Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 28, 2021

2019006472 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/638,960 03/04/2015 Ignacio Miranda Gonzalez 4366-717 1063
48500 7590 04/28/2021
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
WAN, QI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2143
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/28/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte IGNACIO MIRANDA GONZALEZ and BRYAN SOLAN

Appeal 2019-006472
Application 14/638,960
Technology Center 2100

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., DAVID M. KOHUT, and
IRVIN E. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–5, 8–10, 12, 13, 15–19, and 22–27.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use “Appellant” to reference the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Avaya
Inc.” Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
The present invention relates to a system that permits multiple
participants of an electronic visual presentation to control a cursor in the
presentation display. Spec. ¶ 34. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative
of argued subject matter.
1. A method comprising:
providing, by a microprocessor, a first cursor in a multimedia
conference controlled by a first user of a first communication
endpoint, the first communication endpoint being in a first
location, wherein the multimedia conference comprises a
plurality of users on a plurality of communication endpoints at
a plurality of locations;
detecting, by the microprocessor, a first event associated with
the multimedia conference, wherein the first event associated
with the multimedia conference is detecting a specific slide of
a presentation; and
in response to detecting the first event associated with the
multimedia conference, enabling at least one of:
switching, by the microprocessor, control of the first cursor in
the multimedia conference from the first user of the first
communication endpoint to where a second user of a second
communication endpoint now controls the first cursor in the
multimedia conference, the second communication endpoint
being in a second location; or
providing, by the microprocessor, a second cursor in the
multimedia conference controlled by the second user of the
second communication endpoint, wherein the second cursor is a
new cursor that is added after the multimedia conference has
started.
Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis added).
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Rejections2
Claims 1, 3, 13, 15, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over LaBine (US 2009/0292999 A1; Nov. 26, 2009) and
Ouyang (US 2016/0065625 A1; Mar. 3, 2016). Final Act. 3–7.
Claims 4, 9, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over LaBine, Ouyang, and Suito (US 2007/0123243 A1; May
31, 2007). Final Act. 7–11.
Claims 8 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over LaBine, Ouyang, and Mitsui (US 2013/0249788 A1;
Sept. 26, 2013). Final Act. 12–15.
Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, and Lock (US 2015/0149404 A1; May 28, 2015).
Final Act. 17–18.
Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, and Louchheim (US 2015/0381932 A1; Dec. 31, 2015).
Final Act. 18–19.
Claim 22 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, and Lee (US 2008/0040137 A1; Feb. 14, 2008).
Final Act. 19–21.
Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, and Chawla (US 2007/0005752 A1; Jan. 4, 2007).
Final Act. 21–22.

2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 5 and 17 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over LaBine, Ouyang, and Jones (US
2013/0198657 A1; Aug. 1, 2013). Ans. 28.
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Claim 24 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, and Vempati (US 2008/0096597 A1; Apr. 24, 2008).
Final Act. 22–23.
Claim 25 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, and Ramalho (US 2016/0057390 A1; Feb. 25,
2016). Final Act. 24–25.
Claim 26 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, and Hasegawa (US 2014/0059569 A1; Feb. 27,
2014). Final Act. 25–26.
Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, and Sakaniwa (US 2012/0020641 A1; Jan. 26,
2012). Final Act. 26–27.
OPINION
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1, 3, 13, 15, and 23
over LaBine and Ouyang
Contesting this rejection of independent claim 1, Appellant contends:
While it is true that LaBine does teach that control of a cursor
can be switched, LaBine does not teach or suggest that cursor
control can be changed based on detecting a specific slide of a
presentation as recited in claim 1. This is why the Examiner is
trying to rely on Ouyang.
. . . .
In . . . Ouyang, when the slide is detected, a user is
notified of the slide change because the user has indicated that
the particular page/slide is of interest. . . . Ouyang, like LaBine,
does not suggest that detection of the change in the slide is used
for any kind of cursor control.
Appeal Br. 8–9 (citing Ouyang ¶ 49) (emphasis omitted). The Examiner
responds:
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LaBine teaches switching cursor control based on a type
of input trigger event[.] [A d]ifferent mechanism could be
adopted in a multiple user conference for enabling remote
control, such as [LaBine’s] time lapse mechanism[.] LaBine
does not specifically teach [the claimed] “detecting a specific
slide of a presentation” as an input mechanism. [However],
Ouyang teaches a triggering event of detecting a specific slide
of a presentation[;] that is, when the presenter changes to slide
10, then the slide change event is detected as a type of system
input or triggering event. Thus[,] detecting a specific slide of a
presentation could be adopted as a type of input mechanism for
switching cursor.
Ans. 30 (citing LaBine ¶¶ 82, 84; Ouyang ¶ 49). Appellant does not reply to
the Examiner’s response. We are, therefore, unpersuaded of Examiner error.
The Examiner’s reasoning for the proposed combination of prior art
teachings is as follows. Ans. 30. LaBine switches cursor control amongst
multiple computers and does so in response to a trigger event that indicates a
change in user control is warranted, e.g., when the current person in control
has done nothing for a threshold duration. Id. Ouyang detects that a specific
slide of an electronic visual presentation has opened in the presentation
display. Id. Because a person of ordinary skill in the art (herein “artisan”)
would have understood that a newly displayed slide may warrant a change in
user control, and because LaBine and Ouyang show it was within the skill in
the art to perform a change in user/cursor control in response to a newly
displayed slide, it would have been obvious for LaBine’s invention to switch
cursor control in response to a newly displayed slide.
Appellant does not provide sufficient persuasive reasoning or
evidence in rebuttal. Appellant argues that neither LaBine nor Ouyang
switches cursor control in response to a newly displayed slide. However, it
is not persuasive to show one reference individually fails to teach a claim
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feature where, as here, the rejection reads the feature on combined teachings
of two or more references. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking
references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references.”).
Appellant also contends:
In order to combine Ouyang with LaBine, the Ouyang reference
must provide some motivation associated with the
focus/primary purpose of claim 1, which is cursor control.
Why would it be obvious to use the slide detection of Ouyang
(which is used to notify a user) for managing a cursor when
Ouyang does not suggest using this type of event to control a
cursor? What the Examiner is doing is using hindsight
reasoning . . . .
Appeal Br. 10. We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. The only reasoning
that the Examiner has not supported with direct evidence is that an artisan
would have understood a newly displayed slide can warrant a change in user
control. Given the ubiquitousness of slide presentations whereby two
presenters each address a different set of slides for a presentation, there is
simply no need for direct evidence. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 417–18 (2007) (If the plain inferences and creativity of an artisan
(e.g., common sense) provide sufficient reason for the combination, the
analysis “need not seek out precise teachings” (id. at 418).); id. at 419
(“[O]bviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of
the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the
importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 1 is
sustained.
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Appellant also contests the rejection of claim 23, which depends from
claim 1 and recites: “wherein the first event associated with the multimedia
conference is visually detecting a human gesture in the multimedia
conference to switch control of the first cursor in the multimedia
presentation.” Appeal Br. 22. Appellant contends:
LaBine . . . teaches that user events from a
mouse/keyboard/pen (mechanical devices) can be detected.
This is clearly different from claim 23. . . . Using a mechanical
device such as a mouse is not visually detecting a human
gesture.
. . . LaBine [also] teaches a user can use a toolbar bar to
remotely control the presenters shared desktop. This is clearly
different from claim 23. Using a toolbar with a mouse is not
the same as visually detecting a human gesture in the
multimedia conference to control a cursor. What is detected in
LaBine is a click of a mouse . . . .
Appeal Br. 14 (citing LaBine ¶¶ 81, 84) (emphasis omitted). The Examiner
responds:
[A u]ser clicking on the screen is a visually seen human
gesture. It is not specified in the claim language that “visually”
is associated with camera view or other detecting mechanism.
Ans. 33–34.
We are persuaded of Examiner error. Base claim 1 recites “detecting,
by the microprocessor, a first event.” Claim 23 adds, to this recitation, “the
first event . . . is visually detecting a human gesture.” Presumably, though
not expressly stated, the Examiner construes these recitations as requiring
only that a gesture is visually detected and the detection is somehow
conveyed to the microprocessor; e.g., a person sees the gesture and then
enters a respective input to a personal computer. Ans. 33–34. In LaBine’s
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cited disclosure, and as Appellant argues, the mouse click is rather
mechanically detected by the mouse and the mechanical detection is
conveyed to a computer. Appeal Br. 14. Any visual detection by the user is
not a component of this detection and conveyance. Id.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 23 is not
sustained.
Claims 3, 13, and 15 are not argued separately but rather alleged to
overcome the rejection for the same reasons presented for claim 1. Appeal
Br. 11. Accordingly, because the rejection of claim 1 is sustained, the
rejection of claims 3, 13, and 15 are sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 4, 9, and 16
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Suito
Claims 4, 9, and 16 are not argued separately but rather alleged to
overcome the rejection for the same reasons presented for claim 1. Appeal
Br. 11. Accordingly, because the rejection of claim 1 is sustained, the
rejection of claims 4, 9, and 16 are sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 8 and 18
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Mitsui
Claims 8 and 18 are not argued separately but rather alleged to
overcome the rejection for the same reasons presented for claim 1. Appeal
Br. 11. Accordingly, because the rejection of claim 1 is sustained, the
rejection of claims 8 and 18 are sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 19
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Lock
Claim 19 is not argued separately but rather alleged to overcome the
rejection for the same reasons presented for claim 1. Appeal Br. 11.
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Accordingly, because the rejection of claim 1 is sustained, the rejection of
claim 19 is sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 10
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Louchheim
Appellant also contests this rejection of claim 10, which depends from
claim 1 and adds: “wherein the second event is a stress level or mood of the
first user.” Appeal Br. 20. Appellant contends: “Louchheim teaches
. . . that pitch, mood, alertness etc. information may be detected. This
information is used to detect ‘an interestingness rating associated with each
audience’[.] Louchheim does not even mention a cursor.” Id. at 13 (citing
Louchheim ¶ 35). The Examiner responds that “detecting the . . . pitch of
the user . . . is indicative the user’s mood is [thus] a specific type of trigger
event.” Ans. 31.
We are persuaded of Examiner error. The Examiner’s rationale for
rejecting each of the argued claims, including claim 10, is generally the
same. For independent claim 1, the Examiner determines: LaBine’s
invention switches user/cursor control in response to an event indicating a
change in user control is warranted; another reference (Ouyang) teaches
detection of an event; and an artisan would have understood that the detected
event may warrant a change in user control. Supra 5 (addressing claim 1).
Here, in rejecting claim 10 over LaBine and Louchheim, the Examiner
determines Louchheim’s detected pitch of someone may indicate a change in
user/cursor control is warranted. Ans. 31. This reasoning is not supported.
And, unlike the rationale for claim 1 (supra 5), this reasoning is not plainly
apparent. The rejection therefore lacks needed evidence that an artisan
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would have understood a detected pitch of someone may indicate a change
in user control is warranted.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 10 is not
sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 22
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Lee
Appellant also contests this rejection of claim 22, which depends from
claim 1 and adds: “wherein the first event associated with the multimedia
conference further comprises detecting a group discussion period to switch
control of the first cursor in the multimedia presentation.” Appeal Br. 22.
Appellant contends:
Lee does disclose detecting a group discussion period. As
stated by the Examiner, Lee teaches, in paragraph [0043],
sending an email to notify a user when the group discussion
terminates. Lee does not suggest that the detection of the group
discussion period is used for any type of cursor control . . . .
Lee does even mention a cursor.
Id. at 13–14 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner responds: “Lee teaches
detecting . . . the end of the discussion period[] and provides corresponding
notification . . . . [I]t means that the specific group discussion period is
detected by the system, and detecting a group discussion period is just a
specific mechanism.” Ans. 32 (citing Lee ¶ 43).
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Applying the general
rationale discussed above (supra 9–10), the Examiner determines Lee’s
detected termination of a group discussion may indicate a change in user
control (e.g., cursor control) is warranted. Ans. 32. Here, because an
artisan would have understood that termination of a group discussion may
warrant a change in user/cursor control (see supra 6 (inferences permitted
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under KSR)), and because LaBine and Lee show it was within the skill in the
art to perform a change in user/cursor control in response to a detected
termination of a group discussion, it would have been obvious for LaBine’s
invention to switch cursor control in response detecting a group discussion
period (as is claimed). Ans. 33–34. Appellant does not provide sufficient
persuasive reasoning or evidence in rebuttal, but merely argues against Lee
individually by arguing it does not teach the detected termination of a group
discussion prompts a change in cursor control. Appeal Br. 13–14; see also
Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097 (“Non obviousness cannot be established by
attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 22 is
sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 12
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Chawla
Claim 12 is not argued separately but rather alleged to overcome the
rejection for the same reasons presented for claim 1. Appeal Br. 11.
Accordingly, because the rejection of claim 1 is sustained, the rejection of
claim 12 sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 24
over LaBine, Ouyang, and Vempati
Appellant also contests this rejection of claim 24, which depends from
claim 1 and adds: “wherein the first event associated with the multimedia
conference is detecting one or more Dual Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF)
tones to switch control of the first cursor in the multimedia presentation.”
Appeal Br. 22. Appellant contends:
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Vempati teaches . . . that a DTMF tone may be used as a “talk”
DTMF tone. The DTFM tone allows a user to talk in a push-to-
talk session. . . .
Vempati does not suggest that the detection of the DTMF tone is
used for any type of cursor control . . . .
Appeal Br. 15 (citing Vempati ¶ 34). The Examiner responds: “Vempati
teaches the ‘talk’ DTMF tone is used to communicate to a node managing
the push-to-talk session that the user is requesting speech control of a push-
to-talk conference bridge[.]” Ans. 34 (citing Vempati ¶ 34).
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Applying the general
rationale discussed above (supra 9–10), the Examiner determines Vempati’s
detected request to “talk” may indicate a change in user/cursor control is
warranted. Ans. 34. This reasoning is not supported by direct evidence.
However, direct evidence is not needed because it is plainly apparent that a
request to talk may warrant control of LaBine’s slide presentation by
someone other than the presenter (i.e., the requester) and may accordingly
warrant a change in user/cursor control. See supra 6 (inferences permitted
under KSR). Because an artisan would have understood this, and because
LaBine and Vempati show it was within the skill in the art to perform a
change in user/cursor control in response to a detected DTMF request to
“talk,” it would have been obvious for LaBine’s invention to switch cursor
control in response detecting a DTMF (as is claimed). Appellant does not
provide sufficient persuasive reasoning or evidence in rebuttal, but merely
argues against Vempati individually by contending it does not teach the
detected DTMF prompts a change in cursor control. Appeal Br. 15.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 24 is
sustained.
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Obviousness Rejection of Claim 25
over LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, and Ramalho
Appellant also contests this rejection of claim 25 (indirect
dependence), which depends from claim 1 and adds: “wherein the second
event is the second user not paying attention to the multimedia conference.”
Appeal Br. 23. Appellant contends: “Ramalho . . . teaches that a user may
use a recording to listen to a conference if the user was not paying attention
during the conference. The system of Ramalho does not actually detect
whether the user was paying attention or not.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Ramalho
¶¶ 14, 55). The Examiner responds: “Ramalho teaches something [that]
occurs in the conference due to the user not paying attention to the
multimedia conference[.] The event of the user not paying attention happens
and triggers some other action.” Ans. 35 (citing Ramalho ¶ 55).
We are persuaded of Examiner error. Applying the general rationale
discussed above (supra 9–10), the Examiner determines Ramalho’s
disclosed lack of attention by a participant of a presentation may indicate a
change in user/cursor control is warranted. Ans. 35. As Appellant argues,
Ramalho’s invention does not detect that the participant lacks attention.
Appeal Br. 15–16. There is accordingly no evidence that it was within the
skill in the art to detect the lack of attention, much less to change user/cursor
control in response to such detection.
We add that the cited lack of attention does not concern Ramalho’s
presenter. Ramalho ¶ 55 (“not requiring a presenter to restate . . . content,
due to[] lack of attention from a participant”). Therefore, it is not clear why
the lack of attention would warrant a change in user/cursor control from the
presenter to someone else.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 25 is not
sustained.
Obviousness Rejection of Claim 26
over LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, and Hasegawa
Appellant also contests this rejection of claim 26, which depends from
claim 1 and adds: “wherein the second event is the second user looking at or
pointing to a specific area of the presented document.” Appeal Br. 23.
Appellant contends:
Hasegawa teaches . . . that a camera can detect a person pointing
to a mark on a sheet of paper. This information is then used to
acquire a photographed image of the sheet of paper. Hasegawa
does not suggest that the detection of the pointing is used to for
any type of cursor control.
Appeal Br. 16 (citing Hasegawa ¶ 29). The Examiner responds: “Hasegawa
teaches the user’s fingertip is pointed at a desired indicator (mark) 8 on the
paper sheet 7 . . . , wherein the specific area is ‘indicator (mark) 8 on the
paper sheet 7’.” Ans. 36 (citing Hasegawa ¶ 29).
We are persuaded of Examiner error. Applying the general rationale
discussed above (supra 9–10), the Examiner determines Hasegawa’s
detection of a finger pointing to a printed mark (on paper) may indicate a
change in user/cursor control is warranted. Ans. 36. As Appellant argues,
there is no apparent nexus between Hasegawa’s detection of a finger
pointing to a printed mark and a need to change user/cursor control. Appeal
Br. 16.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 26 is not
sustained.
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Obviousness Rejection of Claim 27
over LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, and Sakaniwa
Appellant also contests this rejection of claim 27, which depends from
claim 1 and adds: “wherein the second event is the presence of the second
user being off camera.” Appeal Br. 23. Appellant contends: “Sakaniwa
teaches . . . that if a user leaves a sensor detection area, a presence detection
flag is changed from ON to OFF. Sakaniwa does not suggest that the
presence detection flag is used to control a cursor.” Appeal Br. 17 (citing
Sakaniwa ¶ 111). The Examiner responds: “Sakaniwa teaches when the
user is not in the detection area, then presence detection flag changes
correspondingly[.]” Ans. 37 (citing Sakaniwa ¶ 111).
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Applying the general
rationale discussed above (supra 9–10), the Examiner determines
Sakaniwa’s detection of a person leaving an defined area may indicate a
change in user/cursor control is warranted. Ans. 37. This reasoning is not
supported by direct evidence. However, direct evidence is not needed
because it is plainly apparent that a presenter’s leaving of the area displaying
the slide presentation may warrant a change in user/cursor control. See
supra 6 (inferences permitted under KSR). Because an artisan would have
understood this, and because LaBine and Sakaniwa show it was within the
skill in the art to perform a change in user/cursor control in response to
detecting the presenter has left the area displaying the presentation, it would
have been obvious for LaBine’s invention to switch cursor control in
response to the presenter leaving the area displaying the presentation (as is
claimed). Appellant presents no persuasive reasoning or evidence in
rebuttal, but merely argues against Sakaniwa individually by arguing it does
not teach that the detected leaving of an area prompts a change in cursor
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control. Appeal Br. 17; see also Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097 (“Non
obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 27 is not
sustained.
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OVERALL CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 1, 3–5, 8–10, 12, 13, 15–19, and 22–27.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 13,
15, 23 103 LaBine, Ouyang 1, 3, 13, 15 23
4, 9, 16 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Suito 4, 9, 16
8, 18 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Mitsui 8, 18
19 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Lock 19
10 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Louchheim 10
22 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Lee 22
12 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Chawla 12
24 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Vempati 24
25 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, Ramalho 25
26 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Suito Hasegawa 26
27 103 LaBine, Ouyang, Suito, Sakaniwa 27
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–5, 8, 9,
12, 13, 15–19,
22, 24
10, 23, 25–27

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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this Appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART