Avon Mirror & Distributing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 10, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 225 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

AVON MIRROR & DISTRIBUTING CO.
Avon Mirror & Distributing Co. and Millard J.
Hammonds. Case 7-CA-15912
January 10, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND PENELLO
On September 21, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions ' and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that the Respondent, Avon Mirror & Distrib-
uting Co., Detroit, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the
clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc.. 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard in Detroit, Michigan, on July 18, 1979. The
charge was filed by Millard J. Hammonds, an individual,
herein called Hammonds, on January 3, 1979, and the
complaint issued on February 1, 1979. The issue raised by
the complaint and litigated at the hearing is whether Avon
Mirror & Distributing Co., herein called Respondent or the
' All dates hereafter are in 1978 unless otherwise stated.
2The violations of the wage hour laws involved were not explained on the
record, although Respondent apparently did not contest Hammonds' claim
that it had to pay some back wages. In any event, it was not shown that
247 NLRB No. 33
Company, refused on or about September 1, 1978.' and at all
times thereafter, to hire Hammonds because of his activities
on behalf of Giaziers and Glassworkers Local Union No.
357, Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union. The alleged refusal to hire Ham-
monds is argued by the General Counsel to be a violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, herein called the Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the
briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Michigan corporation, is engaged in the
manufacture, sale, and distribution of glazing and glasswork
and related products, and maintains a place of business in
Detroit, Michigan. During the past calendar year Respon-
dent in its business operations purchased and received at its
Detroit place of business materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from suppliers located outside the State of
Michigan. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The complaint alleges,
Respondent admits, and I find that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Testimony
Hammonds was employed by the Union as an organizer
from November 1, 1965, until August 31, 1977. From June
1964 until December 5, 1977, he also held the position of
financial secretary-treasurer for the Union. It was Ham-
monds' testimony that shortly after becoming an organizer
he was going through the Union's records and discovered
that although the Union had a collective-bargaining agree-
ment with Respondent it actually had no members employed
by Respondent. Accordingly, Hammonds arranged to meet
with some of Respondent's employees and had them join the
Union. Thereafter, Hammonds contacted Isidore Cipriano,
president of Respondent, and advised him that his people
had signed up with the Union and he would have to pay
them union wages. Moreover, he told Cipriano that some of
the employees had back wages coming to them, but Cipriano
refused to pay any back wages. Hammonds then, in early
1966, reported the matter to Blanchard Rice, an employee of
the wage and hour division of the Department of Labor, and
as a result thereof Respondent was required to pay at least
three employees some back wages.'
In succeeding years Respondent and the Union main-
tained contractual relations with the last agreements' effec-
tive from June 1, 1978, to and including May 31, 1980.
Respondent knew that Hammonds had reported any wage violations to the
government.
Respondent had two agreements with the Union, one coverng employees
engaged in erection and installation of glass products (referred to as the
(Continued)
225
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hammonds had no part in negotiating the agreements with
Respondent but did occasionally have contact with Cipriano
when he would occasionally call the union hall for men.' It
also appears that Hammonds checked with Respondent
from time to time to insure that the union-security provi-
sions of the collective-bargaining agreements were being
complied with. Hammonds was responsible for servicing the
employees of Respondent up until August 31, 1977, when he
left his position as a union organizer.
Hammonds testified that around the first week of Septem-
ber he called the union hall and talked to Frank Schwenck,
the business agent of the Union at the time, and asked if he
had any work available, especially for a glasscutter.'
Schwenck replied that Cipriano had called and requested a
glasscutter but that when Schwenck had told Cipriano that
Hammonds was available Cipriano stated that he did not
want Hammonds because Hammonds would cause him
trouble. Following his call to Schwenck, Hammonds tele-
phoned Cipriano but was unable to talk to him, even after
repeated calls to him that day and at least one call the
following day. In view of his inability to reach Cipriano,
Hammonds telephoned Leonard Isrow, an employee of
Respondent and the union steward at the time for both
inside and outside employees, and asked Isrow to inquire of
Cipriano whether Cipriano had called the Union for a
glasscutter and, if so, what he had said. The following night
Isrow reported to Hammonds that he had talked to Cipriano
and confirmed that Cipriano had called for a glasscutter,
that Schwenck had referred Hammonds, but that Cipriano
had stated he did not want Hammonds because Hammonds
would cause him trouble. Hammonds thereafter had no
other contact with Respondent and was never hired by
Respondent. It was stipulated by the parties hereto that
Respondent did hire an employee as a glasscutter on
September 25.
Hammonds' testimony concerning his conversations with
Isrow was substantially corroborated by Isrow, who testified
that a few days after Labor Day he told Cipriano that he
heard that he was looking for an inside cutter. Cipriano,
according to Isrow, answered that he was and asked if Isrow
knew of anybody. Isrow replied that Hammonds was
looking for a job, to which Cipriano responded "1 wouldn't
hire that son-of-a-bitch down here because he wouldn't
cause me nothing but trouble." Dennis Cantrall, another
employee who was present at the time, testified in accor-
dance with Isrow that Cipriano had said that Hammonds
"wouldn't do nothing but cause me trouble here."
Isidore Cipriano denied that he made the specific remarks
attributed to him by Isrow and Cantrall although he did
admit that around September 4 or 5 he did discuss the hiring
of Hammonds with Isrow. Cipriano admitted that he may
have told Isrow he may have said that he did not want any
problems. Moreover, he added that, if he had mentioned
"problems," it would have been a reference to the "trouble"
he would have encountered in going against the desires of his
"outside" or "glaziers" contract), and the other covering employees engaged
in warehousing, cutting, and fabricating of glass products (referred to as the
"inside" contract). Both agreements contained union-security provisions.
' While there was no exclusive referral agreement between Respondent and
the Union, the Union maintained a list of members who were seeking
employment, and employers, including Respondent, did occasionally contact
the Union for referrals.
general salesman Dale McAtamny and Contract Foreman
Jerry Bolen, whom he had consulted about the hiring of
Hammonds and who also rejected Hammonds.
According to Cipriano, he had been contacted in the
spring of the year by Hammonds about employment but had
no jobs then, although he indicated he would keep Ham-
monds in mind. According to Cipriano, under Respondent's
hiring practices selection of an individual for hire involved
the joint agreement of Cipriano, McAtamny, and Bolen. In
September Cipriano admittedly consulted separately with
McAtamny and Bolen about the hiring of Hammonds, and
both rejected the idea, both claiming, according to Cipriano,
that Hammonds had been out of the trade too long.6
Cipriano's testimony regarding his consultations with
McAtamny and Bolen on the hiring of Hammonds was not
supported by them altogether and was contradicted in part.
While McAtamny testified that Cipriano had talked to him
about Hammonds, he claimed he simply told Cipriano that
he would not hire Hammonds because he had heard that
Hammonds was not industrious. Bolen's testimony was
contradictory because he testified on direct examination that
he told Cipriano that they were in a "slow" period and if
they were going to reach out and hire somebody it should be
somebody who had present experience, but on subsequent
examination he denied there was any discussion of Ham-
monds' qualifications with Cipriano and testified that he
could not recall giving Cipriano a reason for not hiring
Hammonds. Then he testified that they did not need
anybody at the time Cipriano talked to him.
Cipriano also testified that he did talk to Frank Schwenck
at the union hall having called him to see if there were any
people at the hall who wanted employment, but he added
that the call was made in November. At that time Schwenck
had mentioned Hammonds and a man named Joe Miller, a
glazier or outside man. Cipriano said he told Schwenck that
he did not need Hammond but he did ask for Miller's
number. He denied saying anything to Schwenck about
Hammond other than that he did not need him.
Schwenck, called by Respondent, supported Cipriano's
testimony in part. He related that Cipriano had called him in
November and he had mentioned Hammonds' name to
Cipriano as well as Miller's. However, Cipriano, according
to Schwenck, had said that he did not feel that Hammonds
would fit in, that some of the fellows did not like him. With
respect to Miller, Cipriano had told Schwenck to send Miller
over and he would try Miller out on the inside awhile and
see how he worked out.7 Schwenck, who had lost an
intraunion election for the position of business agent to
Hammonds on June 4, 1979, was at first evasive about what
he had told Hammonds that Cipriano had said but finally
testified that he did not believe he told Hammonds any of
the details of what Cipriano had said regarding the refusal to
employ Hammonds.
It was Schwenck's additional testimony that he and
Hammonds initially signed up Respondent's employees for
' A cutter is a classification covered by the inside collective-bargaining
agreement.
I It is undisputed that Hammonds had not worked at the trade during the
time he held a position with the Union. It is also undisputed, however, that he
had in excess of 20 years' experience in the trade prior to taking a position
with the Union.
' Miller was not in fact hired by Respondent at any time.
226
AVON MIRROR & DISTRIBUTING CO.
the Union, rather than Hammonds' alone. Moreover, he
testified contrary to Hammonds that at the time Respon-
dent's employees signed up there was no collective-bargain-
ing agreement between Respondent and the Union.
B. Conclusions
Considering the testimony of Hammonds and Schwenck, I
credit Hammonds. While there appear to be obvious errors
in recollection on Hammonds' part,' he impressed me as a
sincere and truthful witness. It is clear that what Schwenck
reported to him about Cipriano's refusal to hire him
prompted Hammonds' subsequent attempts to contact Cipri-
ano and, finally, to have Isrow find out what the situation
was. Furthermore, Hammonds' version as to the time of his
talk to Schwenck about Cipriano's call, September rather
than November, is more consistent with the time when
Cipriano admittedly had talked to McAtamny and Bolen
about hiring Hammonds as well as the time when Respon-
dent actually hired an inside man.
I found Schwenck less persuasive in demeanor. He was
clearly hostile to Hammonds. Moreover, at the hearing an
issue was raised by the General Counsel as to whether
Schwenck's testimony was in violation of the rule invoked on
motion of the parties for sequestration of witnesses. While it
appears that there was no actual violation of the rule because
the testimony of Hammonds on the same subjects subse-
quently testified to by Schwenck was given prior to the time
the rule was invoked, Schwenck was evasive in his testimony
about the extent of Hammonds' testimony he had heard.
Thus, he admitted hearing only that part of Hammonds'
testimony concerning how Hammonds "signed up" Respon-
dent's employees. Schwenck also could not recall whether he
heard any of the testimony of Isrow or Cantrall and added
that if he had heard then he could not recall any of the
things they said. I find Schwenck's failure of recollection
incredible since the testimony of Hammonds, Isrow, and
Cantrall had been given only a few hours earlier. I conclude
that Schwenck was making a deliberate effort to avoid the
attack on his testimony based on the alleged violation of the
sequestration rule, and this effort taints his entire testimony.
I also credit Isrow and Cantrall where their testimony
contradicts that of Cipriano. Both appeared credible in
demeanor, and their testimony was for the most part
mutually corroborative.' Furthermore, the testimony of
Isrow and Cantrall is enhanced by the fact that they were
' Schwenck's testimony that there was no collective-bargaining agreement
between Respondent and the Union at the time Respondent's employees were
signed in 1966 appears to be more likely than Hammonds' testimony to the
contrary. It is more likely that Respondent would have become liable for
violations of wage and hour law provisions at a time when no agreement was
in existence. It is improbable that any union agreement would have provided
wages less than those called for under prevailing wage and hour laws, and the
Labor Department would have no obligation to enforce contractual provisions
calling for wages in excess of such laws.
I do not credit that testimony of Isrow, however, in which he related that
Cipriano referred to Hammonds as a "son-of-a-bitch." Isrow's prehearing
affidavit omitted such a reference, and Cantrell, whom I found particularly
credible, did not attribute such a remark to Cipriano.
'° Respondent presented evidence that Hammonds had been injured in
August presumably to show that he would not have been making inquiry
about a job in September. I conclude such evidence fails to establish that
Hammonds would not be looking for a job despite the injury which was to his
ankle. Claims statements signed by Hammonds' doctor indicate Hammonds'
testifying adversely to Respondent at a time when they were
still employed by Respondent and were, conceivably, subject
to economic reprisal. Such testimony is not likely to be false.
Shop-Rite Supermarket, Inc., 231 NLRB 500 (1977). Lastly,
Cipriano was equivocal and unconvincing in his testimony
regarding what he told Isrow and Cantrall about not hiring
Hammonds.
The General Counsel contends, on the basis of the
testimony credited above, that the refusal to hire Hammonds
was based on Respondent's pretextual reasons and that in
actuality Hammonds was not hired because of his prior
status as an organizer for the Union. In support of this
contention, the General Counsel points to the background
including Hammonds' organizing Respondent's employees
and his administration of the union contract, both factors
which supply motivation, according to the General Counsel,
for Respondent's failure to hire Hammonds.
Respondent contends, on the other hand, that Hammonds
was not hired because of the failure of Cipriano, McAtamny,
and Bolen to agree on hiring him. That failure was based,
according to Respondent's brief, on Hammonds' lack of
recent experience in the industry.
In considering the pretext argument, it must first be
observed that there was no consensus among Respondent's
witnesses as to exactly why Hammonds was not interviewed
or hired. Thus, McAtamny's stated reason was that he heard
that Hammonds was not industrious. McAtamny's self-
serving testimony in this regard was never substantiated.
Bolen was equivocal in stating his reasons, but it appears
that Bolen based his refusal to consider Hammonds on
Hammonds' lack of recent experience in the trade and also
because Respondent did not need anyone at the time. The
latter basis is refuted by the fact that Respondent did hire an
employee in September within 2 to 3 weeks after Cipriano
discussed Hammonds' hiring with Bolen and at a time when
Hammonds was clearly available.' Moreover, it is highly
improbable that Cipriano would have been talking to Bolen
about hiring Hammonds if there had not been a need for an
additional inside man. As to the other basis asserted by
Bolen for not hiring Hammonds, it must be observed that
Respondent at no time undertook to ascertain Hammonds'
qualifications, ability, or recent experience by either an
interview or a test." Bolen's outright rejection of Hammonds
becomes even more suspect in light of his admissions that he
really did not try to establish Hammonds' qualifications,"
anticipated availability for work first on September 5, and subsequently on
September 11. With such anticipated availability dates, it would not have been
unreasonable for Hammonds to be looking for work in early September, even
if, as it turned out, he collected disability payments up to September 24.
" While Respondent's brief points out that Hammonds never submitted an
application for employment or left a telephone number where he might be
reached, it is clear that Respondent was well aware that Hammonds could be
reached through the Union if Respondent was disposed to consider Ham-
monds on a nondiscriminatory basis. Moreover, it is equally clear that
Cipriano called the Union for referral of men without their having previously
filed employment applications with Respondent and without their having
made prior contacts with Respondent. Finally, there was no testimony that
Hammonds was rejected for employment because he had not gone through the
formality of filing an application.
" Respondent argues that Hammonds could not have been qualified to
work with laminated glass which had only come into general use since about
1972. 1 find this argument specious in view of the failure to ascertain
(Continued)
I
227
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and he made no attempt to check out the references of the
man subsequently hired for the inside work in September.
Based on the foregoing and the contradictory testimony of
Respondent's witnesses, I am persuaded that the reasons
advanced by Respondent for the failure to hire Hammonds
are not the real reason or reasons and are therefore
pretextual. The issue remains as to Respondent's true
motivation in refusing to hire Hammonds, and the General
Counsel must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent was moved to reject Hammonds for unlawful
reasons.
As stated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation (Iron King Branch) v.
N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (1966):
Actual motive, a state of mind, being the question, it
is seldom that direct evidence will be available that is
not also self-serving. . .. If [the trier of fact] finds that
the stated motive for a discharge is false, he certainly
can infer that there is another motive. More than that,
he can infer that the motive is one that the employer
desires to conceal-an unlawful motive-at least where,
as in this case, the surroundings facts tend to reinforce
that inference.
Having found the existence of a pretext here, Respon-
dent's conduct is susceptible to the inference it acted
unlawfully. The resolution of the issue with respect to
Respondent's motivation here is complicated by the absence
of any significant evidence of animosity on Respondent's
part toward Hammonds in particular because of his union
position or against the Union generally. The record does not
establish a bad relationship between Respondent and Ham-
monds during the time Hammonds served as an organizer.
Moreover, there was no showing that he gave Respondent a
difficult time in administering any collective-bargaining
agreement. Indeed, no grievances were filed during Ham-
monds' administration, nor were there any strikes or other
conduct on Hammonds' or the Union's part during that time
which would tend to engender some animosity against
Hammonds.
I am unable, in considering Respondent's motivation, to
attach significant weight to Hammonds' involvement some
12 to 13 years earlier in either initially organizing Respon-
dent's employees or in insuring that the employees "signed
up" in keeping with the union-security provisions of an
existing agreement. Nor do I find Hammonds' reporting of
Respondent to the Government for wage and hour law
infractions of any significance since it was not shown that
Respondent was aware that Hammonds was responsible.
Nevertheless, the credited testimony establishes that Cipri-
ano told Isrow and Schwenck" that Hammonds was not
acceptable for employment because he would cause him
trouble. The impact of that statement cannot be disregarded,
and Cipriano's lame effort to explain it away, after conced-
ing that he may have said something like it, was hollow and
unconvincing. In the absence of some other reasonable and
credible explanations not set forth in argument of counsel or
Hammonds' qualifications and the absence of evidence showing the extent to
which he would have been required to work with laminated glass if hired.
" This is based on Hammonds' credited version of what Schwenck told him
Cipriano had said. While technically hearsay, it was admitted in evidence
without objection and, thus, constitutes probative evidence. Inland Cities.
Inc.. 241 NLRB 374 (1979).
contained in the record, it appears that Hammonds' only
capacity to cause Respondent any trouble would flow from
his familiarity with the Union-Respondent collective-bar-
gaining agreements and the reasonable expectation that as a
former union official he would be more inclined to require
strict observance by Respondent of those agreements. That
Respondent had a reasonable basis for fearing strict obser-
vance from the agreements was indicated in the testimony of
Cantrall who, on examination by Respondent at the hearing,
testified without contradiction that notwithstanding the
absence of filed grievances Respondent "never went by the
Union laws."" Accordingly, in view of the pretextual
reasons advanced for refusing to hire Hammonds, the
inference of unlawfulness to be drawn from such pretextual
reasons, and the reinforcement of the inference of unlaw-
fulness reflected by Cipriano's statement that Hammonds
would cause him trouble lead me to the conclusion, which I
hereby make, that Hammonds was not hired because of his
former position with the Union.
In reaching the conclusion noted above, I have given due
consideration to the cases cited in Respondent's brief in
support of the argument against a violation here. However, I
find those cases distinguishable. More specifically, in Superi-
or Forwarding Company, 242 NLRB 761 (1979), a case cited
by Respondent, no violation was found on the employer's
refusal to hire a former union official notwithstanding the
employer's assertion of false claims for the refusal to hire.
There, however, unlawful motivation was not found in the
refusal to hire not only because was there a good relationship
between the employer and the union representative involved
but also because the employer had actually invited the union
representative to apply for employment. Nor had the
employer there, unlike here, expressed the concern the union
representative would cause him trouble. Roadway Express,
Inc., 243 NLRB 592 (1979), also cited by Respondent, is
likewise distinguishable on its facts. There the issue was
whether an employer had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by advising a former union representative that he would not
be hired by the employer because of "problems that existed
in our previous relationship." No violation was found
because, on the basis of uncontradicted testimony, the
"problem" was explained as a reference to a demonstrated
"degree of untrustworthiness" on the part of the union
representative while in office, and not to his union position
per se. Since the union representative hearing the employer's
remark was aware of what "problems" the employer alluded
to, the remark was found not to be coercive. In the instant
case, Cipriano's reference to Hammonds' causing him
trouble if hired has not been satisfactorily explained away.
Considering all the foregoing, I conclude that Respondent
did not consider Hammonds for employment and did not
employ Hammonds because of his former position with the
Union. It is clear that a refusal to employ or consider an
individual for employment for such a reason constitutes a
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Consolidated
Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 242 NLRB 770 (1979);
Peoples Cartage, Inc., 229 NLRB 1223 (1977). I therefore
" The General Counsel's offer to prove that if hired Hammonds would have
discovered certain alleged violations of the collective-bargaining agreements
was rejected as irrelevant and speculative.
228
AVON MIRROR & DISTRIBUTING CO.
find and conclude that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint.
CONCI SIONS f1 IVW
I. Respondent is an employer enllgaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2). (6). and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Sectioe 2(5) of the Act.
3. B) refusing to employ Millard J. Hammonds because of
his former position with, and employment by. the Union.
Respondent has engaged in. and is engaging in., unfair labor
practices withinl the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and ( I ) of the
Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices constitute unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Tillt Rw)t
Having found that Respondent has committed violations
of Section (a)(3) and (1) of the Act. I shall recomimend that
it be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Since I have found that Respondent discrimilatorily
refused to employ Millard J. Hammonds. it will be recom-
mended that Respondet he ordered to employ Hammonds
to the position ill which he sought employrmcnt and for
which he was qualified, granting him the same seniority and
other rights and privileges he would have enjoyed absent the
discrimination against him together with backpac. The
backpay shall be computed in accordance with the formula
approved in f'i W. Woolworth Co.. 90 NLRB 289 (1950).
with interest computed in the manner and amount pre-
scribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977)."
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law. and upon the entire record. and pursuant to Section
IO(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER'"
The Respondent, Avon Mirror & Distributing Co..
Detroit, Michigan, its officers. ageints. successors, and as-
signs. shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Glaziers and Glasswork-
ers Local Union No. 357, Brotherhood of Painters and
Allied Trades. AFL-CIO. or any other labor organization
by discriminatorily refusing to hire any persons or in any
other manner discriminating against them with regard to
their hire and tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment.
(b) I any like or related manner interfering with.
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Millard J. Hamlmonds immediate employment in
such position las he would have been hired, absent the
discrimination against him. with the same senliority and
other rights and privileges he %N ould have enjoyed. and nlake
him whole fi r- his loss of earnilings ill the maner set forth in
the section ellntitled "TiThe Remedy.
(h) PreseCrve ald. upon request, mlake a ailable to the
Board or its agents. for examination ad copying. all pal roll
records. social security payment records. timecards, person-
niel L'colds and reports, and all other records necessar to
allalyc tile amotlt of hbackpa, due under tlie terms of this
Order.
(c) ost at its Detroit. Michigan. place of business copies
of tile att;lched notice m;arked "Appendix."' Copies of said
notice. on forms pro ided b! the Regional Director lor
Region 7. after being dul. signed bh Respondent's autllo-
rized represeltativc. shall be posted bh Respondent iminmedi-
atel upon receipt thereof ad be maiim;lillted bh it for 6()
coisecuti e days thereafter. il clnspicious places. including
all places where rctices to employccs arc customaril, posted.
Reasonable steps shiall he takenl hb Respondent to insureI that
said notlices lle ot altered defaced ol- co ered by a;1 other
material.
(d) Notifl the Regiona;l Director for Region 7. in s. riting,
within 20 days from tile date of tllis ()rd1r. 1lha steps
Respondcnt has ta kel to complS heres ith.
Sec. g.ncrall.. Itt P mb t' & Ilicltai ( . Is NI Rlt 71i. 17 721
I hi2)
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