Ayman Hammad

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2020

12431489 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/431,489 04/28/2009 Ayman Hammad 80083-749307 5254
66945 7590 01/31/2020
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP/VISA
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
ANDERSON, MICHAEL W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte AYMAN HAMMAD
____________

Appeal 2018-005390
Application 12/431,489
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MICHAEL W. KIM, MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, and JOSEPH A.
FISCHETTI, and, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 13, 14, 16, 17, 27–29, and 31. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Visa U.S.A.
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant states the application describes a “consumer device.” Spec.
¶ 6.
Claim 13, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
13. A method comprising:
receiving, by an access device, a first account
identifier associated with a first account, a second account
identifier associated with a second account, and an alterable
flag from a portable consumer device, wherein the alterable flag
links the first account and the second account, and wherein a
state of the alterable flag indicates whether value is to be
automatically transferred from the second account to the first
account;
generating, by the access device, a first
authorization request message associated with a purchase
transaction, wherein the first authorization request message
includes the first account identifier associated with the first
account, the second account identifier associated with the
second account, a transaction amount, and the alterable flag
stored in the portable consumer device;
sending, by the access device to a server computer,
the first authorization request message, wherein the server
computer thereafter:
analyzes the first authorization request
message,
determines that the first account does not
contain sufficient funds to pay for the transaction amount
for the purchase transaction,
determines the state of the alterable flag, and
performs additional processing depending
upon the state of the alterable flag, wherein, if the
alterable flag is in a transfer state, the additional
processing includes initiating a transfer of value from the
second account to the first account by transmitting a
request to an issuer of the second account, and
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transmitting a second authorization request message
associated with the purchase transaction for the
transaction amount to an issuer of the first account; and
receiving an authorization response message from
the server computer.

THE REJECTION
The following rejection is before us for review.
Claims 13, 14, 16, 17, 27–29, and 31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 6–7 in the
Final Office Action2 and on pages 3–9 in the Examiner’s Answer3.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We affirm the rejection of claims 13, 14, 16, 17, 27–29, and 31 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues claims 13, 14, 16, 17, 27–29, and 31 as a group.
(Appeal Br. 7–21). We select claim 13 as the representative claim for this
group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 13. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).

2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on August 11, 2017.
3 All references to the Examiner’s Answer refer to the Examiner’s Answer
mailed on March 1, 2018.
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An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether
the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that
“the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in
light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether
the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology
or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
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In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance at
53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states:
There are a number of payment card programs that are
used to control spending by teens[.] One such program is
entitled Visa Buxx®. This program uses a prepaid, reloadable
card that is created for teens. In the program, a parent enrolls
their teen, then loads money onto the prepaid card. Parents
retain complete control of the account associated with the
prepaid card and can view the teen’s spending history at any
time using a website. The website can be used to enroll teens,
replenish value, check balances and transactions, view special
offers and access money management tools. It offers several
options to fund the prepaid card including credit cards and debit
cards. A value reload feature on the website enables
cardholders and/or parents to set their own loading and
reloading schedule (with a valid funding account on file).
Value reload options include immediate one-time, scheduled
one-time, recurring scheduled and low balance.
Spec. ¶ 2.
The Specification goes on to state:
Although the above-described program is useful, it could
be improved. For example, the consumer may want to perform
an off-line transaction. If the balance on the prepaid card is too
low to conduct a purchase transaction for a particular item, the
consumer may not be able to make the purchase. Further, in the
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above-described system, it is necessary for a parent to log onto
a website to change the reload parameters associated with the
reloadable card.
Spec. ¶ 3.
Understood in light of the Specification, claim 13, recites, in pertinent
part, the concepts of:
receiving, . . . a first account identifier associated with a
first account, a second account identifier associated with a
second account, and an alterable flag . . ., wherein the alterable
flag links the first account and the second account, and wherein
a state of the alterable flag indicates whether value is to be
automatically transferred from the second account to the first
account;
generating, . . . a first authorization request message
associated with a purchase transaction, wherein the first
authorization request message includes the first account
identifier associated with the first account, the second account
identifier associated with the second account, a transaction
amount, . . .;
sending, . . . the first authorization request message,
wherein . . . thereafter:
analyz[ing] the first authorization request message,
determin[ing] that the first account does not contain
sufficient funds to pay for the transaction amount for the
purchase transaction,
determin[ing] the state of the alterable flag, and
perform[ing] additional processing depending upon the
state of the alterable flag, wherein, if the alterable flag is in a
transfer state, the additional processing includes initiating a
transfer of value from the second account to the first account by
transmitting a request to an issuer of the second account, and
transmitting a second authorization request message associated
with the purchase transaction for the transaction amount to an
issuer of the first account; and
receiving an authorization response message.
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Accordingly, the Examiner found that the claims are directed to plural
judicial exceptions, finding:
Claim(s) 13–14, 16–17, 27–29, and 31 are directed to a
series of steps instructing how to link a first account with a
second account using an alterable flag (including: . . .
receiving . . . a first account identifier . . . , . . . generating
. . . a first authentication request message . . . , . . . sending
. . . the first authorization request message . . . , . . . analyzes
the first authorization request message . . . , . . . determines
that the first account does not contain sufficient funds to
pay for the transaction amount . . . , . . . determines the state
of the alterable flag . . . , . . . transmitting a second
authorization request message . . . , . . . receiving an
authorization response request message . . . , and . . . stores
a balance . . .), which is a fundamental economic practice, as
well as a method of organizing human activities, and thus an
abstract idea. Additionally, the claims are similar to the
following concepts/cases that the courts have recognized to be
abstract ideas: collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis
(Electric Power Group), creating a contractual relationship
(buySAFE), collecting and comparing known information
(Classen), obtaining and comparing intangible data
(Cybersource), data recognition and storage (Content
Extraction), organizing information through mathematical
correlations (Digitech), and processing information through
a clearinghouse (Dealertrack). 4

4 In our analysis to follow, we will address the first two “directed to”
findings made by the Examiner for the sake of brevity. That the Examiner
made plural findings as to what the claims are directed to is not in error. See
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.”
Cf. Appeal Br. 8; Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2016); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Farbo
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Final Act. 6–7.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 13 recites a fundamental
economic practice because claim 13 recites such elements, e.g.,
“determin[ing] that the first account does not contain sufficient funds to pay
for the transaction amount for the purchase transaction,” and “transmitting a
second authorization request message associated with the purchase
transaction for the transaction amount to an issuer of the first account.”
These elements recite the idea of ensuring adequate funds are provided to
cover the cost of a transaction which is a fundamental economic practice.
The patent-ineligible end of the spectrum includes fundamental economic
practices. Alice, 573 U.S. at 220. Fundamental economic practices are
considered certain methods of organizing human activity, which is an
enumerated abstract idea. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
We also agree with the Examiner that limitations of claim 13 are
similar to those recited in Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) in that the claims are similar to “collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis.” Final Act. 6. For example, claim 13 recites in pertinent part,
“analyz[ing] the first authorization request message, determin[ing] that the
first account does not contain sufficient funds to pay for the transaction
amount for the purchase transaction, determin[ing] the state of the alterable
flag, and perform[ing] additional processing depending upon the state of the
alterable flag.” These are concepts capable of being performed practically in

Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech Image Techs.,
LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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the human mind as mental processes, because the steps of receiving,
transmitting, storing, and analyzing data mimic the human thought processes
of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with paper and
pencil, where the data interpretation is capable of being practically
performed in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 13 only
generically requires “an access device,” “a portable consumer device,” and
“a server computer.” These components are described in the Specification at
a high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 25, 26, 30, 35, 36 and Figs.1 and 2.
We fail to see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer
components and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to
“impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 53. We also find no indication in the Specification
that the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing.
Thus, we find that the claims recite fundamental economic practices
and mental processes that are not integrated into a practical application.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to account balances, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”).
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Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:
As such, the claims, when considered individually and in
combination, are nothing more than the instruction to
implement the abstract idea (i.e. linking a first account with a
second account using an alterable flag) in a particular, albeit
well-understood, routine and conventional technological
environment. The additional limitations are merely
performing repetitive calculations; receiving, processing,
and storing data; electronic recordkeeping; automating
mental tasks; and receiving or transmitting data over a
network, all of which have been held by the courts to be well
understood, routine, and conventional computer functions.
The additional limitations of the independent and dependent
claim(s) when considered individually and as an ordered
combination do not amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea.
Final Act. 3–4.
We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the
claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the
abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do
not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to receive, generate, send, analyze, determine, and apply decision
criteria to data as a result, amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—
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some of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer
functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In
re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming.”). In short,
each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the
claims do not affect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of
information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 25, 26, 30,
35, 36 and Figs.1 and 2). Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract ideas using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (receive,
generate, send, analyze, determine, and apply decision criteria to data as a
result) and storing is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to
be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed.
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Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification,
generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was
abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appeal Br. 7–21; Reply Br. 2–8. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues:
Notwithstanding the above, the Examiner has also failed to
establish a prima facie case of patent ineligibility, because the
Examiner has failed to establish that any of the alleged abstract
ideas (A), (B), or (C) are similar to a concept that the courts
have identified as an abstract idea. In particular, the Examiner
fails to explain “why” the cases are “similar to at least one
concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.”
Appeal Br. 9.
We disagree with Appellant. First, any alleged differences between
what the Examiner describes as constituting “abstract ideas” and cited case
law does not constitute error, because the characteristics of abstract ideas
can be described, at different levels of abstraction, to what the claims are
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directed. It is recognized that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described
at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, 842 F.3d at 1240.
Second, to the extent Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in
adequately supporting this determination by not providing evidence, we are
unpersuaded. In this regard, there is no requirement that examiners must
provide evidentiary support in every case before a conclusion can be made
that a claim is directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., MPEP
§ 2106.07(a)(III). Moreover, the Federal Circuit made clear in Berkheimer
that “not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the
underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881
F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In fact, the Federal Circuit in Berkheimer
did not require evidentiary support for independent claim 13 because “[t]he
limitations [of claim 13] amount to no more than performing the abstract
idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer
components.” Id. at 1370.
All that is required of the USPTO to meet its prima facie burden of
production is that the Examiner set forth the statutory basis of the rejection
and the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate and
informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132.
As the statute itself instructs, the Examiner must “notify the applicant,”
“stating the reasons for such rejection,” “together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing the
prosecution of his application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132; see also In re Jung, 637
F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (declining “to impose a heightened burden
on examiners beyond the notice requirement of § 132”). Here, as we found
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above, the Examiner has made these findings as required by the statute. See
Final Act. 2–7.
Appellant also argues, “[a] prima facie case of patent ineligibility has
not been established, because the alleged abstract idea is untethered from the
language of the claims.” Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis omitted).
We disagree with Appellant again because, as determined above, the
Examiner’s findings made in the Final Action meet the requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 132. Notwithstanding, we direct Appellant’s attention to the
Examiner’s “directed to” findings on pages 6–7 of the Final Action where
the Examiner explicitly tethers bolded print claim limitations5 to the
fundamental economic practice and the mental process exemptions. The
Examiner’s characterization of claim 13 is thus, in our view, fully consistent
with the Specification, including the claim language as set forth above as
intrinsic evidence. Thus, the Examiner did provide sufficient evidentiary
support for the Alice “step two–A” determination in this case.
Although we agree with Appellant that the claims must be read as a
whole (Appeal Br. 12), we nevertheless find, on balance, that claim 13
recites the idea of ensuring adequate funds are available to cover the cost of
a transaction for the reasons specified above with respect to our “directed to”
findings. As found supra, claim 13 only includes the following generically
recited device limitations: “an access device,” “a portable consumer
device,” and “a server computer.” What remains in the claim after
disregarding these device limitations, are abstractions,

5 We note the Examiner’s inclusion of the phrase “stores a balance” is
deemed a typographic error without consequence of error. C.f., Appeal Br.
10.

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receiving, . . . a first account identifier associated with a
first account, a second account identifier associated with a
second account, and an alterable flag . . ., wherein the alterable
flag links the first account and the second account, and wherein
a state of the alterable flag indicates whether value is to be
automatically transferred from the second account to the first
account;
generating, . . . a first authorization request message
associated with a purchase transaction, wherein the first
authorization request message includes the first account
identifier associated with the first account, the second account
identifier associated with the second account, a transaction
amount, . . .;
sending, . . . the first authorization request message,
wherein . . . thereafter:
analyz[ing] the first authorization request message,
determin[ing] that the first account does not contain
sufficient funds to pay for the transaction amount for the
purchase transaction,
determin[ing] the state of the alterable flag, and
perform[ing] additional processing depending upon the
state of the alterable flag, wherein, if the alterable flag is in a
transfer state, the additional processing includes initiating a
transfer of value from the second account to the first account by
transmitting a request to an issuer of the second account, and
transmitting a second authorization request message associated
with the purchase transaction for the transaction amount to an
issuer of the first account; and
receiving an authorization response message.

“A claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis
omitted) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90).
Likewise, we fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellant (Appeal
Br. 13) between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Appeal Br. 13. In DDR Holdings, the Court evaluated the eligibility of
claims “address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if
adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink
protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host’s website
after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” Id. at
1257. There, the Court found that the claims were patent eligible because
they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to
resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The
Court cautioned, however, “that not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. In the claims
before us, there is no device which similarly transforms the manner in
which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem that had no
“pre-Internet analog.”
Appellant next argues,
The alterable flag can cause the central server computer to
transfer funds from the second account to the first account, to
ensure that the transaction can be completed with the first
account. Note that this instruction to transfer occurs during an
actual transaction, and is not performed before the transaction
as in conventional systems.
As such, embodiments of the invention eliminate the
need to contact a central Web server using another computer,
prior to any transaction being conducted, to transfer funds from
the second account to the first account.
Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis omitted).
We disagree with Appellant. First, the timing features the Appellant
argues are not recited in the claims. We find that in this particular case, the
broadly claimed sequence of information analysis and output focuses on the
result, rather than the technical details of its implementation. It is generic
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and conventional and is similar to language otherwise held to be abstract
(see Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715 (sequence of receiving, selecting,
offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment
recited an abstraction)). Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the
broader scope of claim 13 which merely describes data flows in a network,
without any technological mechanisms for doing so. The question is
whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that
improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or effect that
itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this case, claim 13 as a whole is focused on
satisfying certain contingencies for ensuring adequate funds are available to
cover the cost of a transaction. In other words, nothing in claim 13 purports
to improve computer functioning or “effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225.
Citing to BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), Appellant asserts, “[t]his is an ‘inventive
concept’ and is not an ‘abstract idea,’ because it is not conventional or well-
understood, and is further concrete and tangible as it is run on multiple
computers in a distributed system.” Appeal Br. 18. Appellant’s reliance on
BASCOM is misplaced. In BASCOM, the Federal Circuit determined that
the claimed installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from
the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user
provided an inventive concept in that it gave the filtering tool both the
benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP
server. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. The court, thus, held that the second
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step of the Mayo/Alice framework was in favor the patent owner, because
the claimed invention “represents a ‘software-based invention[ ] that
improve[s] the performance of the computer system itself.’” BASCOM, 827
F.3d at 1351 (alterations in original) (stating that like DDR Holdings, where
the patent “claimed a technical solution to a problem unique to the Internet,”
the patent in BASCOM claimed a “technology-based solution . . . to filter
content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other Internet
filtering systems . . . making it more dynamic and efficient”).
Here, however, Appellant does not identify, and we do not find, any
improvement to computer technology analogous to the ordered combination
described in BASCOM or any additional element or elements recited in
claim 13 that yield an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to another technology or technical field. There is nothing in
the claim 13 which is similar to the intermediary device inserted between
two otherwise conventional computer nodes to move the location where a
process is otherwise ordinarily executed. In BASCOM, it was the location of
the filtering element, whereas in the instant claims there is no such specific
location of ordered combination elements.
Likewise unpersuasive are Appellant’s analogies of the appealed
claims to those in Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom Inc., 841 F.3d
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 19–20. In Amdocs, the court adopted the
district court’s interpretation of the claim term “enhance,” stating, it
approved “reading the ‘in a distributed fashion’ and the ‘close to the source’
of network information requirements into the term ‘enhance.’” Id. at 1300.
The court then went on to find the claim’s “enhancing” limitation
necessarily required that the generic components operate in an
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unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer
functionality. Id. at 1300–01. In this way, the claims of Amdocs are
inconsistent with those before us on appeal here in that in the latter, no
specific technologic modifications were required to solve a problem or
improve the functioning of a known system generally to produce patent-
eligible subject matter. See, e.g., DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d 1245; McRO,
837 F.3d at 1315. No such problem or evidence showing how the claims
solve a stated technical problem has been identified here other than attorney
argument, and we are not persuaded that the claims are not directed to an
abstract idea.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 13, 14, 16,
17, 27–29, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION
Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
13, 14, 16, 17,
27–29, 31
101 Eligibility 13, 14, 16, 17,
27–29, 31

AFFIRMED