Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 24, 2021

2019007001 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/801,340 07/16/2015 Sudhindra Kulkarni 4366-738 9195
48500 7590 03/24/2021
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
DOLLY, KENDALL LYNN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2436
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/24/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SUDHINDRA KULKARNI
Appeal 2019-007001
Application 14/801,340
Technology Center 2400
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20, which are all claims pending in
the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The claims are directed to systems and methods to authorize server
resources using voiceprint or telephone passwords. See Spec. (Field of the
Disclosure). In particular, Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed
invention are directed to “systems and methods of obtaining authorization
for an application or client to access certain privileged resources on behalf of
a user in the OAuth2 protocol based on a voice input; validating an
authentication token; and logging in to a service based on the validation.”
Spec. 32 (Abstract).
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
Appeal (emphases added to contested prior-art limitations):
1. A method for authorization, comprising:
receiving, by a microprocessor, a voice input from a user;
requesting, by the microprocessor, an authentication token
based on the voice input;
validating the authentication token by sending the
authentication token to a device of the user and receiving an
authorized request token based on the validating; and
logging in to a service, by the microprocessor, based on
the authorized request token.

2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
June 7, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sept. 27, 2019); Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 31, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,”
mailed Dec. 21, 2018); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed
July 16, 2015).
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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Armington et al. (“Armington”) US 2003/0163739 A1 Aug. 28, 2003
Chern US 2011/0239283 A1 Sept. 29, 2011
Hruska US 2012/0028609 A1 Feb. 2, 2012
Mahaffey et al. (“Mahaffey”) US 2014/0189808 A1 July 3, 2014
Karpey et al. (“Karpey”) US 2015/0095028 A1 April 2, 2015
Grossemy US 2015/0319170 A1 Nov. 5, 2015
REJECTIONS
R1. Claims 1–6 and 9–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over the combination of Karpey, Armington, and Chern.
Final Act. 3.
R2. Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Karpey, Armington, Chern, and
Hruska. Final Act. 13.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 5–18) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness
Rejection R1 of claims 1–6, 9–16, 18–20 on the basis of representative
claim 1. We address Rejection R1 of dependent claim 17, argued separately,
infra.
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Remaining dependent claims 7 and 8 in Rejection R2, not argued
separately, stand or fall with independent claim 1 from which they depend.3
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not
advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other
issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–20
and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as
our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 17 for
emphasis as follows.
1. § 103 Rejection R1: Claims 1–6 and 9–16, and 18–20
Issue 1
Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 5–10; Reply Br. 2–6) the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over the

3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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combination of Karpey, Armington, and Chern is in error. These
contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests a method for authorization that includes inter alia, the step of
“validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a
device of the user and receiving an authorized request token based on the
validating,” as recited in claim 1?
Principles of Law
“[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of
references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425.
The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior
art would have suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the
art. Keller, 642 F.2d at 425.
In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
416 (2007).
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
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likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . . [A] court
must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.
Id. at 417.
Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth
“some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Analysis
The Examiner cites the combination of Karpey, Armington, and
Chern as teaching or suggesting the contested limitations of claim 1. See
Final Act. 3–5; and see Ans. 6–10.
In particular, the Examiner cites Karpey as teaching or suggesting the
limitation “validating the authentication token.” Final Act. 4, citing Karpey
¶¶ 22, 63–65. In addition, the Examiner finds Chern teaches or suggests
“validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a
device of the user.” Final Act. 4, citing Chern ¶¶58–60. The Examiner also
finds Chern teaches the step of “receiving an authorized request token based
on the validating.” Ans. 4, citing Chern ¶ 60.
Appellant argues: “The prior art fails to show validating the
authentication token by sending the authentication token to a device of the
user and receiving an authorized request token based on the validating and
providing a service to the user in response to receiving the authorized
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request token,” arguing Chern at paragraphs 58–60 does not teach or suggest
this limitation. (Appeal Br. 7–9.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner’s findings because Chern’s authentication authority server, which
transmits the security token to the client, teaches or at least suggests
“validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a
device of the user.” See Chern ¶ 59. We are also not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner’s findings because the
Examiner cites to Karpey for teaching “validating the authentication token.”
Final Act. 4, citing Karpey ¶ 22, 63–65. We also note Chern’s receiving a
request and security token from client 100, and then the server performing
an operation to validate the token at least suggests “receiving an authorized
request token based on the validating.” See Chern ¶ 60.
Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach
or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the
Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 2–6, 9–16, and 18–20 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping,
supra.
2. § 103 Rejection R1 of Dependent Claim 17
Dependent claim 17 (Appeal Br. 22 (Claims Appendix)) recites:
The system of claim 13, wherein the requesting
comprises sending one of a voice print message and a
Telephone User Interface message, wherein the requesting
comprises sending the Telephone User Interface message,
wherein the validating the authentication token is based on the
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Telephone User Interface message, and wherein the method for
authorization of a user is an OAuth 2.0 protocol.
Appellant contends “it appears as though the Examiner may be
attempting to take Official Notice of certain facts.” Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant further argues “Applicant traverses the Examiner's obviousness
rejection and requests that the Examiner either properly takes Official Notice
of the fact, including providing a clear technical line of reasoning for the
Official Notice, or properly supports the rejection with documentary
evidence.” Appeal Br. 15.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the Examiner
properly took official notice that the process recited in claim 17 was well
known, and further provided documentary evidence that the noticed fact was
notoriously well-known by citing to the Grossemy and Mahaffey references
to support the fact that OAuth 2.0 was a known, common protocol at the
time of the invention. See Final Act. 11, Ans. 6.4
In addition, Appellant did not properly traverse the taking of Official
Notice. In reviewing the record, Appellant has not traversed the Examiner’s
finding by stating that the purported well-known fact is not considered to be
common knowledge or well-known in the art. See MPEP § 2144.03(C) (“To
adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant must specifically point out
the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include stating
why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-
known in the art. See 37 CFR 1.111(b).” (Emphasis added)). An adequate
rebuttal of the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice must contain sufficient

4 We also note the Examiner corrected the typographical error in stating
“Hruska” instead of “Chern” in Rejection R2. Ans. 6.
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information or argument to create on its face a reasonable doubt regarding
the circumstances justifying the Examiner’s notice of what is well known to
one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971).
Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on
the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of
claim 17, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion
of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of dependent claim 17.
3. Rejection R2 of Claims 7 and 8
In view of the lack of any substantive or truly separate arguments
directed to obviousness Rejection R2 of dependent claims 7 and 8 under
§ 103 (see Appeal Br. 16–18), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims. Arguments not made are waived.
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 1–8) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in
the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the
Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s
Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections R1
and R2 of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art
combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections.
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DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
References/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 9–20 103 Armington, Chern 1–6, 9–20
7, 8 103
Karpey, Armington,
Chern, Hruska 7, 8
Overall
Outcome 1–20
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED