B. J. & R. Machine Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 1984

270 N.L.R.B. 267 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

B. J. & R. MACHINE CO.
B. J. & R. Machine & Gear Company and Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica (UAW). Cases 7-CA-18382(1) and 7-CA-
18643
30 April 1984
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER
On 3 September 1982 Administrative Law Judge
William A. Pope II issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and
conclusions as modified.
The Respondent operates two plants at which it
manufactures equipment for the aircraft and aero-
space industries. As of October 1980,2 one of the
plants was unionized, the second was not. In early
October, the Union advised the Respondent that an
organizing campaign had commenced at the second
plant and that employees Miller, Dontje, Redmon,
and Baker were on the organizing committee. The
Union lost the election held in November and filed
objections. Subsequently, a second election was
held in September 1981. The Union won and was
certified.
The acts alleged as unfair labor practices in this
proceeding occurred in October, November, and
December. The judge found that the Respondent
had violated Section 8(aXl) by various statements
made to employee Miller by Plant Superintendent
Bachan in separate incidents in October and No-
vember, and that the Respondnt had violated Sec-
tion 8(aX3) by its layoff of Miller, Dontje, and
Redmon in November and December. While we
affirm the judge's finding that the Respondent
through Bachan violated Section 8(aX1) in Novem-
ber, we reverse his finding that the Respondent
likewise violated Section 8(aX1) in October. None-
theless, we affirm his finding that the Respondent's
November-December layoff of the three employees
violated the Act.
I In sec. II, par. 2, of his decision, the judge stated that employees
Miller and Redmon were laid off on 22 November 1981, 10 days after the
UAW lost the election held on 12 November 1981. The record reveals
that each of these events occurred in 1980 rather 1981.
2 Hereafter all dates referred to are 1980 unless stated otherwise.
The judge concluded that the Respondent,
through Bachan, violated Section 8(a)(l) in Octo-
ber by interrogating employee Miller about his rea-
sons for supporting the Union; by suggesting that
Miller form an in-house committee to represent em-
ployees; by threatening the loss of life insurance
benefits if the Union got in; and by threatening
plant closure if the Union got in, and a strike
ensued. This conclusion was based on the judge's
crediting of Miller over Bachan concerning a con-
versation between the two in Bachan's office in
October 1980.3
In discrediting Bachan's version of this conversa-
tion, the judge first found that Bachan's credibility
hinged, in major part, on the "collective attitude"
of the Respondent's management towards the "in-
trusion" of a union into its plant. He reasoned that,
if management were truly neutral about unioniza-
tion, Bachan would have had little reason to make
the remarks attributed to him by Miller. Converse-
ly, if management were opposed to a union, then
Bachan would have had a motive for attempting to
dissuade Miller from supporting the Union. The
judge then concluded that the Respondent's presi-
dent, Jakobi, had an "anti-union tilt," relying solely
for that finding on Jakobi's testimony that he felt
he could point out to employees the relative advan-
tages and disadvantages of a union. The judge
noted that Jakobi had instructed Bachan to advise
employees of the Respondent's benefits and he con-
cluded that Jakobi had authorized the Respondent's
managers to speak against the need for a union. He
then theorized that the real reason that Bachan had
summoned Miller to his office was to dissuade him
from supporting the Union and not, as Bachan had
testified, to caution Miller about discussing union
business when he was supposed to be working.
Finding that this demonstrated Bachan's "lack of
candor" about the purpose of the meeting, the
judge found Bachan's testimony to be "less credita-
ble" than Miller's and, as noted, he found the viola-
tions based on Miller's testimony. We conclude
that the basis for this credibility resolution was
faulty.
Member Zimmerman agrees with these findings and conclusions of
the judge and would affirm them. He dissents from his colleagues' rever-
sal of the 8(aXl) findings of the judge and the credibility findings on
which those findings were based. See his dissent in Herbert F. Darling,
Inc., 267 NLRB 476 (1983). Member Zimmerman notes that demeanor
was a factor in the judge's credibility resolution and that Bachan's testi-
mony corroborated portions of the testimony of Miller regarding the Oc-
tober meeting. He also notes that about a month later Bachan unlawfully
threatened Miller with discipline because of his protected concerted ac-
tivity, and that on 22 November 1980 the Respondent unlawfully termi-
nated Miller. In the context of these other unfair labor practices directed
against Miller, Member Zimmerman believes there is ample support for
the judge to resolve credibility against Bachan on, inter alis, "the collec-
tive attitude of Respondent's management ... towards the intrusion of a
union into employer-employee relations within the Respondent's plants."
270 NLRB No. 47
267
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It is well established that the Board will not
overrule an administrative law judge's credibility
resolutions which are based on his observation of
demeanor unless a clear preponderance of all of the
relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect.4 However, when an administrative law judge
bases his credibility resolutions on factors other
than his observations of the witnesses' demeanor,
we may independently evaluate the witneses' credi-
bility.5 In the instant case, the credibility resolution
as to the incident involving Miller and Bachan
clearly was based on factors other than the judge's
observations of demeanor.6 It was, instead, pre-
mised on his conclusion that Bachan's credibility
rested on management's "collective attitude"
toward unionization which he found to have an
"anti-union tilt" as allegedly demonstrated by the
testimony of President Jakobi.
We reject the judge's basis for concluding that
management had an "anti-union tilt," i.e., Jakobi's
belief that he could advise his employees as to the
relative merits of a union. Indeed, an employer has
every right to deliver its message concerning its
views about unions so long as it accomplishes this
end in a noncoercive way. Thus, whatever Jakobi's
beliefs about unionization, they do not, without
more, aid in determining whether Bachan violated
the Act as alleged. While Jakobi instructed Bachan
to advise employees of the Respondent's benefits,
this, without more, is insufficient to sustain the
judge's conclusion that Bachan would engage in
and in fact did engage in the unlawful discussion
alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, we find that
it was error for the judge to have inferred, without
supporting evidence, a connection between the per-
ceived "collective attitude" of management and
what Bachan actually said. Moreover, while the
judge asserted that Bachan had "concealed" the
real purpose of the meeting, i.e., to discuss the
Union, we note that Bachan admitted mentioning
to Miller several features of the contract that the
Respondent had at its unionized facility. Under
these circumstances, we find insufficient evidence
to establish that Bachan concealed the purpose of
the meeting.
In sum, we are unable to accept the reasoning on
which the judge based his decision to credit Miller
over Bachan and we shall, therefore, independently
analyze the record. Initially, we note that the Gen-
eral Counsel has the burden of establishing allega-
4 Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 P.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). El Rancho Market, 235 NLRB 468 (1978), enfd. 104
LRRM 2612 (9th Cir. 1979).
a Colon Equipment, 257 NLRB 78 (1981).
' Contrary to our dissenting colleague's contention, a close reading of
the judge's decision clearly shows that demeanor was not a factor in the
judge's analysis of this particular incident.
tions by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 We find
that he has failed to do so with respect to the alle-
gations of 8(aX1) violations occurring during Ba-
chan's mid-October conversation with Miller. In
this regard, we have determined that there is no
basis in the record from which we could conclude
that either Miller or Bachan is more credible as to
the substance of the statements made during their
October meeting. We note that the judge made no
credibility resolutions in reaching his conclusion,
with which we agree, that during a second conver-
sation in mid-November the Respondent, through
Bachan, violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening to
terminate Miller. Moreover, while we agree that
the Respondent later laid off Miller for discrimina-
tory reasons, we cannot attribute the animus evi-
dent in this action to Bachan so as to conclude that
he likely made the unlawful statements attributed
to him during the October incident. Thus, we note
that it was the Respondent's manager of manufac-
turing, Mains, and not Bachan, who selected the
employees to be laid off. And, while the Respond-
ent's president, Jakobi, may have indicated an
"anti-union tilt" by virtue of his testimony regard-
ing the layoffs, we cannot on that basis alone find
that Bachan made the illegal statements as ascribed
to him in October. Accordingly, we shall dismiss
these allegations on the grounds of failure of proof.
Despite our unwillingness to accept the judge's
conclusion with respect to the 8(a)(1) allegations
outlined above, we agree with his finding that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by
laying off employees Miller, Redmon, and Dontje
because of their union activities.8
Employees Miller, Redmon, and Dontje, known
union activists and members of the Union's in-plant
organizing committee, were laid off shortly after
the Union lost the first election and while its objec-
tions to the elections were pending. The Respond-
ent contended that these three employees were laid
off as part of a larger economically motivated
layoff caused by a decline in orders. The Respond-
ent said that it lost a major customer which provid-
ed almost 50 percent of its business in early 1980.
The Respondent did lay off some 16 employees
during October, November, and December; how-
ever, it also hired 13 new employees during this
period. The Respondent's president, Jakobi, initial-
ly contended during the investigation of the unfair
labor practice charge that the alleged discrimina-
tees were laid off because they were lowest in se-
niority within their specific departments. Subse-
Delta Metals, 236 NLRB 1665 (1978).
' Miller and Redmon were laid off on 22 November; Dontje was laid
off on 5 December.
268
B. J. & R. MACHINE CO.
quently, Jakobi and the Respondent's manager of
manufacturing, Mains, asserted that the Respondent
considered additional factors, such as performance
and attitude, in deciding which employees would
be laid off. At the hearing, the Respondent at-
tempted to establish that Miller, Redmon, and
Dontje had performance and/or attendance prob-
lems.
The judge concluded that the Respondent laid
off these three employees because of their union
activities. He found that economic considerations
had little, if anything, to do with the layoffs, and
he discredited the Respondent's atempt to establish
that the three were terminated for cause. He noted
that the Respondent did not cite cause as a reason
for the terminations at the time of the layoffs or
during the investigation of the unfair labor practice
charge, but raised it for the first time at the hear-
ing.
In affirming the judge we note that the layoffs of
the three known union activists occurred shortly
after the Union lost the election and were pursuant
to a layoff policy based in large part on subjective
criteria. These factors, coupled with the Respond-
ent's inconsistent explanations for selecting the al-
leged discriminatees for layoff, raise an inference
that the Respondent laid them off to retaliate for
their union activities and to thwart any renewed at-
tempt to organize for the Union. The Respondent's
proffered economic defense was insufficient to
rebut this inference. We particularly note the in-
consistency in the Respondent's hiring of new em-
ployees at a time when it claimed that declining
orders mandated that employees be laid off. In the
absence of some reasonable explanation as to this
inconsistency, which the Respondent did not offer,
we find the Respondent's defense unconvincing.
Moreover, we note that while the Respondent
claims to have lost a customer which supplied 50
percent of its business, the sales figures it submitted
do not reflect a 50-percent drop in business. Ac-
cordingly, based on the foregoing, we find that the
Respondent laid off Miller, Redmon, and Dontje
because of their union activities and thereby violat-
ed Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board hereby
orders that the Respondent, B. J. & R. Machine &
Gear Company, Madison Heights, Michigan, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with termination of
employment because of their exercise of rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Laying off or otherwise discriminating
against any employee for supporting the Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Workers of America (UAW), or any
other union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Offer David M. Miller, Janet M. Redmon,
and Alan J. Dontje immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former positions or, if those positions
no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make them whole for
their loss of earnings, with interest, in the manner
set forth in the section of the judge's decision enti-
tled the "Remedy."
(b) Expunge from its files any reference to the
terminations of David M. Miller, Janet M.
Redmon, and Alan J. Dontje, and notify each in
writing that this has been done and that evidence
of the unlawful terminations will not be used as a
basis for future personnel action against them.
(c) Post at its plant in Madison Heights, Michi-
gan, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."9 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 7, after being
signed by the Respondent's authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediate-
ly upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
9 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board."
269
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or pro-
tection
To choose not to engage in any of these
protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with termina-
tion of employment because of their exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL NOT lay off or in any other manner
discriminate against employees because of their
union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL offer reinstatement, if not already pro-
vided, to David M. Miller, Janet M. Redmon, and
Alan J. Dontje, to their former jobs or, if such po-
sitions no longer exist, to substantially equivalent
positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and WE WILL make
them whole for any loss of pay they may have suf-
fered by reason of our discrimination against them
with interest.
WE WILL expunge from our files any references
to the terminations of David M. Miller, Janet M.
Redmon, and Alan J. Dontje and WE WILL notify
each that this has been done and that evidence of
the unlawful termination will not be used as a basis
for further personnel actions against them.
B. J. & R. MACHINE & GEAR COM-
PANY
DECISION
WILLIAM A. POPE II, Administrative Law Judge. A
consolidated complaint, dated January 29, 1981, issued
by the Regional Director for Region 7, alleges that the
Respondent, B. J. & R. Machine & Gear Company (B. J.
& R. or the Respondent), engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, by threatening plant closure
if a union orgar$ing campaign was successful and the
employees thereafter engaged in an economic strike; co-
ercively interrogating employees concerning union affili-
ation; telling an employee that life insurance benefits
would be reduced if the Union was successful in its orga-
nizing campaign; encouraging employees to select an em-
ployee committee in an effort to undermine support for
the Union; threatening an employee with being "black-
balled" because of union activities; and laying off its em-
ployees Janet M. Redmon, David M. Miller, and Alan J.
Dontje because they had assisted and supported the
Union. Trial was held before me on October 19 and 20,
1982, in Detroit, Michigan.
I. ISSUES
The issues in this case are:1
(1) Did the Respondent commit unfair labor practices,
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by
(a) Threatening an employee with plant closure if the
Charging Union was successful in its organizational cam-
paign and the employees thereafter engaged in an eco-
nomic strike in support of their collective-bargaining de-
mands.
(b) Coercively interrogating an employee concerning
his membership, support for, and activities on behalf of
the Charging Union.
(c) Telling an employee that employees would receive
smaller life insurance benefits if the Charging Union was
successful in its organizational campaign.
(d) Informing employees that they could select an em-
ployee committee to meet with it concerning terms and
conditions of employment in an attempt to undermine
their support for the Charging Union.
(e) Threatening employees with being laid off and
"blackballed" by the Respondent because of their activi-
ties on behalf of the Charging Union?
(2) Did the Respondent commit an unfair labor prac-
tice, in violation of Section 8(aXl) and (3) of the Act, by
laying off its employees David M. Miller, Janet M.
Redmon, and Alan J. Dontje, because they had support-
ed and assisted the Charging Union and engaged in con-
certed activities for mutual aid and protection?
The General Counsel argues that the testimony of its
witnesses, who are more creditable than those of the Re-
spondent, shows that the Respondent engaged in a pat-
tern of unlawful statements, threats, predictions, and in-
terrogation in order to intimidate and coerce its employ-
ees into not supporting an organizing campaign by the
UAW in October and November 1980, all of which
clearly demonstrated the Respondent's union animus. In
the context of the Respondent's union animus, the Gen-
eral Counsel submits, the timing of the termination of the
employment of three of four of the known union orga-
nizers shortly after the UAW was unsuccessful in the
first election, together with inconsistent explanations for
its actions, proves that the Respondent laid off David
t The Respondent stipulated that it has at all times material herein
been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
270
B. J. & R. MACHINE CO.
Miller, Janet Redmon, and Alan Dontje because of their
union activities.
The Respondent argues that it was not antagonistic
toward the UAW, and that it is inherently implausible
that an employer of its size would go to the extreme of
"forcing 42 persons out of its employ from September 1,
1980, to December 5, 1980, in order to discriminate
against three union activists of low seniority and varying
skills, who were unavailable for other shifts or once laid
off, did not call back, or return to offer themselves for
employment." Citing a business downturn, the Respond-
ent asserts that it was forced to lay off employees in Oc-
tober and November 1980, when reductions in its work
force resulting from voluntary terminations and dis-
charges were insufficient to reduce its payroll to May
1980 levels. Denying the General Counsel's claim that
the "layoffs of the alleged discriminatees were pretex-
tual," the Respondent contends that Miller, Redmon, and
Dontje were merely three of a number of employees
whom it laid off for economic reasons, and that it chose
to lay them off because they were junior in seniority,
lacking in experience, and were unqualified for other
jobs. Arguing first that there were no improper state-
ments made to its employees, as alleged in the complaint,
the Respondent goes on to conclude that, even if there
were one conversation violating Section 8(aX1) involving
only one union organizer, it was too isolated and remote
to require a remedy. I disagree.
II. BACKGROUND
The Respondent, which operates two plants in the De-
troit area, is engaged in the manufacture of gears, gear
boxes, and assemblies, primarily for the aircraft and aero-
space industries. Construction of its second plant, a
24,000-square-foot facility, was completed in the latter
part of 1980. Bachan Aerospace, an affiliated company,'
is engaged in the manufacture of aircraft parts and com-
ponents. It operates a plant in the Detroit area located
near the Respondent's plants, and a plant located in
Windsor, Canada. Bachan Aerospace is a union employ-
er, whose employees are represented by the UAW, the
Charging Union in this case.
At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated as
follows:
That a petition in case number 7-RC-16096 was
filed by the UAW on October 7, 1980, to represent
Respondent's production and maintenance employ-
ees. Then an election was held on November 12,
1980; that the UAW filed objections to that election
on November 18, 1980; that a hearing was held on
December 16, 1980, pursuant to a notice of hearing
issued December 4, 1980; and that that hearing re-
sulted in the conducting of a second election on
September 2nd, 1981; and that the UAW was there-
after certified as representative of Respondent's pro-
duction and maintenance employees on September
11, 1981.
' The two companies apparently have common stockholders and
common management. Phillip Jakobi serves as president and chairman of
both companies.
It was also stipulated that on October 7, 1980, the UAW
notified the Respondent by letter that four of Respond-
ent's employees, "Dave Miller, Alan Dontje, Jan
Redman [sic], and Jim Baker," were members of the
UAW organizing committee.
On November 22, 1981, some 10 days after the UAW
lost the election held on November 12, 1981, David M.
Miller and Janet M. Redmon, who were both employed
in the Respondent's inspection department, were laid
off.s On December 5, 1980, Alan J. Dontje, who was
employed in the Respondent's grinding department, also
was laid off.4 Following the layoff, the three alleged dis-
criminatees neither actively sought nor were they offered
reinstatement by the Respondent.
111. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Threats
The first issue in this case involves a series of state-
ments allegedly made by Douglas Bachan, then superin-
tendent of Respondent's Plant 2, to David M. Miller, one
of the four union organizers identified in the UAW's
letter of October 7, 1980, to the Respondent. Two ques-
tions must be answered to resolve this issue: First, did
Bachan make the statements attributed to him; and
second, even if he did, did the statements, or any one or
more of them, violate the Act because they were threat-
ening and intended to create an atmosphere of intimida-
tion and coercion. On consideration of the testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses, and the entire record, I find
and conclude that both questions must be answered in
the affirmative.
According to the testimony of David M. Miller, who
was employed by the Respondent in Plant 2 from mid-
August until late November 1980, as a first piece inspec-
tor, he was called to the office of Plant Superintendent
Douglas Bachan on two occasions, once in mid-October
and again in mid-November 1980, where he had conver-
sations with Bachan related to the union organizing
drive. On the first occasion, which took place before the
union election, Bachan showed him a copy of the
Bachan Aerospace union contract and asked him to read
it, stating that he did not think it was a good idea to
bring the Union into the plant. According to Miller,
Bachan pointed out that both wages and life insurance
benefits were lower under the Bachan Aerospace union
contract, and said that if the Union were successful the
Respondent's employees would lose life insurance bene-
fits. Miller testified that Bachan also made the statement
that, if the Union got in and there was a strike, he would
close the plant and send the work to Canada. Miller said
that Bachan asked him why he was on the organizing
committee and, in response to Miller's answer that it was
because of job security, stated that Miller's chances of
being laid off were "about a million to one." Finally, ac-
cording to Miller's testimony, Bachan suggested that
Miller try to interest his fellow employees in organizing
s David M. Miller was hired by the Respondent on August IS, 1980.
Janet M. Redmon was hired on June 9, 1980.
Alan J. Dontje was hired on April 21, 1980.
271
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
an in-plant committee which would negotiate problems
with management, rather than bring in the Union.
On the second occasion, which occurred several days
after the unsuccessful union election on November 12,
1980, Miller testified, Bachan said, "I'm getting sick and
tired of hearing that I'm gonna be sued by the National
Labor Relations Board." Bachan allegedly went on to
say that he would fire anyone found discussing union
business during working hours, and asked Miller, "[Hlow
would you like to hear a rumor to the effect that you're
gonna get laid off, and I'll blackball you no matter what
expense, that you'll never get a job again?" According to
Miller, he made no response because his "job was on the
line. "
Douglas Bachan, a stockholder in both the Respondent
and Bachan Aerospace,6 was the superintendent of Re-
spondent's Plant 2 between September and December
1980. According to his testimony, sometime during the
second week of October, after seeing a copy of the letter
from the UAW listing the employees who were members
of the UAW organizing committee, he called Miller to
his office. Because Miller's name was on the list of union
organizers, Bachan said, he wanted to make it clear to
him that he should not talk about union matters when he
was supposed to be working. Bachan acknowledged that
he informed Miller of several of the features of the
Bachan Aerospace union contract, but he denied threat-
ening Miller with plant closure or suggesting the forma-
tion of an in-plant committee." Bachan acknowledged,
however, that on other occasions, in the course of dis-
cussions with one or more employees concerning em-
ployee communications with management, he had said
that the employees could form an in-plant committee or
go ahead and organize the Union.
According to Bachan, he was not interested in the
views of the Respondent's employees on the union ques-
tion. As he had with other employees, he only wanted to
make sure that Miller understood the benefit package
provided by the Respondent. When Miller volunteered
that his reason for supporting the union was job security,
Bachan replied that he did not believe that Miller needed
to worry about job security at that time. Bachan testified
that he also told Miller that a rumor he had heard, to the
effect that the Union would get Respondent's employees
a big pay increase, did not make sense in view of the fact
that Bachan Aerospace, which was unionized, had a
lower wage scale than the Respondent. Referring to the
Respondent's life insurance program, Bachan said he told
Miller that it was higher than that of Bachan Aerospace,
and that he believed that the amount was going to be
raised soon. In the course of the conversation, Bachan
said, he showed Miller several daily shipping sheets, and
told Miller that, as an inspector, his cooperation would
help cure quality problems which the plant was experi-
' Douglas Bachan's father was the founder of Bachan Aerospace and a
partner in and former chairman of the board of B. J. & R. Machine &
Gear Company.
' Bachan testified that he was told by Phillip Jakobi, the Respondent's
president and chairman, that management was within its rights to make
sure that the Respondent's employees understood the benefits which they
already had. Jakobi's instructions were to say nothing false about the Re-
spondent's benefits.
encing, and that in that way he could play a part in the
plant meeting production requirements and keeping ev-
erybody employed.
After the union election on November 12, 1980,
Bachan testified, he called Miller to his office for disci-
plinary reasons.7 According to information which
Bachan said he had received from Mike Brzoska, Miller's
immediate supervisor, Miller was responsible for circulat-
ing a rumor that the National Labor Relations Board and
the UAW were suing him and that "they were gonna fix
my whatever."" When confronted with the rumor,
Miller admitted having made such a statement to
Brzoska, but only for the purpose of upsetting Brzoska,
whom Miller referred to as an eavesdropper. According
to Bachan, he told Miller he should fire him, and he ad-
monished Miller not to say anything like that again or he
would be fired. Apparently as an object lesson, accord-
ing to Bachan, he asked Miller how he would like it if he
heard rumors that Bachan was out to get him. Bachan
did not acknowledge threatening to fire anyone discuss-
ing union business during working hours, or using the
word "blackball." Bachan repeated several times during
his testimony that he had no complaints concerning Mil-
ler's overall job performance.
There are clearly many similarities to be found in the
testimony of Bachan and Miller concerning the two
meetings in Bachan's office. It is undisputed, for exam-
ple, that during the first meeting, Bachan told Miller not
to worry about being laid off, and he compared the wage
scale and insurance benefits of the Respondent and
Bachan Aerospace, indicating that the Respondent's ben-
efits were superior. g And, during the second meeting,
Bachan admitted, he asked Miller how he would like it if
he heard a rumor that Bachan was out to get him. The
difference is whether Bachan's statements, in context,
were threatening, coercive, and intimidating, and wheth-
er Bachan interrogated Miller and threatened him with
being blackballed or laid off because of his support for
the Union, threatened the Respondent's employees with
possible plant closure and loss of insurance benefits if the
Union won the election, and suggested that Miller form
an in-house employee committee to negotiate with man-
agement.
The issue here is one of credibility, that is, whose testi-
mony should be believed, that of David Miller or that of
Douglas Bachan? Bachan's credibility as a witness hinges
in major part upon the collective attitude of the Re-
spondent's management, of which he was member,
toward the intrusion of a union into employer-employee
relations within the Respondent's plants. If, as professed
I When questioned about the seeming inconsistency in his affidavit of
January 9, 1981, in which Bachan said he had had only one conversation
with Miller, Bachan explained that he did not consider the rumor inci-
dent to have been a conversation but, rather, an occasion when he talked
to Miller as "boss to an employee."
^ Michael Brzoska, inspection leader, confirmed that Miller had told
him about a suit against Bachan by the NLRB and the UAW. Brzoska
also testified that on a later occasion Miller said "that he like to 'rile' me
up, he liked to get me going." David Miller, on the other hand, testified
that he did not recall telling Brzoska that he like to "rile" him.
0 From the record it appears that the Respondent may have had higher
wage scales and higher life insurance benefits than Bachan Aerospace, in
some instances.
272
B. J. & R. MACHINE CO.
by Bachan, Phillip Jakobi, the Respondent's president
and chairman of the board, and Lawrence Mains, then
the Respondent's superintendent of manufacturing, man-
agement was truly neutral, there would have been little
reason for Bachan to have made the disputed remarks at-
tributed to him by Miller. Conversely, if management
opposed the idea of a union representing the Respond-
ent's employees, Bachan would have had a motive for at-
tempting to dissuade Miller from supporting the union
organizing campaign.
The evidence in this case clearly points to the conclu-
sion that the Respondent's management was not neutral
and did not follow a policy of noninterference with re-
spect to the union organizing campaign. That the Re-
spondent was basically opposed to the union is implicit
in the testimony of B. J. & R. President Phillip Jakobi,
who testified that while it was his policy not to interfere
with his employees' desire for a union, he felt that he
could point out advantages and disadvantages. That
would not necessarily violate the Act, of course, but
pointing out advantages and disadvantages is incompati-
ble with a policy of noninterference, such as Jakobi also
claimed to follow, since the very act of framing and ex-
pressing his perception of advantages and disadvantages,
which are inherently subjective, would constitute at least
a subtle effort to shape the listener's views. That Presi-
dent Jakobi considered the disadvantages of a union to
outweigh the advantages, reflecting an antiunion tilt, is
apparent from the instructions which Bachan acknowl-
edged having received from him, which were to make
sure the employees understood the benefits which the
Respondent already provided, without saying anything
that was false. Thus, even if no more specific instructions
were given by President Jakobi to his subordinates, in-
cluding Douglas Bachan, it is clear that the Respondent's
managers were authorized by the company president to
speak out against the need for a union.
In that context, it is clear that Bachan's principal pur-
pose in calling Miller to his office soon after he received
a copy of the Union's letter to President Jakobi listing
the employees who were on the union organizing com-
mittee, which, of course, included Miller, was to attempt
to dissuade Miller from supporting the Union. Bachan's
stated purpose, that of cautioning Miller not to discuss
union business when he was supposed to be working,
was nothing more than a pretext, the more obviously so
because Bachan apparently did not find it necessary to
call any of the other three organizers to his office for
similar cautionary instructions."l Even more revealing of
his real purpose, after cautioning Miller in a perfunctory
manner, Bachan required Miller, who was on company
time and somewhat in the position of a captive audience,
to listen to what amounted to an unsolicited lecture on
Bachan's views concerning the benefits enjoyed by the
Respondent's employees and the absence of a need for a
union.
'o Even if the instructions given by Bachan to Miller were not unlaw-
ful, the manner in which they were given, by singling out one union sup-
porter to receive such instructions, amounts to discriminatory treatment
which violates Sec. 8(sXl). Carolina Steel Corp., 225 NLRB 20 (1976).
Because of Bachan's lack of candor concerning the
real purpose for which he called Miller to his office
before the union election, I conclude that his testimony
concerning what was said during that meeting is less
creditable than that of David Miller. That being so, I
find that on the occasion of his meeting with Miller
before the union election, Bachan exceeded the admoni-
tion given to him by President Jakobi to limit his re-
marks to factually accurate statements about the Compa-
ny's benefits, and made the statements attributed to him
by Miller. Specifically, I credit Miller's testimony and
find that, on that occasion, Bachan made statements to
the effect that, if the Union got in, the employees would
lose life insurance benefits, and that, if there were a
strike, he would close the plant and send the work to
Canada. Further, I find that Bachan used the occasion to
interrogate Miller concerning his reasons for supporting
the Union, and suggested that Miller take the lead in
forming an in-house committee to represent the employ-
ees in negotiations with management.
Having found that Bachan made the statements alleged
in the complaint and described above, the remaining
question is whether or not they constituted unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX)(l) of the
Act. I find that they did.
Although the allegedly unlawful statements were made
to one employee during a single meeting with the plant
superintendent, I find that they were not an insolated or
insignificant incident, that might arguably require no
remedy. Even in the absence of evidence of record indi-
cating that there were similar incidents involving other
employees, I find that Bachan's remarks, made in his ca-
pacity as a high-level management official, which were
directed to one of the four employee union organizers,
constituted a coercive attempt by the Respondent to
interfere with its employees' rights, as guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act, to engage in self-organizational ac-
tivities.
Bachan's interrogation of Miller concerning the latter's
reasons for supporting the union organizational drive
placed Miller in the position of having to justify his ac-
tions to his Employer, which clearly tended to have an
intimidating and inhibiting effect on Miller's free excer-
cise of his Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(aXl)
of the Act. Florida Steel Corp., 215 NLRB 97 (1974);
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 225 NLRB 911 (1976). Similarly
violative of Section 8(aXl) were Bachan's statements that
the employees would lose life insurance under a union
contract, and that he would close the plant and send the
work to Canada if there were a strike. The intimidating
and coercive effect of such statements which clearly
threatened more onerous working conditions and loss of
jobs in the event of union organization is obvious. Alside
Supply Co., 219 NLRB 447 (1975); Sportspal, Inc., 214
NLRB 917 (1974); Adams Automation Co., 218 NLRB
1255 (1975). Also obvious is the restraining effect of an
employer's suggestion, as that made by Bachan to Miller,
that its employees bypass a union and form an in-house
workers' committee to negotiate with management.
Womac Industries, 238 NLRB 43 (1978).
- -
273
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Further violative of the Act were the statements made
by Bachan to Miller during the postelection meeting ini-
tiated by Bachan and held in his office several days after
the November 12, 1980 election. In substance, on that
occasion Bachan warned Miller not to continue saying
that Bachan was being sued by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and the Union, and he asked Miller how the
latter would like it if he heard that Bachan was out to
get him. While Bachan and Miller are not in accord as to
everything that was said,l they agreed on the substance
and I find it unnecessary to resolve any remaining ques-
tions as to what was said because the outcome would not
change my finding that Bachan's statements threatened
Miller for engaging in a protected concerted activity. It
is incorrect to characterize Miller's statements, which he
did not deny, to his foreman, Michael Brzoska, concern-
ing a suit against Bachan, as mere rumors. While it might
not have been technically correct to say there was a suit
pending against Bachan at that moment, an unfair labor
charge had been filed against the Respondent in Case 7-
CA-18383(1) on October 14, 1980, and that is a sufficient
basis to support the conclusion of Miller, a layman, that
the NLRB and the UAW were suing Bachan. Since the
statement clearly related to the efforts of the Respond-
ent's employees to exercise their rights to organize, as
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, it was a protected
concerted activity. Bachan's attempt to silence Miller by
intimidation, and his threat, whether actual or implied, to
discipline Miller if he repeated the statement, constituted
improper interference with Miller's right to engage in
protected activities and therefore violated Section
8(aXI).
b. Layoffs
The remaining issue concerns the circumstances under
which the Respondent terminated the employment of
David M. Miller, Janet M. Redmon, and Alan J. Dontje,
three of the four employees named by the UAW mem-
bers of the UAW organizing committee in the Respond-
ent's plant.' 2 On consideration and demeanor of all of
the witnesses, I find that the evidence shows that the Re-
spondent terminated the employment of the three em-
ployees in question in retaliation for their union senti-
ments and union organizing activities. I do not credit,
and therefore reject, the Respondent's claim that the
three employees were laid off in the ordinary course of
business, and their membership in the UAW organizing
committee and their union organizing activities were co-
incidental and had no bearing on the decision to termi-
nate their employment.
11 Bachan, for example, did not admit to having made the remarks at-
tributed to him by Miller to the effect that he ought to fire Miller, and
would do so if Miller continued to spread the so-called rumor, and that
he would fire anyone caught discussing union business during working
hours. Miller, on the other hand, did not admit to having said that he
made the statements in questions to upset his supervisor, Mike Brzoska.
1" The Respondent also terminated the employment of the fourth
named member of the UAW organizing committee, Jim Baker; however,
the circumstances of the termination of his employment have not been
raised as an issue in this proceeding.
The proximity in time of the layoffs'3 to the UAW's
loss of the November 10, 1980 election and the filing of
objections by the Union on November 18, 1980, raises
the strong inference that the Respondent acted swiftly to
terminate the employment of the employees identified as
leaders of the recent unsuccessful union organizing cam-
paign, and to undermine future effective leadership of
any subsequent renewed organizing activity. From man-
agement's point of view there would be obvious benefits
flowing from the quick elimination of the employees
who had disturbed the status quo by fomenting worker
unrest, and a parallel desirable effect of discouraging
other employees from overtly participating in any future
union organizing campaigns by making an example of
those who had been leaders of the recent unsuccessful
campaign.
Left unrebutted, the Respondent's prompt termination
of the employment of the three named union organizers
following the UAW's unsuccessful attempt to organize
the Respondent's employees is sufficiently strong circum-
stantial evidence of violation of the three employees'
rights under Section 7 of the Act to meet the General
Counsel's burden of proving the alleged violations of
Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent has
attempted to rebut the adverse inference, however, by
testimony from its president, Phillip Jakobi, and then
Manager of Manufacturing Lawrence Mains, who main-
tained that adverse economic conditions necessitated lay-
offs in late 1980, and denied that Miller, Redmon, and
Dontje were laid off because of their union organizing
activities. I do not find Jakobi's testimony on these points
to be creditable, however, because his explanation of the
Respondent's layoff policies changed repeatedly as more
facts became known which were inconsistent with his
earlier explanations. Nor, in view of Jakobi's lack of
candor, do I credit the denial by Lawrence Mains, his
subordinate, that union activity was a factor in the lay-
offs of Miller, Redmon, and Dontje.
Initially, Jakobi, by letter dated December 29, 1980,
stated that the three employees in question were laid off
because they were the lowest in seniority within their
specific department. When it became apparent after pres-
entation of the General Counsel's direct case that the
statement was not true, at least with respect to Redmon
and Dontje,14 Jakobi testified for the Respondent on
direct examination that, when layoffs were necessary,
employees were laid off as close as possible to seniority
I' David M. Miller and Janet M. Redmon were laid off on November
22, 1980; Alan J. Dontje was laid off on December 5, 1980.
14 In greater detail, the Respondent's posthearing exhibit, which is ad-
mitted into evidence as post-hearing Exh. 1, shows that at the time
Redmon, a trainee working on the day shift in the inspection department,
was laid off on November 22, 1980, Charlene R. Silverthrone, a trainee
working in the same department on the night shift, had less seniority. The
same exhibit shows that at the time Dontje was laid off on December 5,
1980, there were seven other employees in his department, the grinding
department, who had less seniority, although only one had the same clas-
sification, Class C, as held by Dontje. Five of the less senior employees
were in Class B., and one was in Class A. The shifts and classification of
employees are insignificant, at this point, however, because in his letter
Jakobi made no reference to seniority within shifts or classifications, but
only to seniority within the departments.
274
B. . & R. MACHINE CO.
and classification,' with little transferring of people be-
tween shifts, in order to follow as closely as possible the
procedures contained in the Bachan Aerospace union
contract. On cross-examination, Jakobi restated the Re-
spondent's layoff policy, but added additional factors:
"But the policy is pretty much based on trainees are laid
off first, it is based on performance, it is based on attend-
ance, it is based on a lot of things. It is based on the
level of-the classification, and it's by department."' 6
Lawrence Mains testified that, as manager of manufac-
turing in late 1980, he was told by President Jakobi to
reduce the payroll by a certain amount, and that he and
Helmut Schmitz made the decision to lay off 13 or 14
employees. In doing so, according to Mains, he consid-
ered seniority, capabilities, attendance, and attitudes,
with seniority being given a little more, but not much,
weight. With respect to Miller and Redmon, Mains said
he and Schmitz decided they would be laid off because
they were very low on seniority, and he "had been get-
ting feedbacks from the shop as to their attendance, their
capabilities, their attitudes."1 7 Mains said he could not
recall if there were employees with less seniority than
they had, but there might have been one. Dontje was
laid off because the crush grinder machine which he had
operated had been removed from the plant and there was
no other machine which he was qualified to operate, and
there had been criticism of his attendance. Mains said
that he believed there was one other employee in
Dontje's department who had less seniority. Mains ac-
knowledged that other employees had been laid off out
of seniority order.
Thus, while the Respondent has steadfastly maintained
that the layoffs of Miller, Redmon, and Dontje were but
three of a number of layoffs' s necessitated by adverse
economic conditions, its explanation of its layoff policy
and how the three employees in question were selected
for layoff has been anything but consistent. It is apparent
from the testimony of Lawrence Mains that, contrary to
the claim of the Respondent's president Phillip Jakobi,
the Respondent did not follow a layoff policy based on
seniority, whether within departments, by classification,
or by shift. Corroborating Mains' testimony that seniori-
ty was but one of four factors, and not necessarily the
determining one, the Respondent's Posthearing Exhibit I
shows that 4 of 17 employees, including Alan Dontje,
who were laid off between September 1, 1980, and De-
cember 31, 1980, were not the least senior by classifica-
tion and shift. Further, of the 17 employees laid off, 7
I' R. Posthearing Eah. I lists employees by classification: Leader,
Class A, Class B, Class C, and Trainee. Jakobi testified that the Respond-
ent's employees, other than trainees, were not told how they were classi-
fied, although that information was provided to employees of Bachan
Aerospace.
1' Jakobi denied that he played any role in selecting employees to be
laid off, stating that he merely told his staff to reduce payroll costs, and
that the decisions to lay off specific employees were made by the staff,
including, Bob Rients in inspection, and Helmut Schmitz and Larry
Mains in machines.
" This contrasts sharply with the testimony of Douglas Bachan, who
acknowledged that in early October 1980 he told Miller that, based on
his job performance, the latter did not have to worry about job security.
Is R. hearing Exh. I shows that the employment of approximately 50
employees was terminated between September 1, 1980, and December 31,
1980, 17 by layoff, 24 by quitting, and 9 by discharge.
were not the least senior employees considering other
employees in their department on the same shifts, with
lower classifications, and 8 had more seniority than other
employees in the same department, with the same or
lower classifications, but working on the other shift.
And, finally, seven employees, in Class C or higher,
were laid off before trainees in their departments.
As noted, the Respondent maintains that the layoff of
Miller, Redmon, and Dontje, who were but three of a
number of employees laid off about the same time, was
necessitated by declining orders and lack of work. While
it may be true that Respondent experienced a loss of
business in late 1980, its claim that it was forced to resort
to layoffs to reduce its payroll costs does not stand up
well under scrutiny. The Respondent's Posthearing Ex-
hibit 1 shows that during the period from January 1,
1980, to October 22, 1981, the Respondent experienced a
turnover of over 200 employees (at least 21 by layoff,
106 by quitting, and 81 by discharge, for a total of 208),
among a work force which apparently fluctuated be-
tween approximately 100 and 150 employees. With a
turnover rate of such proportions (even excluding lay-
offs, which account for only approximately 10 percent of
the employee departures), it would seem that the Re-
spondent could have accomplished its goal of reducing
its work force by a combination of attrition, and a mora-
torium on hiring, coupled with reassignments within the
work force, without the necessity of resorting to layoffs.
This conclusion is even more evident when it is consid-
ered that during the months of October, November, and
December 1980, when 16 employees were laid off, the
work force was concurrently increased by 13 new hires,
resulting in a net reduction of only 3 employees. On its
face, the hiring of new employees at the same time other
employees are being laid off suggests, at the very least,
that the Respondent's claim of economic necessity has
been greatly exaggerated.
It is clear from the evidence in this case that the Re-
spondent had no uniform established layoff policy. To
the contrary, the decision to lay off an employee was
routinely made in secret by management on the basis of
subjective criteria which had more to do with manage-
ment's perception of the employee's value to the Compa-
ny than any objective standard, such as seniority. Indeed,
the evidence in this case most strongly suggests that lay-
offs, as employed by the Respondent, had little, if any-
thing, to do with economic considerations but, rather,
were simply another personnel management tool used by
the Respondent to eliminate employees whom, for what-
ever reason, it considered to be nonproductive or trou-
blesome, but where actual cause for dismissal was appar-
ently lacking. 9
19 As an example, Class A employee William W. Terry, N/C lathe de-
partment, was laid off on October 7, 1980, and replaced by a newly
hired, but lower paid. Class A employee (Dale G. Zitz) on October 20,
1980, some 13 days later. While the record is silent as to further details
concerning this occurrence, it is difficult. indeed, to believe that the Re-
spondent's business was so volatile that an economic downturn which
forced the layoff of an employee could have been so reversed a mere 13
days later that a new employee of the same skill level had to be hired.
275
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In a belated attempt to further justify its actions in
laying off Miller, Redmon, and Dontje, during the trial
of this case the Respondent introduced evidence which it
contends show that all three had job performance prob-
lems and, in the case of Redmon and Dontje, attendance
problems as well. Even assuming there may have been
some basis for such claims, a finding which I specifically
decline to make on the basis of this record, the Respond-
ent's failure to cite good cause as a reason for the dis-
charge of the three employees either at the time their
employment was terminated, or during the investigation
of the unfair labor practice charge, discredits the Re-
spondent's belated contention at this stage of the pro-
ceeding that good cause for discharge was a factor in its
decision to terminate the employment of Miller,
Redmon, or Dontje.
The one remaining thing which distinguished these
three employees from their fellow employees, and
brought them to management's attention, was, of course,
their membership on the UAW organizing committee.
For reasons previously stated, management was not neu-
tral with respect to the UAW's attempt to organize the
Respondent's employees, and Miller, at least, was sub-
jected to harassment, threats, and intimidation by his
plant superintendent because of his union activities. It is
clear that the Respondent opposed the idea of union rep-
resentation of its employees, and that soon after the
UAW was rejected by the employees in the election on
November 18, 1980, it took steps to weaken, if not end,
the union organizing movement by terminating the em-
ployment of the members of the UAW organizing com-
mittee. Economic necessity as reason for laying off
Miller, Redmon, and Dontje was nothing more than a
pretext raised by Respondent to conceal its real objec-
tive, which was to discharge the three employees be-
cause of their union activities. The Respondent's actions
in doing so constitute a clear violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Respondent committed unfair labor practices in
October 1980 by
(a) Threatening an employee with plant closure if the
Charging Union were successful in its organizational
campaign and the employees thereafter engaged in an
economic strike in support of their collective-bargaining
demands, in violation of Section 8(aX1) of the Act.
(b) Coercively interrogating an employee concerning
his membership in, support for, and activities on behalf
of the Charging Union, in violation of Section 8(aXl) of
the Act.
(c) Telling an employee that the Respondent's employ-
ees would receive smaller life insurance benefits if the
Charging Union were successful in its organizational
campaign in violation of Section 8(aXl) of the Act.
(d) Suggesting to an employee that he form an em-
ployee committee for the purpose of meeting with man-
agement to discuss terms and conditions of employment,
in lieu of a union, in violation of Section 8(aXI) of the
Act.
3. The Respondent committed an unfair labor practice
in November 1980 by threatening an employee with loss
of employment if he engaged in the protected concerted
activity of talking about charges filed against the Re-
spondent by the Charging Union or complaints filed or
to be filed against the Respondent by the General Coun-
sel of the National Labor Relations Board, in violation of
Section 8(aXI) of the Act.
4. The Respondent committed unfair labor practices
on or about November 22, 1981, by terminating the em-
ployment of its employees David M. Miller and Janet M.
Redmon and on or about December 5, 1980, by terminat-
ing the employment of its employee Alan J. Dontje,
becaue of their support and activities on behalf of the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it appropriate to order the
Respondent to cease and desist therefrom, and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act.
The Respondent, having committed unfair labor prac-
tices by unlawfully discharging their employees David
M. Miller, Janet M. Redmon, and Alan J. Dontje, shall
offer to reinstate them to their former employment, with-
out prejudice to any rights or privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings they may have sustained
as a result of the termination of their employment. Back-
pay shall be computed in accordance with the formula
approved in F W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest computed in the manner prescribed in Flori-
da Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977); see generally Isis
Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716, 717-721 (1962).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
276