Avaya Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 24, 20212019007001 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/801,340 07/16/2015 Sudhindra Kulkarni 4366-738 9195 48500 7590 03/24/2021 SHERIDAN ROSS P.C. 1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200 DENVER, CO 80202 EXAMINER DOLLY, KENDALL LYNN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2436 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/24/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): cjacquet@sheridanross.com edocket@sheridanross.com pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUDHINDRA KULKARNI Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 Technology Center 2400 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20, which are all claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya Inc. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claims are directed to systems and methods to authorize server resources using voiceprint or telephone passwords. See Spec. (Field of the Disclosure). In particular, Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention are directed to “systems and methods of obtaining authorization for an application or client to access certain privileged resources on behalf of a user in the OAuth2 protocol based on a voice input; validating an authentication token; and logging in to a service based on the validation.” Spec. 32 (Abstract). Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on Appeal (emphases added to contested prior-art limitations): 1. A method for authorization, comprising: receiving, by a microprocessor, a voice input from a user; requesting, by the microprocessor, an authentication token based on the voice input; validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a device of the user and receiving an authorized request token based on the validating; and logging in to a service, by the microprocessor, based on the authorized request token. 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed June 7, 2019); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sept. 27, 2019); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 31, 2019); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Dec. 21, 2018); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed July 16, 2015). Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is: Name Reference Date Armington et al. (“Armington”) US 2003/0163739 A1 Aug. 28, 2003 Chern US 2011/0239283 A1 Sept. 29, 2011 Hruska US 2012/0028609 A1 Feb. 2, 2012 Mahaffey et al. (“Mahaffey”) US 2014/0189808 A1 July 3, 2014 Karpey et al. (“Karpey”) US 2015/0095028 A1 April 2, 2015 Grossemy US 2015/0319170 A1 Nov. 5, 2015 REJECTIONS R1. Claims 1–6 and 9–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Karpey, Armington, and Chern. Final Act. 3. R2. Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Karpey, Armington, Chern, and Hruska. Final Act. 13. CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 5–18) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of obviousness Rejection R1 of claims 1–6, 9–16, 18–20 on the basis of representative claim 1. We address Rejection R1 of dependent claim 17, argued separately, infra. Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 4 Remaining dependent claims 7 and 8 in Rejection R2, not argued separately, stand or fall with independent claim 1 from which they depend.3 ISSUES AND ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–20 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 17 for emphasis as follows. 1. § 103 Rejection R1: Claims 1–6 and 9–16, and 18–20 Issue 1 Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 5–10; Reply Br. 2–6) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over the 3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 5 combination of Karpey, Armington, and Chern is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests a method for authorization that includes inter alia, the step of “validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a device of the user and receiving an authorized request token based on the validating,” as recited in claim 1? Principles of Law “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 425. The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior art would have suggested to the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art. Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. In KSR, the Court stated “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 6 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill . . . . [A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Id. at 417. Further, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Analysis The Examiner cites the combination of Karpey, Armington, and Chern as teaching or suggesting the contested limitations of claim 1. See Final Act. 3–5; and see Ans. 6–10. In particular, the Examiner cites Karpey as teaching or suggesting the limitation “validating the authentication token.” Final Act. 4, citing Karpey ¶¶ 22, 63–65. In addition, the Examiner finds Chern teaches or suggests “validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a device of the user.” Final Act. 4, citing Chern ¶¶58–60. The Examiner also finds Chern teaches the step of “receiving an authorized request token based on the validating.” Ans. 4, citing Chern ¶ 60. Appellant argues: “The prior art fails to show validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a device of the user and receiving an authorized request token based on the validating and providing a service to the user in response to receiving the authorized Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 7 request token,” arguing Chern at paragraphs 58–60 does not teach or suggest this limitation. (Appeal Br. 7–9. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner’s findings because Chern’s authentication authority server, which transmits the security token to the client, teaches or at least suggests “validating the authentication token by sending the authentication token to a device of the user.” See Chern ¶ 59. We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the Examiner’s findings because the Examiner cites to Karpey for teaching “validating the authentication token.” Final Act. 4, citing Karpey ¶ 22, 63–65. We also note Chern’s receiving a request and security token from client 100, and then the server performing an operation to validate the token at least suggests “receiving an authorized request token based on the validating.” See Chern ¶ 60. Based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2–6, 9–16, and 18–20 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. 2. § 103 Rejection R1 of Dependent Claim 17 Dependent claim 17 (Appeal Br. 22 (Claims Appendix)) recites: The system of claim 13, wherein the requesting comprises sending one of a voice print message and a Telephone User Interface message, wherein the requesting comprises sending the Telephone User Interface message, wherein the validating the authentication token is based on the Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 8 Telephone User Interface message, and wherein the method for authorization of a user is an OAuth 2.0 protocol. Appellant contends “it appears as though the Examiner may be attempting to take Official Notice of certain facts.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant further argues “Applicant traverses the Examiner's obviousness rejection and requests that the Examiner either properly takes Official Notice of the fact, including providing a clear technical line of reasoning for the Official Notice, or properly supports the rejection with documentary evidence.” Appeal Br. 15. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because the Examiner properly took official notice that the process recited in claim 17 was well known, and further provided documentary evidence that the noticed fact was notoriously well-known by citing to the Grossemy and Mahaffey references to support the fact that OAuth 2.0 was a known, common protocol at the time of the invention. See Final Act. 11, Ans. 6.4 In addition, Appellant did not properly traverse the taking of Official Notice. In reviewing the record, Appellant has not traversed the Examiner’s finding by stating that the purported well-known fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art. See MPEP § 2144.03(C) (“To adequately traverse such a finding, an applicant must specifically point out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well- known in the art. See 37 CFR 1.111(b).” (Emphasis added)). An adequate rebuttal of the Examiner’s taking of Official Notice must contain sufficient 4 We also note the Examiner corrected the typographical error in stating “Hruska” instead of “Chern” in Rejection R2. Ans. 6. Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 9 information or argument to create on its face a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying the Examiner’s notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971). Therefore, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitations of claim 17, nor do we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 17. 3. Rejection R2 of Claims 7 and 8 In view of the lack of any substantive or truly separate arguments directed to obviousness Rejection R2 of dependent claims 7 and 8 under § 103 (see Appeal Br. 16–18), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims. Arguments not made are waived. REPLY BRIEF To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 1–8) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown. CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness Rejections R1 and R2 of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections. Appeal 2019-007001 Application 14/801,340 10 DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–6, 9–20 103 Armington, Chern 1–6, 9–20 7, 8 103 Karpey, Armington, Chern, Hruska 7, 8 Overall Outcome 1–20 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation