corresponds to audio
content that should be licensed based on the acquired digital
fingerprint or watermark,
update a log of possible license violations when the
detecting indicates that the captured portion of the audio stream
corresponds to audio content that should be licensed, and
generate a notification concerning the log of possible
violations when a number of possible violations meets or
exceeds a predetermined threshold in a predetermined time
period, in detecting whether unlicensed music is being played
on the digital jukebox device.

Because the italicized functions can be performed by a person, they
are like the mental processes in CyberSource and Synopsys. See
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“All of claim 3’s method steps can be performed in the human
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mind, or by a human using a pen and paper. . . . Such a method that can be
performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not
patent-eligible under § 101.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e continue to ‘treat[ ] analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.’”) (citation omitted).
For example, a person can “start the digital jukebox device in an
internal audio mode, in which internal jukebox media is being reproduced by
the digital jukebox device” by selecting the internal audio mode for the
jukebox. Similarly, a person can “determine whether there is queued
internal audio in the digital jukebox device” by examining whether the
queued internal audio exists. Further, a person can “determine whether an
auxiliary override feature is enabled, wherein, when the auxiliary override
feature is enabled, the digital jukebox device is configured to receive an
audio stream from an external source and reproduce the audio stream” by
checking whether the auxiliary override feature is selected.
As a result, we conclude claim 25 recites mental processes, and thus
an abstract idea. See Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1 (Groupings of Abstract
Ideas).
For similar reasons, each of claims 1–24 and 26–36 recites mental
processes, and thus an abstract idea.
Even if claim 25 recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
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The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to
determine whether additional elements of the claim integrate the mental
processes into a practical application. Such additional elements may reflect
an improvement to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 55. We determine additional elements of claim 25 integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application, as the additional elements (listed
below) reflect technology improvement of a digital jukebox device. See
claim 25; see also DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the claims satisfy Alice step two because “the
claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
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networks”). In particular, the additional elements are (i) “in response to
the determination that there is no queued internal audio or the determination
that the auxiliary override feature is enabled, change the jukebox to operate
in an auxiliary audio mode, in which the audio stream from an external
source being provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction via a
speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device,” (ii) “in response to
the changing the digital jukebox device to operate in the auxiliary audio
mode: capture at least a portion of the audio stream after determining that
the audio stream is being provided to the digital jukebox device from the
external source for reproduction via the digital jukebox device, acquire a
digital fingerprint or watermark corresponding to the captured portion; and
(iii) detect whether the captured portion corresponds to audio content that
should be licensed based on the acquired digital fingerprint or watermark,
update a log of possible license violations when the detecting indicates that
the captured portion of the audio stream corresponds to audio content that
should be licensed, and generate a notification concerning the log of possible
violations when a number of possible violations meets or exceeds a
predetermined threshold in a predetermined time period, in detecting
whether unlicensed music is being played on the digital jukebox device.”
Claim 25.
Our determination is supported by the Specification, which describes
the deficiencies of the existing jukebox devices, and technology
improvements of the invented jukebox devices:
A recent trend in some venues involves providing
multiple televisions or other displays throughout the particular
location. For instance, multiple flat screen televisions often are
used for watching sports in a venue. Because of the
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proliferation of multiple displays external to the jukebox for
displaying jukebox-related and/or other media, a need has
arisen for digital jukebox systems to include an auxiliary input.
Spec. ¶ 13.
Unfortunately, the misuse of the auxiliary audio input has
become a serious problem for the operator community. Indeed,
the operator community has not had a viable way to determine
whether the auxiliary input is or was being used for television
or for some undetermined music source, much less what the
rights associated with the music source are. It also follows that
the operator community has been unable to track these
problems, looking for trends and trying to track down the
“guilty” parties.
Spec. ¶ 16.
Fig. 3 is an illustrative audio source switching state
diagram in accordance with certain exemplary embodiments.
Assume, for example, that the jukebox starts in the internal
audio mode (302). A check is performed to determine whether
there is queued internal audio (304). If there is queued internal
audio, a second check is made to determine whether the
auxiliary override feature is enabled (308). If the auxiliary
override feature is not enabled, them [sic] the system is in the
internal audio mode (302). If, however, the [sic] there is no
queued internal audio, or there is queued internal audio by the
auxiliary override feature is enabled, then the system may be in
the auxiliary audio mode (306). In such a case, a determination
is made as to whether the number of auxiliary faults exceeds a
predetermined limit or threshold (310). If so, then the music
fault reporting aspect of the monitoring system may be turned
on (312). It will be appreciated that live or substantially live
notifications may be sent (e.g., to the operator, bar personnel or
managers, etc.) and/or that other actions may be taken such as,
for example, temporarily disabling the auxiliary input,
displaying a message on the screen that unlicensed music has
been detected, and/or the like. Notifications thus may be sent
with each possible violation, periodically (e.g., daily, weekly,
etc.), upon a triggering event (e.g., the predetermined threshold
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being met or exceeded, upon a specific request from an
operator, etc.). The actions may be taken in response to a
response to remote command from operator, automatically by
system, and/or the like, in different exemplary embodiments.
After that, or in the event that the limit is not exceeded, checks
to determine the audio mode may again be made, beginning
with the determination as to whether the jukebox has queued
internal audio (304) and in accordance with the above.
Spec. ¶ 42.
Because the additional elements of claim 25 integrate the mental
processes into a practical application, we determine claim 25 is not
directed to an abstract idea. See Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2.
For similar reasons, each of claims 1–24 and 26–36 integrates the
mental processes into a practical application, and is not directed to an
abstract idea.
Therefore, we reverse the rejection of claims 1–36 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.

35 U.S.C. § 103
On this record, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 1.
For the reasons set forth below, Appellant has not persuaded us the
Examiner erred. To the extent consistent with our analysis below, we adopt
the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in the Final Action and the
Answer.4

4 To the extent Appellant advances new arguments in the Reply Brief
without showing good cause, Appellant has waived such arguments. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).

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I
Appellant contends Martin and Grabar do not collectively teach
in response to the determination that there is no queued internal
audio or the determination that the auxiliary override feature is
enabled, changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio
mode in which the audio stream from an external source is
being provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction
via a speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device;

as recited in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 38–40; Reply Br. 16–18. In particular,
Appellant argues Martin is deficient because
Martin does not teach the claimed “auxiliary override
feature” and “auxiliary audio mode.” In particular, claim 1
defines that “when the auxiliary override feature is enabled, the
digital jukebox device is configured to receive an audio stream
from an external source and reproduce the audio stream,” and in
the “auxiliary audio mode,” the audio stream from an external
source is being provided to the digital jukebox device for
reproduction via a speaker system connected to the digital
jukebox device” (emphasis added).

. . . Martin teaches that “data for use for dart game, jukebox,
and advertisement operation” are stored internally in “a mass
storage device 252 of the entrainment system.” See para.
[0019]. Thus, as admitted by the Examiner, “Martin does not
specifically discloses that the alternate input corresponds to an
audio stream from an external source.” See page 34, lines 18-19
of the Final Office Action (Emphasis added). As a result,
Martin fails to disclose or suggest the claimed “auxiliary
override feature” and “auxiliary audio mode.”

Since Martin fails to teach the claimed “auxiliary override
feature,” Martin also fails to teach “in response to the
determination that there is queued internal audio and the
determination that the auxiliary override feature is not enabled
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... ,” and “in response to ... the determination that the auxiliary
override feature is enabled ... ,” as recited by claim 1 (emphasis
added).

Moreover, since Martin fails to teach the claimed “auxiliary
audio mode,” Martin also fails to teach “changing the jukebox
to operate in an auxiliary audio mode in which the audio stream
from an external source is being provided to the digital jukebox
device for reproduction via a speaker system connected to the
digital jukebox device,” and “in response to the changing the
digital jukebox device to operate in the auxiliary audio mode ....
capturing at least a portion of the audio stream ... ; acquiring a
digital fingerprint or watermark ... ; whether the captured
portion corresponds to audio content that should be licensed ... ;
updating a log ... ; and generating a notification ... ,” as recited
by claim 1 . . . .

Appeal Br. 39 (emphases omitted); see also Reply Br. 16–17. Appellant
argues Grabar is deficient because
even if, for the sake of arguments, that Grabar teaches the
claimed “auxiliary audio mode,” Grabar still fails to teaches
[sic] “changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio
mode” in response to the particularly claimed “determination
that there is no queued internal audio or the determination that
the auxiliary override feature is enabled,” as recited by claim 1 .
. . .

. . . Grabar only teaches the “selection between external sources
and the music stored in the jukebox itself’ by “entering the
service mode of the apparatus pressing the service key inside
the apparatus.” See page 2, lines 13-18 and claim 28 (emphasis
added). Thus, Grabar teaches that a user triggers the
reproduction of music from external sources by pressing the
service key inside the apparatus, rather than in response to the
claimed “determination that there is no queued internal audio or
the determination that the auxiliary override feature is enabled.”

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Therefore, Grabar also fails to teach “in response to the
determination that there is no queued internal audio or the
determination that the auxiliary override feature is enabled,
changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio mode, in
which the audio stream from an external source being provided
to the digital jukebox device for reproduction via a speaker
system connected to the digital jukebox device,” as recited by
claim 1 . . . .

Appeal Br. 40(emphases omitted); see also Reply Br. 17–18.
Appellant has not persuaded us of error. Because the Examiner relies
on the combination of Martin and Grabar to teach the disputed claim
limitation, Appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the
reference individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed.
Cir. 1986). In particular, the Examiner finds—and Appellant does not
dispute—Grabar teaches “auxiliary override feature” and “auxiliary audio
mode in which the audio stream from an external source is being provided.”
See Final Act. 34.
The Examiner further finds—and Appellant does not dispute—Martin
teaches
in response to the determination that there is no queued internal
audio or the determination that the . . . feature is enabled,
changing the jukebox to operate in an . . . mode in which the
audio stream from an . . . source is being provided to the digital
jukebox device for reproduction via a speaker system connected
to the digital jukebox device,

as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 33–34.
Because Appellant does not challenge the propriety of
combining the teachings of Martin and Grabar, the Examiner correctly
finds the combination teaches or suggests
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in response to the determination that there is no queued internal
audio or the determination that the auxiliary override feature is
enabled, changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio
mode in which the audio stream from an external source is
being provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction
via a speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device,

as recited in claim 1.

II
Appellant contends Grabar does not teach “in response to the
determination that there is queued internal audio and the determination that
the auxiliary override feature is not enabled, operating the jukebox device in
the internal audio mode,” as recited in claim 1 (emphases added). See
Appeal Br. 40. In particular, Appellant argues:
Grabar teaches that an authorized person can select between
reproducing music from external sources and reproducing
music stored in a jukebox itself “by entering the service mode
of the apparatus pressing the service key inside the apparatus.”
See page 2, lines 13-18 and claim 28 (emphasis added). Thus,
Grabar teaches that an authorized person can select to
reproducing music stored internally by pressing the service key,
but not “in response to the determination that there is queued
internal audio and the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is not enabled.”

Appeal Br. 40 (emphases omitted).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Because the Examiner relies
on the combination of Martin and Grabar to teach the disputed claim
limitation, Appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the
reference individually. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. The Examiner finds—
and Appellant does not dispute—Martin teaches “in response to the
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determination that there is queued internal audio and the determination that
the . . . feature is not enabled, operating the jukebox device in the internal
audio mode.” See Final Act. 33. The Examiner further finds—and
Appellant does not dispute—Grabar teaches “auxiliary override feature.”
See Final Act. 34.
Because Appellant does not challenge the propriety of combining the
teachings of Martin and Grabar, the Examiner correctly finds the
combination teaches or suggests “in response to the determination that there
is queued internal audio and the determination that the auxiliary override
feature is not enabled, operating the jukebox device in the internal audio
mode,” as recited in claim 1.

III
Appellant contends Martin, Grabar, and Itskov do not collectively
teach
in response to the changing the digital jukebox device to
operate in the auxiliary audio mode:
capturing at least a portion of the audio stream after
determining that the audio stream is being provided to the
digital jukebox device from the external source for reproduction
via the digital jukebox device;
acquiring a digital fingerprint or watermark
corresponding to the captured portion;
detecting whether the captured portion corresponds to
audio content that should be licensed based on the acquired
digital fingerprint or watermark;

as recited in claim 1 (emphasis added). See Appeal Br. 41; Reply Br.
18–20. In particular, Appellant argues
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The cited sections of Itskov teach that a “control gate 20
provides coordinating function used to identify the content
about to be played on the in-house system 8,” and hence “the
content about to be played on the in-house system 8 can be
audited to provide the appropriate tracking of digital media
content played in the commercial establishment.” See para.
[0045] (emphasis added). However, even assuming, for sake of
arguments, that Itskov’s content about to be played may be
from an external source, Itskov does not teach changing the in-
house system 8 to operate in the auxiliary audio mode, much
less auditing the content to be played “in response to the
changing the digital jukebox device to operate in the auxiliary
audio mode.”

Appeal Br. 41 (emphases omitted); see also Reply Br. 18–20.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive, because they are not directed
to the Examiner’s specific findings and conclusions based on Martin and
Grabar. As discussed in Section I above, “changing the digital jukebox
device to operate in the auxiliary audio mode” first appears in the following
limitation (emphasis added)
in response to the determination that there is no queued internal
audio or the determination that the auxiliary override feature is
enabled, changing the jukebox to operate in an auxiliary audio
mode in which the audio stream from an external source is
being provided to the digital jukebox device for reproduction
via a speaker system connected to the digital jukebox device.

As discussed in Section I above, Martin and Grabar and collectively
teach the limitation “changing the digital jukebox device to operate in the
auxiliary audio mode.” As a result, Itskov does not need to teach that
limitation again.
Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1.
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For similar reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 13 and 25.
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent
claims 2–6, 8–12, 14–18, 20–24, 26–30, and 32–36, as Appellant does not
advance separate substantive arguments about those claims. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Separately Argued Dependent Claims 7, 19, 31
On this record, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 7.
Appellant argues Itskov does not teach “temporarily disabling an
audio input of” the digital jukebox device, as recited in claim 7. See Appeal
Br. 42–43; Reply Br. 20–21. In particular, Appellant argues:
The Examiner alleges in the Final Office Action that
paragraphs [0040] and [0052] of [Itskov] teach the claimed
features of claims 7, 19 and 31. See page 39, item 72. However,
the allegation is erroneous.
Paragraphs [0040] and [0052] of [Itskov] teach that the
control gate may prevent some unrecognized audio signals from
being reproduced on the in-house system, but not disabling any
audio input of the in-house system. Temporarily disabling an
audio input of a system is different from preventing
unrecognized audio signal from being reproduced on the
system. [Itskov] thus fails to teach “temporarily disabling an
audio input of the digital jukebox device, wherein an audio
stream from the external source is provided through the audio
input,” as recited by claim 7 (and similarly claims 19 and 31).

Appeal Br. 42–43 (emphases omitted); see also Reply Br. 20–21.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive, because Appellant does not
persuasively explain why Itskov’s disclosures of “[t]he control gate 20 can
interrupt signals from other sources to the amplifier and essentially override
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other sources as may be required” (Itskov ¶ 40) and “the control gate 20 can
be set to operate and prohibit playing music that is not recognized by the
digital content management system” (Itskov ¶ 52) do not teach or suggest
“temporarily disabling an audio input of” the digital jukebox device, as
recited in dependent claim 7.
Further, Appellant’s following argument (Reply Br. 21
(emphases omitted)) is unpersuasive:
A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that
interrupting or prohibiting unauthorized external signals from
being reproduced on the in-house system is different from
temporarily disabling an audio input of the in-house system.
When an audio-input is temporarily disabled, the audio input is
temporarily not able to receive any signals from any devices, no
matter the signals are authorized or not, while interrupting or
prohibiting signals that are unauthorized, the audio input of the
in-house system can still receive other authorized signals.

Contrary to the above argument, claim 7 recites “temporarily
disabling an audio input of the digital jukebox device, wherein an audio
stream from the external source is provided through the audio input”
(emphases added). The claim does not require “the audio input is
temporarily not able to receive any signals from any devices,” as Appellant
argues (Reply Br. 21). As a result, Appellant’s argument is not
commensurate with the scope of the claim.
In any event, one skilled in the art would have found it obvious for
Itskov’s in-house system (Itskov ¶¶ 40, 52; Fig. 1) to include an off switch,
so that the system could be turned off when it is desirable to do so. To that
end, because temporarily turning off Itskov’s in-house system teaches or
suggests temporarily disabling any audio input, the disputed limitation is
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obvious in light of Itskov’s teachings. In short, regardless of whether
Appellant’s claim interpretation has any merit, the limitation “temporarily
disabling an audio input,” is taught by or at least obvious in light of Itskov’s
teachings.
Therefore, and for similar reasons discussed above with respect
to claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 7.
For similar reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 19 and 31.

CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–36 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–36 under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–36 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–
36. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).

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In summary:

Claims
Rejected
Pre-AIA
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–36 101 Subject Matter
Eligibility
1–36
1–36 112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
1–36
1–7, 9–19,
21–31, 33–
36
103 Martin, Grabar,
Itskov, Schmelzer,
Logan
1–7, 9–19,
21–31, 33–
36

8, 20, 32 103 Martin, Grabar,
Itskov, Schmelzer,
Logan, Lim
8, 20, 32
Overall
Outcome
1–36

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED