Avaya Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 4, 2021

2021000656 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 4, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/086,205 03/31/2016 Thomas Moran 416019-US-
NP/AVA183PA
8217
136582 7590 06/04/2021
STEVENS & SHOWALTER, LLP
Box AVAYA Inc.
7019 Corporate Way
Dayton, OH 45459-4238
EXAMINER
WAESCO, JOSEPH M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/04/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pair_avaya@firsttofile.com
pto@sspatlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THOMAS MORAN
Appeal 2021-000656
Application 15/086,205
Technology Center 3600
Before DEBORAH KATZ, JOHN G. NEW, and
ROBERT A. POLLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges.
POLLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involves claims to a method and
system for allocating agent resources in a contact center for unmanned aerial
vehicles (“UAV”) by connecting agents to contacts using dynamic
predictions. Appellant1 seeks our review of the Examiner’s decision to reject
the claims as drawn to patent ineligible subject matter, and as obvious over
the prior art. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya Inc. Appeal
Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to the Specification, UAVs typically require input from a
human agent at one or more points during a UAV excursion, despite the
UAVs being fully or partially autonomous. Spec. ¶ 2. These skilled human
agents “are a scarce resource and represent a large percentage of the
operating cost in many businesses.” Id. Because “the skilled agent will be
required only at certain time periods during the UAV’s excursion. . . . each
agent’s time and availability should be optimized to ensure that agents with
the appropriate skills are available for connection with each contact object at
the optimal time.” Id. ¶ 58.
The Specification describes a contact center that receives information
from customer communication devices or other external sources. Id. ¶¶ 41–
42, Figure 3. The contact center communicates with a UAV deployment
center that manages and maintains a fleet of UAVs. Id. ¶ 42. The UAVs may
be specially equipped to handle particular situations, for example, medical
emergencies. Id. ¶ 45. The contact center further communicates with a
plurality of agents having different skills and attributes. Id. ¶¶ 30, 55, Figure
2. The contact center may use automatic call or contact distribution (“ACD”)
software to route incoming calls to specifically assigned agents. Id. ¶ 20. In
the medical emergency example, the contact center may route an incoming
call to a medical professional who can communicate with the customer who
requested the UAV. See id. ¶¶ 55, 57. “[B]y predicting when the UAV will
reach the target destination, the contact center may dynamically determine
when to connect the [customer] with a skilled medical agent, or some other
skilled agent(s).” Id. ¶ 59.
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Claims 1 and 10 are independent. Claim 1 is representative and
reproduced below with annotations for reference to the limitations in the
claim:
1. A method for allocating agent resources in a contact center,
the method comprising:
[a] receiving a new contact at the contact center;
[b] instantiating, by a processor of the contact center, a contact
object corresponding to the new contact;
[c] receiving, by the processor of the contact center, a first set
of information related to the contact object;
[d] selecting, by the processor of the contact center, a first
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) from a plurality of UAVs for
deployment to a target destination, wherein the first UAV is
selected based on the first set of information and at least one
feature of each of the plurality of UAVs;
[e] associating, by the processor of the contact center, at least
one characteristic of the first UAV with the contact object;
[f] receiving, by the processor of the contact center, during a
travel period of the first UAV to the target destination, an
additional set of information related to at least one of the contact
object or the first UAV;
[g] dynamically predicting, by the processor of the contact
center, a particular agent of the contact center to connect to the
contact object, wherein the prediction is based on the first set of
information and the additional set of information; and
[h] establishing a communication link between an agent
device associated with the particular agent of the contact center
and at least one of (i) a user device associated with the contact
object, or (ii) a communication device associated with the UAV.
App. Br. 27.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–10 and 21–28 as drawn to
unpatentable subject matter pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Non-Final Act. 4–
7.
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The Examiner further rejects claims 1–4, 8, 10, 21–23, and 27 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Chambers2 and Duggan.3 Id. at 7–11.
The Examiner rejects claims 5, 7, 9, 24, 26, and 28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Chambers, Duggan, and Buerger.4 Id. at 11–13.
The Examiner rejects claims 6 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Chambers, Duggan, Buerger, and Chan.5 Id. at 13–14.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Principles of Law
Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are
not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance
with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed
to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are
drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party

2 Chambers et al., US 2016/0253908 A1, publ. Sept. 1, 2016.
3 Duggan et al., US 2011/0130913 A1, publ. June 2, 2011.
4 Buerger et al., US 10,168,674 B1, issued Jan. 1, 2019.
5 Chan et al., US 2016/0189550 A1, publ. June 30, 2016.
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to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 184 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 192 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
USPTO Section 101 Guidance
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO” or “the
Office”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s
January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance (“Memorandum” or “Office Guidance”).6 Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
interactions such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes);
and

6 Available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-
07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf.
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).7
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
Analysis
The Examiner rejects all pending claims as directed to ineligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Non-Final Act. 4–7. The Examiner
finds that the claims recite various steps of receiving and analyzing
information, falling within the abstract idea category of Mental Processes.
Id. at 4–6. The Examiner further finds that the claims recite methods for
organizing and tracking work between people, which fall within the abstract
idea category of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity. Id. For
example, the Examiner finds that the process of “[c]onnecting an agent to a
task has been done in call centers for years, and this particular
implementation is to connect a Pilot (agent) to a task (Pilot the UAV or

7 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be evaluated
properly under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office Guidance). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
this inquiry under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office Guidance).
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monitor it, as there is no detail claimed as to what is being done with this
established link).” Ans. 6.
Having identified the judicial exceptions (abstract ideas) in the claims,
the Examiner finds that the additional elements—apart from the patent-
ineligible judicial exceptions—amount to no more than mere instructions to
apply the judicial exceptions using generic computer components. Non-Final
Act. 6. Therefore, the Examiner finds that the judicial exceptions are not
integrated into a practical application. Id. Finally, the Examiner finds that
the additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the judicial
exceptions because mere instructions to apply an exception using generic
computer components cannot provide an inventive concept. Id.
Appellant argues that the Examiner has not properly applied the
enumerated judicial exceptions set forth in the Office Guidance. Appeal Br.
10–11. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Examiner identifies the
“elements of claim 1 as being directed to ‘a Mental Process for Organizing
Human Activity,’ which is not one of the identified categories listed in the
current guidance.” Id. at 10. Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s
reference to “organizing and tracking work between people” does not relate
to “managing personal behavior, and relationships or interactions between
people.” Id. at 11. Finally, Appellant contends that step [b], instantiating a
contact object corresponding to the new contact, and step [h], establishing a
communication link, cannot be performed in the human mind and thus are
not mental processes. Id. at 12–13.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because we agree with
the Examiner that the claims recite more than one abstract idea falling under
the category of “certain methods of organizing human activity” and mental
processes. The Examiner’s identification of multiple abstract ideas recited
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by the claims is not improper, as “[a]dding one abstract idea [] to another
abstract idea [] does not render the claim non-abstract.” RecogniCorp, LLC
v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). As to the specific
limitations, we agree with the Examiner that the claimed steps—[a]
receiving a new contact; [b] instantiating a contact object; [c] receiving a
first set of information; [d] selecting a UAV based on the first set of
information; [e] associating a characteristic of a UAV with the contact
object; [f] receiving an additional set of information; and [g] dynamically
predicting a particular agent based on the first and additional sets of
information—all relate to processing information, observations, and
evaluations that can be performed in the human mind, i.e., mental processes.
For example, the Specification describes the instantiating step as creating a
contact object representative of a contact based on certain attributes. Spec.
¶¶ 17, 48. Creating representative abstractions according to certain attributes
is a mental process that can be performed in the human mind. As identified
by the Examiner, the claims recite performing these mental processes with a
generic computer, namely, “a processor of the contact center.”
We further agree with the Examiner that assigning a particular agent
to a particular task based on the received data relates to managing
interactions between people, namely between a customer and an agent,
which falls within the category of certain methods of organizing human
activity. See NetSoc, LLC v. Match Grp., LLC, 838 F. App’x 544, 548 (Fed.
Cir. 2020)(“‘maintaining’ a list of participants, ‘presenting’ a user with
selectable categories, ‘displaying’ participant information based on the
selected category . . . are all human activities that the claims more efficiently
organize by applying them to a ‘network computer system.’”)(non-
precedential).
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Appellant argues that even if the claim recites a judicial exception, the
alleged exception is integrated into a practical application for two reasons.
See Appeal Br. 13–15. First, Appellant argues that step [h], establishing a
communication link, is an additional element that effects “a transformation
from one state to another.” Id. at 13–14. Specifically, Appellant argues that
the elements preceding the “establishing” element are used to place a
particular agent device and a user device and/or a device associated with the
UAV “into a different state, as compared to a previous state, and create a
link that was not previously active.” Id. at 14. Appellant analogizes the
claimed method to the method of curing polyurethane claimed in Diehr. See
id.; see also Ans. 3–4 (citing Patent Eligibility Example 45, available at:
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_app1.
pdf).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument as to effecting a
transformation. Unlike Diehr, in which the invention “recited an improved
process for molding rubber articles,” 450 U.S. at 181, the claims at issue
refer to an improved method of communicating over a network between a
UAV customer and a UAV agent. Rather than recite a transformation of a
particular article, the claims merely limit the use of the claimed abstract idea
to a particular technological environment. See ChargePoint, Inc. v.
SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“the invention of
the patent is nothing more than the abstract idea of communication over a
network for interacting with a device, applied to the context of electric
vehicle charging stations.”). Our reviewing court has “repeatedly made clear
that merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular
existing technological environment does not render the claims any less
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abstract.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253,
1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Second, Appellant argues that step [h] applies or uses the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way. Appeal Br. 14–15. Specifically,
Appellant argues that the system “optimizes the use of scarce resources
within a contact center, specifically skilled agents,” and avoids connecting a
user with an agent who does not have the appropriate skills to handle the
contact at that particular time. Id. (citing Spec. ¶¶ 58–61).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because Appellant’s
alleged improvement does not improve the functioning of a computer or is
not an improvement to other technology. See 84 Fed. Reg. 55. Rather,
Appellant’s claimed invention addresses a business problem, namely, more
efficient application of scare human resources which represent a large
percentage of the operating cost in many businesses. See Spec. ¶¶ 2, 58.
Appellant argues that claims recite additional elements that amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea, and that the additional elements are
not well-understood routine and/or conventional. See Appeal Br. 15.
However, Appellant does not make any specific arguments as to any
unconventional elements. See id. Instead, the Specification describes the
devices for implementing the judicial exceptions as conventional and well-
understood. For example, the Specification discloses that known ACD
software “is used by contact center to route incoming calls to specifically
assigned . . . agents” and “allows a system administrator to create an
efficient call management environment.” Spec. ¶ 20. The Specification
further describes the claimed computing devices, including the contact
center processors, agent devices, user devices, and communication devices,
as well-known and conventional. See id. ¶¶ 19, 23, 25, 33, 35, and 77–84.
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Reciting generic computer components does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible. See Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d 1253.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Claims
2–10 and 21–28, which are not separately argued, fall with claim 1.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 8, 10, 21–23, and 27 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Chambers and Duggan. Non-Final Act. 8–11;
Ans. 7–9. The Examiner rejects claims 5, 7, 9, 24, 26, and 28 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Chambers, Duggan, and Buerger. Id. at 11–13.
The Examiner rejects claims 6 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Chambers, Duggan, Buerger, and Chan. Id. at 13–14.
We have reviewed Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1–10 and 21–28 as unpatentable over the cited art. We
disagree with Appellant’s contentions and, except as noted, adopt the
findings set forth in the Examiner’s Answer and Final Rejection. For
emphasis, we highlight and address the following:
Findings of Fact (“FF”)
1. Chambers discloses an unmanned aerial system (“UAS”) for
reliably operating one or more UAVs to perform various functions,
including, but not limited to, package delivery, data capture, mapping,
surveillance, and infrastructure-provisioning. Chambers ¶ 1.
2. Chambers discloses a UAS that receives a service request from
a human user with a user device. The UAS deploys a UAV from a
distribution center to fulfill the request. Id. ¶¶ 25–26, Figure 1.
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3. Chambers discloses the service request includes instructions to
the UAS to provide some service at the destination site. The destination site
maybe any designated location. The requested service may be any service
that can be provided from an airborne platform. The UAV may carry any
suitable payloads depending on the nature of the service request received
from the service requestor. Id. ¶¶ 26–27, 29.
4. Chambers discloses a global system operator that may be a
human user that monitors and operates the UAS. “[O]ne or more of the
global system operators [] are trained UAV pilots, and the UAS [] may hand
over control of a UAV [] to one such operator, temporarily or for the
duration of a UAV mission.” Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
5. Chambers discloses that, in addition to the destination site
location and payload information, the service request may contain other
information that is useful for the fulfillment of the service request. For
example, the service request further comprises a time designating when the
service request should be fulfilled at the destination site. Id. ¶ 36.
6. Chambers discloses a mission planner that provides the UAV
with high-level directives and goals. The directives include movement,
dropping of payload, capturing image data, and transmitting data. The
mission planner may also receive commands from global services, human
operators, or third-parties (such as air traffic controllers). For example, the
mission planner may receive commands from a human operator to change
course or issue new directives. Id. ¶¶ 45, 47, 72, 87.
7. Chambers discloses that the mission planner is required to
know the location, orientation, altitude, and speed of the UAV at various
times during the mission. A flight controller provides this information
through a process called state estimation. Id. ¶ 64.
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8. Chambers discloses that the global system operators connect to
global services and provide human intervention for systems that cannot be
fully automated (or are otherwise selected to not be fully automated). The
global system operators connect to global services through user control
devices, e.g., computers and smartphones. Id. ¶ 111.
9. Chambers discloses that the UAS may include a service request
handler that manages service requests. The service request handler takes
input from a global system operator to determine the distribution center that
will be used to fulfill a service request. The service request handler may
estimate a predicted time of mission completion based on information
received information from the distribution center and the UAV. Id. ¶¶ 116–
119.
10. Duggan discloses that known UAV control systems typically
offer limited real-time control capability or require management by rated
pilots. Because time-critical targets or surveillance objects can pop-up
during the mission, real-time control by skilled pilots is required to deviate
from the planned route to find and identify new targets; to maneuver UAV’s
to avoid traffic; to fly under the weather; or to get better line-of-sight-angles.
Duggan ¶ 7.
11. Duggan discloses a system that provides a uniform UAV
control scheme where an operator may activate and deactivate different
modes of operator control representing different levels of system autonomy,
including autonomous and manual modes. An intelligence synthesizer
ensures that the switch between modes of control is carried out as smoothly
as possible. Id. ¶¶ 12, 59.
12. Duggan discloses that an operator can maintain a variable level
of control over a UAV, from fully manual to fully autonomous, with simple
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user-friendly inputs. The control system may queue the operator to select an
input, or may control the UAV into a constant altitude, heading, and speed
flight until the operator instructs a maneuver. Id. ¶ 368.
13. Duggan discloses the system provides vehicle status
information, sensor management and control functionality, and information
dissemination capability through both data logging and network
connectivity. A route editing dialog is accessed from the map display and
provides the operator rapid interaction for real-time mission planning and
route editing capability. Id. ¶ 381.
14. Buerger discloses a system that allows a human operator to
control teams of multiple heterogeneous unmanned systems (“UMS”) which
are referred to as “agents.” The human operator applies high level perception
and tactical reasoning, while the system automates lower level decisions.
The operator can also bypass high level control and control agents at lower
levels. Buerger 4:11–28.
15. Buerger discloses the system is responsible for assigning agents
to objectives and may hand off objectives from agent to agent according to
attributes of the agents. See Buerger 13:59–15:6.
Analysis for Claims 1, 2, 8, 10, 21, 27
Appellant argues that “the combined teachings of Chambers and
Duggan fail to teach or suggest ‘dynamically predicting . . . a particular
agent of the contact center to connect to the contact object, wherein the
prediction is based on the first set of information and the additional set of
information.” Appeal Br. 20. Specifically, Appellant argues that Chambers
does not teach or suggest predicting or selecting “any particular operator
based on any received information.” Id. at 18. Likewise, Appellant argues
that although Duggan discloses a UAV-control system that receives various
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information, Duggan does not teach or suggest “that the system
predicts/selects any particular operator for connection with the UAV, much
less that the particular operator is selected based on any [of] the received
information.” Id. at 20.
We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive. Both Chambers and
Duggan teach providing an additional set of information by dynamically
updating UAV flight information during the UAV mission. Specifically,
Chambers teaches a mission planner that knows the location, orientation,
altitude, and speed of the UAV at various times during the mission. FF7.
Likewise, Duggan teaches a system that provides UAV status information,
sensor management, and data logging for real-time mission planning and
route editing. FF13.
Both references also teach connecting human operators (agents) to the
UAV with variable levels of control at various times. Specifically, Chambers
teaches handing temporary UAV control to global system operators that are
trained UAV pilots having agent devices. FF4, 8. Chambers also teaches
establishing a communication link between a UAV’s mission planner and
operators or air-traffic controllers. FF6. Duggan likewise teaches a control
mode that switches between autonomous and manual (agent) control as
needed. FF10–12.
By teaching temporary control by a UAV pilot during portions of the
monitored UAV mission, the references suggest dynamically predicting a
particular agent of the contact center to connect to the contact object based
on the first and additional information. Specifically, Chambers teaches that
one or more of the global system operators are trained UAV pilots who
provide human intervention for systems that cannot be fully automated. FF4,
8. A UAV pilot is a particular agent of the contact center, having a particular
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skill or attribute. See Spec. ¶ 55. Likewise, Duggan teaches that it was
known to assign skilled pilots to deviate from a flight plan based on time-
critical targets or surveillance objectives. FF10. It would have been obvious
to assign temporary control to a particular UAV pilot as needed, based on
the real-time flight data received from the UAV. The obviousness analysis
“can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 418 (2007). “A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 421.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1
and 10. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of those claims.
Claims 2, 6, 8, 21, 25 and 27, which are not separately argued, fall with
claims 1 and 10. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Analysis of claims 3, 4, 22, and 23
Appellant contends that claims 3 and 22 further recite dynamically
predicting an optimal time to establish the connection and establishing the
communication link during that optimal time period. Appeal Br. 20, 22.
Appellant contends that claims 4 and 23 further limit the optimal time to the
arrival time of the UAV at the target destination. Id. at 21–22. Appellant
argues that the combination of Chambers and Duggan does not teach or
suggest using a predicted time of mission completion to determine when the
operator/agent should be connected or establishing a communication link
during a specific time period. Id. at 21.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. As discussed above,
Chambers and Duggan use real-time monitoring of the UAV to predict the
mission completion or arrival time. A person of ordinary skill in the art
would have recognized the predicted arrival time as an optimal time to
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connect the autonomous UAV to a skilled UAV pilot to complete the
mission. “[W]hile an analysis of obviousness always depends on evidence
that supports the required Graham factual findings, it also may include
recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of
ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or
expert opinion.” Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 3, 4, 22, and 23.
Analysis for claims 5, 7, 9, 24, 26, and 28
Appellant argues that neither Chambers nor Duggan teach selecting an
agent based on at least one attribute. Appeal Br. 23. Appellant acknowledges
that Buerger assigns agents to objectives based on particular attributes;
however, Appellant argues that Buerger’s agents are UAVs and not human
operators. Id. Appellant argues that it is unreasonable to interpret Buerger’s
UAVs as the agent in claim 5, and therefore “Buerger fails to teach or
suggest selection of the (human) agent/operator based on attributes of the
(human) agent/ operator.” Id.; see also Reply Br. 12–13.
We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive. We agree with
Appellant that Buerger’s agents are UAVs, and thus Buerger teaches an
algorithm for assigning UAVs to particular objectives based on UAV
attributes. FF14, 15. However, as noted by the Examiner, the rejection is
over the combination of Chambers, Duggan, and Buerger. See Ans. 11–12.
The Examiner has identified a reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to
use Buerger’s system for assigning objectives to Chambers and Duggan’s
human agents, particularly on a temporary basis due to updated information
from the UAV. See Non-Final Act. 11–12. Specifically, the Examiner finds
that the references “are all analogous art which teach solutions to controlling
Appeal 2021-000656
Application 15/086,205
19
unmanned vehicles using operators, and the combination would lead to an
improvement in the control of the system as the optimized agent would be
selected for each particular objective, and thus improve the efficiency of
operations.” Id. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a
person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve
similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its
actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
Appellant also argues that claim 7, depending from claim 5, is
separately patentable. Appeal Br. 24–25. Specifically, Appellant argues that
the prior art does not teach selecting an additional agent based on their
attributes at the time of arrival of the UAV at a target destination. Id. at 24.
We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive. As discussed above,
we agree with the Examiner that Chambers and Duggan suggest contacting
an agent at the time of UAV arrival based on additional information about
the UAV mission. Although Buerger teaches assigning UAV agents and not
human agents, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized
that Buerger’s system for assigning agents to objectives based on agent
attributes would apply to Chamber’s and Duggan’s skilled pilots. Likewise,
Buerger’s system for handing-off objectives from agent to agent based on
their attributes would be similarly applicable. See FF15. Accordingly, the
combination of Chambers, Duggan, and Buerger suggests selecting an
additional agent for connection with the contact object based on at least one
additional parameter and at least on attribute of the additional agent, as
recited by claim 7.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 5
and 7. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of those claims.
Appeal 2021-000656
Application 15/086,205
20
Claims 24, 26, and 28, which are not separately argued, fall with claims 5
and 7. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–10, 21–28 101 Eligibility 1–10, 21–28
1–4, 8, 10,
21–23, 27
103 Chambers, Duggan 1–4, 8, 10,
21–23, 27

5, 7, 9, 24,
26, 28
103 Chambers,
Duggan, Buerger
5, 7, 9, 24,
26, 28

6, 25 103 Chambers,
Duggan, Buerger,
Chan
6, 25
Overall
Outcome
1–10, 21–28

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED