Ayana C.,1 Complainant,v.Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 21, 20180120171287 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 21, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Ayana C.,1 Complainant, v. Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency. Appeal No. 0120171287 Hearing No. 570-2014-00565X Agency No. ARBELVOIR13JUN02037 DECISION On February 17, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s January 19, 2017, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. ISSUES PRESENTED The issue presented in this case is whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Administrative Judge’s (AJ) erred in finding that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination when she was terminated from her position. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Logistics Management Specialist at the Agency’s INSCOM Plans and Programs Division, Office of the Chief of Staff in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. On February 25, 2013, Complainant was hired as a reemployed annuitant. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120171287 2 Complainant maintained that her supervisor, (S1) forced her to resign after he indicated to her that she was not adequately performing her position. On May 31, 2013, Complainant was given the option to resign in lieu of termination, which she chose to do. Complainant alleged that she was terminated because of her age, race, and color. She maintained that had she been allowed more time to learn the job, she would have mastered her position. On July 17, 2013, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), color (Black), and age (64) when on May 31, 2013, she was forced to resign from her position as a Logistics Management Specialist, GG-13. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Administrative Judge. Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on December 9, 2016. The AJ found that assuming, arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, namely, that Complainant was terminated because she was not adequately performing her positon and she required too much assistance from other staff members. The AJ found that Complainant did not demonstrate that the Agency’s reasons were pretext for discrimination. The AJ noted that even Complainant indicated that if she had more time in the position she would have mastered the job. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination or a constructive discharge as alleged. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends, among other things, that the AJ erred in granting the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing. Complainant argues that she should have been allowed a hearing in order to prove her case. In response, the Agency contends, among other things, that the AJ properly found no discrimination. The Agency maintained that it articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and Complainant did not show that the reasons were pretext for discrimination. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Standard of Review In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed 0120171287 3 de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing). 0120171287 4 Upon review of the record, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact presented here. The record has been adequately developed, Complainant was given ample notice of the Agency’s motion for a decision without a hearing, she was given a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, she was given the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and she was given the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. We find that, even assuming all facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor, as explained below. Therefore, we find that the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff’d, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Once Complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Agency is successful, the burden reverts back to the Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency’s reason(s) for its action was a pretext for discrimination. At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 1993); U.S. Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983). Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that even if we assume, arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that Complainant was giving the option to resign in lieu of termination because she was not meeting performance expectations. Complainant was given the option to resign in lieu of termination, and she accepted. We find that Complainant has not provided any evidence that she was forced to resign. In fact, we find that Complainant has not provided any evidence that discriminatory animus was involved in her termination, as even she admitted that she needed more time to master the position. We find that Complainant did not demonstrate that the Agency’s actions were pretext for discrimination. The central question in a constructive discharge case is whether the employer, through its unlawful discriminatory behavior, made the employee’s working conditions so difficult that any reasonable person in the employee’s position would feel compelled to resign. Carmon-Coleman v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 07A00003 (Apr. 17. 2002). The Commission has established three elements which a complainant must prove in order to substantiate a claim of constructive discharge: (1) a reasonable person in the complainant’s position would have found the working conditions intolerable; (2) conduct that constituted discrimination against the complainant created the intolerable working conditions; and (3) the complainant’s involuntary resignation resulted from 0120171287 5 the intolerable working conditions. See Walch v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940688 (Apr. 13, 1995). Upon review, we find that Complainant failed to show that her working conditions were so intolerable that she was forced to resign. As set forth above, we do not find that Complainant established that the Agency’s actions were discriminatory. As such, we conclude that Complainant did not establish that her resignation constituted a constructive discharge. With regard to Complainant’s contentions on appeal, we find that other than Complainant’s conclusory statements, she has not provided any evidence that discrimination was involved. We find that the preponderance of the evidence does not support Complainant’s allegations that she was subjected to discrimination or a constructive discharge. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 0120171287 6 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 21, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation