Baptist Memorial Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1976

225 N.L.R.B. 525 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Baptist Memorial Hospital and American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO. Cases 26-CA-5734, 26-CA-5781,
and 26-CA-5875
June 30, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
On January 27, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, including a
response to Respondent's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs'
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions I of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order, as modified here-
in.4
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
'The Respondent 's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the
record and exceptions in our view adequately present the issues and posi-
tions of the parties
2 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3, 1951) We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
3 The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent's rule pro-
hibiting uniformed employees wearing medallions and identification other
than "name plates, school pins, professional registration insignia, and hospi-
tal service pins," as enforced , violated Sec. 8(a)(1) We agree Notwithstand-
ing this prohibition against wearing of all insignia other than professional
and hospital pins, Respondent permitted employees to wear at least one
other type of pin , namely, United Fund pins Since Respondent permitted
the wearing of items other than those in the rule, we conclude , in agreement
with the Administrative Law Judge , that the prohibition against the wearing
of union buttons was not directed at any legitimate purpose of Respondent
Rather, it was designed to thwart the Union's organizing campaign in viola-
tion of Sec 8 (a)(I) St Joseph 's Hospital, 225 NLRB 348 (1976) In so find-
ing, however , we do not rely on the Administrative Law Judge 's finding and
conclusion that the rule on its face is unlawful
The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently failed to include the name
of Francis Middleton in par 2 (a) of his recommended Order and the notice
to employees Accordingly , we shall make the appropriate modification in
the order and notice
525
Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Bap-
tist Memorial Hospital, Memphis, Tennessee, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order as so
modified:
1. Add the name "Francis Middleton" to the end
of paragraph 2(a).
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT place reprimand or disciplinary
notices following counseling interviews in the
personnel files of any of our employees for the
purpose of intimidating them and coercing them
with respect to their union activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con-
cerning their union activites or as to how they
intend to vote in union elections.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees con-
cerning the union activities of other employees.
WE WILL NOT invite our employees to bring
their individual grievances to us for satisfaction
instead of acting through their union.
WE WILL NOT offer improvements in condi-
tions of employment to our employees for the
purpose of inducing them to abandon their
union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge employees
if they persist in their prounion activities.
WE WILL NOT offer to assist employees to with-
draw from their union activities or from their
membership in union organizing committees.
WE WILL NOT spy or attempt to spy upon the
union activities of our employees.
WE WILL remove from the personnel files of
the following employees certain disciplinary rep-
rimand notices which we have placed there for
the purpose of coercing them to abandoning
their union activities. Those employees are
named as follows:
Rasher Maclin Phyllis Taylor
Eddie May Pearson Gwendolyn Smith
Patty Wilkins Francis Middleton
WE WILL NOT prohibit the wearing of union buttons
or insignia by any of our employees anywhere in the
hospital premises.
225 NLRB No. 69
526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT In any like or related manner inter-
fere with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the
exercise of their rights to self -organization , to join or
assist American Federation of State , County and
Municipal Employees , AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organizations , and to engage in other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any
and all such activities.
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held on November 17, 18, 19, and
20, 1975, at Memphis, Tennessee, on complaint of the Gen-
eral Counsel against Baptist Memorial Hospital, herein
called the Respondent. The original complaint, later
amended, issued on October 1, 1975, on a charge filed Au-
gust 4, 1975, by American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union.
The essential question presented is whether the Respon-
dent, in a variety of ways, unlawfully restrained and
coerced its employees in their efforts towards self organiza-
tion in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act. Briefs were
filed after the close of the hearing by the General Counsel
and the Respondent.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Baptist Memorial Hospital is a general welfare corpora-
tion doing business in the State of Tennessee, where it op-
erates a hospital providing health care services . During the
past 12 months in the course of its business it received
gross revenues for services rendered to patients in an
amount in excess of $250,000. I find that the Respondent is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that American Federation of State , County and
Municipal Employees , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Baptist Memorial Hospital is one of the largest in the
country, with well over 4,000 employees, professionals and
nonprofessionals. The Union started an organizational
campaign in 1974, with widespread handbilling at the hos-
pital entrances beginning sometime in September. At the
start few employees participated in the distribution of
union literature; in January more of them did so; and by
July 1975 regular weekly meetings of an employee commit-
tee were being held and more and more employees joined
the committee and gave out handbills at the various en-
trances. The Union sent letters to the hospital's administra-
tive authorities listing the names of the union committee
members-the letters are dated July 25, 28, 30, and 31,
August 7, 11, 12, 21, 25, and 27, September 11, and Octo-
ber 23. The Union also distributed in great numbers at the
hospital entrances leaflets announcing the names of the
employees who had joined the organizational committee;
these were distributed on July 31 and August 4, 5, and 21.
On September 19, 1975, the Union filed a representation
petition seeking a Board-conducted election among over
1,500 employees, and a hearing on that petition was held in
the latter part of October.
The substance of the complaint-albeit it pinpoints a
long series of individual acts-is that the Employer reacted
to all this by resorting to coercive tactics designed to dis-
suade the employees, but particularly those known to be
the organizers, away from their prounion resolve. The com-
plaint lists allegations of threats, interrogations , promises
of benefits, and other devices aimed at intimidating the
employees and thereby putting a stop to their activities.
The case presents essentially a picture of.repetitive viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act- illegal interference, re-
straint, and coercion. Certain precise acts alleged are also
said to have constituted violations of Section 8(a)(3), but
only in a tangential sense.
The Respondent denies the commission of any unfair
labor practices.
A. Preliminary Comment
The parties spent much time in the hearing of this case;
repetitive details were brought out again and again, cross-
examination went on and on, like incidents were related
but added little new to the story, and counsel for both sides
submitted very extensive briefs. But all that is really in-
volved is a program of improper interference with the at-
tempt by employees to engage in collective bargaining,
their statutory right. Too great delay in the administrative
processing of this case could frustrate their exercise of that
fundamental right. There is an election in the offing, for
whatever questions need be decided in the representation
case are already before the Board. The basic purpose of the
Act is to assure that employees have the privilege, if they so
chose, to vote on the question of union or no union, and to
do so without coercion by their employer. It would be a
mistake, therefore, to belabor again in unending detail here
all the minutiae of the 600-page record, for such an ap-
proach could only assure further delay before the Board of
what in the end is no more than one step preliminary to the
election that may soon be held.
There are some questions of credibility, but very few. By
and large the overly extended testimony was occasioned by
Respondent's witnesses explaining away certain admitted
statements as really innocuous, or in their opinion justified,
intended as something other than what on the face of
things would appear. Fourteen employees testified in sup-
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
port of the complaint , each an employee whose name had
been publicized as a member of the Union 's organizing
committee , and almost all of them concededly known to be
such by the Respondent . All of them held the lower ranks
of employment , in the sense that they do the lesser skilled
work , are less trained , and in consequence less artfully ar-
ticulate . In contrast , the Respondent 's witnesses , virtually
all supervisors and seemingly professionally qualified per-
sons, were very glib , evasive , argumentative ; indeed they
spoke as much injustification of their actions as they did in
denial . As a group, they were much less convincing than
were the rank-and-file employees.
The point which I think is pervasive in the case is well
illustrated by one or two incidents . At the start of the
union campaign, back in 1974, high management an-
nounced to its supervisory staff that henceforth there must
be comprehensive documentation of every jot and tittle of
reprimand talk and fault finding of employees that might
take place . The instruction was repeated at a number of
staff meetings in the spring of 1975 by the Respondent's
expert labor relations counsel . The printed forms used for
this purpose are entitled "Counseling Interview Records";
some , but only very few, had been used in the past. With
advent of the Union , they came, as to some employees
anyway, in a flood. It took some effort to draw the un-
equivocal admission, but the supervisors finally did say
that these are straight reprimand notices, placed in the per-
sonnel files of the employees all the time , for use in possi-
ble discipline or discharge . And, of course , they have an
intimidating effect upon the employee who is made to
know such things are placed in his or her file.
As they spoke about this or that reprimand notice that
had been written up and detailed the circumstances relat-
ing to it , the supervisors repeatedly answered purely factual
questions with expanded explanations of why, in a hospital
trying to help sick people, rules of conduct had to be en-
forced without question.
Phyllis Taylor is a radiology aide, on the fob since Janu-
ary 1973 . She became active in the union campaign. She
was absent at times and always conformed with the system
of being required to telephone in before her appointed
hour if she could not come to work. She had such an ab-
sence , calling in in advance, during July . On July 31, 1975,
during a morning distribution of union literature, her name
appeared on a leaflet as a member of the organizing com-
mittee . At 4 o'clock that afternoon her supervisor, Sue
Hayes, called Taylor to the office , showed her a reprimand
notice , and asked her to sign it; it listed 10 precise and
dated absences , starting on January 2, 1975 , and ending
with that of July 17. Was this only normal recording of a
reprimand for improper job performance by an employee,
or was it a coercive tactic aimed at putting the fear of the
Employer into the aide if she persisted in her union activi-
ty? Hayes had spoken to Taylor a month earlier about her
absences and told her she had to improve. But throughout
the 2-1 /2 years of employment no notice of any kind had
been placed in her personnel file. When she invited Taylor
to her office that day, Hayes had the union leaflet with the
girl's name on her desk and admitted she had seen the
name there. She explained the delay in talking to Taylor
about this absence 2 weeks earlier on the ground she,
527
Hayes , had been on vacation . But she returned on the 28th
and saw Taylor that day and the next 2 days at work, yet
said nothing to her then . Further , why did it become so
important to have Taylor admit to delinquencies in atten-
dance dating back to January 1st? It would be an under-
statement to say Hayes' story is suspect . Asked had she
inquired whether the girl's absence had been excused,
Hayes refused to answer , and then admitted she did not
care . Taylor refused to sign the reprimand because she was
not sure the absences there listed were correct . Hayes told
her she would put it in the employee 's personnel file any-
way. In the total circumstances I find her reason for writ-
ing this reprimand , for asking Taylor to sign it, and for
placing it in her file was to coerce her in her union activi-
ties, and therefore in every respect a violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Rashire Maclin is an operating room technician, called a
scrub nurse , and she worked for 2 years. She became active
for the Union beginning late in 1974; she attended meet-
ings, handbilled at the entrances early in 1975 , and author-
ized her name on the committee leaflet by July 31, 1975.
The first reprimand notice in her personnel file she was
ever aware of, and asked to sign , is dated March 15, 1975.
From that day on more than 30 additional reprimand no-
tices have been put in her file , some signed by her and
some not . Many relate to absences, some explained by her
sickness or that of her child , and some for lateness-one
for being 4 minutes late, one 7 minutes late, and two for
having been subpenaed to testify in an NLRB hearing.
Again , was the employee confronted with all these formal
documents of criticism , all placed in her file after she
signed or refused to sign , because it was a normal way of
doing business , simply because the supervisors wanted to
be able to "remember"-as some of them said-or was the
Respondent 's purpose to make her understand she risked
her fob by continuing with her union activities ? Who ever
heard of 30 written reprimand notices within a 9-month
period without the employee being discharged , or at least
disciplined in some way? What this means, of course, is
that the record of absences and latenesses in Maclin's case
are normal aspects of employment for her type of work,
and her type of recruited employee. If there is any doubt of
an ulterior and unlawful motive , it is disspelled by refer-
ence to a single reprimand . It is dated June 5, 1974 [sic];
Maclin had never seen it or heard of it until Louise Court-
ney, her immediate supervisor , asked her to sign it on July
30, 1975! Courtney 's only answer to the question why did
she ask the employee to sign the ancient document at all,
was because "she had not signed it." For the least Court-
ney was not telling the truth at the hearing.
There is more that bears a logical relationship to this
matter of the reprimand notices. Early in August, a few
days after being asked to sign the old notice , and a few
days after her name had appeared on the July 31 union
leaflet as a member of the organization committee , Maclin
was called to the office for a periodic evaluation. There
Courtney and Robinson, the higher supervisor, talked to
her. Maclin testified that Courtney told her "she was very
disappointed to see my name on the list . . . she didn't
know why I felt like I needed a union . . . if I was so
dissatisfied with my job, why did I stay there . . . she also
528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
told me that I could leave." Maclm thought Courtney was
referring to transfer to some other department and suggest-
ed it. To this Courtney answered "I'll see what I can do."
Still according to Maclm, Robinson then said , "if I had
had problems why had I not tried to talk to Ms. Courtney
or Dr. Groner . . . to alleviate problems . . . she felt like
the umon wasn't the place for Baptist." When Robinson
asked her "why do you feel you need a union," Maclm said
for overtime pay, which she was not receiving. The meeting
ended with no talk of evaluation at all. Robinson 's testimo-
ny is not really different. She recalled Courtney did say she
was disappointed to see Machn's name on the union leaf-
let, and that there was talk of why the employees wanted a
union. Robinson also admitted asking why had not Maclm
"tried . . . to talk to her employer ... if she was not satis-
fied with her position . . ." When Courtney was asked at
the hearing whether she had invited Maclin to leave the
hospital, she avoided a direct answer; "I do that to most
any of them."
I credit Maclm. However indirectly the supervisors may
have put it, they were interrogating her concerning her
union sympathies , inviting her to present her grievances
individually to them, offering to satisfy her demands to
dissuade her from her resolve, and even threatening to get
her out of the hospital if she did not quit. The barrage of
recorded reprimands, coupled with this kind of "counsel-
ing interview" talk-a pure euphemism-makes the in-
tended and inevitable coercion clear. By this conduct of
Courtney and Robinson the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. See New Fairview Hall Convalescent
Home, 206 NLRB 688 (1973). 1 also find that by placing
the June 5, 1974, reprimand in Maclin's file, the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3).
One other incident involving Maclin deserves mention
here. On November 12, 5 days before the start of the hear-
ing in this case , three more reprimand notices were placed
in her file. On the 5th, her day off, Mackin came to the
hospital for her paycheck. While there she asked the de-
partment secretary if she could talk a moment with a Mrs.
Everett, a nurse on duty. Everett was called, came to the
hall, and the two spoke for a moment or two. Robinson, at
a nearby desk, then asked Everett to return to her post. On
November 8, Mackin did not feel well and asked for a
change of assignment-to circulation nurse instead of
scrub nurse. Courtney obliged her. While on duty her hus-
band telephoned, she was called out, and she spoke to him.
Four days later Robinson called her to the office and asked
her to sign two reprimands, one for the 5th and one for the
8th.
Mackin testified, without contradiction, that before that
date it was an accepted practice for employees to receive
occasional personal telephone calls while on duty, and that
no one had ever before been criticized for it. She refused to
sign the reprimands, because, she said, the secretary had
approved Everett coming out to talk to her and because
she had only talked to her husband once (Robinson told
her she had received three calls). Robinson then called the
secretary, who, in Machn's presence, said her husband had
called her three times; Maclm then said "It's a lie." With
this, Robinson immediately wrote up a third reprimand,
for calling the secretary a liar. Maclin also testified she
later learned her husband had called three times, but twice
had not been connected to her.
Robinson 's explanation of all this tells a revealing story.
She said that on the 5th she had seen Maclin talking with
Everett in the hall, that for a while she did nothing because
"I thought maybe .. . she had something very short she
needed to tell her, I was trying to be nice." This was admis-
sion that such incidents did not merit faultfinding. And
perhaps this is why Robinson also found it necessary to
add to the reprimand notice the following extended justifi-
cation : "Mrs. Maclm should asked the nurse in charge for
permission to talk to Mrs. Everett. It is not customary for
personnel to be called from their assignment to see visitors
unless it is an emergency or a matter of importance that
should not wait. We do relay messages to our personnel."
As to the November 8th incident, it is a fact Mackin only
talked once on the phone. Courtney had agreed to her
doing one job instead of another that day because of her
physical condition. Notwithstanding, the reprimand notice
relating to that day contains the following statement. "If a
person is sick or unable to carry out their assigned duty
then they should stay homt and not be a liability to their
co-workers. And according to law scrubbing is an OR.
techician's duty. There is a limit on time for phone calls
and it should be observed conscientiously. The patient is
paying for a service that they are getting."
If what happened on the 5th and the 8th merited repri-
mand at all-and I am sure it did not (what did Mrs Mac-
lin have to do with the fact Mr. Mackin made two calls
that were ignored?)-there is no explanation of why the
notices were not written at the time. Robinson had been a
participant in the first incident. Why were the notices pre-
pared so belatedly? On this total record there can be no
question but that all three of these personnel entries were
no more than further implementation of a fixed policy to
use ostensibly proper recording methods as an intimidation
technique for coercing Maclm away from her union activi-
ties. I find that Robinson 's conduct vis-a-vis Mackin that
day constituted further violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, and that placement in her file of the three notices
constituted violations of Section 8(a)(3).
B. Further Incidents of Coercive Use of Reprimand File
Notices
As stated above, very extensive use of these warning
writeups charging misbehavior to the employees, was an
innovation timed with the advent of the Union. The super-
visors admitted they were told the new system was being
instituted because now there was a union problem. At the
hearing, counsel for the Respondent contended there is
nothing improper in any employer making provable rec-
ords of absences, latenesses , disobedience, or of any kind
of error or rule infraction by an employee. The argument
then continues , as a defense to the complaint , that there
can be no finding of illegal use of the reprimand system so
long as it can be shown that it was very widely practiced.
The theory here, apparently, is that so long as an employer
treats everybody alike, whatever it may do to this employee
or that must be excused. And in support of the defense, the
Respondent placed into evidence the personnel files of
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 529
over 150 other employees, some known unioneers and
others as to whom the record is silent. Many of these files
contain reprimand notices in great numbers. But the theory
of complaint is not that the mere act of filing written repri-
mand notices , even multiple notices, is of itself sufficient
proof of unfair labor practices. Rather, the allegation is
that in those incidents, as shown by the evidence, where the
Respondent used the method :or coercive purposes, unfair
labor practices were committed. This general defense ap-
proach, not substantially reasserted in the brief, is totally
unpersuasive. If an employer discharges employee A be-
cause of his union activity, the fact that it may have also
discharged others hardly offsets the evidence of wrong-
doing as to A.'
Another incident on this aspect of the case involved Ed-
die May Pearson , a nursing assistant working as a relief
floater. She had been an employee over 4 years and joined
the organizing committee. She was called into the office of
Lillian Parker, her administrative supervisor, early in Au-
gust, after her name appeared on the union leaflet as a
committee member. Her testimony is that Parker said she
was "surprised" to see her name on the leaflet, that she did
not think the Baptist Hospital was a place for the Union,
and then went on to explain the existing benefits the em-
ployees enjoyed and asked what the employees who at-
tended union meetings expected. Pearson said she had nev-
er before been called into such a conference. Parker's
version of this talk in her office is that she called the em-
ployee in to discuss the hospital benefits with her. It was
impossible to draw a coherent answer from her as to why
she had invited Pearson for such a talk at all. In fact,
Parker's deliberate and repetitive evasion of one straight
question after another, and her clearly argumentative de-
meanor as a witness , made her an absolutely discredited
witness. With knowledge of the woman's now publicized
union activity, she was interrogating her, pure and simple,
and thereby violating Section 8(a)(l) of the Act as alleged
in the complaint.
On September 27, while on duty, Pearson asked permis-
sion of the nurse in charge to visit a sick uncle in another
ward , was given permission , and went to see him for a
moment . Later in the shift she asked permission again, still
of the nurse in charge, and visited the relative briefly again.
She had done this before, always with permission, and nev-
er been criticized. Parker said the employees are permitted
to do this, but only during their breaks. A higher official of
the hospital testified unequivocally that employees had al-
ways been given permission to visit sick relatives by their
supervisors. No one said anything in criticism to Pearson
that day. But on October 2, Parker again called her to the
office, where she had written up a reprimand notice about
the incident, and asked why she had left her unit to go
somewhere else. Sensing invitation to argument , Pearson
stood silent ; she refused to sign because she had been given
permission, as always. And again the question arises: Why
did Parker wait 5 days to go through the impressive perfor-
mance after the nurses in charge had seen everything? In
addition to this reprimand-dated October 2-three other
documents were later added to Pearson's file. The only
date discernible on all three of them is "11-7," which I read
as November 7, Parker's varying testimony, only seemingly
to the contrary, notwithstanding. Now it was 10 days be-
fore the start of this hearing. The first of these additional
notices is a very extensive and detailed story of minute
occurences during September 28, 29, and 30. The next two
relate , sometimes clearly and sometimes obliquely, again to
the incident of September 28 about visiting the sick rela-
tive . It is not possible to understand what business -like or
reasonable purpose these last formal writeups served. The
best that can be understood from Parker' s explanation, as
offered at the hearing , is that she made all these entries so
long after the event because she only learned later that
Pearson had told other supervisors she had been visiting a
relative, and because she, Parker, dust wanted to record the
fact Pearson had not told her, Parker, about the relative! It
was a meaningless explanation by the supervisor. I can
only conclude that all this recording in the employee's per-
sonnel file was another instance of resort to the new "docu-
mentation system" for illegal coercive purposes, and I
therefore find the filing of all four written notices, that of
October 2 and the three of November 7, to have been vio-
lations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.2
C. Coercive Interrogations and Illegal Promises
1. J. W. Terry works out of the pharmacy, delivering
medicines, and became active in the Union. He testified
that on August 7, after his name appeared on the union
organizational committee leaflet , Grove Bowles, director of
the pharmacy department, called him into the office and
said : " I see your name is on the committee, so he said it
surprised me." Bowles then asked "why did I want the
union," and "did I know anybody working with the
union." Terry answered his cousin's wife was such a per-
son As they talked-as much as 30 minutes, as Terry re-
called-Bowles found occasion to tell Terry he could be
transferred to another department so as to have Saturdays
and Sundays free. Bowles denied having asked did the em-
ployee know about others who might be working for the
Union, but he did admit telling the man he was "surprised"
to see his name on the union list, and that Terry did say
"something about ... his sister-in-law . . . some member
of his family was working with the Union." Asked why he
brought up the subject of the Union by saying he was sur-
prised at Terry's participation, the witness gave no coher-
ent answer. I do not credit his denial, and I find he unlaw-
fully interrogated Terry about the identity of other
prounion persons and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
2. Leona Horton is an LPN working under Mary Chit-
man, a registered nurse. On August 11, Chitman told her "I
saw your name on the organizing committee . . . I was
very disappointed . . . If a Union comes in don't you think
that is going to make it harder on us?" When Horton re-
' Mississippi Tank Company, Inc 194 NLRB 923 (1972)
Z Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation [Iron Ring Branch] v N L R B, 362
F 2d 466 (C A 9, 1966)
530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sponded Chitman was not to blame for arrival of the
Union , the supervisor repeated " the union would make it
harder on us," and then asked had anyone harassed Hor-
ton to sign. The girl said no, and then suggested it was
improper for them to be talking about the union activities.
To this Chitman responded " I know , but I have been going
to ask you about this," and then went on to ask did the girl
know what she was doing, the Union would "make it much
harder on us," and finally "she would help me in anyway
that she could but , not in trying to organize the Union."
This is all from Horton 's testimony ; Chitman did not testi-
fy. I find Chitman coercively interrogated the employee,
threatened her with more difficult conditions of employ-
ment in the event a union prevailed-however obliquely
she may have articulated the thought , and offered to help
her discontinue her activities on behalf of the Union, all in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
3. Another example of subtle but nevertheless clear at-
tempts to influence employees away from the Union with
promises of material gain appears in the also uncontradict-
ed testimony of Marie Suggs , a housekeeping department
employee . She said that a few weeks after her name ap-
peared on the Union 's July 31 leaflet , Polly Kuhnl, her
supervisor , sat her down in an empty room to talk and said
that Louis Speck , director of housekeeping, had told her
"to ask me was there anything they had done to me to
make us want a Union." Suggs' testimony continues that
when she answered she was looking for "better benefits,
she [Kiihnl] said that the Union didn't care anything about
us, all they wanted was to get our money and, then after
they got our money, they won't know what happened to us.
Then she said that our benefits won't be too permanent
and, after we used up all of our sick days then we wouldn't
have any more."
I think the message was clear enough here. Expressions
of opinions are one thing , but suggestions to a housekeep-
ing employee that she would end up with less sick leave
allowance under a union than she was then enjoying-and
it matters not how round -about the words used to get the
idea across-is impermissible coercive intrusion by the
Employer into the right of employees to make their own
choice . I find that Kiihnl was threatening Suggs that day,
and therefore committed an unfair labor practice charge-
able to the Respondent.
4. The name of Dorothy Bean, another housekeeping
employee , appeared on the Union 's leaflet of August 20, as
a new member of the committee . The same day Speck, the
director, called her to his office to say, as he held the leaflet
in his hand , and as she testified: "I thought you were my
friend . . . I know you are not . . . Dorothy, why do you
think that you all need a union?" Bean answered among
other things that she had been passed over in favor of out-
siders in her applications for transfer to another depart-
ment . To this, Speck said "why didn't you come to me and
talk to me about your transfer . . . I will tell you what I
will do, I will check and see . . . and he told me to hold off
because I didn't know what he had coming for me ." Speck
talked to her about why it would be to her disadvantage to
favor the Union, and finally asked : "how was I going to
vote." She told him it was her secret.
Speck 's testimony is that he asked the girl in for the
purpose of telling her "I thought she was a friend of mine
.. . we talked some about . . . working toward the union
against the hospital . . I thought that she would be a help
to us as far as being a friend or employee of the hospital."
Beyond this , Speck said he could not recall "What all we
talked about."
I credit Bean , and I find that by questioning her as to
how she was going to vote , and by promising more favor-
able consideration of her application for transfer , the direc-
tor violated the proscriptions of the statute.
5. Vivian Cooper is a nursing assistant whose name ap-
peared on the organization committee list on July 31. Her
administrative supervisor , Helen Aloway , later called her
into the office , commented upon her name being on the
list, and "made a comment that if there was anything she
can do to get my name off the leaflet she would be glad to,
she and Mrs . Dubay [ Dube] . . . she also . . . said, Mrs.
Dubay should have talked to you several days prior to that
day .. .." As they talked , Aloway said she was "shocked
and amazed that I could do anything such as that," and
repeated "if there was anything she could do to help me get
my name off the leaflet to be sure to come to her ." The talk
lasted 30 minutes.
A few days later, still according to Cooper , Dubay called
her to the office and said she was "shocked and surprised
that my name should appear on the leaflet and if there was
anything she would do she would also help me get my
name off the leaflet."
Aloway denied having said anything about helping
Cooper leave the Union ; she also denied generally a varie-
ty of statements set out in the questions put to her by
Respondent 's counsel . She even equivocated on whether
she talked about the Union at all , but then : "I might have
mentioned to her that Mrs. Dubay might talk with her, but
I did not tell her about what . . . I suppose . . . I gather
that she would understand this was about the union, but I
did not say specifically what it would be about ." Aloway
also admitted that , after seeing the girl '; ame on the union
leaflet , she did ask did she know what she was doing. As to
her disagreement with Cooper , I do not credit Aloway.
Dubay, too, denied offering to help remove Cooper's
name from the committee list. And , as she continued to
testify: "I said , Cooper .. . I'm very curious . . . I dust got
the surprise of my life. I saw your name on this list . . . I
dust want you to tell me what prompted you to belong to a
union . . . I will like to know . . . what they offer you in
any way that I thought we could give you or we haven't
given you already ." Cooper answered the Union provided
educational programs , and to this, Dubay said: "Have you
tried to request formally for another position? . . . Has
anyone listened or not listened to you when you have
asked for it? . . . All you ' ll have to do is come to me, and
we'll make the right requisition, and I can see if I can help
you get whatever education it is you want."
I consider Dubay's total testimony virtual corroboration
of that of the employee . I find that both Aloway and Du-
bay questioned Cooper as to her reasons for joining the
Union in order to know how to bait her out of the idea,
and that both of them promised her better working condi-
tions as inducement for abandoning the Union , in each
incident violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL - 531
D. Attempt at Unlawful Surveillance
There is a house detective, Leon Cohen, a member of the
hospital security department. He is on friendly terms with
a porter named Charlie Carson, a known member of the
organizing committee, and one day asked and arranged for
Carson to go to a union meeting and report back about
what went on there. The testimony about what happened
was given by Carson and is uncontradicted because Cohen
did not testify. Carson, whose hours are from 3 to I 1 p.m.,
regularly has Wednesday off, but on Wednesday morning,
September 17, Cohen telephoned him to say Speck, in
charge of all housekeeping work and therefor chief over
both Cohen and Carson, had changed the man's day off
and wanted him to come to work that day. When Carson
asked why, Cohen refused to say on the telephone. Carson
came to the detective's office as directed and Cohen told
him there would be a union meeting the next night and he
wanted Carson to go there and "come back and tell me all
that you can remember." When Carson at first refused,
Cohen told him it would not hurt him and on a slip wrote
the address of the union meeting and scheduled hour-7
p.m. With this, Carson proceeded to his usual work station,
only to have his immediate supervisor, William Jackson,
say: "Today is your day off, what are you doing?" When
Carson just said he had been ordered to come to work,
Jackson took him to Speck's office, but after talking to the
secretary, told Carson to start work.
The next night Carson went to the union meeting. Mean-
while, at about 6:30 p.m., Cohen telephoned Mrs. Carson
at home, and asked that her husband telephone him when
he returned from the meeting. Carson did that, at about
midnight; Cohen asked him "What is going on"; Carson
answered it seemed like everybody there was for the
Union; and Cohen then said "You're not telling me ev-
erything. I'll talk to you tomorrow " The next day Cohen
again told Carson he was not reporting everything-"I
want to know the truth." When Carson repeated he only
knew all favored the Union, Cohen became angry and used
abusive language.
If Cohen spoke for management in this incident, it was
an outright attempt to spy upon the union activities of the
employees and the clearest unfair labor practice. The
Respondent's defense is that Cohen was not an agent of
the Company. Considering all the relevant evidence, I find
that he was and that by his conduct the Respondent violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) of the Act once again. Only I week earli-
er the administration had been informed that Carson was
on the union organizing committee. The porter had never
before been called to work on a Wednesday. Speck said it
was he who made the decision to rearrange Carson's sched-
ule that week, because some other man was going to be off.
Three hundred people work under Speck, about 15 or so
doing cleanup work at night. There is a direct superior over
Carson-Mr. Jackson. Why did a security officer have to
call the porter at home to tell him of the top
administrator's decision? It is a fact the detective-
Carson's old friend and benefactor-got the message to
him. Why was Jackson kept in the dark about all this?
When Carson arrived Wednesday, Jackson was surprised
and even went to Speck's office-presumably because he
did not need the man on that shift. In such a picture,
Speck's statement in his investigation affidavit and again in
his oral testimony, that "maybe" it was Cohen whom he
chose to communicate with Carson, takes on great signifi-
cance. When to all this is added the fact the Respondent
clearly was carrying on a widespread program of illegal
interrogation of employees about their union activities,
Speck's past participation m those activities, and the highly
indicative timing of the events, the conclusion is fully war-
ranted that Carson in fact was carrying out Speck's instruc-
tion in this whole affair, as he told Carson.
E. No Solicitation Rule?; No Union Buttons!
In the complaint, as originally written and as amended
at the hearing, and in the arguments plus the evidence ad-
duced, the General Counsel charges the Respondent with
unlawful restraint upon the employees' right to carry on
their concerted activities anywhere inside the very large
hospital complex, consisting of many buildings. The sub-
ject is repeatly referred to throughout the record as "rules"
against solicitation, "rules" against distribution, and
"rules" against wearing union buttons on their garments
while in the hospital premises. But despite the lengthy rec-
ord, the only "rule" that was objectively established is that
involving the wearing of buttons. It appears in the
hospital's employee manual, and reads as follows:
Identification of uniformed employees is limited to
name plates, school pins, professional registration in-
signia , and hospital service pins. The wearing of me-
dallions and identification other than professional and
hospital is not authorized.
Beyond this, there was no written "rule" on the subject
of union solicitation or distribution. The complaint alleges
there is one-precisely in so many words-but that phrase
is only taken from an investigation affidavit by Reynolds,
the assistant vice president. It sets out his then concept of
what went on, but his testimony-when called as an ad-
verse witness by the General Counsel-expands upon the
concept and modified it considerably. There is a paucity of
evidence as to how the rule-whatever it is , if there be
one-was or is being implemented. As Reynolds para-
phrased it in his statement, it would be clearly unlawful
under Board law, for it says there shall be no solicitation at
all during working hours on the employer' s premises.
There were incidents, here and there, where the subject
arose during personal interviews with employees, but the
testimony as to what the few employees involved were told
falls short of proving affirmatively that too restrictive a
rule was in fact in effect, this not only from the testimony
of supervisors but also that of employees. Thus, Francis
Middleton, when Reynolds reprimanded him for wearing a
union button inside the hospital (see below), among other
things, quoted Reynolds as telling him he was free to help
organize the Union "as long as it didn't interfere with my
7 Cf Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc, 196 NLRB 769 (1972)
Reynolds' statement of the rule according to his affidavit reads . "No solici-
tation of employees, patients or medical staff by any employee or other
individuals during working hours on the employers premises "
532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work ." Middleton also quoted Reynolds as "saying he
could not do so on break times or lunch ." Middleton can-
didly said he did not really remember how Reynolds had
phrased it.
Holding the matter of wearing union buttons in abey-
ance for the moment, I do not think it is possible , or fair, to
make a definitive finding on this record that this Respon-
dent in fact had, or implemented , an illegal no solicitation
rule. It is simply too large an institution-as said , with over
4,000 employees-to predicate so broad and precise a find-
ing of pervasive illegality upon so little proof . The entire
subject of union activities in hospitals is still a relatively
new one , and perhaps it would be best for the Board itself,
in its expertise , to advise-maybe in this very case-just
what the areas for lawful solicitation and distribution in
hospitals should be . After all , there is an inevitable simi-
larity in the physical layout and functional operations of
all hospitals.
About the wearing of union buttons there is no dispute
as to what the issue of the case is. Middleton , the porter,
had a union button attached to his cap one day; a supervi-
sor saw it in Middleton 's hand near the elevator door as the
man was about to leave for the day. The nearest bed on
that floor , along the corridor , was about 20 feet away. The
supervisor told him he was not permitted to wear the but-
ton. Middleton 's name had already appeared on both a
union leaflet and a union letter to the Company . The next
day he was called to Speck 's office , where Speck criticized
him for a number of faults; a reprimand notice placed in
Middleton 's personnel file that day includes the statement
"Talked about wearing unauthorized pins, etc."
My first finding is that the rule of attire as it appears
unequivocally in the employee handbook which is still to-
day in the hand of the employees violates Section 8 (a)(1) of
the Act under Board law . On its face it discriminates
against union insignia being worn and other medallions or
badges . It is one thing to prohibit wearing of all badges; it
is a different story to prohibit union buttons while permit-
ting others . It was also admitted the employees are permit-
ted to wear United Fund pins. There are people whose
work keeps them in areas where patients have no occasion
to appear , such as kitchens and related places. As the wear-
ing of union buttons is only one form of solicitation, there
can be no justification for distinguishing between one kind
of pin and another when no one but employees have occa-
sion to be present . At the hearing Reynolds, the adminis-
trator, explained that when the union campaign started
"We . . . told our supervisors ... that if the employees
wear . . . this button you have [ the union button received
into evidence], that if they wear those things in nonpatient
areas, that that is acceptable . . . We made this slight alter-
ation to our plan of our personal appearance code ...."
He then admitted he had no knowledge of employees being
informed of the change , and there is no evidence so to
indicate . As he continued to explain , Reynolds started dis-
tinguishing between those areas of the hospital where
union buttons are permitted and where they are not. At
one point he said they are not permitted in the cafeteria.
He then shifted , saying they are not permitted wherever
patients might wander. Then , realizing the statement might
outlaw buttons just about everywhere , he proceeded to
take certain areas out of the proscription-the laundry
room , the dining room , the laboratories , maybe the engi-
neering shops, etc. It is clear on this record the employees
have been told to remove union buttons and that they have
complied with the instruction . It will not do , to legalize too
broad a rule , for one official of so large an institution sim-
ply to say it has been modified to comply with whatever
the law may be. This rule, as written in the employee hand-
book , must be struck.
But the Respondent 's more adamant position is clear. It
asserts the right to prohibit the wearing of union buttons
by any employee anywhere in the hospital , so long as it is
possible a patient might find himself in the area at any time
for any reason . And in the end the General Counsel took
issue with this fixed position . The complaint , as it now
stands, alleges it is illegal to exclude ordinary union but-
tons anywhere in the hospital , even in a patient's room.
The heart of the issue now is whether it is true, as the
Respondent contends , that there is something inherently
and inevitably so disturbing and controversial about a
union button , or insignia , that the very sight of one on
anybody's attire will endanger the health of any person
who is ill, so that all union buttons must be totally banned
from their sight. The only evidence offered to support this
broad conclusionary assertion is an expression of opinion
voiced by the Respondent's witness , Dr. Edward Garrett, a
surgeon formerly chief of staff of the hospital . Dr. Garrett
said it was "within the realm of possibility " that any con-
troversial object could affect the proper care of patients.
He continued that he thought any object touching upon
the subject of labor organizations appearing in the sight of
a sick person "potentially ," "theoretically and perhaps ac-
tually" could be detrimental to his recovery. The doctor
also candidly admitted, however , he had never conducted
objective studies in this area, had never heard of any, and
had never heard of other physicians having had the sug-
gested adverse experience . I do not deem this statement by
Dr. Garrett sufficiently persuasive proof supporting the
factual defense assertion made as justification by the Re-
spondent for virtually banning union buttons throughout
the hospital . In view of the Federal labor policy favoring
collective bargaining in the health care industry, as reflect-
ed in the enactment of the 1974 nonprofit hospital amend-
ments to the Act, the contention that union buttons could
serve as an agitating influence upon exceptionally sensitive
patients is outweighed when balanced against the employ-
ees' right to engage in activities protected by Section 7.
Despite the unique nature of a hospital environment and
the special conditions prevailing there, a general ban on the
wearing of union buttons is unduly broad and in conflict
with that policy of the Act which requires employers to
achieve their legitimate business purposes with a minimum
of interference with the rights of employees to engage in
self-organization.
I find that by reprimanding Middleton , and by recording
the reprimand notice in his personnel file, for wearing a
union button on the premises , the Respondent violated
Section 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the Act. I also find that the
Respondent 's rule prohibiting any employees from wearing
union buttons or insignia at any time in the hospital is a
continuing violation of Section 8(a)(1). There were otl•ar
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 533
instances of supervisors telling employees not to wear
union buttons at work , but no useful purpose would be
served by the further details here . The cease -and-desist or-
der and the remedy thus commanded would be the same.
There is more detailed and conflicting testimony about
still other conversations between supervisors and employ-
ees in which there was talk of the Union. In some perhaps
the record would support additional pin-pointed findings
of illegal questioning , or individual invitations to satisfy
grievances behind the Union's back. But it would be pure
repetition of unfair labor practices already found to bur-
den this decision with further such facts . In some instances
the alleged unfair labor practices were not proved . For ex-
ample : Carol Bowie testified that sometime in May her
supervisor , Creedon, asked had anyone from the Union
been to her home to talk about organizing the Union. On
cross-examination Bowie changed it somewhat. Now it
came out that Creedon asked "had anybody come to our
house saying that they were from Baptist ," and if so, "they
are not representing Baptist ." Creedon' s version is that he
did not ask , but only commented to the employees, as he
said he had heard , that somebody was going to people's
houses saying "they were with the hospital," or "being with
the hospital." Considering Bowie 's total story, I believe
Creedon here and make no finding of improper question-
ing.
Bowie also recalled Shirley Barnes, another supervisor,
one day asking three girls "why did we want a union." Out
of context , this might be interrogation , but considering
Bowie 's further testimony I make no such finding . She said
the three employees were already discussing the union
among themselves when Barnes asked the question. Lyn-
dell Ballard , one of the other women then present , recalled
two such comments by Barnes. According to Ballard, too,
the employees were already themselves talking about the
Union before the supervisor got into the conversation. Bal-
lard quoted Barnes as asking "were we sure that what we
wanted was a union ," and "were these the reasons that you
want the union?" Barnes said at the hearing she knew at
the time these women favored the Union, but denied ask-
ing why they wanted it. She said her comment , after hear-
ing them talk of what they might gam by self-organization,
was: "Is that why you want a union?" I believe Barnes'
version , and conclude she said nothing improper to these
women.
One final story merits reporting , albeit not in too great
detail , because it graphically illustrated the coercive meth-
od reflected throughout the record. Gwendolyn Smith and
Patty Wilkins are two of seven technicians who work in the
G. I. Laboratory; Katheryn Chiti is their immediate super-
visor and Dr. Randolph McCloy the director of the labora-
tory. Both women were active in the organizational cam-
paign, went to meetings , solicited cards, and appeared on
the July 31 union leaflet as committee members. Smith
started work in 1967 and Wilkins in 1972. McCloy referred
to Smith as a very bright and outstanding employee. No
reprimand notice of any kind was placed in Wilkins' per-
sonnel file before March 21, 1975. In May both were told
to remove union buttons from their dresses. That same
month Smith was called to the office by Chiti and asked
had she had anything to do with the union literature which
was seen in the conference room ; although she said no, a
"counselling interview" was placed in her file.
There is another reprimand notice , also found in Smith's
file and received in evidence , that speaks volumes in itself.
It itemizes , with exact dates , 13 absences-many followed
by the word "ill" or "child ill"-covering the period July
1973 to May 1975, and then reports on certain "counselling
interviews"-two for June 22 and 24, 1974, for a single
incident and one for a May 7, 1975, incident of some kind.
The document itself contains no explanation of how it
came to be prepared at that time , or at all . Supervisor Chiti
said she wrote up this notice , and gave it to Reynolds, the
assistant vice-president, at his request ; she said she used to
keep personal notes in a little box . Asked why Reynolds
should ask for all this at that particular time , her only an-
swer was he wanted it, and she did not know why. This was
unquestionable resort to the "documentation " innovation
that could have no purpose other than coercion , especially
in the light of further "interviews" in the private office of
Director McCloy on October 3.
Work in the laboratory is sometimes slack , with usually
more patients in the morning than in the afternoon. The
director said the technicians often sit around reading a
book or doing passtime puzzles; he also said they are per-
mitted , when work allows, to leave the laboratory for per-
sonal matters with permission of their supervisor . There is
also testimony , uncontradicted , that Chiti, the supervisor,
sometimes sits in the laboratory and knits when there are
no patients.
On Friday, September 26, at 10 minutes before 3 o'clock
quitting time , the girls were sitting about idle; there were
no more patients for the day. Chiti told Smith some one
wanted to speak to her in the hall. Smith went out where
two men , attendants from another department, were stand-
ing. Smith spoke a few words, came back in to call Wilkins
because one of the men wanted her , and the two returned
to the corridor. They talked only a minute or two when
Chiti called them back in, saying she wanted no "hanging
around" the hall . The girls came in, it was just about quit-
ting time , and they went home. From this incident, after
Chiti had herself told the women they could step out, there
evolved an incredible series of reprimand notices , all duly
recorded and placed into Smith 's file.
On Monday, September 29, Chiti called both women
into her office, criticized them for leaving the department,
wrote up reprimand notices against them about what had
happened the previous Friday, and placed one in each
lady's file. Chiti also placed a separate writeup in each
woman 's file relating nothing more than what had taken
place Friday , the stepping out to talk to somebody. On
October 3 McCloy called Smith to his office for an inter-
view.
About this talk McCloy 's testimony is that Chiti had told
him about the Friday incident and that he had ordered her
to record it. Why? "so that we could remember it ... .
McCloy said he told Smith he knew of the Friday incident
and asked her version of it . He told her he knew of her
union activities and those of Wilkins; he called he-- in so
that she could "ventilate" her problems; he asked her what
her "problems" were ; it was he who brought up the subject
of the Union . In the course of the extended talk Smith
534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complained about not being paid overtime, going without
lunch, and Chat picking on her after expressly giving per-
mission to step out to the hall. There was also some talk
between Smith and the director that day about Smith going
to school to acquire technical standing that might later
help her find work elsewhere. Obviously, having called the
girl in to probe into her union activities and to draw out
what it was she could be bought off with, McCloy would
offer some kind of help now that she spoke of going to
school. Did he say he would help her, and only her, or did
he say he would help anybody on the staff who wished to
improve herself? This fine distinction later became the ba-
sis for a much lengthier recorded disciplinary notice.
The testimony by McCloy that he wanted Smith to "ven-
tilate" her problems-"Q: You called her so she could talk
to you? The Witness: Yes, sir."-I do not credit. He called
her to interrogate her as to her reasons for favoring the
Union, to find out what he might offer to wean her away
from the idea, to belabor a third time the fact that a week
earlier the women had stepped out into the hall after the
supervisor had given permission. All this questioning was
pure violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find.
Over a month later, on November 5, McCloy called
Smith into his office still again, and now, after another
meeting with her, he had typed a single-spaced full page
report detailing an extensive disciplinary interview. Mc-
Cloy did not testify about the substance of his talk with
Smith that day; presumably he relies on the later carefully
drafted document as proof of what he said. Asked why he
had prepared such a record, all he could answer was "to
document the conversation." I do not believe this man.
The meticulously phrased report, written 2 weeks before
the start of this hearing, over I month after anything of
note had happened, ending with a reminder to Smith she
could be dismissed, reads like a lawyer's brief justifying his
client's past conduct. I find entirely unpersuasive McCloy's
defense that he wrote such a general indictment of Smith
only because there had been erroneous "feedback" that he
had promised to help Smith to go to school, not everybody.
And to correct this error, he wrote-on November 5-
about a May 1975 incident about Smith being insubordi-
nate for calling Chiti a liar, about how excellent Chiti's
work performance has always been, and about how he
would not stand for insubordination and misrepresentation
in the lab by anybody.
Considering the total record reflecting McCloy's activi-
ties with respect to the Respondent's reaction to the em-
ployees' organizational campaign, I find he called this
woman into his office on November 5, lectured her gener-
ally, and filed a reprimand notice in her file that day for
the purpose of further coercing her in her union activity
and thereby again violated Section 8(a)(1). And the filing
of the disciplinary document was a violation of Section
8(a)(3) as well.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
conduct prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, it
must be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
specific affirmative action , as set forth below, designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By placing reprimand notices into the personnel files
of its employees the Respondent has been, and is violating
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the foregoing conduct, by promulgating and main-
taining a rule prohibiting employees from wearing union
buttons or insignia in the hospital, by interrogating em-
ployees concerning their union sympathies and how they
intended to vote in union elections, by interrogating them
concerning the union activities of fellow employees, by
asking employees to bring their grievances directly to man-
agement for resolution in place of a union , by offering im-
provements in conditions of employment as inducement
for employees to abandon their union activities, by threat-
ening to discharge employees if they persist in their pro-
union activities, by offering to assist employees to with-
draw from union activities, and by spying or attempting to
spy upon the union activities of its employees, the Respon-
dent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practic-
es in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER4
The Respondent, Baptist Memorial Hospital, Memphis,
Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Placing reprimand or disciplinary interview notices
in the personnel files of its employees for the purpose of
coercing them in their union activities.
(b) Maintaining and enforcing its rule prohibiting em-
ployees from wearing union buttons or insignia in the hos-
pital premises, interrogating employees concerning their
union sympathies and how they intended to vote in union
elections, interrogating employees concerning the union
activities of fellow employees, asking employees to bring
their grievances directly to management for resolution in
place of a union, offering improvements in conditions of
employment as inducement for employees to abandon
In the event no exceptons are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 535
their union activities, threatening to discharge employees if
they persist in their prounion activities, offering to assist
employees to withdraw from union activities, or spying or
attempting to spy upon the union activities of its employ-
ees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right
to self-organization, to form, loin, or assist American Fed-
eration of States, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or
to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Remove from the personnel files of the following
employees the reprimand, disciplinary notices bearing the
indicated dates and exhibit identification numbers:
Rasher Maclin-June 5, 1974 (G.C. 12(a) ), Novem-
ber 5, 1975 (G.C. 12(bb) ), November 8, 1975 (G.C.
12(cc)) and November 12, 1975 (G.C. 12(dd) );
Phyllis Taylor-July 31, 1975 (G.C. 18(a) );
Eddie May Pearson-October 2, 1975 (17p), three
notices dated November 7, 1975 (17q, r, and s);
Gwendolyn Smith-September 19, 1975 (16e), Sep-
tember 26, 1975 (16f), and November 5, 1975 (16h);
Patty Wilkins-September 29, 1975 (15c).
(b) Post at its hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 26, after being duly signed by its representatives, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by it to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
5 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board "