Bayco Products, Inc.Download PDFTrademark Trial and Appeal BoardDec 17, 201987708217 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2019) Copy Citation This Opinion is Not a Precedent of the TTAB Hearing: December 12, 2019 Mailed: December 17, 2019 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____ Trademark Trial and Appeal Board _____ In re Bayco Products, Inc. _____ Serial No. 87708217 _____ Richard L. Schwartz and Enrique Sanchez, Jr. of Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Schwartz PLLC, for Bayco Products, Inc. Teague Avent, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 125, Heather Biddulph, Managing Attorney. _____ Before Kuhlke, Bergsman and English, Administrative Trademark Judges. Opinion by English, Administrative Trademark Judge: Bayco Products, Inc. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the mark INTEGRITAS, in standard characters, for “flashlights, namely, portable rechargeable lanterns” in International Class 11.1 1 Application Serial No. 87708217; filed December 5, 2017 under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s claim of a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Serial No. 87708217 - 2 - The Examining Attorney refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood of confusion with the mark set forth below for “light bulbs; light bulbs, electric; lighting fixtures; lighting installations; lighting tubes; electric light bulbs; fixtures for incandescent light bulbs; fluorescent electric light bulbs; halogen light bulbs; incandescent light bulbs; LED light bulbs” in International Class 11:2 When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested reconsideration. The Examining Attorney denied Applicant’s request for reconsideration, and the appeal was resumed. Pursuant to Applicant’s request, an oral hearing was held on December 12, 2019. We affirm the refusal to register. I. Analysis Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co, 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”) (cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Ind., Inc., 575 U.S. 2 Registration No. 5265635; issued August 15, 2017; the colors green and gray are claimed as features of the mark. The registration includes the following description of the mark: “The mark consists of the wording ‘ENTEGRITY’ in stylized font with the ‘en’ in green and ‘tegrity’ in gray. There is a green line below the wording; the bottom of the letter ‘g’ overlaps with the line.” Serial No. 87708217 - 3 - 138, 135 S.Ct.1293, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 2049 (2015)); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co. Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant or for which there is evidence of record. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019); M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns., Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015) (“While we have considered each factor for which we have evidence, we focus our analysis on those factors we find to be relevant.”). We treat as neutral any DuPont factors for which there is no record evidence or argument. In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and goods or services. See In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); see also In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The likelihood of confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but ‘may focus … on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods.’”) (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Serial No. 87708217 - 4 - A. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Goods and Trade Channels The respective goods need not be identical or directly competitive for there to be a likelihood of confusion, but the evidence must establish that the goods are related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source. Hewlett- Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003-04 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also In re Rexel, Inc., 223 USPQ 830, 831 (TTAB 1984). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed in the identification of goods in a particular class. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981). The Examining Attorney has introduced third-party websites showing that light bulbs, encompassed in the cited registration, and flashlights, covered by Applicant’s application, are sold through the same online retailers, often under the same mark. The evidence includes:3 • SureFire, manufacturing and retailing SUREFIRE flashlights and rechargeable flashlights and SUREFIRE flashlight lamps;4 3 Citations to the prosecution record are to the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system by page number in the downloadable .pdf versions of the documents. All other citations are to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. 4 March 26, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 9-15 (surefire.com). As seen in the excerpt, the “lamp” is a type of light bulb that would fit a flashlight. “Light bulb” is defined as “an electric light” which would encompass these “lamps” that provide the electric light for flashlights. Dictionary.com based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2019). The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed format or regular fixed editions. In Serial No. 87708217 - 5 - • The Coleman Company, Inc., retailing light bulbs, lanterns, rechargeable lanterns, and flashlights;5 • Mag Instrument Inc. manufacturing and retailing MAGLITE flashlights and rechargeable flashlights and replacement lamps for flashlights;6 • LightJunction.com retailing light bulbs and flashlights, including rechargeable flashlights;7 • BrightGuy.com retailing light bulbs, flashlights, and rechargeable flashlights, including STREAMLIGHT light bulbs and flashlights, BRIGHT STAR light bulbs and flashlights, PRINCETON light bulbs and flashlights, and Applicant’s INTEGRITAS rechargeable lantern flashlight;8 • SuperbrightLEDs.com retailing LED rechargeable flashlights and lanterns and LED flashlight bulbs and lights;9 • BatteryJunction.com retailing flashlights, including lantern flashlights, and light bulbs, including STREAMLIGHT rechargeable lantern flashlights and flashlight bulbs;10 and re White Jasmine LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1385, 1392 n.23 (TTAB 2013); In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006). 5 March 26, 2018 Office Action at TSDR 16-24 (coleman.com). 6 Id. at 25-45 (maglite.com). Some pictured flashlights bear MAG-LITE, with a hyphen. 7 October 14, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 6-8. 8 Id. at 9-16. 9 Id. at 17-19. 10 Id. at 20-28. Serial No. 87708217 - 6 - • TopBulb.com retailing flashlight bulbs and flashlights, including rechargeable flashlights.11 This evidence establishes that light bulbs and flashlights, including rechargeable flashlights, are related because they may emanate from the same source and be identified by the same mark. Applicant’s admission that it sells both flashlights and light bulbs, albeit under different marks,12 further supports that the goods may emanate from the same source. The goods also are complementary given that a light bulb is an essential feature of a flashlight. Wincharger Corp. v. Rinco, Inc., 297 F.2d 261, 132 USPQ 289, 291-292 (CCPA 1962) (power supply equipment such as motors and generators and voltage dividing instruments, potentiometers and rheostats are complementary products because “[t]he products are all within the field of electrical apparatus and in some instances devices similar to those manufactured by appellee are used in connection with the various items produced by appellant”). The same evidence demonstrates that flashlights and light bulbs are marketed through the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers.13 Applicant relies on extrinsic evidence to argue that Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods and trade channels are different. Specifically, Applicant asserts that Registrant’s goods are “specialized light bulb products”14 for “high end energy 11 Id. at 29-41. 12 Request for Recons. 4 TTABVUE 7 and 10. 13 In view of this evidence, whether Registrant sells its products through the Internet, as Applicant questions, is immaterial. September 20, 2018 Office Action Response at TSDR 7-8. 14 Req. for Recons. 4 TTABVUE 6. Serial No. 87708217 - 7 - efficient lighting projects”15 for “stationary installation in commercial buildings”16 whereas Applicant’s goods are rechargeable, hand-held, portable flashlights “sold to a very specialized market, such as one that services firemen, police, and other first responders.”17 We are bound to compare the goods and trade channels as identified in the application and cited registration, neither of which include such limitations. Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comp. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed.”). Accordingly, as opposed to a trademark infringement litigation, the distinctions Applicant attempts to draw are irrelevant in a likelihood of confusion analysis regarding whether an applicant’s mark may be registered. For these reasons, the relatedness of the goods and trade channels weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. B. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks We next consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital 15 September 20, 2018 Office Action Response at TSDR 7. 16 Id. 17 Request for Recons. 4 TTABVUE 7. Serial No. 87708217 - 8 - Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014); DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)). The issue is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side- by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to result. Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 688 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975). We do not predicate our analysis on a dissection of the involved marks; we consider the marks in their entireties. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1160; Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining likelihood of confusion.”). But one feature of a mark may be more significant than another, and it is not improper, for rational reasons, to give more weight to a dominant feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. Stone Serial No. 87708217 - 9 - Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1161 (finding that the Board did not err in reasoning that the term LION was dominant in both applicant’s mark STONE LION CAPITAL and opposer’s marks LION CAPITAL and LION); In re Chatam Int’l, 71 USPQ2d at 1946. In considering the similarities between the marks, “[w]e must compare the marks as they appear in the drawings, and not on any [actual use] that may have additional wording or information.” In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1186 (TTAB 2018); see also In re i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1749. Accordingly, Applicant’s extrinsic evidence and arguments that its “mark is always closely associated with its registered NIGHTSTICK mark” and that “Registrant’s website displays the registered mark with the words Energy and Integrity underneath the mark in the same green-gray two color scheme, which is a feature of the cited mark” are unavailing.18 We also must keep in mind that although the cited mark is stylized and in color, Applicant has applied to register a standard character mark without limitation on the manner of display. Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re RSI Sys., LLC, 88 USPQ2d 1445, 1448 (TTAB 2008); In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 USPQ2d 1012, 2015 (TTAB 1998). Accordingly, we must assume that Applicant could display its mark in a stylization and color scheme similar to the cited mark. In re Aquitaine Wine, 126 USPQ2d at 1186 (TTAB 2018) (“Since Registrant’s mark is a standard character mark, we must consider that the literal elements of the mark (the words and the letters) may be presented in any font style, 18 September 20, 2018 Office Action Response at TSDR 6-7. Serial No. 87708217 - 10 - size or color, including the same font, size and color as the literal portions of Applicant’s mark. This is because the rights associated with a standard character mark reside in the wording per se and not in any particular font style, size, or color.”) (citing Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Even considering the color elements as a point of distinction they are not sufficient to distinguish the marks. Both Applicant’s mark and the cited mark consist of four syllables and the first three syllables of the marks, “entegrit” v. “integrit,” look and sound similar. The marks also share a connotation and commercial impression. The cited mark is nearly phonetically identical to the word “integrity” and the first three syllables of Applicant’s mark also call to mind “integrity.”19 This word creates a commercial impression that the goods of Registrant and Applicant are reliable and of high quality. That Applicant’s mark starts with an “i” and ends in “as” creates some visual and aural differences between the marks, but not enough to overcome the similarities between the marks in overall appearance and sound. Applicant argues that the “en” prefix in the cited mark “brings to mind the beginning of the word energy.”20 Given 19 The Examining Attorney presented evidence that “integritas” is Latin for “chastity,” “integrity,” “blamelessness,” “correctness, purity,” “soundness” and “the whole.” October 14, 2018, Final Office Action at TSDR 42 and 47. Applicant argues that these “quite different impressions” should be considered in assessing the similarities between the marks. Applicant’s Reply Brief 10 TTABVUE 5-6. Latin, however, is not a living language so it is unlikely that the relevant consumers would be aware of the Latin meanings other than “integrity,” which is suggested by the first three syllables in Applicant’s mark. 20 September 20, 2018 Office Action Response at TSDR 7. Serial No. 87708217 - 11 - that the cited mark is the near phonetic equivalent of the term “integrity,” we are not persuaded that consumers would ascribe the term “energy” to the prefix “en” in the cited mark even though the “en” prefix is highlighted in green font. But even if the cited mark also connotes “energy” this does not change the fact that the marks share the connotation and commercial impression of “integrity.” In this regard, we note that Registrant engenders the commercial impression of “Integrity” by displaying its mark on its website as reproduced below:21 Whereas trade dress may not be used to prove that trademarks are not similar, trade dress may be used to prove that a word mark projects a similar commercial impression. As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated: Ordinarily, for a word mark we do not look to the trade dress, which can be changed at any time. Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Electric Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 724, 156 USPQ 340, 342 (CCPA 1968). But the trade dress may nevertheless provide evidence of whether the word mark projects a confusingly similar commercial impression. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus. Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 223 USPQ 1281, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 21 Id. at TSDR 14. Serial No. 87708217 - 12 - When viewing the marks in their entireties, we find that the similarities between the marks in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression are significant and outweigh the differences in the marks. This factor favors a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion. C. Sophistication of the Purchasers Applicant argues that the sophistication of the purchasers and price points of the identified products will obviate any likelihood of confusion. Specifically, Applicant asserts that Registrant’s goods are sold as part of Registrant’s “commercial lighting projects” to “careful, individual sophisticated purchasing customers (on a project by project basis) at a price point many multiples of that [of] Applicant’s products,”22 and that Applicant’s flashlight portable lanterns “typically retail” for $200 each and are targeted to first responders who will exercise care in making a purchase.23 Again, these arguments are irrelevant in a USPTO ex parte appeal because there are no trade channel limitations or price restrictions in the application or cited registration. In re Fabfitfun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670, 1673 (TTAB 2018) (no price restrictions in identifications of goods); In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764 (TTAB 1986) (evidence that relevant goods are expensive wines sold to discriminating purchasers must be disregarded given the absence of any such restrictions in the application or registration). 22 Id. at TSDR 8. 23 Request for Recons. 4 TTABVUE 7. Serial No. 87708217 - 13 - We must make our determination based on the least sophisticated consumer. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163 (affirming that the Board properly considered all potential investors for recited services, which included sophisticated investors, but that precedent requires consumer care for likelihood-of-confusion decision to be based “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers”). Flashlights and light bulbs are the types of products that are purchased by the general public, and there is no evidence that the general public would exercise a higher degree of care when encountering these goods. In addition, some flashlights and light bulbs are sold at relatively low price points as evidenced by the websites of record showing light bulbs sold for as low as $0.37 and flashlights sold for as low as $5.75.24 Eveready Battery Co. v. Green Planet, Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2009) (“Generally, purchasers of casual, low cost ordinary consumer items exercise less care in their purchasing decisions and are more likely to be confused as to the source of the goods.”). Light bulbs also are goods that are replaced frequently. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enters., Ltd., 774 F.2d 1144, 227 USPQ 541, 542 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (purchasers of “relatively inexpensive and frequently replaceable … products have long been held to a lesser standard of purchasing care”). For these reasons, this DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. D. Actual Confusion Kevin Kirkman, Applicant’s Product Line Manager, avers that since introducing the INTEGRITAS portable lantern product in September 2018, Applicant has sold 24 October 14, 2018 Final Office Action at TSDR 7, 29, and 36. Serial No. 87708217 - 14 - “in excess of 1600 units … with gross sales in excess of $190,000,” and that despite these “significant” sales, he is “aware of no instances of actual marketplace confusion” of the product with “any third party product – much less any ENTEGRITY branded specialty lightbulb product.”25 This declaration has little evidentiary value for several reasons. See In re Bissett-Berman Corp., 476 F.2d 640, 642, 177 USPQ 528, 529 (CCPA 1973) (stating that self-serving testimony of appellant’s corporate president’s unawareness of instances of actual confusion was not conclusive that actual confusion did not exist or that there was no likelihood of confusion). First, Applicant launched its INTEGRITAS product relatively recently so there has not been any meaningful opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred. Second, there is no evidence regarding the extent of Applicant’s advertising and the geographic scope of its sales. Third, Mr. Kirkman testified that Applicant sells its INTEGRITAS rechargeable lanterns to specialized distributors for sale to those in hazardous work environments such as fire, rescue, industrial and automotive industries.26 Lebanon Seaboard Corp. v. R&R Turf Supply Inc., 101 USPQ2d 1826, 1834 (TTAB 2012); Barbara’s Bakery Inc. v. Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1287 (TTAB 2007) (the probative value of the absence of actual confusion depends on there being a significant opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred). Fourth, we do 25 Request for Recons. 4 TTABVUE 10, Kirkman Declaration, ¶¶ 7 and 9. 26 Id., Kirkman Declaration, ¶ 5. As explained above, when analyzing the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods, we are bound by the description of goods in the application and cited registration. However, when we analyze whether there have been any reported instances of confusion, we consider the marketplace because we are determining whether there has been a reasonable opportunity for confusion to have occurred. Serial No. 87708217 - 15 - not know whether Registrant is aware of any instances of actual confusion. See, e.g., In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1817 (TTAB 2001); In re Jeep Corp., 222 USPQ 333, 337 (TTAB 1984); In re Barbizon Int’l, Inc., 217 USPQ 735, 737 (TTAB 1983). Last, while “[a] showing of actual confusion would of course be highly probative, if not conclusive, of a high likelihood of confusion. The opposite is not true.... The lack of evidence of actual confusion carries little weight, especially in an ex parte context.” In re Majestic Distilling, 65 USPQ2d at 1205 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, this DuPont factor is neutral. II. Conclusion Applicant’s arguments that confusion is not likely are mostly predicated on evidence of how Applicant and Registrant use their marks in the marketplace. As explained, in determining the issue of registrability, we must consider the goods and marks as identified in the application and cited registration. Based on the similarities between the goods, trade channels, and marks, and the fact that the goods include general consumer items sold at relatively low price points, we find that confusion is likely between Applicant’s mark and the mark in the cited registration. Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is affirmed. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation