Bay Standard Products Mfg., Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 6, 1967

167 N.L.R.B. 340 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gerhard Landgraf and Peter Landgraf , d/b/a Bay
Standard Products Mfg. Co. and International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, District Lodge No. 115, Local Lodge
No. 824. Case 20-CA-4146
September 6, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND ZAGORIA
On April 20, 1967, Trial Examiner Henry S.
Salim issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a brief in support
thereof; the General Counsel filed an answering
brief, and cross-exceptions and brief in support
thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-
exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, ex-
cept as modified below.
1. We find, in agreement with the Trial Ex-
aminer, that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by the following conduct:
(a) On July 1, 1966, Gerhard Landgraf told em-
ployees that if they went on strike, he would make
the plant a family business and move it where he
could obtain cheaper labor.
(b) After the picketing began on July 1, Gerhard
Landgraf told employees on the picket line that he
did not need them, that he could close the plant, or
run it as a family business with no employees, or he
could move elsewhere.
(c) During the evening of June 29, when a union
meeting was held, Gerhard Landgraf came to the
plant where Robert Nelson was working, and asked
him whether he had attended the union meeting that
night.
Paragraph V(e) of the complaint alleges that
Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by giving the impression that it was keeping em-
ployees' union activity under surveillance, rather
167 NLRB No. 44
than by "keeping employees under surveillance,"
as stated by the Trial Examiner. However, we find
that the allegation made in paragraph V (e) has not
been established by a preponderance of the credible
evidence. Accordingly, this allegation is dismissed,
as recommended by the Trial Examiner.
2. We affirm the findings of the Trial Examiner
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act by discharging Raymond Lackey, and
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to recog-
nize and bargain with the Union. We further find,
on the basis of the facts as found by the Trial Ex-
aminer and supported by the record, that a prepon-
derance of the evidence establishes that all of the
Respondent's products and maintenance employees
went on strike on July 1, 1966, in protest against
the Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain
with the Union and its discriminatory discharge of
and refusal to reinstate Raymond Lackey; that the
strike was therefore caused and prolonged by these
unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint;
and, accordingly, that the strikers are unfair labor
practice strikers who, upon unconditionally offering
to return to work, are entitled to reinstatement even
if it is necessary to dismiss subsequently hired em-
ployees.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Board hereby renumbers conclusions of law
6 and 7 as 7 and 8, and adds the following as conclu-
sion of law 6:
"6. The strike among production and main-
tenance employees of Respondent which began on
July 1, 1966, was caused and prolonged by the
Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with
the Union and the discriminatory discharge of and
refusal to reinstate Raymond Lackey, which are
hereinabove found to constitute unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the Act."
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent , Gerhard Landgraf and
Peter Landgraf , d/b/a Bay Standard Products Mfg.
Co., Concord, California , its officers , agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner ' s Recommended Order, as
herein modified:
1. Make the following changes in the Recom-
mended Order:
(a) Delete paragraph 1(e) and substitute the fol-
lowing:
"(e) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
BAY STANDARD PRODUCTS MFG. CO. 341
organizations , to join or assist any labor organiza-
tion, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any
and all such activities , except to the extent that any
such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act , as modified by the Labor- Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959."
(b) Insert the following as paragraphs 2(d) and
(e), and reletter the present paragraphs 2(d), (e), and
(f), accordingly:
"(d) Upon application , offer reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges , to all employees who were on strike
July 1, 1966 , or who joined the strike thereafter,
dismissing, if necessary , any persons hired after
that date ; and make such employees whole for any
loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of any
refusal to reinstate them upon such application.
Any backpay will be computed on a quarterly basis
in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Com-
pany, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at 6 per-
cent per annum, as set forth in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716."
"(e) Notify the above-described employees, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from
the Armed Forces."
(c) Change the first clause of the second sen-
tence of the paragraph relettered as 2(g ) to read:
`Copies of said notice , on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 20, ..."
2. Make the following changes in the notice:
(a) In the fifth indented paragraph insert the
words "threaten to" after "WE WILL NOT."
(b) Change the period at the end of the sixth in-
dented paragraph to a comma and add the follow-
ing: "except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment,
as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959."
(c) Delete the ninth paragraph and add the fol-
lowing as the last indented paragraph:
"WE WILL, upon application , offer to all em-
ployees who were on strike on July 1, 1966, or
joined the strike thereafter , immediate and full rein-
statement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions , without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges , dismissing , if necessary,
any persons since hired; and make them whole for
any loss of pay they may suffer as a result of any
refusal to reinstate them upon such application,
with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum."
(e) Change the Armed Forces note to read as
follows:
"Note: We will notify Raymond Lackey and the
above-described unfair labor practice strikers, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from
the Armed Forces."
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HENRY S. SAHM, Trial Examiner: This is an orthodox
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) case except for the Employer's con-
tention that the union business agent's request for recog-
nition was accompanied by such vile and abusive lan-
guage when he purportedly accused the Employer of
being a "Nazi" and running his plant like a "concentra-
tion camp" that the Union's recognition demand is not
only legally unenforceable but also released the Employer
from any obligatin to bargain.'
This case was heard at San Francisco, California, on
December 6, 7, and 8, 1966, on a charge filed July 8,
1966, and a complaint which issued on September 28,
1966. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the com-
plaint alleges that the Respondent has committed various
acts of interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, discharged an employee in
violation of Section 8(a)(3), and has refused to bargain
with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5). Briefs were
filed on January 31, 1967.
Upon consideration of the entire record, including the
evidence adduced at the hearing, the briefs filed by the
General Counsel and Respondent, and observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, there is hereby made the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondents Gerhard Landgraf and Peter Landgraf
are, and have been at all times material herein, copartners
doing business under the trade name of Bay Standard
Products Mfg. Co., with a plant and place of business
located in Concord, California, where they are engaged
in the business of metal processing and manufacturing au-
tomobile accessories. During the past years Respondent,
in the course and conduct of its business operations, sold
and shipped products directly to customers located out-
side the State of California valued in excess of $50,000.
It is found , therefore , that Respondent is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act and that it would ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
' See section III, C, In 41.
342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is, and at all times material herein has been,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The testimony
In the latter part of June 1966, the employees of
Respondent's plant became interested in organizing a
union. Approximately 15 employees met immediately
after work on June 28 at the home of Ray Lackey (an al-
leged discriminatee in this proceeding), whose home is
approximately 500 feet from Respondent's plant. While
the men were congregating on the sidewalk outside
Lackey's home preparatory to going inside to the meet-
ing, Ronald Gates, an employee, testified that Peter
Landgraf, coowner of the Respondent Company, ".
drove up and seen everybody standing around and kind
of smiled and asked what was going on ... he asked Ray
[Lackey] to go with him some place and they left and
then Ray returned in a few minutes."2 Lackey testified
that when Peter Landgraf asked the employees "what
was going on," they told him they were raising money for
a fellow employee who had three fingers amputated a few
days before while working at his machine in Respond-
ent's plant.
Peter Landgraf's version of coming to Lackey's home
and seeing the employees was described by him as "a re-
union of just about all our employees and I went there and
asked first what they were doing." He went on to explain
that his purpose in going to Lackey's home was to drive
him back to the plant to finish up the day's packing.
When Lackey returned from the plant, the meeting
began and it was decided by the employees to authorize
Lackey to contact a union. That same evening, Lackey
spoke to Sam Swisher, business representative of the
Charging Union with respect to the possibility of organiz-
ing a union at Respondent's plant. Swisher told Lackey to
inform his fellow workers that he would meet with them
the following evening, June 29. The meeting was held as
scheduled at a restaurant and attended by approximately
15 employees. At that time and place, Swisher explained
the advantages of a union and then requested those
present to sign union cards. Of the 23 production and
maintenance employees, 14 of them signed union cards
that evening and 3 more who had not attended the union
organizational meeting signed cards on June 30 at the
request of Lackey, and another signed at Lackey's so-
licitation the following day for a total of 18 in all.3
On June 30, at approximately 7 p.m., Gerhard
Landgraf, coowner of the Respondent, came to Lackey's
home after working hours and without first knocking on
the door, entered his home and told Lackey while he was
in the midst of his meal that he was fired because of his
inefficiency.4 Lackey said nothing whereupon Landgraf
left.
2 Although it was after working hours, it is uncontradicted that Peter
Landgraf asked Lackey to return to the plant and pack some merchandise
preparatory to shipping it to customers On cross-examination, Gates
specified Lackey was gone 15 to 20 minutes
3 Ronald Beard, who signed on June 30 in the plant, is presently work-
ing for Respondent Harold Henry and Robert Nelson, who signed June
30, and Jim Crawford on July 1, were not working for Respondent at the
time of the hearing
4 Lackey testified that Landgraf said to him " I see you are enjoying
That same night , Lackey notified Swisher, the Union's
business agent , that Landgraf had discharged him. The
following morning Swisher and Lackey went to the plant
and met with Landgraf but not before Swisher told the
employees they were not to report for work until
Lackey's discharge was first discussed with Landgraf.
The employees all agreed not to report for work.
Swisher first discussed Lackey's discharge with
Landgraf5 and then handed him a letter stating the Union
"represents your employees in an appropriate unit of
production and maintenance employees" and requested
that Landgraf meet with the Union for the purpose of
negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement. (See G.C.
Exh. 7.) Landgraf refused to read the letter, whereupon
Swisher placed it upon Landgrafs desk and left the plant.
During the discussion, Swisher did not show Landgraf
the employees' signed union authorization cards nor did
the latter request that he be allowed to examine them. It
was stipulated at the hearing that the membership appli-
cation cards are valid and were signed by the employees
whose names appear on them. It was further stipulated
that the appropriate unit consists of 23 production and
maintenance employees.
The employees, all of whom had not reported for work
that morning, were standing outside the plant as Swisher
and Lackey emerged from their meeting with Landgraf in
his office. Swisher reported to them what had transpired
in Landgrafs office and advised the employees that they
were going on strike, whereupon a picket line was
established in front of the plant with Lackey as stewards
Landgraf then came out of the plant and approached
the employees who were already picketing and stated to
Swisher that he would meet with him the following day,
Saturday, July 2. They met for 3 hours the next day but
the results were inconclusive. Swisher insisted, however,
at this meeting that "one of the demands in the finaliza-
tion of the consumation of the contract, that Ray Lackey
had to be reinstated with back wages, and if
[Respondent] wanted to fight it any further that we
would have a grievance procedure we would take it to."
The parties have not met since this meeting on July 2,
1966, nor have either of them requested another meeting.
After the July 2 meeting with Swisher concluded,
Landgraf returned to the plant where he was accosted by
an employee named McLain who asked to speak to him.
He agreed and McLain, accompanied by two other strik-
ing employees, Tomlins and Bonham, came into
Landgrafs office. They told him they had been
designated by some of the striking employees to represent
them and that they would return to work if he would agree
to increase their hourly wage rate by 10 cents, furnish
better toilet facilities and a drinking fountain, change the
starting time from 8:30 to 8 a.m., 10-minute coffeebreaks,
and their paychecks to be delivered in envelopes during
working hours instead of the present practice of waiting
until after work for their pay. Landgraf agreed to all of
their requests, whereupon some , but not all of the striking
employees, agreed to return to work on July 5, 1966. It
appears some of the men returned to work at this time and
your meal and enjoying life. .. Mr. Lackey, I'm sorry but ... you are
fired."
' At Swisher' s insistence , Lackey was paid his wages when Landgraf
refused to reconsider his discharge of Lackey the previous evening.
6 Michael DeAngelis , an employee, testified that when Swisher re-
ported to the employees outside the plant as to what had occurred in his
meeting with Landgraf that Swisher said: "They will not accept the Union
so, let's picket."
BAY STANDARD PRODUCTS MFG. CO. 343
others returned later, 15 in all, and approximately 4 or 5
had not returned as of the time of the hearing but con-
tinued to picket the . 7
A. The Discharge of Lackey
Lackey was hired on April 1 , 1966, and placed in
charge of the packing and shipping department about
April 15, 1966. His starting wage was $2 . 10 and he was
earning $2.30 an hour when he was terminated on June
30, 1966. Lackey's duties were to assemble surfboard
and ski carriers , pack them in boxes , and prepare them for
shipping."
As detailed above under the section entitled "The
Testimony ," Lackey was in the forefront of union activity
at Respondent ' s plant An employees ' meeting was held
at his home on June 28; he was selected by his fellow em-
ployees to be the union steward ; he contacted Swisher,
the business agent, and told him of the employees' wish
to be represented by a union ; he also notified the em-
ployees of the June 29 union meeting and solicited three
or four employees to sign union application cards.
On June 30 , about 7 p.m., at a time when Lackey was
eating his evening meal, Gerhard Landgraf came to his
home and told him he was fired because of numerous
complaints he had received from customers that parts
were missing from shipments sent them by Respondent."
Respondent claims they received approximately 50 com-
plaints during the 3 months Lackey was employed and
Gerhard Landgraf testified he reprimanded him "5 or 10
or maybe 15 times" and his son , Peter , testified he repri-
manded Lackey "5 to 10" times. Lackey admits he was
admonished at the most on three occasions : once at the
beginning of his employment ; a second time about a week
before his termination ; and perhaps a third occasion at an
unspecified date but believes this was when he was work-
ing on the punch press.
It is uncontradicted that both Gerhard and Peter
Landgraf also packed as well as an employee named
Crawford" and another employee whom Gerhard
Landgraf could only identify as "Bob." Landgraf ad-
mitted some of the customers ' complaints of missing parts
in their shipments might have been due to the negligence
of other packers and not exclusively to Lackey.
In determining whether Lackey 's termination was for
union activities or for cause, as Respondent contends, the
problem is to ascertain the Employer 's true, underlying
motive." The fact that a lawful cause for discharge is
available is no defense where the employee is actually
discharged because of his union activities.12
For the reasons hereinafter explained , it is believed the
record in this case makes plain that with respect to
Lackey, there is considerably more than a coincidental
connection between his union activities and his termin-
ation.13 Indeed, it is found that the "principal events
[are] really no coincidence at all, but rather part of a
deliberate effort by the [Respondent] to scotch the lawful
measures of the employees before they had progressed
too far toward fruition." 14 Under these circumstances, "a
very convincing case of discharge for cause would have
to be made to make unreasonable a conclusion that the
discharge was because of union [activities]." 15 As was
stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:"
... whatever may be thought of the case made, if the
occurrences are viewed and apprehended piecemeal,
viewed and apprehended as a whole, the record fully
supports the . . . findings: that an anti-union coup
was planned . . . to eradicate the union and unionism
from the plant....
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act is not intended generally to
interfere with the freedom of an employer to hire and fire
as he pleases. He may discharge employees as he sees fit;
he may discharge them in the interest of efficiency or
from personal animosity or mere whim. 17 But in making
these decisions he must not discharge them on grounds of
union affiliation or activity. "Moreover, it matters not
that for reasons apart from union activity an employee
deserves summary discharge, if as a fact the reason was
union activity.'" A justifiable ground for dismissal is no
defense if it is a pretext and not the moving cause.'"
Against the fact pattern delineated above, Respond-
ent's contentions, as hereinafter explicated, to exonerate
itself from a finding of unfair labor practices are singularly
unimpressive. Certain undisputed and demonstrable facts
in this case and additional indicia detailed below,
strengthen and fortify this conclusion
Opposed to the contention of just cause alleged by
Respondent for Lackey's discharge, there has been
weighed its improper attitude in union relations, the
suspicious, suggestive, and summary nature of the ter-
mination in a context of open hostility to unionism, with
no meaningful prior notice ever having been given
Lackey, its timing in relation to the advent of union activ-
ities,20 the discharge within 48 hours after Lackey held a
union meeting at his home and Peter Landgraf saw the
employees there, the granting of all the employees' de-
mands shortly after the Union requested recognition, and
the unconvincing character of the proffered reasons for
Lackey's discharge - are all significant factors in deter-
mining whether or not the discharge was improperly
motivated and the multiplicity of and shifting reasons21
given for Lackey's discharge which the Board has held in-
' Ronald Beard , who is presently employed by Respondent , testified
that seven or eight of the employees , before returning to work, met with a
lawyer and signed a paper stating that they were resigning from the Union
8 Occasionally , he operated a punch press machine
0 Wayne Roberts , who is presenty employed by Respondent and was
present when Landgraf fired Lackey , testified that Landgraf told Lackey
"he had got another letter from his customers complaining of parts missing
in their surfboard carriers , and he pulled the letter out of his pocket and
was going to show it to Ray [but ] [ Lackey] said he didn't want to see
the letter "
10 Crawford worked for Respondent as a packer from June 28 until "the
week before school started "
' 1 N L R B v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation , 301 U S . 1, 45-60,
The Radio Officers' Union of the Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL
(A H Bull Steamship Company ) v N L.R B , 347 U S 17,43-44
12 N L R B v Ace Comb Co , 342 F 2d 841 (C A 8)
'' N L R B v Condenser Corporation of America , 128 F 2d 67, 75
(C A 3)
1" N L R B. v Jamestown Sterling Corp, 211 F 2d 725, 726 (C A 2)
15 Damien Grain and Milling Company v N L R.B., 130 F 2d 321, 328
(C.A 8)
"Shell Oil Company v N.L R.B , 196 F 2d 637, 639 (C A 5)
'T N L R B v T A McGahey, Sr, et al, d/bla Columbus Marble
Works, 233 F 2d 406, 412, 413 (CA 5)
11 N L R B v Electric City Dyeing Co, 178 F 2d 980, 983 (C.A 3).
SeeN.L R B v. Dixie Shirt Company, 176 F 2d 969, 973-974 (C A 4)
19N.L R B v Solo Cup Company, 237 F 2d 521,525 (C.A 8)
20 N L.R B v Soft Water Laundry, Inc, 346 F 2d 930,935 (C A 5)
21 In addition to Lackey' s alleged failure to pack shipments properly,
Respondent shifted its defense to other reasons , namely Peter Landgraf
testifying that Lackey was "extremely rude"; "wrong labeling of boxes",
and leaving work before the pickup truck arrived at the plant for the day's
shipments
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
dicates they are pretextuous.22 There has also been
weighed the extent to which Gerhard Landgraf departed
from accepted business practices in discharging Lackey
in such a precipitate and summary manner by entering
Lackey's home after working hours, unannounced and
without first knocking on the door. If any doubt remains,
it is dispelled by a consideration of this unusual manner
of effectuating Lackey's discharge.23
Moreover, contrary to the Respondent's contention
that it did not know of Lackey's union activities, it is
found for the following reasons that Respondent was well
aware of his union activities. To resolve the issue as to
whether the Respondent knew this, consideration must
be given to circumstantial evidence as well as what is
direct. However, it is well recognized that a finding of
knowledge must frequently rest on inference, since direct
evidence of intention to violate the Act is rarely obtaina-
ble. "Courts and other triers of facts, in a multitude of
cases must rely upon such evidence, i.e., inferences from
testimony as to attitudes, acts and deeds; where such
matters are involved, the use of such inferences is often
indispensable."24 Then, too, events ambiguous when
viewed in isolation often become clear when considered
in relation to other events.
Evidence of this knowledge is convincing as Respond-
ent's immediate response to the Union's incipient or-
ganizational efforts and request for recognition was a
responsive movement to oppose the Union. The deter-
mined opposition of Respondent to the Union's organiza-
tion of its employees was translated by the Landgrafs into
a coercive effort to thwart the freedom which the Act
guarantees employees in organizational matters. These
acts of opposition toward the Union gave a coercive
emphasis to Respondent's concurrent attitude toward
Lackey. The Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Link-Belt
Company, 311 U.S. 584, 602, stated the Board "was not
required to deny relief because there was no direct
evidence that the employer knew these men had joined a
union." Direct knowledge is not necessary; such
knowledge may be inferred from the record as a whole.25
Thus, this attitude was implemented by the discharge
of Lackey who was the prime motivating force behind the
union organizational campaign. No other reasons find
justification and the asserted reason of Lackey's ineffi-
ciency being the reason for his discharge is shown to be
fictitious as Respondent's just cause being alleged as the
reason for his discharge is not so because the evidence
does not establish the factual validity of the reasons as-
signed for Lackey's discharge.
This concatenation of Lackey contacting the Union im-
mediately after the employees' meeting at his home at
which time Peter Landgraf came to his home unan-
nounced, Lackey's extensive union activities and solicit-
ing his fellow employees to sign union cards, arranging for
them to attend the organization meeting on June 29 at
which the Union's business agent spoke and his
precipitate firing the following day with no advance
22 N.L.R.B. v. L. C. Ferguson, et al., dibla Shovel Supply Company,
257 F.2d 88, 92-93 (C.A. 5), N.L.R.B. v. WTVJ, Inc., 268 F.2d 346
(C A. 5).
25 Cf. Fort Worth Steel and Machinery Company, 125 N LRB 371.
24 F. W. Woolworth Company v. N.L.R.B., 121 F.2d 658,660 (C.A. 2).
25 Wiese Plow Welding Co., Inc., 123 NLRB 616; National Video Cor-
poration and Navidico, Inc., 114 NLRB 599; Pyne Moulding Corpora-
tion, 110 NLRB 1700, enfd. 226 F.2d 818 (C.A. 2), Malone Knitting
Company, 152 NLRB 643, 644, fn. 2.
26 See section C, infra.
notice, was merely a temporal coincidence, stretches
credulity too far when the following cumulative factor is
considered; namely, Respondent's union animus which
reflects prior knowledge of Lackey's union activities.
Conclusively corroborative of this finding is Gerhard
Landgraf asking Nelson, an employee, if he had attended
the meeting which the Union held on the evening of June
29, 1966.26 In determining whether his discharge was dis-
criminatory, consideration also has been given to
Respondent's illicit interrogation of and threats made to
its employees as well as its refusal to bargain with the
Union, all of which is detailed below under section C, et
seObviously, the discharge of the leading union advocate
is a most effective method of undermining a union's or-
ganizational effort.27 This is a situation where it is be-
lieved that the Respondent has characterized the union
activity for which Lackey was discharged as dissatisfac-
tion with him as an employee in an effort to justify the dis-
crimination against him and that the various reasons as-
serted were simply a pretext or an afterthought to
disguise its unlawful motivation which was to rid itself of
Lackey.28 Corroborative of this conclusion is Gerhard
Landgraf's testimony in which he admitted he offered to
rehire Lackey. Such conduct is inconsistent with
Landgraf's defense that Lackey's inefficiency compelled
him to discharge Lackey.
Where Respondent's defense becomes feckless is in
failing to produce the numerous purported written letters
of complaint it received from its customers regarding
missing parts in their shipments which were probative to
prove its oral contention and to refute the General Coun-
sel's contention that Lackey's union activty was the
motivating cause for his discharge. Moreover, Respond-
ent's unexplained failure to support and substantiate its
lawful cause justification for Lackey's discharge by the
production at the hearing of its claimed receipt of many
letters of complaint from customers with respect to
missing parts in their shipments, within the power of
Respondent to produce, renders the sole reason for
Lackey's discharge, namely, his inefficiency, dubious and
also warrants drawing an inference that there were no
such letters in existence.20 This failure to produce such
evidence "not only strengthens the probative force" of its
absence "but of itself is clothed with a certain probative
force."30 In view of the above, it is found that Respond-
ent has not sustained its affirmative defense that Lackey
performed his assigned duties in an incompetent manner,
and was discharged therefor.
Accordingly, the discharge of Lackey constituted an in-
terference with, and restraint and coercion of, Respond-
ent's employees in the exercise of their rights provided
for in Section 7 of the Act, and was discrimination in re-
gard to his hire and tenure of employment, and forcibly
indicated to all of Respondent's other employees who
were retained that similar action awaited them if they
should give aid and comfort to the Union, thereby
21 N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532,536 (C.A. 4).
28 N.L R B v Jackson Tile Manufacturing Co., 282 F 2d 90, 92, 93
(C.A. 5).
29 Interstate Circuit v U. S , 306 U S 208, 255, 226; N.L.R B v Sam
Wallich, et al., dlbla Wallich & Schwalm Company, et al., 198 F.2d 477,
483 (C A. 3); Concord Supplies & Equipment Corp., 110 NLRB 1873,
1879.
90 Paudler v. Paudler, et al., 185 F.2d 901, 903 (C.A. 5), cert . denied
341 U S 920.
BAY STANDARD PRODUCTS MFG. CO. 345
discouraging membership in the Union, as evidenced by
some employees signing a paper disavowing the Union'31
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.32
B. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(1)
"The question of organization by the employees ... is
the exclusive business and concern of the employees. It
is the mandate of the statute that the employer shall not
intrude himself into the picture. The slightest inter-
ference, intimidation or coercion by the employer of the
employees in the rights guaranteed to the employees by
the statute constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act."33
In determining whether an employer's conduct
amounts to interference, restraint, or coercion within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1), the test is not the employer's
intent or motive, but whether the conduct is reasonably
calculated or tends to interfere with the free exercise of
the rights guaranteed employees by the Act. 34 Threats of
discharge for prounion activity tend to deny employees
the free exercise of the right to self-organization guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.35 Threats to close a plant if
a union organizing drive is successful obviously have a
similar coercive effect.36 Interrogation or questioning
may extract information which is often used for sub-
sequent reprisals and to induce fear. This fear will be felt
not only by the worker interrogated but by all other em-
ployees who hear of the questioning. Especially in the in-
secure organizational period, the employer can make a
seemingly innocent question suggest his displeasure with
employees who support the union. Such questions may
convey an imagined threat of reprisal and dissuade em-
ployees from supporting a union. In the instant case, as
explicated below, the questioning is so linked with other
antiunion conduct that it is part of a pattern of hostile con-
duct directed by the Respondent against union activity.
An overall perspective of the factual situation in the
case at bar reveals Respondent's conduct was such as
restrained, interfered with, and coerced employees in the
exercise of their rights for the reasons hereinafter in-
dicated. On the issue of whether the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1), consideration has been given also to
Respondent's union animus, its discriminatory termina-
tion of Lackey, and refusal to bargain, infra, as it is not
required that each item of Respondent's conduct be con-
sidered separately and apart from all others, but con-
sideration must be given to all such conduct as a whole
with a view to drawing inferences reasonably justified by
their cumulative probative effect.37
In applying these principles to this case, it is concluded
and found that by the following conduct, which is singly
and in combination unfair labor practices, the Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(I) of the Act as it interfered
with, restrained, and coerced the employees in their
freedom to choose to be represented by the Union or no
union: (1) when Gerhard Landgraf threatened to close his
plant and move elsewhere if the employees engaged in
union activities; (2) when- Gerhard Landgraf threatened
to close the plant if the employees selected the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative; (3) when Ger-
hard Landgraf inquired of Robert Nelson, an employee,
while he was working at the plant after working hours on
June 29, if he had attended the union meeting that night.38
Paragraphs V(b), V(c), and V(e) of the complaint alleg-
ing violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because of
Respondent's stating in the presence of an employee that
Respondent would not negotiate with a union, threatening
employees with discharge if they participated in union ac-
tivities, and keeping employees under surveillance are
dismissed. The General Counsel has failed to prove these
allegations by a preponderance of the testimony adduced
in this proceeding as required by Section 10(c) of the Act.
C. The Alleged Refusal to Bargain in Violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5)
The complaint alleges that a majority of the Respond-
ent's production and maintenance employees selected
the Union as their bargaining representative on or about
June 29, 1966; that on July 1, 1966, the Union requested
Respondent to bargain and that Respondent refused to do
so.
The Respondent denies it violated Section 8(a)(5) con-
tending that:
(1) The Union did not make the clear and
unequivocal demand for recognition and bargaining
necessary for a finding of an unlawful refusal to bar-
gain.
(2) Assuming, arguendo, that a clear and
unequivocal demand for recognition was made, this
demand was accompanied by such vile and abusive
language that the demand cannot be considered valid
or enforceable.
(3) The Union lacked the majority status necessa-
ry to support an order to bargain.
It is uncontradicted that Swisher came to Gerhard
Landgraf's office on July 1, 1966, and introduced himself
as the Union's business representative. He attempted to
hand a letter to Landgraf who refused to accept it where-
upon Swisher placed the letter on Landgraf's desk and
shortly thereafter Swisher left the office. This letter reads
as follows:
July 1, 1966
Bay Standard Products
Concord, California
Mr. G. Landgraf:
This will serve to notify you that the International
Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, Local Lodge
824, represents your employees in an appropriate
unit of production and maintenance employees.
Pursuant to this, we desire to meet with you for the
purpose of negotiating and consumating a collective
bargaining agreement as to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment , and other conditions of employment
in behalf of these employees.
3' See fn 7, supra
31 Rosen Sanitary Wiping Cloth Co , 154 NLRB 1 185
33 N L R.B v William Davies Co., Inc., 135 F.2d 179,181 (C.A 7)
34 N L R B v Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811,814 (C.A. 7).
35 N L R B v Syracuse Stamping Company, 208 F.2d 77 (C.A 2).
36 N L R B v Somerset Classics, Inc, 193 F 2d 613 (C A 2), cert de-
nied sub nom Modern Manufacturing Co v N L R B, 344 U S 816;
N.L R B. v Franks Bros Company, 137 F 2d 989 (C.A. 1), affd. 326
U.S 702(1944)
31 N.L R.B. v. Popeil Brothers , Inc., 216 F.2d 66, 68 (C.A 7);
N L R B. v C W Radcliffe , et al., d/b/a Homedale Tractor & Equipment
Company, 211 F 2d 309, 313 (C A 9), cert denied 348 U.S. 833
38 Precision Products & Controls, Inc, 160 NLRB 1119
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Please notify us as to the date, time and place
when a representative of your firm will meet with a
representative of our organization for the aforemen-
tioned purpose.
Very truly yours,
International Association of
Machinists , AFL-CIO
Lodge 824
/s/ Sam Swisher
/t/ Sam Swisher
Business Representative
The Respondent ' s contention that the union official
made no clear and unequivocal demand for bargaining is
without merit . No particular form of words is required to
establish a demand to bargain . It is sufficient if the lan-
guage or conduct employed , expressly or by implication,
conveys with reasonable clarity a request by a bargaining
representative to meet with the employer concerning bar-
gaining negotiations or conditions of employment within
the bargaining unit. As was said by the circuit court in Joy
Silk Mills, Inc. v . N.L.R.B., 185 F.2d 732, 741
(C.A.D.C.), cert . denied 341 U.S. 914:
. the request to bargain [need not] be in haec ver-
ba, so long as there was one by clear implication. The
Labor-Management Relations Act "is not a statute
of frauds or an act prescribing the formalities of con-
veyancing . No seal or writing is required by its
terms Nor is any special formula or form of
words. "39
Furthermore , Respondent ' s contention that the Union
lacked the majority status necessary to support an order
to bargain is without factual validity. To begin with, it
never challenged the Union ' s majority status. Also, the
record is clear that an overwhelming majority of the em-
ployees in an appropriate unit had validly designated the
Union as their bargaining representative when the Union
made its demand for recognition . Moreover , while a
Board election is normally the best method of determin-
ing whether or not employees desire to be represented by
a bargaining agent , where , as here, an employer engages
in unfair labor practices which make impossible the hold-
ing of a free election , there is no alternative but to look to
signed authorization cards as the only available proof of
the choice employees would have made absent the
Respondent 's unfair labor practices . 40 Furthermore, it is
not too unreasonable to infer that the unlawful conduct of
Respondent indicates its actions were motivated by a
desire to undermine the Union ' s majority status. Cor-
roborative of this conclusion of bad faith is Gerhard
Landgrafs statement when he received the Union's de-
mand for recognition that he would close the plant and
relocate where he could obtain cheaper labor.
39 See also Van De Kamp's Holland-Dutch Bakers, Inc, 56 NLRB
694, 707, 711, enfd 152 F 2d 818, modified 154 F 2d 828 (C A 9)
0 See New England Liquor Sales Co , Inc, 157 NLRB 153, Ben Cor-
son Manufacturing Co , 112 NLRB 323, 342
41 Landgrafs affidavit, dated August 18, 1966, given to a Labor Board
investigator, states Swisher called him a "Nazi" but makes no mention of
him being accused by Swisher of running his plant like a "concentration
camp " Lee Ruth Waller, Respondent 's secretary, testified she overheard
the conversation between Landgraf and Swisher and the latter called
Landgraf "a dirty German "
The Respondent also claims that assuming, arguendo,
a clear demand for recognition was made, this demand
was accompanied by such vile and abusive language that
the demand cannot be considered valid or enforceable.
Gerhard Landgraf claimed that when Swisher, the union
official, came to his office on July 1 that in the course of
their conversation, Swisher called him a "Nazi" and ac-
cused him of running his plant like a "concentration
camp. "41 Assuming, but not accepting Landgrafs version
of what occurred in this respect, and certainly such contu-
melious and scurrilous language can neither be ignored
nor condoned, it should be noted that these vituperative
accusations were allegedly made in the course of a meet-
ing at which the Union requested recognition Such con-
frontations between employers and unions sometimes
take on many aspects of hard, serious, and intense
exchange of views accompanied by various gradations of
opprobrious and colorful language not heard usually in a
drawing room. Such modes of expression must be viewed
in the context in which it occurs as it is not at all unusual
in the industrial relations field for participants to not al-
ways employ the language used in polite formal society.
It is also a fact that tempers are aggravated and attitudes
harden in the stress and strain of sensitive situations such
as the one involved here. Restraint might be more desira-
ble, but cannot be expected realistically.42
Thus, under such an atmosphere, a frank, provocative,
and not always complimentary exchange of views must
be expected and permitted the participants if discussion
is to be fruitful rather than sterile. They must not be in-
hibited by niceties and semantics and they must be free to
debate and challenge one another without censorship or
liability for intemperate statements even if in the course
of discussion rant, fustian, bombast, and uncomplimenta-
ry, angry, and rude remarks are exchanged and the
character, veracity, and repute of participants questioned.
If conferees were liable to being charged with an unfair
labor practice for threatening or abusive statements made
or a resentful employer permitted to seize upon derogato-
ry statements directed at him by a union representative as
a valid reason for refusing to continue bargaining,
negotiations would become stilted and sterile, and parties
to such negotiations would hesitate to participate. Such
a result would be contrary to the policy and purpose of
the Act; namely, that stable industrial peace can most
satisfactorily be secured by encouraging the processes of
collective bargaining.43 It would seem that such extreme
statements which allegedly were made during this first
meeting between Swisher and Landgraf, however
regrettable, cannot justify a refusal to continue negotia-
tions in view of the sometimes acrimonious and bitter re-
marks exchanged during the give-and-take of bargaining
sessions . It would seem that a line exists beyond which
bargaining conferees may not with impunity go, but that
need not be decided here as it is highly significant that the
day following this first meeting, Landgraf, at his own sug-
gestion and initiative, met with Union Representative
Swisher in an attempt to resolve their difference S.44
42 Cf Indiana Gear Works, a Division of the Buehler Corporation, 156
NLRB 397,401
43 Section 201 of the Act
44 In Deeco, Inc , 127 NLRB 666, the employer refused to deal with
the union's representative because he called the employer a "liar " The
Board found this to be a violation of Section 8 (a)(5) because an employer
may not dictate to a union its selection of representatives unless the
union's agent 's remarks or epithets show an attitude which would make
any attempt at good-faith bargaining a futility.
BAY STANDARD PRODUCTS MFG. CO.
Respondent also claims that the Union lacked the
majority status necessary to support an order to bargain
"because of the fleeting nature of the Union's majority
status." It will be recalled that as of the time the Union
requested recognition that approximately 18 of the 23
employees in the appropriate unit had signed union
authorization cards. Thereupon, by virtue of the provi-
sions of Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union became the ex-
clusive representative of all the employees in the bargain-
ing unit , and Section 8(a)(5) provides that when an em-
ployer refuses to bargain with the representative chosen
by his employees, he is guilty of an unfair labor practice.
Such a showing has been made here.
It is uncontradicted that the union representative at-
tempted to hand Landgraf a letter requesting recognition
but that he refused to accept it, whereupon Swisher
placed it upon Landgrafs desk. When Landgraf refused
to accept the letter, he acted at his peril in refusing to
recognize a duly selected bargaining agent in view of the
Union's majority status being clearly established and by
engaging in unlawful conduct designed to undermine the
Union.45 Respondent elected to take "the chance of
what [the facts] might be."46
Based upon the entire record in this proceeding, includ-
ing the Respondent's refusal to accept the recognition
letter, and for the reasons delineated below, it properly
can be inferred information came to the notice of the
Respondent which apprised it that the union letter it
refused to accept was a request for recognition and bar-
gaining. Moreover, it is well settled that such knowledge
may be based on circumstantial evidence.47 Assuming,
arguendo, lack of direct evidence that Respondent
literally read the Union's letter, the Trial Examiner is not
precluded from finding knowledge on the basis of such in-
contestably strong circumstantial evidence, as is present
here; namely, that Respondent, upon its refusal to accept
the Union's letter, the day after the employees' June 29
meeting, immediately embarked upon a course of pur-
poseful and perverse conduct, beginning with the
discharge of an employee, as well as interrogations and
threats, all in order to dissipate the Union's majority.48
Accordingly, it is found that the Respondent refused to
bargain collectively on July 1, 1966, and since, with the
Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in
an appropriate unit and thereby deprived its employees
not only of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act,
but also violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.4s
The Trial Examiner has carefully read and studied
counsel for the Respondent's excellent brief which makes
a thorough analysis of the testimony in support of his con-
tention that the General Counsel has failed to prove the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and cites
various cases in support. However, the trier of these facts
finds no occasion for lengthening this Decision by citing,
distinguishing , or discussing them because it is believed
that the controlling reasons for this Decision have been
sufficiently discussed. Moreover, counsel's arguments
are premised on an interpretation of the facts which the
Trial Examiner does not share.
45 N L R B v Piqua Munising Wood Products Co, 109 F.2d 552, 556
(C A 6)
46 N.L R.B v Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F 2d 862, 869 (C A 2), cert.
denied 304 U S 576, 585, N L R B v Elliott- Wilhams Co ., Inc, 345
F 2d 460 (C A 7),enfg I43 NLRB 81 1
41 F W Woolworth Company v N L.R B ., 121 F 2d 658, 660 (C A
2), N L.R B. v C. W Radcliffe, supra at 315
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
347
1. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent at their Concord, California, plant, excluding
office clerical employees, supervisors, guards, and
watchmen as defined in the Act, constitute a unit ap-
propriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
3. At all times since July 1, 1966, the Union has been
the exclusive representative of all the employees in the
aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
4. By refusing on and after July 1, 1966, to bargain
collectively with the Union, Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By discharging Ray Lackey, Respondent dis-
criminated against him in regard to his tenure of employ-
ment, and the terms and conditions thereof, to discourage
membership in the Union and thereby engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
7. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the allegations of para-
graphs V(b), (c), and (e) of the complaint. It will be
recommended that said complaint be, to that extent,
dismissed.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices as above set forth, it will be recommended that
it cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative action,
set forth below, found necessary and designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent interfered with,
coerced, and restrained its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act which the basic
purpose of the Act was designed to achieve, it shall be
recommended that Respondent be required to cease and
desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act. 50
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily
discharged Ray Lackey, it will be recommended that it
offer him immediate, full, and unconditional reinstate-
ment to his former or substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or other rights,
privileges, or working conditions, and make him whole
for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the dis-
crimination against him, by paying to him a sum of money
41 See Malone Knitting Company, 152 NLRB 643, fn 2, Employers'
Association of Building Metal Fabricators , Rhode Island District; Rum-
ford Steel Products , Inc , 149 NLRB 382
19 Marvin A Wit beck, d/bla Witbeck's IGA Supermarket , 155 N LRB
40,fn 2
so N L R B v Entwistle Mfg Co, 120 F 2d 532 (C A. 4); California
Lingerie Inc , 129 NLRB 912
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
equal to the amount he would have earned from the date
of the discrimination against him until such discrimination
has been fully eradicated, less his net earnings during the
period of such discrimination. Backpay with interest at
the rate of 6 percent per annum, shall be computed in the
manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716.
Inasmuch as the discharge of employees for reasons of
union affiliation or concerted activity has been regarded
by the Board as one of the most effective methods of de-
feating the exercise by employees of their rights to self-
organization, the Trial Examiner is of the belief that there
is danger that the commission of unfair labor practices
generally is to be anticipated from Respondent's unlawful
conduct in the past. It will be recommended, therefore,
that Respondent be required to cease and desist from in
any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act.51
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, it is recommended that Respondent,
Gerhard Landgraf and Peter Landgraf, d/b/a Bay Stan-
dard Products Mfg. Co., its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from-
(a) Coercively interrogating employees as to their
membership in, views about, or activities on behalf of in-
ternational Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge No. 115, Local
Lodge No. 824, or any other labor organization.
(b) Threatening to close down the Respondent's plant
if employees engaged in union activities, or if any union
were selected by the employees as their collective-bar-
gaining representative.
(c) Discouraging membership in the aforesaid Union,
or any other labor organization of its employees, by dis-
criminatorily discharging, or in any other manner dis-
criminating against any employee in regard to hire,
tenure, or any term or condition of employment.
(d) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with International Association of Machin-
ists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge
No. 115, Local Lodge No. 824, as the exclusive
representative of all their employees in the following ap-
propriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees of Respond-
ent at their Concord, California, plant, excluding office
clerical employees, supervisors, guards, and watchmen as
defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(b) of the Act.
(e) Discouraging membership in International As-
sociation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, District Lodge No. 115, Local Lodge No.
824, or any other labor organization of its employees, or
by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their
hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the appropriate unit with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Offer to Ray Lackey immediate, full, and uncondi-
tional reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
other rights, privileges, or working conditions, and make
him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered
by reason of the discrimination in the manner set forth in
the above section entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Notify Ray Lackey if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payments records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary or useful to determine or compute the
amount of backpay due, as herein provided.
(e) Post at its plant premises in Concord, California,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."52
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by
Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.53
51 N L R B v Entwistle Mfg Co, supra, 536
12 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
"I In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respond-
ent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge No . 115, Local
Lodge No . 824, or any other labor organization of
BAY STANDARD PRODUCTS MFG. CO.
our employees , by discharging you or by discriminat-
ing in regard to your hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of your employment.
WE WILL NOT discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against you because of your assistance
to or support of any union.
WE WILL offer to Ray Lackey immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job with us and pay him
the wages he lost by reason of his discharge.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate you about
your membership or conduct on behalf of any union.
WE WILL NOT close or move the plant if you help
a union or select a union to represent you.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with,
restrain , or coerce you in the exercise of your right to
self-organization , to form labor organizations , to join
or assist International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge No.
115, Local Lodge No. 824 , or any other labor or-
ganization of our employees , to bargain collectively
through representatives of your own choosing, or to
engage in other concerted activities for the purposes
of mutual aid, or to refrain from any and all such ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, District Lodge No. 115, Local Lodge
No. 824 , as the exclusive representative of our em-
ployees in the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL, upon request , bargain with International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO, District Lodge No. 115, Local Lodge
No. 824 , as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the bargaining unit described below
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment , and other conditions of employment , and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such an un-
derstanding in a signed agreement.
349
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the ef-
forts of International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge No.
115, Local Lodge No. 824, on behalf of such em-
ployees.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent at their Concord, California, plant,
excluding office clerical employees, supervisors,
guards, and watchmen as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropnate for purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or not to
become or remain members of any union.
Dated By
BAY STANDARD PRODUCTS
MFG. CO.
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
Note: We will notify Ray Lackey if presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to
full reinstatement upon application in accordance with
the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 13050 Federal
Building, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San
Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-3197.