AVAYA INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 9, 2020

2019004935 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/728,531 12/27/2012 Krishna Kishore DHARA 4366-858 4646
48500 7590 12/09/2020
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
MCADAMS, BRAD
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2456
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte KRISHNA KISHORE DHARA, VENKATESH
KRISHNASWAMY, and XIATAO WU

Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531
Technology Center 2400

Before JASON J. CHUNG, BETH Z. SHAW, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 7–9, and 11–24. Appeal Br. 1.
Claims 2–6 and 10 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 2. Claims 25 and 26
are not rejected, but have been objected to as depending from a rejected
claim. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Avaya Inc.
Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

2
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention generally relates to authorizing sharing profile
data of a third party on a communication system. Spec. ¶ 1. Modern
devices may pull contact information from various sources, however, data
may still be missing from each contact, requiring a perhaps tedious process
to complete data for each contact. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. One way to complete the data
would be to obtain missing information of one contact from another contact;
however, such data sharing may be tricky where sharing of a person’s data
occurs without that person’s knowledge. Id. ¶ 4.
Independent claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a processor, a request from a computing device of
a first user to provide a second computing device of a second
user with access to profile data of a third user, wherein the third
user is different than the first and second users, and wherein the
first user already has access to the profile data of the third user;
generating, by the processor, a common context value based
only on an association between the first user and the third user,
wherein the common context value indicates a connection
strength between the first user and the third user;
comparing, by the processor, the common context value to a
threshold; and
in response to the common context value being above the
threshold permitting, by the processor, the computing device of
the first user to provide the computing device of the second user
with access to the profile data of the third user.

Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

3
REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Pagan US 2008/0256602 A1 Oct. 16, 2008
Hull et al.
(Hull)
US 2012/0203846 A1 Aug. 9, 2012
Yu et al. (Yu) US 2013/0198811 A1 Aug. 1, 2013

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 7, 9, 11–13, and 15–24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Yu and Hull.
Claims 8 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over the combination of Yu, Hull, and Pagan.

OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections (Final Act.
3–7, Ans. 3–7) in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has
erred (Appeal Br. 6–13, Reply Br. 4–7). We are not persuaded by
Appellant’s contention of Examiner error in rejecting claims 1, 7–9, 11–21,
23, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We are persuaded by Appellant’s
contention of Examiner error in rejection claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
1. Claims 1, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–21, and 23–24
We begin with claim 1. The first issue raised by Appellant is whether
the combination of Yu and Hull teaches or suggests a common context value
compared to a threshold computed only on an association between a first
and third user. Appeal Br. 6.
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

4
The Examiner finds Yu to teach generation of a common context
value (Yu’s “Trust Metric”) among first and third users, wherein a common
context value larger than a threshold permits the second user to be able to
access the profile data of the third user (Yu’s “Trust Metric” larger than a
threshold determines whether shared profile data is sent to the second user).
Final Act. 3. The Examiner finds Yu to lack teaching of receiving a request
from a first user to provide a second user with access to profile data of a
third user, and wherein the first, second and third users are different. Final
Act. 3. However, the Examiner has relied upon Hull for teaching this
limitation, through Hull’s description of “User A sends an invitation
request to User B to provide access to the profile of User C, wherein
Users A, B and C are different.” Id. at 3–4 (citing Hull ¶ 122). The
Examiner finds the combination of Yu and Hull to teach the claimed
limitation. Id.
Appellant argues that Yu instead teaches context values between first
and second users and between first and third users to be compared to a
threshold. Id. at 7–9. Appellant argues that the Examiner, by including
associations beyond that of the first and third user, does not show a teaching
of only between the first and third users. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Appellant’s
arguments solely against Yu are not persuasive where the rejection is based
upon the combination of Yu and Hull. The test for obviousness is “what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
The Examiner has combined Hull’s technique of using relations among three
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

5
users, in which two are not related, and Yu’s technique of computing a Trust
Metric value between two users, to teach or suggest the claimed computation
only on an association between a first and second user to provide a second
user with access to the profile of the third user. The Examiner’s findings are
supported by Hull, in which B is related to both A and C, and A desires to
connect with C via A’s connection with B. Hull ¶ 122. Accordingly,
Appellant’s argument that Yu, by itself, does not teach the entirety of the
limitation in dispute is not persuasive, because the Examiner has shown how
the combination of Yu and Hull teaches that limitation.
The second issue raised by Appellant is whether Yu teaches away
from the claimed invention. Appellant argues that because Yu does not
compute common context only between two users, Yu would result in an
erroneous common context and thus teach away from granting the access of
claim 1. Appeal Br. 8.
Where the prior art “teaches away from combining certain known
elements, discovery of a successful means of combining them is more likely
to be nonobvious.” KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
A prior art reference may teach away from combining elements where the
reference criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the claimed
invention. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Here, Appellant has not shown any statement in Yu to criticize,
discredit, or otherwise discourage computing a common context only on two
users. Appellant agrees that Yu “does consider the relationship between two
people.” Reply Br. 5. Appellant instead argues that Yu does not suggest
that a two-person trust level would be used in a scenario where there are
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

6
more than two users. Id. However, the fact that Yu does not make a
suggestion is insufficient to show that Yu affirmatively criticizes, discredits,
or otherwise discourages doing so. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that
Yu teaches away from the claimed invention.
For the above reasons, we are not persuaded of error, and affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Appellant argues that independent claims 9
and 15, and claims 7, 11–13, 16–21, and 23–24 depending therefrom, are
allowable for the same reasons. Appeal Br. 9–10. Accordingly, we affirm
claims 1, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–21, and 23–24, which are rejected under the same
grounds. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
2. Claim 22
Appellant argues that claim 22 is not taught by the combination of Yu
and Hall. Claim 22 depends from claim 1, and recites the further limitation,
wherein the common context value is based on an email and
wherein the common context value is different based whether at
least two of the first user, the second user, and the third user are
mentioned in a communication thread in a body of the email
and/or are Carbon Copied (CCed) in the email, wherein the
communication thread is a recorded exchange of information
occurring between the at least two of the first user, the second
user, and the third user.
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.).
The Examiner found that Yu taught that trust levels can vary based on
the frequency of communication of different users. Final Act. 6 (citing Yu
¶ 31). The Examiner reasoned, “users that are mentioned in emails or are
included in email recipient headers more frequently form a greater trust
level.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The Examiner further asserts that a Carbon
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

7
Copy is a well known type of email address and would have been considered
in Yu’s trust value calculations. Ans. 9.
Appellant argues that Yu, while mentioning email, does not
distinguish among where the users are mentioned in the email. Appeal Br.
12. Appellant argues that Yu does not specifically mention a carbon copied
recipient, or otherwise distinguish between the different types of recipients
in an email. Id. Appellant does not contest that a Carbon Copy is a well
known type of email address. Reply Br. 7. However, Appellant argues that
Yu does not suggest that the calculation would be different “based
specifically on a Carbon Copy.” Id.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner has shown
Yu to calculate trust levels based on the frequency of communication,
including email communication. Final Act. 6; Ans. 9 (citing Yu ¶ 31).
Further, the Examiner and Appellant agree that the use of Carbon Copy
recipients are well known in the prior art. However, the claim requires not
merely communication involving a recipient who is one of the involved
users. Claim 22 requires that the email communication be between at least
two of the three users, and additionally, mention at least two of the three
users in either the body or Carbon Copy portion of the email. In other
words, the Examiner has shown that Yu calculates based upon email
frequency, and that emails are known to contain Carbon Copy and body
portions, but has not explained sufficiently, on this record, why one having
ordinary skill in the art would be guided by Yu to look specifically for two
of the users’ names only in the body or the Carbon Copy portion of emails
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

8
between two of the three users. Accordingly, we are persuaded by
Appellant’s argument and reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22.
3. Claims 8 and 14
Appellant argues that the applied combination of Yu, Hull, and Pagan
does not teach the additional limitation of “receiving permission from the
third user for the first user to share the profile data with the second user.”
Appeal Br. 10. Appellant argues that Yu does not teach this limitation.
However, the Examiner finds this limitation to be taught by Hull’s providing
that a user may receive permission from another user to permit access to yet
another user. Ans. 9. Appellant has not addressed Hull’s teaching, and
accordingly, is not persuasive as to this argument.
Appellant further argues that the applied combination of Yu, Hull, and
Pagan does not teach the additional limitation of “permitting the first user to
share the profile data of the third user with the second user even when the
common context value is below the threshold.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant
argues that Pagan is relied upon for this teaching, but that Pagan teaches
only a whitelist that exempts users from all requirements of a policy. Id. at
11. Appellant argues that Pagan teaches neither a second user nor a
threshold. Appellant further argues that Hall does not teach a threshold
either, and that the Examiner is trying to use Yu’s threshold, which is not
being used in the same manner. Id.
The Examiner finds that “it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art to have combined permitting profile data to be shared
as taught by Yu-Hull with permitting data to be shared even when the
common context value is not above the threshold as taught by Pagan.” Final
Appeal 2019-004935
Application 13/728,531

9
Act. 7. Appellant has not explained why such a combination is in error,
focusing instead on why each individual reference does not, by itself, teach
or suggest the additional limitation of claims 8 and 14. Appeal Br. 10–11;
Reply Br. 6–7. Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner’s finding that the combination of Yu, Hull, and Pagan teaches or
suggests the limitations of claims 8 and 14, and we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of those claims.
CONCLUSION
For the above-described reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1, 7–9, 11–21, 23, and 24 as being obvious over the applied
references under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and reverse the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 22 as being obvious over the applied references under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/Grounds Affirmed Reversed
1, 7, 9,
11–13,
15–24
103(a) Yu, Hull 1, 7, 9, 11–
13, 15–21,
23, 24
22
8, 14 103(a) Yu, Hull, Pagan 8, 14
Overall
Outcome
1, 7–9, 11–
21, 23, 24
22

AFFIRMED-IN-PART