Axioma, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 23, 2020

2020005562 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/475,523 03/31/2017 Dieter Vandenbussche 166.0023 1572
23448 7590 12/23/2020
HULTQUIST IP
P.O. BOX 14329
RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, NC 27709
EXAMINER
SHAH, BHAVIN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
hip@hultquistip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DIETER VANDENBUSSCHE and
ROBERT A. STUBBS

Appeal 2020-005562
Application 15/475,523
Technology Center 3600

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1–15.1 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Qontigo Inc. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter “relates generally to methods and
apparatuses for producing performance attribution for investment
portfolios.” Spec., page 2. Claim 1, reproduced below with emphasis
added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method for interactively
displaying factor-mimicking portfolio (FMP)-based
performance attribution (PA) for a set of historical investment
portfolios within a graphical user interface which displays
graphs of residual performance contributions not explained by
FMPs, the method comprising:
electronically receiving by a programmed computer the set
of historical investment portfolios;
displaying on the graphical user interface a first set of
FMP user choices for constructing a first set of FMPs;
automatically monitoring, by the programmed computer,
a user selector in the graphical user interface for a first user
selection to perform a first PA, and, upon detection of the first
user selection to perform the first PA, constructing a first set of
FMPs satisfying the first set of FMP user choices;
performing the first PA on the set of historical investment
portfolios using the first set of FMPs, the first PA including a
determination of a first residual performance contribution
representing a part of a historical portfolio return not explained
by the first set of FMPs;
automatically monitoring, by the programmed computer,
user entered changes to the first set of FMP user choices to create
a second set of FMP user choices for constructing a second set
of FMPs;
automatically continuing to monitor, by the processor, the
user selector in the graphical user interface for the second user
selection to perform a second PA, and, upon detection of the
second user selection to perform the second PA, constructing a
second set of FMPs satisfying the second FMP user choices;
performing the second PA on the set of historical
investment portfolios using the second set of FMPs including a
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determination of a second residual performance contribution
representing a part of a historical portfolio return not explained
by the second set of FMPs; and
displaying on the graphical user interface a graph
including the first and second residual performance
contributions over time.
Appeal Br. 23 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTION
Claims 1–15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter.
OPINION
The rejection of claims 1–15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter.
The Appellant argues these claims as a group. See Appeal Br.2 10–13
and 17–20. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and
the remaining claims 2–10 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”
In that regard, claim 1 covers a “process” and is thus statutory subject
matter for which a patent may be obtained.3 This is not in dispute.

2 We will refer the Corrected Appeal Brief filed Feb. 18, 2020.
3 This corresponds to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance which
requires determining whether “the claim is to a statutory category.” 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 53
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised 101 Guidance”). See also id. at 53–54
(“consider[] whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four
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However, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 provision “contains an important
implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
In that regard, notwithstanding claim 1 covers statutory subject
matter, the Examiner has raised a question of patent eligibility on the ground
that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Alice step one — the “directed to” inquiry:
According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 218 (emphasis added).
The Abstract Idea4
The Examiner determined, inter alia, that claim 1 “is directed towards
computing performance attribution analysis for determining performance of
a portfolio.” Final Act. 3. See also id. at 4 (“Claim l is directed to the
abstract idea of constructing portfolios.”)
The Examiner reached that characterization of what the claim is
directed to (“constructing portfolios”) by reproducing those steps recited in
the claim that the Examiner determined to be directing the claimed subject

statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C.
101.”).
4 This corresponds to Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. Step 2A
determines “whether a claim is ‘directed to’ a judicial exception,” such as an
abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Step 2A is two prong inquiry.
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matter to an abstract idea and construing those steps “under its broadest
reasonable Interpretation.” Id. at 3–4. Examiner determined therefrom that
the claimed subject matter “covers performance of the limitation in the mind
but for the recitation of generic computer components. Thus, the claim
recites a mental process.” Id. at 4. In effect, the Examiner classified the
concept to which the claim is directed to within the enumerated “Mental
processes” grouping of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 Revised 101
Guidance.5
Pages 10–13 of the Appellant’s Brief and the Reply Brief challenge
the Examiner’s statement that “the claim recites a mental process” (Final
Act. 4).
The Appellant quotes claim limitations, such as "electronically
receiving by a programed computer"; "displaying on the graphical user
interface"; and, "automatically monitoring, by the program and computer,
the user entered changes", to show that the claimed subject is “not
performable by the mind.” Appeal Br. 10. According to Appellant, various
claim elements “do not involve mental processes, but machine process steps
involving automatic monitoring and automatically triggering actions upon
such detection.” Id. at 11. For example, “‘[a]utomatically monitoring’ of ‘a
user selector in the graphical user interface’ is not a mental step.” Id.
[T]he 2019 Guidelines in footnote 14 state: "If a claim, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the

5 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a
Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To
determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners
are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within
the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the
[2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
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mind but for the re-citation of generic computer components,
then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind" (emphasis
added). The final Office Action incorrectly addresses this last
requirement, stating at page 23 "the calculation can be performed
in the mind." However, it is not whether in some theoretical
sense, they can be performed but whether they can practically be
performed in the mind in the context claimed.
Here, the claims clearly cannot practically be performed in
the mind. As addressed at page 25, line 10-page 30, line 13, the
complexity and large number of calculations required are
contrary to any suggestion that the present claims can practically
be performed in the mind. The evidence clearly establishes that
the field of the present invention is so computationally intense
that it is not practically susceptible to performance in the mind
where even a single factor mimicking portfolio is involved, and
the complexity is only increased where sets of FMPs are
employed as disclosed and claimed. See also, the discussion of
the Background of the Invention at page 8, line 4-page 9, line 16
regarding the complexity of factor risk models generally.
Id. at 13.
We decline to get into a debate over whether certain claim limitations
can be performed in the human mind. There is no need here to explore the
workings of the human mind to ascertain if it can handle performing the
steps claimed. What is needed is to “determine whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” Packet Intelligence LLC v.
NetScout Systems, Inc., 965 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2020), such as an
abstract idea.
Also, we disagree with the Appellant’s suggestion that the Examiner’s
determination at step one of the Alice framework is rendered fatal (and the
claims are patent–eligible) if the concept (“constructing portfolios”) does not
fall within the enumerated “Mental processes” grouping of abstract ideas set
forth in the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. As we explain, perhaps it might
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have been better to classify the concept within one or more of the other
groupings (i.e., “Mathematical concepts” and “Certain methods of
organizing human activity”). Be that as it may, the legal determination that
the claim is directed to an abstract idea does not turn on making the right
choice. Cf. Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Communication Technology Holdings
Limited, 955 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ("Ericsson’s suggestion that
an abstract idea must be a “mathematical algorithm,” “method of organizing
human activity,” or “fundamental economic practice,” id., is legally
erroneous. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the use of such
“categorical rules” to decide patent eligibility.")
The recent decision EcoServices, LLC v. Certified Aviation Services,
LLC, 2020 WL 5949809, at *6 (Fed. Cir. 2020) explains:
At step one of the Alice framework, “we look to whether
the claims ‘focus on a specific means or method that improves
the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect
that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic
processes and machinery.’” Cardionet, LLC v. Infobionic, Inc.,
955 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting McRO, 837 F.3d
at 1314). We also consider the patent's written description, as it
is “helpful in illuminating what a claim is ‘directed to.’ ” Id.
(quoting Chamberlain, 935 F.3d at 1346); ChargePoint, 920
F.3d at 766.
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In that regard, we consider the claim as a whole giving it the broadest
reasonable construction as one of ordinary skill in the art would have
interpreted it in light of the Specification at the time of filing.6,7,8
Claim 1 is a method comprising 8 steps employing two devices: “a
programmed computer” and “a graphical user interface.” The Specification
describes these elements in generic terms. See, e.g., paras. 20–24. The
“programmed computer” is used to perform the first, third, fifth, and sixth
steps. The “graphical user interface" is used to perform the second, sixth,
and eighth steps. No device is attached to the fourth and seventh steps – they
call for performing a factor-based performance attribution (PA) which,
reasonably broadly, could be performed by hand.
The steps are:
(1) “receiving” A;
(2) “displaying” B;
(3) “monitoring” for C and “upon detection of [C], constructing” D;
(4) “performing” E “on” A “using” D “including a determination of” F;
(5) “monitoring” G;

6 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
7 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the claims. .
. . . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations, it is
important to read the claims ‘in light of the [S]pecification.’” Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), among others.
8 See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 15 n. 14 (“If a claim,
under its broadest reasonable interpretation.”) (emphasis added).
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(6) “continuing to monitor” for H “and, upon detection of [H]
constructing” I;
(7) “performing” J “on” A “using” I “including a determination of” K;
and,
(8) “displaying” L.
Where,
A is a “the set of historical investment portfolios”;

B is “a first set of FMP user choices for constructing a first set of
FMPs [factor mimicking portfolios]”;

C is “a first user selection to perform a first PA”;

D is “a first set of FMPs satisfying [B]”;

E is “the first PA”;

F is “a first residual performance contribution representing a part
of a historical portfolio return not explained by [D]”;

G is “user entered changes to [B] to create a second set of FMP
user choices for constructing a second set of FMPs”;

H is a “second user selection to perform a second PA”;

I is “a second set of FMPs satisfying the second FMP user
choices”;

J is “a second PA”

K is “a second residual performance contribution representing a
part of a historical portfolio return not explained by [I]; and,

J is “a graph including the [F] and [K] over time.”
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As can be seen from a plain reading of the claim, the method as
claimed is not focused on improving technology. Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l,
Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims are
focused on providing information to traders in a way that helps them process
information more quickly, ’556 patent at 2:26–39, not on improving
computers or technology.”). Rather than being directed to any specific
asserted improvement in computer capabilities, the claim supports the
opposite view — that the claimed subject matter is directed to a scheme for
performing factor-based performance attribution (PA) using factor
mimicking portfolios (FMPs) in managing investments employing generic
devices as tools. The Specification evidences the generic nature of the
devices that may be used to automate the process. See, e.g., Spec. pages 20–
24. “[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
223.
The claim provides no additional structural details that would
distinguish any device required to be employed to practice the method as
claimed from its generic counterparts.9 We note that the claim mentions the
use of a “user selector,” but no technical details are provided. Although the
Specification exemplifies selectors via conventional touch screens (see Spec.
24), the term reasonable broadly covers any conventional computer selection
function, such as clicking.

9 Cf. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. App’x 950, 954 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (non-precedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid
of any implementation details or technical description that would permit us
to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the
abstract idea identified by the district court.”).
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Looking to the Specification, it describes the invention in “business
relations” (see 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52) terms,
explaining that an objective of the claimed invention is to “enable[ ]
portfolio managers to obtain actionable information concerning the sources
of his or her investment returns.” Spec. 2.
The present invention relates generally to methods and
apparatuses for producing performance attribution for
investment portfolios. In particular, the invention concerns a
machine for displaying factor-based performance attribution
(PA) results for a set of historical investment portfolios using a
framework that computes the attribution using a set of factor
mimicking portfolios (FMPs). By considering different
constraints, universes, and rebalance frequencies for the FMPs,
different PA results may be advantageously obtained.
Id.
Also, the Specification attributes no special meaning to any of the
recited operations, individually or in the combination, as claimed. In our
view, notwithstanding some of the steps do not even specifically require a
computer (i.e., the fourth and seventh steps), the "receiving”, “displaying”,
“monitoring”, “performing", “monitoring”, “continuing to monitor”,
“performing”, and, “displaying” steps are common computer processing
functions that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
would have known generic computers were capable of performing and
would have associated with generic computers. Cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015):
Beyond the abstract idea of offer-based price optimization,
the claims merely recite “well-understood, routine conventional
activit[ies],” either by requiring conventional computer activities
or routine data-gathering steps. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294) . . . . For example, claim 1 recites
“sending a first set of electronic messages over a network to
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devices,” the devices being “programmed to communicate,”
storing test results in a “machine-readable medium,” and “using
a computerized system . . . to automatically determine” an
estimated outcome and setting a price. Just as in Alice, “all of
these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.”
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294)
(alterations in original); see also buySAFE[, Inc. v. Google, Inc.],
765 F.3d [1350,] 1355 [(Fed. Cir. 2014)] (“That a computer
receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
By so broadly defining the inventive method, that is, by setting out
what it is aspiring to accomplish without any means for achieving it (other
than via generic devices), let alone any purported technological
improvement, the claim is in effect presenting the invention in purely result-
based functional language, strengthening our determination under Alice
step one that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Two-Way Media
Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“Claim 1 recites a method for routing information using result-based
functional language. The claim requires the functional results of
‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’ ‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating
records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these results in a
non-abstract way.”). See also Uniloc USA v. LG Elecs. USA, 957 F.3d 1303,
1308 (Fed. Cir. 2020):
The claims we held ineligible in Two-Way Media similarly
failed to concretely capture any improvement in computer
functionality. In Two-Way Media, the claims recited a method of
transmitting packets of information over a communications
network comprising: converting information into streams of
digital packets; routing the streams to users; controlling the
routing; and monitoring the reception of packets by the users.
874 F.3d at 1334. Two-Way Media argued that the claims solved
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data transmission problems, including load management and
bottlenecking, but the claimed method was not directed to those
improvements. Id. at 1336–37. We therefore held the claims
ineligible because they merely recited a series of abstract steps
(“converting,” “routing,” “controlling,” “monitoring,” and
“accumulating records”) using “result-based functional
language” without the means for achieving any purported
technological improvement. Id. at 1337.
To the extent the Appellant means to argue that the claim presents a
technical-improvement solution,10 it is unpersuasive as to error in the
Examiner’s determination that the claimed subject matter is directed to an
abstract idea. This is so because the method as claimed fails to adequately
support it. We are unable to point to any claim language suggestive of an
improvement in technology. The Appellant argues, for example, that the
“invention is so computationally intense” (Appeal Br. 13) so as to suggest,
we think, that the claimed subject matter involves a technical improvement.
The difficulty is that we are unsure about what “computationally intense”
entails. As it now stands, the claimed method does not call for a large

10 If Appellant means to argue this point, then such an argument would
correspond to Prong Two [“If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical
Application”] of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “A claim that
integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. One
consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an additional element
(or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a
practical application” is if “[a]n additional element reflects an improvement
in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or
technical field.” Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).

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number of calculations nor does it call for anything more than
conventionally operating generic devices.
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded that the claim is not directed to an
abstract idea. We agree with the Examiner that the claim is directed to
“constructing portfolios” and that falls, at least, within the enumerated
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas
set forth in the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance.
For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

Alice step two — Does the Claim Provide an Inventive Concept?11
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73
(2012)).
In that regard, the Examiner determined, inter alia, that “[t]he claims
do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the judicia1 exception because, when considered

11 This corresponds to Step 2B, of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56 (“[I]f a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial
exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the
additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to
determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the
additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception
itself).”).
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separately and as an ordered combination, they do not add significantly more
(also known as an '"inventive concept"') to the exception.” Final Act. 5. We
agree.
The Appellant presents its position on pages 17–20 of the Appeal
Brief. It appears to repeat many of the arguments raised against the
Examiner’s Alice step one determination.
We addressed the matter of whether the claim presented any purported
specific asserted technical improvements in our analysis above under
step one of the Alice framework. This is consistent with the case law. See
Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“We have several times held claims to pass muster under Alice step one
when sufficiently focused on such improvements.”).
We cited the Specification in our earlier discussion. It is intrinsic
evidence that the claimed devices as claimed are conventional. In doing so,
we have followed “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)],” USPTO Memorandum, Robert
W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner For Patent Examination Policy, April 19,
2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”)).
Appellant directs our attention to DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com,
L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) where claims were directed to a
solution “rooted in computer technology” and Visual Memory LLC v.
NVIDIA Corp, 867 F.3d 1253, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2017) where eligible
claims were “focus[ed] on a ‘specific asserted improvement in computer
capabilities.’” Appeal Br. 19–20.
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While it is true that specific technological advancements, when
claimed, can render claimed subject matter not directed to an abstract idea,
for the reasons discussed, here the record does not adequately support an
argument that the claimed system provides an improvement in computer
functionality. Cf. Bridge and Post, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc.,
778 Fed.Appx. 882, 891 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
But as this court noted in DDR, “not all claims purporting to
address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. at
1258. In that case, the court distinguished problems “necessarily
rooted in computer technology,” like the visual presentation of a
website, from claims that “recite the performance of some
business practice known from the pre-internet world.” Id. The
’594 patent is the latter, as evidenced by its acknowledgement
that tracking users in order to display advertisements was known
in the pre-Internet world, and that its steps for accomplishing this
on the Internet were conventional. We therefore hold that the
asserted claims of the ’594 patent are unpatentable.
No other persuasive arguments having been presented, we conclude
that no error has been committed in the determination under Alice step two
that claim 1 does not include an element or combination of elements
circumscribing the patent-ineligible concept it is directed to so as to
transform the concept into a patent-eligible application.
We have considered all of the Appellant’s arguments (including those
made in the Reply Brief) and find them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, because we are not persuaded as to error in the
determinations that representative claim 1, and claims 2–15, which stand or
fall with claim 1, are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an
“inventive concept,” we sustain the Examiner’s conclusion that they are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter for being judicially-excepted
from 35 U.S.C. § 101. Cf. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x
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991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have considered all of LendingTree’s
remaining arguments and have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly,
because the asserted claims of the patents in suit are directed to an abstract
idea and do not present an ‘inventive concept,’ we hold that they are directed
to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”); see, e.g., OIP Techs.,
788 F.3d at 1364; FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15 101 Eligibility 1–15

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED