Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 16, 2020

2020001260 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/752,854 06/27/2015 William Meaney 415077-US-
NP/AVA125PA
2679
136582 7590 09/16/2020
STEVENS & SHOWALTER, LLP
Box AVAYA Inc.
7019 Corporate Way
Dayton, OH 45459-4238
EXAMINER
MEINECKE DIAZ, SUSANNA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pair_avaya@firsttofile.com
pto@sspatlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte WILLIAM MEANEY, DARA GEARY,
ADRIAN RYAN, and EDEL KELLY
________________

Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JASON J. CHUNG, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection
of claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
The invention relates to providing notifications to resources to
manage communication sessions in an enterprise. Spec. ¶ 2. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the invention and is reproduced below:

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Avaya, Inc. is the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 4.
2 Claims 7, 15, and 20–23 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 29–31.
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

2
1. A computing system to manage a communication
session in an enterprise, the system comprising:
a memory device storing executable code; and
a processor in communication with the memory device,
wherein the executable code, when executed by the processor,
causes the processor to:
receive a subscription request from an agent of the
enterprise, wherein the subscription request comprises
subscription criteria indicating parameters of communication
sessions which the agent of the enterprise is interested in and a
time when the agent of the enterprise is unavailable to manage
communication sessions;
monitor the communication session to generate a data
metric about the communication session based on the
parameters of the subscription criteria;
analyze the generated data metric to generate a
subscription report about the communication session;
determine if the agent is unavailable to manage the
communication session;
determine if the agent is subscribed to real-time
notifications;
generate the notification for the agent of the enterprise
based on the generated subscription report if the agent is
unavailable to manage the communication session and if the
agent is subscribed to receive real-time notifications; and
transmit the generated notification to the agent of the
enterprise.
Appeal Br. 28 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added).

REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–5.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Dwyer (US
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

3
2015/0195406 A1; filed Jan. 8, 2015) and Somasundaram (US
2013/0147623 A1; published June 13, 2013). Final Act. 5–11.

ANALYSIS
I. Claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Principles of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

4
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

5
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the Update, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “Update”)
(available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

6
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
C. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain methods of
organizing human activity. Final Act. 4. The Examiner concludes the
present claims are not integrated into a practical application and there are no
limitations recited in the present claims that add significantly more to the
abstract idea. Id. (citing Spec. ¶ 102); Ans. 13–14 (citing Spec. ¶ 102; In re
TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016); OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); buySAFE,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Appellant argues that, although the present claims recite an abstract
idea, each element of the present claims does not recite an abstract idea and,
therefore, the present claims as a whole are not directed to an abstract idea.

determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

7
Appeal Br. 17–18. Appellant argues the present claims are similar to the
patent eligible claims of Example 42 of the USPTO 2019 Examples because
the present claims include converting the communication session (regardless
of a format of the communication session) to a data metric that is used when
generating a subscription report. Id. at 18–20. Appellant argues the
Examiner does not provide the evidence required by Berkheimer to support a
determination that the additional elements are well-understood, routine, or
conventional. Id. at 20–22 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). We disagree with Appellant.
D. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question that we resolve pursuant to
the 2019 Revised Guidance. The emphasized portions of claim 1,5
reproduced above (see supra at 2), recite commercial interactions (including
business relations).6 Commercial interactions (including business relations)
fall within the category of certain methods of organizing human activity
(i.e., an abstract idea). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14.
Appellant also acknowledges the present claims recite an abstract idea.
Appeal Br. 17–18. We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present
claims as a whole are not directed to an abstract idea (id.) for the reasons
discussed infra §§ I.E. and I.F.
We must still determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the

5 Appellant does not argue claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19 separately with
particularity. Appeal Br. 17–22. We, therefore, group these claims together
and refer to them as the “present claims.”
6 We determine the “transmit” limitations are extra-solution activity. See
also Ans. 13–14 (the Examiner makes the same determination).
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

8
abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract
idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55. We therefore (1) identify whether there are any additional recited
elements beyond the abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements both
individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the
exception into a practical application. See id.
Accordingly, we proceed to Prong 2.
E. Step 2A, Prong 2
Here, the elements in the present claims used to implement the
abstract idea are the “memory device,”7 “processor,”8 “enterprise,”
“computer,”9 and “database.”10 See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because they do not impose any
meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons.
Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets
forth an improvement in technology. Appeal Br. 9–10 (citing Core Wireless
Licensing S.A.R.L v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The
Update addresses how we consider evidence of improvement that is
presented to us. The Update states:

7 This additional element is recited in claim 1 (and its dependent claims)
only. See Claims App.
8 This additional element is recited in claim 1 (and its dependent claims)
only. See Claims App.
9 This additional element is recited in claims 9 and 16 (and its dependent
claims) only. See Claims App.
10 This additional element is recited in claim 16 (and its dependent claims)
only. See Claims App.
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

9
[T]he evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the
considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular
treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular
machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole “integrates [the]
judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.
Update 11 (emphases added). The Update further states:
During examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
We, therefore, focus on any evidence Appellant cites in its briefs, as
discussed in the Update. Appellant does not refer us to any paragraphs of
the Specification or other evidence of an improvement to a technology or
technological field. Appeal Br. 18–20.
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

10
Furthermore, the additional elements in the present claims, namely
“memory device,” “processor,” “enterprise,” “computer,” and “database,” do
not, either individually or in combination, integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Appellant’s Specification discloses that these elements
encompass generic computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 11–13, 31, 38, 53, 100,
102. Merely adding generic computer components to perform abstract ideas
does not integrate those ideas into a practical application. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely includ[ing] instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an example of when an
abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application).
We, therefore, conclude that the additional elements, whether
considered individually or as an ordered combination, do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements are
generic computer components that do not impose meaningful limits on
practicing the abstract idea.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims are
similar to the patent eligible Examples because the present claims include
converting the communication session (regardless of a format of the
communication session) to a data metric that is used when generating a
subscription report. Appeal Br. 18–20. Instead, we conclude that the
present claims are directed to improvements to an abstract idea (i.e., certain
methods of organizing human activity), rather than to improvements to a
technology or technological field. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new
abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework,
a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

11
or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the
inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd.
v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to Step 2A,
Prong 2. Because the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
F. Step 2B
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner fails to
provide sufficient evidence to support the finding that the additional
elements implementing the abstract idea, whether considered individually or
as an ordered combination, are well-understood, routine, and conventional.
Appeal Br. 20–22 (citing Berkheimer, 881 F.3d 1360). The Examiner does
not make a specific finding that the additional elements implementing the
abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Final Act. 3.
To the extent that Appellant is arguing that the Specification does not
support a finding that the additional elements implementing the abstract idea
are well-understood, routine, and conventional, we disagree because the
Specification indicates that the additional elements (i.e., “memory device,”
“processor,” “enterprise,” “computer,” and “database”) are nothing more
than generic computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 11–13, 31, 38, 53, 100, 102.
Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional elements were well-
understood, routine, and conventional components because it describes them
at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates that they are
sufficiently well-known.
Appellant does not argue that the dependent claims recite any
additional features that would transform the abstract idea embodied in
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

12
independent claims 1, 9, and 16 into an inventive concept. We, therefore,
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of: (1) independent claims 1, 9, and 16; and
(2) dependent claims 2–6, 8, 10–14, and 17–19 under § 101.
II. Claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner finds Somasundaram teaches sending notifications to a
first customer, and the first customer gives a second customer authorization
to receive notifications while the first customer is away on vacation, which
the Examiner maps to the limitation
determine if the agent is unavailable to manage the
communication session; determine if the agent is subscribed to
real-time notifications; generate the notification for the agent of
the enterprise based on the generated subscription report if the
agent is unavailable to manage the communication session and if
the agent is subscribed to receive real-time notifications; and
transmit the generated notification to the agent of the enterprise
recited in claim 1 (and similarly recited in claims 9 and 16). Final Act. 6–10
(citing Somasundaram ¶¶ 19, 71, 89); Ans. 14–18 (citing Somasundaram
¶¶ 19, 71, 89).
Appellant argues Somasundaram merely teaches when a user is
unavailable, the notification is sent to a third party (i.e., a different entity),
which is not the same entity as the subscribing entity and is not the
unavailable entity. Appeal Br. 26; Reply Br. 3. Appellant argues
Somasundaram is not analogous to the claimed invention because
(1) Somasundaram is directed to video surveillance systems, whereas the
claims are directed to providing notifications to resources and
(2) Somasundaram is directed to video surveillance, whereas the claims are
directed to providing notifications in an efficient manner so Somasundaram
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

13
is not reasonably pertinent to the problem being solved. Reply Br. 4–5. We
disagree with Appellant.
Somasundaram teaches sending notifications to a first customer, and
the first customer gives a second customer authorization to receive
notifications while the first customer is away on vacation. Somasundaram
¶¶ 19, 71, 89 (cited at Final Act. 6–10; Ans. 14–18). Paragraphs 19, 71, and
89 of Somasundaram do not state that the first customer stops receiving
alerts while away on vacation; these paragraphs merely state that the second
customer also receives alerts while on vacation. See e.g., Somasundaram
¶¶ 18, 19 (paragraph 18 discusses a customer receiving alerts and paragraph
19 begins with “[m]oreover” and states that the second customer receives
alerts while the first customer is on vacation; paragraphs 18 and 19,
therefore, are not alternative embodiments and we interpret paragraphs 18
and 19 as teaching both the first customer and the second customer receiving
alerts). We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Somasundaram teaches or at least suggests the limitation
determine if the agent is unavailable to manage the
communication session; determine if the agent is subscribed to
real-time notifications; generate the notification for the agent of
the enterprise based on the generated subscription report if the
agent is unavailable to manage the communication session and if
the agent is subscribed to receive real-time notifications; and
transmit the generated notification to the agent of the enterprise
recited in claim 1 (and similarly recited in claims 9 and 16). Final Act. 6–10
(citing Somasundaram ¶¶ 19, 71, 89); Ans. 14–18 (citing Somasundaram
¶¶ 19, 71, 89).
Appellant’s non-analogous art argument is untimely. Reply Br. 4–5.
Appellant’s argument is untimely and waived because the Examiner did not
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

14
change the theory of unpatentability in the Answer (compare Final Act. 6–
10 with Ans. 14–18), while Appellant proffered new arguments in the Reply
Brief (compare Appeal Br. 26 with Reply Br. 4–5) without showing good
cause. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Even assuming, arguendo, that this
argument were not untimely, we determine that Somasundaram is analogous
to the present claims.
The test for determining whether a prior art reference constitutes
analogous art to the claimed invention is: (1) whether the prior art is from
the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, or (2) if the
reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the
reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which
the inventor is involved. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
In determining the field of endeavor, we look to the written
description and claims, including the structure and function of the invention.
Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1326. In defining the field of invention, and in
determining the relevance of Somasundaram to the obviousness inquiry,
here a broad approach should be taken. Indeed, the Supreme Court provided
guidance in determining the applicability of a reference’s teachings in an
obviousness inquiry. In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Court explained
that if a feature has been used to improve one device, and a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that it would improve a
similar device in that field or another, implementing that feature on the
similar device is likely obvious. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
417 (2007).
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

15
Here, the appropriate scope of the field of endeavor is sending
notifications to a second customer while the first customer is away.
Somasundaram ¶¶ 19, 71, 89. Appellant characterizes Somasundaram as
being in the field of video surveillance. Reply Br. 3. However, in arriving
at that description, Appellant too narrowly characterizes the Somasundaram
reference. Somasundaram is within the field of endeavor because it teaches
sending notifications to a second customer while the first customer is away.
Somasundaram ¶¶ 19, 71, 89.
Because we determine that Somasundaram is within the same field of
endeavor as the claimed invention, we need not consider Appellant’s
arguments regarding whether Somasundaram is reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which Appellant is involved.
Appellant does not argue claims 1–6, 8–14, and 16–19 separately with
particularity. Appeal Br. 26–27; Reply Br. 2–5. We, therefore, sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of: (1) independent claims 1, 9, and 16;11 and
(2) dependent claims 2–6, 8, 10–14, and 17–19 under § 101.
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

11 Independent claims 9 and 16 are method claims that recite conditional
limitations, which means that the conditional limitations need not be given
patentable weight. Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL
6277792 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential); accord Ans. 18.
Appeal 2020-001260
Application 14/752,854

16
CONCLUSION

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 8–14,
16–19
101 Eligibility 1–6, 8–14,
16–19

1–6, 8–14,
16–19
103 Dwyer,
Somasundaram
1–6, 8–14,
16–19

Overall
Outcome
1–6, 8–14,
16–19