Aydin, Osman et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 3, 2020

14377281 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/377,281 08/07/2014 Osman Aydin LUTZ 201851US01 6943
48116 7590 08/03/2020
FAY SHARPE/NOKIA
1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor
The Halle Building
Cleveland, OH 44115-1843
EXAMINER
BLANTON, JOHN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2466
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@faysharpe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte OSMAN AYDIN and STEFAN VALENTIN1
________________

Appeal 2019-000383
Application 14/377,281
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, ERIC B. CHEN, and
SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 3–9, and 11–17. See generally Appeal Br. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Board conducts a limited de novo
review of the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified
by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies ALCATEL-LUCENT as the real
party in interest. Appeal Brief filed May 1, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”), 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant describes the present invention as follows:
The invention concerns a method for scheduling of radio
resources to user terminals . . . of different network operators
using a scheduling unit, wherein the scheduling unit determines
weight parameters for the user terminals . . . of the different
network operators for scheduling of the radio resources based on
a predefined distribution of radio resources among the different
network operators . . . and at least one data throughput per user
terminal in a time interval . . . , and the scheduling unit schedules
the radio resources to the user terminals . . . of the different
network operators based on said weight parameters, and a base
station therefor.
Spec., Abstract.2
Independent claim 1, reproduced below with formatting modified for
clarity, illustrates the appealed claims:
1. A method for scheduling of radio resources to user terminals of
different network operators using a scheduling unit, wherein
the scheduling unit determines weight parameters for the user
terminals of the different network operators for scheduling of the radio
resources based on
a predefined distribution of radio resources among the
different network operators and
data throughputs per user terminal in a time interval,
wherein
said weight parameters are determined based on used radio
resources per user terminal in a time interval and

2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s arguments in
their entirety, we refer to the above mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the
following documents for their respective details: Appellants Specification
filed August 7, 2014 (“Spec.”), the Final Action mailed March 2, 2018
(“Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed August 15, 2018 (“Ans.”);
and the Reply Brief filed October 15, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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said data throughputs are determined based on forgetting
factors, the forgetting factors being adapted specifically per user
terminal for each network operator and provided for rescheduling
an arbitrary user terminal at an earlier or later point in time;
and the scheduling unit schedules the radio resources to the user
terminals of the different network operators based on said weight
parameters.

STATEMENT OF THE REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 6, 7, 12, and 15–17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Chapin (US 2009/01700472 A1; published July 2,
2009) and Mueller (US 2006/0160556 A1; published July 20, 2006). Final
Act. 12–16.
Claims 3–5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Chapin, Mueller, and Norlund (US 2011/0038341 A1;
published Feb. 17, 2011). Final Act. 16–18.
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Chapin, Mueller, and Nordström (US 2013/0343321 A1; published
Dec. 26, 2013). Final Act. 18.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Chapin, Mueller, and Ogura (US 2008/0031212 A1; published Feb. 7,
2008). Final Act. 18–19.
Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Chapin, Mueller, and Venkatraman (US 2013/0136056 A1; published
May 30, 2013). Final Act. 19.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Chapin, Mueller, and Wu (US 2010/0110895 A1; published May 6,
2010). Final Act. 20.
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THE EXAMINER’S DETERMINATIONS AND
APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS
The Examiner finds that Chapin discloses scheduling radio resources
to user terminals of different network operators using a scheduling unit,
wherein the scheduling unit determines the different network operators for
scheduling of the radio resources based on a predefined distribution of radio
resources among the different network operators. Final Act. 12 (citing
Chapin ¶¶ 90–97). The Examiner further finds that Chapin discloses that the
scheduling unit schedules the radio resources to the user terminals of the
different network operations based on weight parameters. Id. at 12–13.
According to the Examiner, “[the] host specifies the proportion of base
station capacity that is available to each carrier. Resource allocations are
described in a node policy file that the host installs on each shared base
station.”). Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Chapin ¶¶ 90–97).
The Examiner subsequently clarifies,
Chapin discloses a physical base station [that] is managed by a
host. The host manages multiple virtual base stations within the
physical base station. Each virtual base station corresponds to an
independent carrier with its own respective mobile users ([¶] 48).
The host “controls the spectrum allocation table that limits the
frequencies where each carrier’s virtual base station may
operate” ([¶] 97), and the host “specifies the proportion of base
station capacity that is available to each carrier. Resource
allocations are described in a node policy file that the host installs
on each shared base station” ([¶] 97). Thus Chapin expressly
discloses the scheduling of radio resources for each virtual base
station which in turn are resources for the users of the each
respective virtual base station.
Ans. 3.
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The Examiner finds that Mueller teaches (1) radio resources are
scheduled based upon data throughputs per user terminal in a time interval,
and (2) weight parameters are determined based on used radio resources per
user terminal in a time interval. Final Act. 13 (citing Mueller ¶¶ 4–6). The
Examiner further finds that Mueller teaches that the data throughputs are
determined based on forgetting factors, the forgetting factors being adapted
specifically per user terminal for each network operator and that the
forgetting factors provided for rescheduling an arbitrary user terminal at an
earlier or later point in time. Id.
The Examiner finds that one would have been motivated to implement
the proportional fair scheduling, as described by Mueller, in the resource
allocation across virtual base stations, as described by Chapin. Final
Act. 13. The Examiner recites a stated motivation as being “to improve
fairness scheduling for [a] user on a virtual [base station].” Id.
Appellant argues, inter alia, that Chapin relates to a shared network
infrastructure that entails virtual or shared base stations, but that Chapin
does not address the concept of scheduling. Appeal Br. 9. Appellant argues
that Chapin’s system merely entails virtual base stations being assigned
different frequency bands. Id. at 9–10 (citing Chapin ¶ 16). According to
Appellant, “[w]hile Chapin indicates hardware is shared, . . . Chapin does
not address the issue of scheduling user traffic and does not disclose or
suggest any method for scheduling radio resources to user terminals of
different network operators.”). Id. at 10.
Appellant responds to the Examiner’s clarification of the Answer, as
follows: “the Examiner only refers to alleged disclosure in Chapin of a host
controlling a spectrum allocation table, specifying a proportion of base
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station capacity available to each carrier and describing allocations in a node
policy file. The Examiner then characterizes these alleged disclosures as
expressly disclosing scheduling.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant reiterates that
Chapin’s disclosure of controlling the spectrum allocation table does not
constitute a “disclosure of a method of scheduling.” Id. Appellant argues,
“[e]ven if these elements may provide or represent information that could be
used in a scheduling process, Chapin does not disclose a scheduling
process[,] and the Examiner does not provide citation to disclosed steps or
elements of an allegedly disclosed scheduling process.” Id.

ANALYSIS
From these stated rationales and arguments, we understand the
Examiner and Appellant to disagree as to what claim 1 means by reciting
“[a] method of scheduling radio resources to user terminal of different
network operators using a scheduling unit,” and what claim 1 means in
reciting, “the scheduling unit determines weight parameters” (claim 1,
emphasis added). More specifically, we understand the Examiner’s position
to be that the claim language, “the scheduling unit determines weight
parameters,” as recited by claim 1, merely means that the scheduling unit
dictates or specifies weight parameters. We understand Appellant’s position
to be, in contrast, that the claim term “determines” more narrowly requires
that the scheduling unit, after reasoning or observation, ascertain or decide
the weight parameters. See, e.g., Random House Unabridged Dictionary,
2020 ed. (defining the term “determine” to include either of these two
distinct meanings) (available at
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/determine?s=t).
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It is well settled that during examination of a patent application,
pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent
with the Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “[I]nterpreting what is meant by a word in a claim is
not to be confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the
specification, which is improper.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301
F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). We, therefore, interpret the claim term “determine” in light of the
rest of claim 1 and also in light of Appellant’s Specification.
Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, that the scheduling unit “determines”
weight parameters for scheduling of the radio resources based on (1) a
predefined distribution of radio resources, (2) data throughputs per user
terminal in a timer interval, and (3) radio resources per user terminal in a
time interval. Claim 1 also sets forth that “the scheduling unit schedule the
radio resources to the user terminals of the different network operators based
on said weight parameters.” Claim 1’s express language, then, indicates that
the scheduling unit concludes or ascertains how to schedule the radio
resources after observing the variously recited conditions. If claim 1 were
intended to instead mean that the scheduling unit causes weight conditions to
be forwarded to the user terminals, as we understand the Examiner to be
interpreting the claim, claim 1 alternatively could have recited steps to the
effect of (1) determining the weight parameters, either by some other
particular component or determined generally, without reciting that the
scheduling unit performs the determining, (2) communicating the
determined weight parameters to the scheduling unit, and (3) forwarding the
determined weight parameters from the scheduling unit to the user terminals.
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Appellant’s Specification also supports this interpretation of the claim
term “determine” and the associated functioning of the scheduling unit:
the scheduling unit is adapted to determine weight
parameters for the user terminals of the different network
operators for scheduling of the radio resources based on a
predefined distribution of radio resources among the different
network operators and a data throughput per user terminal in a
time interval,
and the scheduling unit is adapted to schedule the radio
resources to the different network operators based on said weight
parameters.
Spec. 4:24–5:3.
For these reasons, we interpret claim 1 to mean that the scheduling
unit itself ascertains, decides, or determines what the weight parameters are
after taking into consideration (1) the predefined distribution of radio
resources among the different network operators, (2) the data throughputs
per user terminal in a time interval, and (3) the used radio resources per user
terminal in a time interval. And because the obviousness rejection of
claim 1 is only based upon the theory that Chapin’s scheduling unit merely
causes the weight parameters to be forwarded to the user terminals, the
Examiner has not established that Chapin teaches a scheduling unit that
determines weight parameters, consistent with the broadest reasonable
interpretation of claim 1.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. Accordingly, we
reverse the rejection of that claim and also of claims 6, 7, 12, and 15–17,
which either depend from claim 1 or otherwise recite similar claim language.
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Application 14/377,281

9
With respect to the remaining obviousness rejections of claims 3–5, 9,
11, 13, and 14, the Examiner does not rely on any of the additionally cited
references to cure the deficiencies of the obviousness rejection explained
above. See Final Act. 16–20.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

REVERSED

Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 6, 7, 12, 15–17 103(a) Chapin, Mueller 1, 6, 7, 12,
15–17
3–5 103(a) Chapin,
Mueller,
Norland
3–5
9 103(a) Chapin,
Mueller,
Nordström
9
11 103(a) Chapin,
Mueller, Ogura
11
13 103(a) Chapin,
Mueller,
Venkatraman
13
14 103(a) Chapin,
Mueller, Wu
14
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–7, 9,
11–17