2020004875 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2021)

Baidu USA, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 8, 2021

2020004875 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/226,249 08/02/2016 Yi Zhen 28888-2017 1668 119276 7590 02/08/2021 BAIDU USA LLC c/o NORTH WEBER & BAUGH LLP 3260 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94304 EXAMINER ARAQUE JR, GERARDO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/08/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): bbaugh@northweber.com docket1@northweber.com docket2@northweber.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte YI ZHEN, HONGLIANG FEI, SHULONG TAN, and WEI FAN ____________ Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 Yi Zhen, Hongliang Fei, Shulong Tan, and Wei Fan (Appellant2) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 1–11 and 16–20, 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed January 23, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 15, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed April 13, 2020), and Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 30, 2019). Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 2 the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Appellant invented a way of using information handling systems to estimate demand for healthcare resources. Specification para. 1. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added). 1. A method for estimating a resource demand, the method comprising: [1] extracting data from a plurality of sources; [2] using the data to generate records; [3] assigning a label to each record to obtain labeled records; [4] identifying one or more entities within each labeled record by applying to a labeled record one or more techniques correlating to that label for identifying an entity or entities; [5] generating, from the labeled records, entity features and relationships between two or more entities; [6] for each entity, converting the entity features and relationships between two or more entities into a vectorized representation of the entity; [7] using vectorized data of entities and resource data to train a set of models on a first set of data; [8] evaluating each model of the set of models using an evaluation set of data; and 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Baidu USA, LLC (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 3 [9] selecting a model based on evaluations. The Examiner relies upon the following prior art: Name Reference Date Li US 2009/0216860 A1 Aug. 27, 2009 Karpistsenko US 2014/0156806 A1 June 5, 2014 Danner US 2016/0203264 A1 July 14, 2016 Laster US 2017/0061375 A1 Mar. 2, 2017 Trouillon US 2017/0337481 A1 Nov. 23, 2017 Claims 1, 2, 6–8, 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Laster. Claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Li. Claims 10 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Trouillon. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Karpistsenko. Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Danner. ISSUES The issues of novelty and obviousness turn primarily on whether Laster describes vectorising data as in limitation 6. FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 4 Facts Related to Appellant’s Disclosure 01. Matrix decomposition, machine learning, or other processes known to those skilled in the art may be used to obtain vectorized feature representations of entities and/or integrated records. Spec. para. 55. 02. A vectorized feature representation may be, for example, an n-dimensional numerical vector that comprises elements that each has a value. Spec. para. 56. Facts Related to the Prior Art Laster 03. Laster is directed to providing implants for surgical procedures. Laster para. 2. 04. Laster describes items being ordered on an on-demand or just- in-time basis as a result of the predictive modeling. Laster para. 9. 05. Laster describes a surgical management system using patient characteristics, such as sex, age, height, and weight, to predict the sizes of implants that are likely to be needed at a medical facility. Laster para. 10. 06. Laster describes inputting the patient characteristics of the particular patient to a predictive model that has been trained to predict items likely to be used in surgeries. The predictive model has been trained using data indicating characteristics of other patients and items used in surgeries for the other patients. Laster para. 40. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 5 07. Laster describes predictive models being trained using support vector machines3, among other implementations. Laster paras. 69, 142, 234, and 245. Karpistsenko 08. Karpistsenko is directed to spatio-temporal data collection, integration, processing, distribution, protocols, and analytics. Karpistsenko para. 3. ANALYSIS Claims 1, 2, 6 – 8, 16, 19, and 20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Laster The Examiner determines that Laster describes putting data into vectors as in limitation 6. Final Act. 4. We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that, as to limitation 6, in Laster: [e]ach of the cited passages merely discusses, in general terms, predictive models, such as support vector machines. But none of the cited passage suggests or explicitly discloses performing a step of, for each entity, converting the entity features and relationships between two or more entities into a vectorized representation of the entity. Appeal Br. 10. The Examiner determines that Laster: discloses the conversion of entity features and relationships into data representations of the entity and in view of the cited 3 Support vector machines use support vectors to train models. Support vectors are the data points that lie closest to the decision surface (or hyperplane), which is an optimal hyperplane for linearly separable patterns. See MIT tutorial paper Berwick, An Idiot’s Guide to Support Vector Machines, https://web.mit.edu/6.034/wwwbob/svm.pdf. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 6 paragraphs provided above the data would have to be converted to a format that would be useable by a technique that a practitioner of the invention would want to use. Since Laster discloses that one of those techniques is the use of support vector machines then it stands to reason that the data would have to be converted into vectors so that the support vector machine can perform the necessary operations, i.e. using the data of entities and resource data to train a set of models on a first set of data. Ans. 5–6. We agree with Appellant that these determinations “rest squarely upon subjective speculation rather than fact.” Reply Br. 2. The Examiner fails to account for Laster’s referral, not to vectors generically, but to a support vector machine, which by definition uses support vectors. Support vectors contain the points closest to the analytical plane that sorts data. Limitation 6 instead forms vectors of the entity features and relationships between two or more entities. These are not further described or characterized as support vectors. Laster does not mention how it forms the support vectors in support vector machines. Examiner’s determination as to inherency only supports the fact that Laster would form some support vectors for the data closest to the analytical plane that support vector machines use, not that Laster would vectorize data as in limitation 6. Claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 18 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Li These claims depend from the claims above. Claims 10 and 11 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Trouillon These claims depend from the claims above. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 7 Claim 5 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Karpistsenko This claim depends from the claims above. Claim 9 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Danner This claim depends from the claims above. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The rejection of claims 1, 2, 6–8, 16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Laster is improper. The rejection of claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Li is improper. The rejection of claims 10 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Trouillon is improper. The rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Karpistsenko is improper. The rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Laster and Danner is improper. NEW GROUND OF REJECTION The following new ground of rejection is entered pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Claims 1–11 and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 8 STEP 14 Claim 1, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. STEP 2 The Supreme Court: set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent- eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or 4 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 9 whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. STEP 2A Prong 1 At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method claim 1 recites extracting and generating data, assigning labels, identifying entity data, generating entity relationship and feature data and converting this into a vectorized representation of the entity, using vectorized data of entities and resource data to train a set of models, and selecting a model. Extracting data is modifying data. Assigning labels is data generation. Identifying data is rudimentary data analysis. Converting data into a vectorized representation is mathematical analysis and data modification. Training models is generic data processing. Selecting a model is rudimentary data analysis. Thus, claim 1 recites modifying, generating, analyzing, and processing data. None of the limitations recites technological implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means. From this we see that claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either natural phenomena or laws of nature. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 10 Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract idea are patent ineligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas include (1) mathematical concepts,5 (2) certain methods of organizing human activity,6 and (3) mental processes.7 Among those mental processes listed in the Revised Guidance are concepts performed in the human mind. Like those concepts, claim 1 recites the concept of estimating demand. Specifically, claim 1 recites operations that would ordinarily take place in advising one to select a model based on evaluations of entity representations. The advice to select a model based on evaluations of entity representations involves selecting a model, which is a mental act, and evaluating models, which is an act ordinarily performed in mind. For example, claim 1 recites “selecting a model,” which is an activity that would take place whenever one is making a mental choice. Similarly, claim 1 recites “evaluating each model,” which is also characteristic of mental judgment. The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for estimating a resource demand. The steps in claim 1 result in estimating demand by 5 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 6 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 7 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 11 selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so. As to the specific limitations, limitations 1–9 recite generic and conventional modifying, generating, analyzing, and processing of entity attribute data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations. To advocate selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations is conceptual advice for results desired and not technological operations. The Specification at paragraph 1 describes the invention as relating to using information handling systems to estimate demand for healthcare resources. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites estimating demand. This is an example of concepts performed in the human mind as mental processes because the steps of modifying, generating, analyzing, and processing data mimic human thought processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to perform data modification, generation, analysis, and processing and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 12 animation”). As such, claim 1 recites modifying, generating, analyzing, and processing data, and not a technological implementation or application of that idea. From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 1 recites estimating demand by selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations, which is a mental process, identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea. STEP 2A Prong 2 The next issue is whether claim 1 not only recites, but is more precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to, this concept i.e. integrated into a practical application.8 At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “ ‘to a new and useful end,’ ” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the “ ‘buildin[g] block[s]’ ” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results, devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 –5 recite basic conventional data 8 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 13 operations such as generating, updating, and storing data. Steps 6–9 recite generic computer processing expressed in terms of results desired by any and all possible means and so present no more than conceptual advice. Limitations 6 and 7 further recite converting data into vectorized representations and using those representations to train a model. But this recites no more than the abstract concept of converting data and using as a training input. Neither the claims nor the Specification recite or describe technological mechanisms or improvements for implementing these concepts. Simply calling for a vectorized format is no more than a disembodied concept. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data are interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically achieves those results. Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 1 simply recites the concept of estimating demand by selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations as performed by a generic computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation. Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The 22 pages of specification do not bulge with disclosure, but only spell out different generic equipment9 and 9 The Specification describes a central processing unit, with a micro- processor or the like, and may also include a graphics processor and/or a Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 14 parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of estimating demand by selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations under different scenarios. They do not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, claim 1 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply estimating demand by selecting a model based on evaluations of entity representations using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. None of the limitations reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. We conclude that claim 1 is directed to achieving the result of estimating demand by advising one to select a model based on evaluations of floating point coprocessor for mathematical computations, and a system memory, which may be in the form of random-access memory (RAM) and read-only memory (ROM). Spec. para. 74. Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 15 entity representations, as distinguished from a technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This amounts to mental processes as exemplified by the estimating of demand by advising one to select a model based on evaluations of entity representations, which fall within mental processes that constitute abstract ideas. The claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. STEP 2B The next issue is whether claim 1 provides an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter the analysis at Mayo step two. the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted). Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 16 “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer for modifying, generating, analyzing, and processing data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). None of these activities is used in some unconventional manner nor does any produce some unexpected result. Appellant does not contend it invented any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. Even data vectorization is simply application of a mathematical algorithm, itself an abstract idea manifestation. Further, such vectorization is no more than formatting data as appropriate for a machine learning operation.10 As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make 10 See e.g., Rumelhart, D., Hinton, G. & Williams, R., Learning representations by back-propagating errors. Nature 323, 533–536 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1038/323533a0 showing use of vectorized data as machine learning input Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 17 the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s claim 1 add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data modification-generation- analysis-processing is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. We conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. REMAINING CLAIMS Claim 1 is representative. The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical application of that concept. As to the structural claims, they: are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 18 computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101“in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. LEGAL CONCLUSION From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of mental processes as exemplified by the estimating of demand by advising one to select a model based on evaluations of entity representations, without significantly more. CONCLUSION The rejection of claims 1–11 and 16–20 is reversed. Claims 1–11, 16–20 are rejected in a new ground under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 1, 2, 6–8, 16, 19, 20 102(a)(2) Laster 1, 2, 6–8, 16, 19, 20 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, 18 103 Laster, Li 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, 18 10, 11 103 Laster, Trouillon 10, 11 5 103 Laster, Karpistsenko 5 Appeal 2020-004875 Application 15/226,249 19 Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New Ground 9 103 Laster, Danner 9 1–11, 16–20 101 Eligibility 1–11, 16–20 Overall Outcome 1–11, 16–20 1–11, 16–20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. . . . Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. REVERSED; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)