Barbara Kendra, Complainant,v.Hershel W. Gober, Acting Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 29, 2000
01995353 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 29, 2000)

01995353

08-29-2000

Barbara Kendra, Complainant, v. Hershel W. Gober, Acting Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Barbara Kendra v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01995353

August 29, 2000

Barbara Kendra, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01995353

v. ) Agency No. 970916

)

Hershel W. Gober, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Barbara Kendra (complainant) timely initiated an appeal from a final

agency decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted

pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405). Complainant alleged that she was discriminated

against on the basis of physical disability (loss of joints in feet)

when:

her March 1995 performance evaluation was lowered from �Outstanding�

to �Fully;�<2>

she was required to perform Supply Technician duties in or about March

1995;

she was denied light duty between July 1995 and November 1995;

she was harassed by her supervisor on January 23, 1997 when he

questioned her in a DDTC staff meeting about computer listings;

she was harassed by her supervisor on February 13, 1997 when she asked

him about timecards for leave she was owed and he replied, �Why don't

you file an EEO on Fiscal like you do me?�; and

her working conditions were changed on July 9, 1996 due to a transfer to

Outpatient DDTC, again denying her requested reasonable accommodation.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Program Secretary at the agency's West Side Health

Care System in Chicago, Illinois. Believing she was a victim of

discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed

a formal complaint on February 21, 1997, raising claim nos. 4-6. At the

conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of her right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or, alternatively,

to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant requested a

hearing and her case was assigned to an Administrative Judge (AJ).

After reviewing complainant's prehearing filings, the AJ determined

that complainant requested to broaden her complaint to include other

discriminatory acts, i.e., claim nos. 1-3. The AJ therefore remanded

the complaint to the agency on March 4, 1998, noting that the record did

not indicate whether complainant sought EEO counseling on these issues

and did not include an investigation into these issues.

On March 19, 1998, the agency asked complainant to contact an EEO

counselor and discuss claim nos. 1-3. While complainant's communication

with the EEO office was occurring, she accepted disability retirement

on April 3, 1998.

On May 20, 1998, the agency issued a FAD, dismissing claim nos. 1-3

under 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(2)) for failure to initiate contact

with an EEO Counselor within the required time period. The agency

also dismissed claim nos. 4-6 pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5),

concluding that complainant's April 3, 1998 retirement rendered her

claims moot. In so finding, the agency noted that complainant did not

request compensatory damages.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, complainant raises a number of contentions, including three

key points. First, she notes that when she mentioned claim nos. 1-3 in

her prehearing statements, she merely intended to show how her working

conditions deteriorated, rather than to request that her complaint be

broadened. Second, she notes that the agency's failure to accommodate

her disability led to the worsening of her conditions, such that she

finally was forced to accept disability retirement. Third, she notes that

absent discrimination, she intended to work three more years so that she

could receive a 20 year pension, and requests compensation for this loss.

In response, the agency reiterates that complainant's April 3, 1998

retirement renders her complaint moot in that she only requested equitable

relief, not compensatory damages.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints

of discrimination be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment

Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the

matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel

action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action.

The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed

to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five

(45) day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Department

of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). "The time

period is triggered as soon as a complainant suspects discrimination

and the complainant may not wait until all supporting facts have become

apparent." Whalen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05960147

(September 18, 1997).

In the case at hand, complainant initiated counseling on December 31,

1996, well beyond the 45-day time requirement for claim nos. 1-3, which

occurred between March 1995 and November 1995. EEOC regulations provide

that the agency or the Commission shall extend the time limits when the

individual shows that she was not notified of the time limits and was not

otherwise aware of them, that she did not know and reasonably should not

have known that the discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred,

that despite due diligence she was prevented by circumstances beyond

her control from contacting the Counselor within the time limits, or

for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission.

Here, complainant has not made any such showing. Moreover, complainant

appears to have never raised claim nos. 1 and 3 with an EEO counselor,

even beyond the 45 day time limit. Nor did complainant allege that claim

nos. 1-3 should be accepted under a theory of continuing violation.

In fact, on appeal complainant clarifies that she raised these issues

as background evidence, to show the deterioration of her working

conditions. The agency's dismissal of these claims is therefore AFFIRMED.

We note however, that these untimely claims must still be considered as

background evidence in the processing of claim nos. 4-6, discussed below.

See Ferguson v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05970792 (March

30, 1999).

Turning to claim nos. 4-6, EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5)

provides for the dismissal of a complaint, or portions thereof, when the

issues raised therein are moot. To determine whether the issues raised in

complainant's complaint are moot, the fact finder must ascertain whether

(1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation

that the alleged violation will recur; and (2) interim relief or events

have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged

discrimination. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631

(1979); Kuo v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970343 (July

10, 1998). When such circumstances exist, no relief is available and

no need for a determination of the rights of the parties is presented.

The agency argues that complainant's claim is moot because her

retirement rendered impossible the recurrence of the alleged violations

and eradicated the effects of any discrimination. In support of this

argument, the agency notes that complainant did not request compensatory

damages. After a thorough review of the file, however, we find that

complainant's retirement did not completely and irrevocably eradicate

the effects of the alleged discrimination.

First, in her initial appeal statement, complainant requests compensatory

damages. Complainant notes that �she was put through so much traumatic

stress� based on the agency's failure to accommodate her disability and

other discriminatory actions, that she �ended up in the hospital.� The

Commission has held that a complainant need not use legal terms of art

such as �compensatory damages,� but may use other words or phrases that

put the agency on notice that the relevant pecuniary or non-pecuniary

loss has been incurred. See Roubachewsky v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Request No 05960194 (January 6, 1997); Haynes v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05920891 (December 14, 1993). In addition,

complainant spells out her request for compensation for �pain, suffering

and physical and emotional trauma� as well as for medical costs, in

her response to the agency's statement on appeal. The Commission has

held that even if, as here, complainant raises compensatory damages for

the first time on appeal, a complaint is not moot due to the potential

availability of damages. See Roubachewsky; see also Kyriazi v. Department

of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05930086 (March 4, 1994).

Moreover, if complainant establishes that she was wrongly denied

reasonable accommodation, she will be entitled to relief that would

place her in the position she would have been in had no discrimination

occurred. Complainant alleges that if she had been accommodated, she

would have remained at her job for 3 more years in order to receive

a 20 year pension. Thus, if complainant establishes discrimination,

she may be entitled to back pay. It cannot be said, therefore, that

her retirement completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the

alleged discrimination.

Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of claim nos. 1-3 was proper and

is AFFIRMED. The agency's dismissal of claim nos. 4-6 as moot<3> was

improper and is REVERSED. Claim nos. 4-6 are REMANDED in accordance

with the following order and applicable regulations.

Finally, we note that complainant contends on appeal that she was

forced to accept disability retirement because of the agency's refusal

to accommodate her disability. The record reveals that at the time

of her retirement, complainant had worked at the agency for 17 years.

Complainant contends that if her disability had been accommodated, she

would have worked 3 more years in order to receive a 20 year pension.

The agency does not respond to this contention. As this claim is clearly

related to the issue of whether complainant was denied a reasonable

accommodation, it shall be consolidated with claim nos. 4-6 on remand.

ORDER

The complaint--including claim nos. 4-6 and the forced retirement

claim--is remanded to the Hearings Unit of the Chicago District Office

for scheduling of a hearing in an expeditious manner. The agency is

directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit

within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

The agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at

the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted

to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue

a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R.� 1614.109 and

the agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �

1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0400)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN

THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

August 29, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2 A review of the record indicates that complainant intended to allege

that she had received an evaluation of �Outstanding� in the prior

evaluation period and received the lower evaluation in March 1995.

3 While complainant's claim that she was denied reasonable accommodation

in July 1996 may appear to have been untimely raised, the Commission has

held that a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation may constitute

a recurring violation, that is, a violation that recurs anew each day

that the employer fails to provide the accommodation. See Mitchell

v. Department of Commerce, EEOC Appeal No. 01934120 (March 4, 1994).

Hence, complainant's December 31, 1996 counselor contact was timely.